On the Concept of Subject in Modern English

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I

In the recent discussion of English syntax, it has long been argued whether a grammatical relation between elements that constitute a sentence, particularly the status of subject, should need semantic or pragmatic considerations. It is without any doubt that before the transformational theory appeared such discussions outside the pure syntactic argument were considered insignificant.

Many linguists differed in their opinions as to the status of subject. Some have assigned such terms as Agent, Instrumental, Dative, Factive, objective,[1] and so on as are used in Fillmore's Case Grammar[2] model on each actant[3] that occupies a certain position in a sentence and has divergent semantic roles. The status of subject was somehow excluded in their analyses. Others insist that the status of subject are deeply concerned with such pragmatic elements as old-new information,[4] focus[5] and reference[6]. Every one of these notions has some truth in it. Namely, it is evident that subject has much to do with these.

In as early as 17th century, the Port Royal philosopher-grammarians Lancelot and Arnauld made an insightful statement as to the status of subject:

Ce qu'il a de propre est que la proposition dans laquelle il entre (qu'on peut appeller *incidente*) peut faire partie du sujet, ou l'attribut d'une autre proposition, qu'on peut appeller principale.

On ne peut bien entendre cecy, qu'on ne sesouuienne de ce que nous aurons dit dés le commencement de ce discours: qu'en est ce dont on affirme quelque chose, & un atribut, qui set ce qu'on affirme de quelque chose....[7]

As it is very well known, Hermann Paul gave countless insights in linguistics in his *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*.   His term *das psychologische Subjekt* or the psycholoigcal subject suggested rich aspirations to his followers in the world of traditional grammar.   His definition of the psychological subject is:

Jeder Satz besteht demnach aus mindestens zwei Elementen. Diese Elemente verhalten sich zu einander nicht gleich, sondern sind ihrer Funktion nach differenziert.   Man bezeichnet sie als Subjekt und Prädikat.   Diese grammatischen Kategorien beruhen auf einem psychologischen Verhältnis. Zwar müssen wir unterscheiden zwischen psychologischem und grammatischem Subjekt, respektive Prädikat, da beides nicht immer zusammenfällt, wie wir noch im Einzelnen sehen werden.   Aber darum ist doch das grammatische Verhältnis nur auf Grundlage des psychologischen auferbaut.

Das psychologische Subjekt ist die zuerts in dem Bewusstsein des Sprechenden, Denkenden vorhandene Vorstellungsmasse, an die sich eine zweite, das psychologische Prädikat anschliesst. Das Subjekt ist, mit Steinthal zu reden, das Apperzipierende, das Prädikat das Apperzipierte.   Richtig bezeichnet v. d. Gabelentz (Zschr. f. Völkerpsychologie 6, 378) die beiden

Elemente vom Standpunkte des Hörenden aus. Das psycholo-
gische Subjekt ist nach ihm das, worüber der Sprechende den
Hörenden denken lassen, worauf er seine Aufmerksamkeit
hinleiten will, das psychologische Prädikat dasjenige, was er
darüber denken soll. Doch kann dies Art der Bestimmung des
Prädikats leicht zu einer so beschränkten Auffassung verführen,
wie sie in unseren Grammatiken gang und gäbe ist. Wir
müssen daran festhalten, dass es nur darauf ankommt, dass
eine Vorstellung im Bewusstsein an die andere angeknüpft
wird.

Wir sind jetzt gewohnt dem Verhältnis des Subjeks zum
Prädikat einen engern Sinn unterzulegen. Ist das Prädikat
ein Nomen, so verlangen wir für die normale Satzbildung, dass
dasselbe entweder mit dem Subjekt identifiziert werde, oder
dass es den weiteren Begriff bezeichne, welchem der engere
des Subjekts untergeordnet wird, oder dass es eine Eigenschaft
angebe, welche dem Begriffe des Subjekts inhäriert.[8]

In the excerpts cited above, Paul also discussed the relationship be-
tween subject and predicate from the human junction conscious-
ness explaining these two as mutually dependent elements in the
mind of human beings.

Paul still develops his opinion as

Jedes Satzglied, in welcher grammatischen Form es auch
erscheinen mag, kann psychologisch betrachtet Subjekt oder
Prädikat oder Bindeglied sein, respektive ein Teil davon.
Subjekt und Prädikat können dabei ausser durch die Betonung
durch die Stellung markiert werden. Tritt im Deutschen statt
der normalen Voranstellung des grammatischen Subjektes
Voranstellung eines anderen Satzteiles ein, so ist dieser ent-

weder psychologisches Subjekt oder psychologisches Prädikat, ersteres häufiger als letzteres. Im letzteren Falle ist dieser Teil des Satzes zugleich der stärkstbetonte, im ersteren nicht. Die Ansicht, der man öfter begegnet, dass die Voranstellung immer dazu diene den betreffenden Teil des Satzes über alle andern hervorzuheben, ist daher verkehrt.

Regelmässig psychologisches Subj. oder ein Teil desselben ist ein an den Anfang gestelltes rückweisendes Demonstrativum. Denn eben weil es zurückweist, vertritt es diejenige Vorstellung, von der in der Seele des Sprechenden und des Angeredeten ausgegangen wird, woran das weitere als etwas neues angeknüpft wird. Vgl. *ich traf einen Knaben, den fragte ich; — dem sagte ich;—bei dem erkundigte ich mich;—darüber war ich erfreut.* Oder *ich ging nach Hause, da fand ich einen Brief ; ich sah ihn am Sonntag zum letzten Male, damals sagte er mir.* Oder *Fritz war gestern bei mir; diesen Menschen möchte ich immer zum Hause hinaus werfen; aber ich muss Rücksicht auf seine Familie nehmen: aua diesem Grunde kann ich es nicht.* Ebenso ist das Relativum regelmässig psychologisches Subjekt.[9]

In this, Paul introduced a somewhat structural analysis of a sentence, citing some German examples.

II

Among the so-called traditional grammarians in English, Otto Jespersen presents the most interesting comment on this issue. He wites:

> The confusion arising from the ambiguity of the word "subject" is also responsible for much of what linguists and logicians have written on the so-called psychological and logical subject

and predicate. As a matter of fact, these terms are by various writers used of totally different concepts,...[10]

Then Jespersen criticizes Paul's standpoint as Paul had put too much stress on Gabelentz who difined "the psychological subject as the idea or group of ideas that is first presented in the mind of the speaker and the psychological predicate as what is then joined (neu angeknüpft) to it"[11] to draw out his theory of psychological subject. Jespersen proposes his new idea of logical subject instead, which reflects his position as a formalist. He introduces the essence of his idea in 11 different points.

What interests me most is the fact that Gabelentz, Paul and Jespersen used "the old-new information" as one of the bases of their analysis of subject and predicate. Though they did not use the term given above, the idea that lies between their idea of "Novelty and Importance"[12] had much common points with the present pragmaticians' idea of the "old-new information" criterion.

Although structuralists always attacked the traditional grammarians' analyses of syntactic features in English, Jespersen's as well as his comrades' and his followers' contribution to the study of subject was substantial. Now let us turn our attention to structuralists' and others' points of view.

III

It is doubtless that the ground pattern for the Western European languages is the form "someone does something," in which the "someone" is subject who performs the role of the actor. As to this, Leonard Bloomfield writes:

When a language has more than one type of full sentence,

these types may agree in showing constructinos of two parts. The common names for such bipartite favorite sentence-forms is predications.   In a predication, the more object-like component is called the *subject*, the other part the *predicate*....   For a language like English or Italian, which has only one type of bipartite sentence, these terms are superfluous, but often employed: *John ran* is said to be a predication in which the actor (John) is the sujbect and the action (ran) the predicate.[18]

Thence the subject assumes responsibility for the action expressed in the predicator, and it naturally follows that a subject is always indispensable in European languages.   This characteristics of European languages tends to make the formal function coincide with the significant function.   This has been, according to Hisanosuke Izui's opinion, due in large parts to intellectualization of those languages, and one of its effects has been to change the "obliged" subject into a spontaneous actor-subject.[14] This is to explain that even in European languages it was comparatively recent that subject came to be considered as the true actor-subject, and that subject as the actor came to be taken as indispensable part of a sentence.   Concerning the rise of subject in the history of human languages, Edward Sapir writes:

There must be something to talk about and something must be said about this subject of discourse once it is selected.   This distinction is of such fundamental importance that the vast majority of languages have emphasized it by creating some sort of formal barrier between the two terms of the proposition. The subject of discourse is a noun.   As the most common subject of discourse is either a person or a thing, the noun clusters about concrete concepts of that order.   As the thing

predicated of a subject is generally an activity in the widest
sense of the word, a passage from which has been set aside for
the business of predicating, in other words, the verb, clusters
about concepts of activity. No language wholly fails to distin-
guish noun and verb, though in particular cases the nature
of the distinction may be an elusive one. It is different with
the other parts of speech. Not one of them is imperatively
required for the life of language.[15]

Sapir's argument is that in any language the ultimate classification
of parts of speech results in recognizing the fact that the language
consists of two large form classes, namely, nouns and verbs, both
of which are the minimum set of form classes indispensable for pre-
dication.

Vendryes also has an opinion similar to Sapir's. After discussing
the importance of other parts of speech observed from their roles in
predication, Vendryes concludes that nouns and verbs are the
two essential parts of speech from which other parts of speech have
been derived. He states:

En poursuivant ce travail d'élimination, on aboutit à ne plus
laisser en présence que deux parties du discours, le verbe
et le nom. C'est à cette dualité que les autres parties se
ramènent.[16]

We agree that most languages consist of these two large form classes
and also that these two form classes, nouns and verbs, play the most
significant part in predication.

We come across the traditional grammarians' definition of sub-
ject as "what you talk about," and that of predicate as "what is said
about this subject." Nevertheless the term "subject" used in this

sense is very confusing, since it explains what the subject is from the mental, psychological, and philosophical viewpoints rather than from the formal viewpoint.   Though Otto Jespersen spends much space of his exhaustive work, *The Philosophy of Grammar* to introduce a great number of such discussions by many scholars, their definitions, comments, and counter-comments concerning what the subject is tend to remain too philosophical and mentalistic.   This, as I mentioned before, invited some severe criticisms from the structuralists.   For instance, C. C. Fries argues;

> In the matter of "subjects" and "objects" just as in the attempts to define the "sentence" and the "parts of speech," the conventional grammar has approached the problem by seeking criteria of meaning content rather than of form.[17]

In contrast with the traditional grammarians' approaches, Fries has tried ot find the formal bases on which we identify each functioning unit and structure, and then he interprets subject in terms of the various structures in which Class I words (in other words, nouns and their equivalents) are functional units.   Fries defines subject as follows:

> The "subject" of a sentence, then, is simply the Class I word (or words) that is tied with a Class II word to form the basic pattern of the sentence.   "Subject" is the technical name for the Class I word that is thus structurally bound with a Class II word.[18]

He further continues:

> It is true that very often the "meaning" of the "subject" of the

sentence is "performer," but one cannot approach a sentence assuming that whatever Class I words represent the "perforer" is expressed by Class I words not in the "subject" construction, and the "performer" is only of the various meanings of "subject."[19]

According to Fries, subject represents at least five different meanings:[20]

1) The *dean* approved all our recommendations.
        (Subject is performer.)
2) One *difficulty* is the size of the trees.
        (Subject is that which is identified.)
3) The *abstract* is very bulky.
        (Subject is that which is described.)
4) The *requisition* was sent over a week ago.
        (Subject is that which undergoes the action.)
5) *Mr. W* was given the complete file on the ceremony.
        (Subject is that "to or for" which the action is performed.)

The suprasegmental quality of the sentence is more intensively emphasized in Archibald Hill's definition of subject.

The first main sentence element is the subject. It is a construction bounded by a juncture point with minimal linkage and must occur in a sentence in which there is a verb. No nominal sentence element can be identified except in terms of its relation to other sentence element, so that minimal sentence like "John!" or even "Good boys!" do not contain identifiable elements and will be called elementless sentences.[21]

According to Hill, "The subject is that noun or pronoun material which selects the form of the verb.[22] And "the predication is that verb or verbal material whose form is selected by the subject." It seems that Hill considers selection[28] to be the most important measure to decide the role of the element in a sentence.[24]

IV

Next, I would like to briefly survey the opinions about subject presented by grammarians of other schools who are contemporary to the transformationalists. Generally speaking, their assertion can be classified into three kinds:

1) Subject in English should be defined by means of the parameter of the discourse such as old-new information in which "what is being talked about" is stated.

2) There exist interrelationships between subject and semantic roles.

3) There also exist other kind of interrelationships between the function of discourse and subject.

However, since these interrelationships and parameters are not generalized as yet, the category "subject" is not clarified in the syntactic theory.[25]

The direction suggested here can be traced very well in the opinions of the linguists who belonged to the Prague School. For instance, Mathesius insists that the subject in English equals the theme ($\fallingdotseq$ topic) but that it is controlled by a strong grammatical Principle which resides outside of thematicity. By grammatical principle, it seems, they mean semantic roles. Firbus maintains this standpoint in his analysis of English subject. Firbus still con-

tinues:

> In English a sentence without a thematic subject does not
> belong to the central part of the linguistic system of English,
> but such a subject is always synthesized within it and it cannot
> by all means be regarded as a peripheral phenomenon.[26]

Here it seems that he is arguing in English a sentence in which the
subject conveys the topic is more prototypical than a sentence other-
wise constructed.

P. H. Sgall and E. Benešová discuss that English subjects are
usually unmarked elements but they are not necessarily thematic.[27]
They also insist that whether an English sujbect is the actor of an
action expressed by a predicate or a bearer of a state or an attitude
expressed by a predicate, it is the unmarked case.[28]   In other works,
they claim that the category subject has the relationship "subject
versus predicate" since statistically English subject cannot be defin-
ed by the above mentioned properties.   It seems that this category
is attractive, but to them it is nothing more than a grammatical cate-
gory.[29]

In tagmemics, Pike[30] does not give a clear, unified definition of
subject, but he only states that the varied occurrences indicate
varied tagmemes, namely, they belong to relationships that produce
the interrelationships of elements.   For instance,

1. actor-as-subject-of-sentence
    "John went home."

2. recipient-of-action-as-subject-of-sentence
    "John was hit in the eye."

are some typical examples.

Longacre's definition is based on discourse theory.   He writes:

> Subject is what we are talking about.   It is often equivalent
> to old information....   Furthermore, it is part of the meaning
> of surface categories that they are able to encode.   Thus sub-
> ject comes to mean something on the order of 'that which we
> are talking about' or old information partly because it encodes
> so many varying and different deep structure [semantic] rela-
> tions.[31]

Halliday, like Sgall and Benešovà observes that the subject is a
kind of relationship that exists within considerations of semantic,
and pragmatic interrelationships which are counted for by statisti-
cal analysis.   Let me quote a passage from Halliday:

> The subject may be actor, goal, beneficiary or range....   In
> thematization, the subject may be (included within) theme or
> rheme;... if we restrict the discussion to declarative clauses the
> unmarked option has the subject as theme.[32]

Although his definitions of theme and rheme are vague and tend to
be somewhat subjective, it is evident that he also recognizes the in-
terrelationship between subject and semantic role or pragmatic
function.   Because subject is essentially a grammatical category,
and it must be clarified on syntactic basis.

Beside Mathesius, those who defined the English subject not on
the basis of pragmatic (discourse) function, but on the semantic
role were Bates and MacWhinney.   They write:

> English merges agent and topic in most cases, capitalizing on

the role of perspective in creating a statistical overlap between these categories. When the overlap does break down, agency is more likely to dominate in assignment of subjectivization.[33]

Their standpoint and assertions are clear as far as their analysis is applied to simple discourse and basic sentences; however, there are also those whose definition of subject is based on discourse analysis of longer and more complex sentences. This latter group insists that sentences with complex structures which change the interrelationship between topic and other semantic roles should be used as variants to decide the validity of the definition of subject.

V

With the appearance of transformational theory, subject has been defined syntactically. The transformationalists' definitions of subject are assuredly based on the constituent structure of a sentence. In other words, it has become adequate that the category subject can be defined independently without semantic or pragmatic considerations. The writings of Chomsky, Johnson and others have shown that the category subject can be predicted through the constituent structures of sentences, together with other syntactic relations.[34]

Relational Grammar represented by Perlmutter maintains the peculiar way of approaching this issue, too. According to it, the existence of subject can be consistently predicted by the constituent structure of a sentence, namely, it is not a cross-linguistic phenomenon. Although relationalists do not deny the independent status of grammatical relation, in their opinion, the existence of subject is not independent. They differ in their opinions on this point from

the transformationalists' who claim that the grammatical relations
are 'independent and primitive.'   Perlmutter argues:

> Conceiving of grammatical constructions in terms of gramma-
> tical relations has led to the discovery that there is a relatively
> small class of constructions that reappear in languages differ-
> ing in word order and case marking patterns. [...] The
> detailed study of individual languages reveals that a particu-
> lar construction in a given language [...] may be linked in in-
> dividual languages with semantic, pragmatic, or presupposi-
> tional effects, with constraints on definiteness or specificity of
> reference of nominals, with the organization of the sentence
> into old and new information, and so on. The general stra-
> tegy of [Relational Grammar] in all such cases is to separate
> the syntactic nature of a particular construction from the se-
> mantic, pragmatic, etc., factors with which it interacts. This
> goes along with the claim that the syntactic constructions
> utilized by particular languages are characterizable in syntactic
> terms independently of the semantic, pragmatic, discourse, etc.
> conditions under which they will be used in one language or
> another.[35]

Here, analyzing the grammatical structures that can be defined in
grammatical relations, Perlmutter presents the argument that, if
grammatical structures are not related with semantics, pragmatics
and discourse, namely, if they are characterizable, then it must also
be assumed that the grammatical relations that constitute gramma-
tical structures must also be characterizable.   Otherwise, the seman-
tic, pragmatic and discourse conditions that affect the grammatical
relations must be transferred to the structure that include those con-
ditions.   In short, they insist that the grammatical relations have

nothing to do with semantic and pragmatic considerations, because they are primitive—having no internal structures and cannot be drawn out of any other notion.   Although Perlmutter elucidates:

> The grammatical relations needed for individual grammars and for cross-linguistic generalizations cannot be defined in terms of other notions, but must be taken as primitive notions of syntacitc theory.[36]

I dont' accept the idea that the grammatical relations are not independent from semantic and pragmatic relations.   I would rather support Oosten's argument that:

> Subjects are indeed not primitive, but they are also not independent or non-syntactic factors.[37]

Then she makes a proposal:

> I suggest the use of prototype theory: what is predictable from semantics and pragmatics is not all subjects, but *prototypical* subjects.[38]   [Italics mine]

She concludes that subject can be for the first time organized under the deep relationship between agent and topic.   This opinion of hers is not new.   Neither is the statement that discusses the status of subject from universality and relativity such as subjecthood, semantic roles, and discourse relations new. there appeared dozens of articles, theses, and dissertations dealing with subject in those aspects.   Oosten has made five new discoveries[39] making uses of their theories:

1.   English subjects are motivated by a prototype containing

notions of 'agent' and 'topic' (as well as grammatical characteristics like agreement).

2. The categories of 'agent' and 'topic' themselves have prototype structure.

3. The definition of English subject is different for the different constructions of English, though always in terms of topic and agent. In fact, the reason the different constructions are used is to convey that the referent of the subject is not a prototypical agent or is not a prototypical topic, or both—and the use of the construction has implications for the subset of agent and topic characteristics that the subject of the construction does have.

4. As a consequence one can see that the category 'subject' *is* grammaticized, contrary to what is implied in Role-and-Reference Grammar (Van Valin and Foley 1980: each syntactic construction triggers a different subset of agent and topic characteristics as its prototype for the subject of the construction. Thus, although subjects are never primitive nor totally unpredictable, they are grammaticized to an extent: their exact meaning depends on the syntactic construction in which they occur.

5. Prototypes are ubiquitous in language. Others have demonstrated the need for prototypes in the area of semantics. My research demonstrates it for the syntactic categories passive and subject, the semantico-syntactic categories of the pronouns (my research has focused particularly on *I, you, they*) and the pragmatic categories agent and topic. Based on this and the previous research, one can conclude that it would be advisable to operate which occurring in a certain sentence will be chosen as the subject.

She develpos her original theory named prototype hypothesis based on the above listed five points. As for my critique of Oosten's

point of view, I would like to present it in a forthcoming paper.

VI

As I have introduced and commented so far in this article, the notion of subject in Modern English has been analyzed from various approaches.   Namely,

A.   Based on classical models.

      (Traditional Grammar: Pre-School)

B.   Based on meaning and human psychology.

      (Traditional Grammar: Late-School)

C.   Based on inductive formalism.

      (Structuralism: Pre-School)

D.   Based on deductive formalism.

      (Structuralism: Late-School)

E.   Based on semantic and pragmatic roles.

      (Case Grammar)

The above is a rough division of the various schools and doctrines. And the following is the assignments by linguists:

Port Royal and other European linguists represent A group;

Jespersen and Curme B Group;

Bloomfield and Fries C Group;

Chomsky and his followers D Group;

Fillmore and McCauley E Group.

As a current antagonistic grouping the following might be acceptable:

1.   Relational Grammar *vs.*   Formalism

2.   Case Grammar *vs.*   Formalism

3.   Functional Grammar *vs.*   Formalism

Since language itself involves a lot of mystery, the notion of subject is no exception.   If one adhers too firmly to one's assertion and dogma, one may lose sight of one's goal.   The best way to approach each issue of unsolved linguistic problems is to face the real state of every linguistic phenomenon and deal with it broad-mindedly. Otherwise, nothing truthful and realistic can be captured.

NOTES

1   Timothy J. Quain "Evolution of the Theory of Case Gremmar," Ph. D. dissertation presented to Middle Tennessee State University, 1986.   Quain briefs the outline of Fillmore's Case Grammar theory very compactly in this thesis.   Cf. Chapter II, pp. 33–50.

2   Fillmore's Case Grammar theory was first introduced in his "The Case for Case" in a comprehensive form.   He later partly revised the theory in "The Case for Case Reopened."   Cf. "The Case for Case," in *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, eds. E. Bach and R. J. Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), pp. 1–99; "The Case for Case Reopened," *Syntax and Sdmantics* vol. 8: *Grammatical Relations*, eds. Peter Cole and Jerrold M. Sadock (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 59–81.

3   The term *actant* was introduced by Lucien Tesniere.   The author was first introduced to this term nad concept through Fillmore's classes at the Ohio State University, Winter Quarter, 1965.   Cf. Lucien Tesniere, *Elements de Syntaxe Structurale* (Paris: Editions Klinkisek, 1982), pp. 105–15.

4   This concept has been discussed by many linguists old and new, though the term given to it is varied.   The most wellknown is Halliday's.   Cf. M. A. K. Halliday, "Types of Process," *System and Function in Language*, ed. G. R. Kress (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 159–173.

5   Halliday discusses this notion very minutely in his book.   Cf. M. A. K. Halliday, "Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English Part 2" *Journal of Linguistics* 3, pp. 199–244.   Chomsky also picked up this idea and gave a comprehensive explanation.   Cf. Noam Chomsky, "Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation," *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader*

in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology, eds D. D. Steinberg and L. A. Jakobovits (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 183–216. See also the author's article "Rondai to Syooten no Bunpoo" (The Grammar of Theme and Focus) *Syuryuu, Special Number in Memory of Late Professor R. H. Grant, 1975.*

6 Of this concept many linguists have given their splendid speculations. For instance, M. A. K. Halliday and R. Hasan, *Cohesion in English* (London: Longman, 1976); M. A. K. Halliday, "Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English Part 1 & Part 2," *Journal of Linguistics* 3, pp. 37–81, pp. 199–244, respectively. T. A. van Dijk, *Text and Context* (London: Longman, 1977).

7 Arnauld and Lancelot, *Grammaire Générale et Raisonée* (Menston: The Scolar Press, 1967), pp. 66–67. This is a facsimile edition of the original which was published in 1660.

8 Harmann Paul, *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* (Halle (Saal): Max Niemeyer, 1980), pp. 124-5.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 284.

10 Otto Jespersen, *The Philosopy of Grammar* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), p. 147.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

13 Leonard bloomfield, *Language* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1933), p. 173.

14 Hisanosuke Izui, "Mastery of the Japanese Language," *Japan Quarterly* 3, 1955. The text the author used is in *Gengo no Kenkyuu* (The Study of Language) (Tokyo: Yusindo, 1956).

15 Edward Sapir, *Language* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949), p. 119.

16 J. Vendryes, *Le Language* (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1921), pp. 138–9.

17 C. C. Fries, *The Structure of English: An Introduction to the Construction of English Sentences* (New York: Harcount, Brace & Co., 1952), p. 175.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 176.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 177-8.

21 A. Hill, *Introduction to Linguistic Structures: From Sound to Sentence in English* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958), p. 259.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 273.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 273.

24 L. Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–9 and pp. 229–37.

25 This is a representation of Firbus' theory by Jeanne van Oosten. Cf. Jeanne

van Oosten, "The Nature of Subjects, Topics and Agents: A Cognitive Explanation,·' unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted to University of California, Berkeley, p. 15.

26 Jan Firbus, "None-Thematic Subjects in Contemporary English," *Travaux Linguistic de Prague* vol. 2 (1966), pp. 239–56.

27 P. Hajičovà Sgall and E. Benešovà, *Topic, Focus and Generative Semantics* (Kronberg Taunus: Scriptor Verlag, 1973), p. 150.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 183.

29 Oosten, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

30 Kenneth L. Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), p. 196.

31 R. E. Langacre, *An Anatomy of Speech Notions* (Lisse, The Netherlands: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1976), p. 287.

32 M. A. K. Halliday, "Notes on Transitivity Part 2," p. 215.

33 E. Bates and B. MacWhinney, "Functionalist Approaches to Grammar," *Language Acquisition: The State of the Art*, eds. E. Wanner and L. R. Gleitman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 173–218.

34 N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), p. 163 and p. 221; N. Chomsky, *Lectures on Government and Binding* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1981), p. 42, p. 128ff.; D. E. Johnson, "Toward a Theory of Relationally-Based Grammar," unpublished ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

35 D. M. Perlmutter, "Relational Grammar," *Syntax and Semantics* 13 *Current Approaches to Syntax*, eds Moravcsik and Wirth (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 202f.

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37 Oosten, *op. cit.* p. 1.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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