

## **The Iranian Islamic State and the Present\***

Exploring the front line of the conflict of civilizations

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### **Summary**

Many aspects of the unique Islamic system specific to Iran, created after the Iranian revolution under Khomeini's guide, stand in opposition to the values of Western modernism. One of the facets of the Shī'ah doctrine that Khomeini has relied on and developed can be traced back to the "philosopher king" described by the Greek philosopher Plato. As one of the values of the medieval West, this concept of the Plato's philosopher king lies behind the antagonism of medieval and the modern West, also behind the conflicts between the totalitarianism and liberalism in modern Western world, furthermore recent years' domestic division in Iran.

This deep division, however, indicates to us and makes us aware of the pitfalls lurking in the shadows of liberalism and capitalism which have been triumphant in the modern West, particularly following the end of the cold war.

One example can be seen in a comparison of the reasoning presented by Khomeini and the Shī'ah, which has a function of controlling human's desires (materialistic desire; i.e., greed and lust for power), while the reasoning of the modern West, which takes on the characteristics of a method or tool for fulfilling human desires; in fact, this reasoning underlies many modern sciences.

Some aspects of today's capitalistic economy exist by constantly stimulating human's desires (for example, technological innovations and advertising that stimulate desire to encourage consumption), and as such, this capitalistic economy has exhibited a tendency of late to rush in the direction of strengthening these characteristics as just such a method or tool.

**Keywords:** Iran, Islam, Western Modernism, Liberalism, Clash and Dialogue Between Civilizations

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## I. Introduction<sup>1)</sup>

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### 1.1. The Twelve Imām Shī'ah and Khomeinī

According to the Twelve Imām Shī'ah, as the Prophet Muḥammad was resting at the spring Ghadīr Khumm on his way home from his last Hajj, he appointed his cousin and son-in-law 'Ali, the fourth orthodox Caliph of the Sunni, as his successor in accordance with a command from Allah. While being called the "successor," it means a successor as the leader of the Muslim community (*umma*), because Muhammad is believed to be the last Prophet. Therefore, the first to third caliphs before 'Ali – Abū Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and 'Uthmān ibn 'Affan – are considered usurpers by the Shī'ah. The position of leader was handed along to the twelfth among 'Ali's descendants through nomination by the predecessor, and they are called Imām by the Twelve Imām Shī'ah. However, no Imām was responsible for governance under the rule of the Umayyad or Abbasids except the fourth caliph, 'Alī.

The twelfth Imām disappeared as a child in 874 (Minor Occultation). Before this first occultation he appointed four deputies, but the position of representative was not taken over after the fourth deputy in 941 (Major Occultation). Following this Major Occultation, the concept arose that all '*ulamā*' (Islamic scholars) were representatives of the hidden Imām. This idea was initially no more than a claim for a share in the authority invested in the Imām, and was gradually interpreted into a wider range of meanings. During the Qajar (Qājāriye) dynasty of the 19th century, it was generally understood that the monarch was the political representative and the '*ulamā*' the religious representatives. Further, R.M. Khomeinī argued in his *Velāyat-e Faqīh* (government of Islamic jurists) that '*ulamās*, specifically Islamic jurists, assume the position of the Imām's representatives and play a leading role not only in religious but also in political matters.

### 1.2. Abstract of the *Velāyat-e Faqīh*

Unequal treaties that included the capitulation clause providing for extraterritoriality were imposed by Western powers on Iran during the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925). In order to escape this situation and acquire recognition under international law as a full-fledged legal subject, Iran was compelled during the early *Pahlavī* dynasty (1925-1979) to introduce Western law. Islamic law can consist of roughly two parts: one related to religious rituals that specifies the relationship between individuals and God—named *ibādāt*—such as worship, and the other that specifies the character of human relationships, or society—called *Mu'āmalāt*—such as penalties. The introduction of Western law, however, led to the loss of the latter facet of Islamic law, while the former was retained.

In response to this state of affairs, Khomeinī argued in his *Velāyat-e Faqīh* that both parts of Islamic law must be enforced, and that required a revolution to purge the non-Islamic governance that had arisen as a result of deviations since the founding of the Umayyad in 661,

and to establish Islamic governance. In other words, Khomeinī held that the establishment of Islamic governance was a prerequisite to the enforcing of Islamic law. The theory also stated that establishing Islamic governance had two purposes: emergence from Western colonial rule to strengthen the *umma* (Muslim community) for the salvation of an oppressed people, and the creation of a society that would foster religious, intellectual, virtuous people.

Who, then, is qualified to rule the Islamic state? Khomeinī pointed to “a just Islamic jurist” to take the office of ruler for two reasons. One, since the Islamic state is governed according to Islamic law, the ruler must of necessity be knowledgeable in that law, that is, the ruler must be an Islamic jurist. Two, in enforcing that law, the ruler must be just, in other words, he must not be swayed by carnal desires.

Khomeinī also delineated the authority of the ruler, saying that an Islamic state established by a just Islamic jurist, his leadership is tantamount to societal leadership by the Prophet Muḥammad.

The above leadership does not include all of the areas of authority of the prophet Muḥammad, however. Muḥammad was both prophet and leader, but he was the last prophet. Therefore, only the position of leader was passed to subsequent Imāms. The leadership of the Imām embraced two levels: one in the world created by God (*takvīnī*), the natural world, and the other in the artificial world (*omūre-e e‘tebārī-ye ‘oqlā’ī*) of agreements and rules created by human reason—for example, the law and social systems. Imāms were said to be able to perform miracles in nature because of their leadership in the world created by God (*takvīnī*). Khomeinī specified that the type of leadership passed from the Imām to the Islamic jurist was that of the artificial world (*omūre-e e‘tebārī-ye ‘oqlā’ī*).<sup>2)</sup> The artificial world is, in a broad sense, part of the world created by God, but it is also a domain in which human beings exercise the discretionary power of free will and its accompanying responsibility (see Chart 1).

<Chart 1>

- God → Prophet:
- 1) Position of Prophet (nobovvat)
  - 2) Position of Leader (emāmat) → To Imāms (until the Major Occultation of 941)
    - (a) Leadership in the natural world created by God (able to perform miracles in nature)
    - (b) Leadership in the artificial world → To Islamic jurists

According to Khomeinī, the leadership in the artificial world that is passed on to Islamic jurists includes the power to issue “the government commandments” (*Aḥkām-e Ḥokūmatī*) that the Prophet issued as ruler, in addition to the power to enforce the *sharī‘a* (Islamic law) issued by God via the Prophet.

Taking the opportunity of dealing with the establishment of a labor law in his later years, in 1988, Khomeinī demonstrated a further interpretation of the government commandments. He demonstrated that in his view the government commandments was the most important facet of Islamic law and took precedent over other facets. The power for this government commandment was called “unconditional leadership” (*Velāyat-e Moṭlaqe*). However, there are several interpretations of this unconditional leadership in Iran. One is that an Islamic jurist in the position of ruler—on condition that he complies with religious purposes—has precedence over Islamic law, and that he has the power to issue a government commandment in the public interest (*maṣlah*), even if such a decree involves a violation of Islamic law.<sup>3)</sup> Another interpretation has it that an Islamic jurist who is ruler is empowered to exercise the unlimited authority that the Prophet and Imāms used to enjoy as societal leaders, except when there is evidence, for example, of the power to declare offensive jihad, although Islamic law takes precedence over the ruler.<sup>4)</sup>

In conclusion, Khomeinī discussed establishing Islamic governance and enforcing Islamic law as it refers to human relationships, an aspect that was lost with the introduction of Western law, in addition to the relationship between God and individuals under the wing of a just Islamic jurist who has the right to issue the government commandments. Therefore, Khomeinī may be considered to have discussed the salvation of an oppressed people by casting off Western colonial rule, specifically interference by the USA, and reinforcing the Islamic community (*umma*). In addition, it should be pointed out that the establishment of an Islamic state amounts to the creation of a society that nurtures religious, intellectual and ethical people, in other words, a “virtuous society” under the direction of an Islamic jurist who is well acquainted with the will of God.

### 1.3. Creation of a Virtuous Society

It has been pointed out that Khomeinī’s concept of the virtuous society was based on the concept of the philosopher king set out by Plato in *The Republic*. In his discussion of the virtuous city (*madīne-ye fāzele*), Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), who has been dubbed a master second only to Aristotle by the Islamic philosophy community, was influenced by ancient Greek thought, specifically Plato’s concept of the philosopher king, and this was passed on to Islamic philosophy as a general precept. Interested in Islamic mystical gnosis (*irfan*) as a youth, Khomeinī became aware of the concepts of the “perfect human” proposed by Ibn al-‘Arabī (1165-1240) and the virtuous city of al-Fārābī through the writings of ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā (1571-1640).<sup>5)</sup>

What, then, is the virtuous city described by al-Fārābī? The following citations from the section on al-Fārābī in a philosophy textbook edited by the Iranian Ministry of Education serve as an outline.

“Human beings need to create a city [society] to guide them to the highest virtue, because no one alone can obtain what is necessary. In such a city [society], individuals play different roles. ... [Among such cities,] the excellent one is the one in which people devote themselves to their [respective] tasks and establish virtue (*faḏāyēl*), in short, bring happiness to the city. That is what we call virtuous city.”(Words in brackets are my notes.)

“In addition to great spirituality and nobility, the leader of the virtuous city must be blessed with sufficient ability and virtue to carry out significant tasks. Acquiring the highest level of thought, he must be able to discover the benefit of people, regulations (*aḥkām*) and *sharī‘a* and explain them to all the people clearly so that he can equip society with the requisites for bringing about the holy ideal”.

In this manner, “the leader of the virtuous city brings good fortune to the people. To make this a reality, he must achieve the highest stage of human bliss, that is the stage where one can communicate with the active intellect: angel.”

Therefore, “the measures and actions of the leader of the virtuous city are politics that is carried out to establish good and justice in the city in accord with the regulations (*aḥkam*) and *sharī‘a*, which are based on spiritual inspiration, knowledge and revelation. Jobs, arts and crafts are assigned to the residents according to their talents and abilities. In this order of the good, residents enhance their virtues and attributes and demonstrate their compatibility with happiness in this world and the next world. Such politics is virtuous one, and cannot be made to happen save under the direction of the leader.”<sup>6)</sup>

In short, human beings need to establish a society in order to enhance their virtue. This means that human beings can only attain virtue and happiness as members of a community where they work together to seek the common good. Al-Fārābī explained that among such communities, or nations, the noblest state is the one led by the leader with the most excellent virtue and intellect.

Al-Fārābī also argued that the leader of the virtuous city must in principle be a Prophet, but that after death of the last Prophet, the role of leader was entrusted to his successors. What, then, are the requirements for such successors? They are provided by the following citations from the definition of the virtuous city in a recent Japanese translation by Masataka Takeshita:

1. To be Sage.
2. To be acquainted with the law, customs and social systems used by the primary rulers [Prophets], and never fail to follow the example of the primary rulers in all actions.
3. To possess superior deductive powers to deal with matters to which the regulations of the ancestors are not applicable, and to follow the primary rulers in such deductions.

4. To possess superior thinking and deductive powers to deal with new situations to which no custom of the primary rulers [Prophets] is applicable, and to be able to use deductive powers to pursue the improvement of the city.
5. To be able to use speech to make people comply with the regulations established by the primary rulers and later deduced in accord with their examples.
6. To be robust enough to wage war, and to be acquainted with combat techniques.<sup>7)</sup>

In fact, numbers 2 through 5 of these requirements are virtually consistent with the qualities of Islamic jurists. While it has been pointed out that Khomeini's *Velāyat-e Faqīh* is linked through Mullā Ṣadrā and al-Fārābī to Plato's concept of the philosopher king,<sup>8)</sup> these requirements also serve as supporting evidence for tracing Khomeini's argument back to al-Fārābī's concept of the virtuous city.<sup>9)</sup>

## **2. Relationship to Dominant Contemporary Values**

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### **2.1. Relationship to Liberalism**

How is the concept of the philosopher king on which Khomeini's political thought is based related to modern Western values, specifically to liberalism? To answer this question, we must recall a basic fact in the historical development of Western thought: the modern Western values represented by liberalism were developed by reversing the order of the values that were passed on from Plato and Aristotle to the Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) and dominated until the Middle Ages. For example, Yasunobu Fujiwara states in his book, *Jiyushugi-no Saikento (Reconsideration of Liberalism)*:

Plato defined the good man as one whose actions were led by intellect, a rational virtue, and demonstrated courage, a spiritual virtue, and temperance, an appetitive virtue, while maintaining the overall harmony of these virtues and being consistent. A bad man was defined as one in whom these virtues were out of order or reversed, as with the man whose appetites take precedence over other aspects.

Aristotle also classified human life as hedonistic, active or contemplative, arguing that the hedonistic life, as is the case with other animals, is a life dedicated to the satisfaction of desire.

On the contrary, the transformation of values from the Middle Ages to modern times is represented by a reversal in the order of values, such that what Plato called the appetitive aspect dominates the others, or that what Aristotle dubbed the hedonistic life, becomes acceptable.

For instance, Niccolò di Bernardo Machiavelli pointed out that until his times, people had questioned how they should live and ignored how they were living. He argued that human beings were selfish, their ambition and greed never sated, while politics consisted of measures designed to bring a specific order to such human beings rather than to make them virtuous. He virtually gave his approval to the ambition, greed and egotism of human beings.

This view was further developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes argued that everything which is necessary for self-preservation is good and everything which is inhibited is evil. Therefore, the difference between humans and animals does not lie in goal. It lies in nothing more than measures, and thus, reason takes the position of a measure to achieve a goal that is no different from that of animals.

This point reflects the full demise of the classic value system that Plato represented. Since that classic value system supported a society comprised of a ruler and subjects, it was challenged by the modern age. Liberalism is regarded as an extension of this challenge.<sup>10</sup>

What, in short, is the notion of liberalism? Shoji Yoshizaki defines the basic principle of liberalism as follows in his work, *Riberarizumu—Ko no Jiyu no Kiro (Liberalism—the Crossroad of Individual Freedom)*: the liberalist does not seek any political theory that provides individuals with a specific lifestyle, however fascinating it might be, and is against any social form that imposes such an ideal.

However, he makes the following defense for a margin for liberalism: liberalism includes the view that although the basic principle eschews imposition of the common good so that personalities may be enriched through diversification, the imposition of the common good did lead to the emergence of totalitarianism, another view that the basic principle focuses on approval of the presence of the common good in a specific scope that requires that social rules, or justice, be agreeable, and still another view that the basic principle prohibits political imposition but concentrates on the public exchange of values.

Yoshizaki also argues as follows: the answer to the question of how a human being should live must be resolved by each individual, and it is the ultimate insult and negation of human dignity to impose a social solution on individuals. Therefore, liberalism eschews perfectionism, which is based on the view that happiness is achieved through the practice of the ethically perfect life and that the state uses laws to guide people along the right path, which focuses on achievement of a good life aimed at the personal, ethical perfection of individuals and society. To justify political decisions and systems, liberalism follows a perspective that does not allow for any specific measure of the perfection of human beings.<sup>11</sup>

These opinions reveal that the rivalry between Khomeini's political thought, rooted in

Plato's concept of the philosopher king, and the basic values of the modern West, is basically the same as that between the medieval and modern West. Regarding this commonality, Iranian President Moḥammad Khātami, on taking office in 1997, stated admirably that Iranian culture was completely incompatible with modern Western culture, but that it could be compatible with medieval Western culture in spite of the religious differences represented by Christianity and Islam.<sup>12)</sup> Keishi Saeki provides a further explanation: the spirit of civic liberalism, or the spirit of morality and virtue rooted in ancient Greece, continued to constitute the basis of the modern West until the 19th century. This means that Khomeinī's political thought contradicts post-20th century values, the waning of the spirit of civic liberalism, in other words, the values of the USA that dominate the world in "the present".<sup>13)</sup>

## 2.2. The Viewpoint of Khomeinī (Shī'ah)

According to Islam (Shī'ah), man is comprised of flesh, or matter, and spirit, which is the breath of God; God is immanent in the spirit of human beings, therefore humans can distinguish good from evil and tend in their nature (*feṭrat*) toward the good. On the other hand, the material aspect of human beings makes them greedy and selfish. In other words, the human being is considered to have characteristics of both the angels and the beasts, and, standing between the two, can become either one.<sup>14)</sup>

Khomeinī, a student of mystical gnosis (*'irfan*), argued for the necessity of self-knowledge and morality (*akhlāq*). Self-knowledge is not just knowledge of the material aspect of the self but also the spiritual aspect, thereby knowledge of God. Knowing that God did not create human beings without a purpose, it is the duty of mankind to attain God's purpose, that is, to become perfect human beings. People must strive to come closer to God by improving, purifying and conditioning themselves to enhance spirituality and exercising self-control to cast off material desires. The following citation provides a clear description of self-knowledge:

Every entity is on a different plane of perfection. A tree that bears no fruit is on a lower plane of perfection than an apple tree. If for some reason an apple tree has not produced any fruit, it has not fully demonstrated its potential or reached perfection .... Just as with trees, if human beings remain on the same plane as the animals — which only eat, drink, build dwelling places, seek pleasure and go about preserving their species — they do not fully demonstrate their potential or attain perfection.... All human beings are capable of attaining perfection. Such capability is dormant in infants, when humans are no different from animals. By choosing the right pathway and developing the talent and potential with which they have been blessed by God, human beings can pave the way for a better state, possibly one superior to the angels. However, if they choose the wrong path, they become less than animals.... The spirit is the wellspring that guides humans to perfection. The spirit is non-material, constituting personality, while the body is a

tool to carry the spirit, playing the role of a donkey, so to speak. The spirit can be freed from the bonds of the body by strengthening it through worship and obedience to God and fulfillment of religious duties. If these practices are maintained, the human being will grow less likely to depend on the material world and will move forward through purification of the spirit toward a holy kingdom.<sup>15)</sup>

Khomeinī discusses a similar idea in his book *Jehād-e Akbar (The Greater Jihad)*, in which he teaches students of religion about the struggle against the self, toward the noble spirit and responsibility.

In *Jehād-e Akbar*, Khomeinī writes:

Prophets were dispatched to educate and develop the people, prevent moral ugliness, impurity, vulgar behavior and to spread beatific virtue and propriety (*ādāb*).... Those who study at religious schools and want to play leading roles in society in the future must not consider it sufficient to memorize a specific range of technical terms [from Islamic law]. ... Just as you will be faced with difficulties in your study of Islamic law (*fiqh*) and Islamic jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), so too will you be faced with a variety of problems you must deal with for self-improvement. As you progress in acquiring [legal] knowledge, take a greater step forward and control your egotistic desires, strengthen your spirit, acquire moral nobility and learn to be spiritual and religious. Learning these themes [of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence] is, in fact, the first step toward purifying your mind (*nafs*) and learning the virtue, propriety and Divine Sciences (*ma'āref-e elāhiye*).... Where there is a just, religious intellect (*'ālim*) in a community, city or province, his very presence amounts to instruction and education for the people in the region, even though he might not dedicate himself to conventional missionary work or enlightenment.<sup>16)</sup>

In his *Velāyat-e Faqīh* he also says:

Islamic law includes various rules and regulations through which society constitutes a sort of order.... There are commandments and regulations at every step of the way, that human beings might discipline themselves. A perfect, moral, intellectual person is a “walking law” in human form, and a voluntary, autonomous enforcer of the law. It is evident that Islam has invested a great deal of effort in the government, political and economic relationships of society for the development of sophisticated, moral, intellectual people.<sup>17)</sup>

He further states in his last will, written following the revolution:

Islam and Islamic governance are holy phenomena, and making them happen is the best manner of securing the happiness of the faithful. They have the power to defeat tyrannies, pillaging, corruption and encroachment and to guide people to the preferred perfection.<sup>18)</sup>

Khomeinī views the human being as an entity that is able to control selfishness and the desire for material things or power, and that must struggle to educate, discipline and improve himself through compliance with the God-given Islamic law, and struggle against himself to achieve the purpose of his creation, becoming a perfect human being, that is longed for by the spirit, the breath of God (Chart 2).

<Chart 2><sup>19)</sup>

The perfect, moral, intellectual human being (possibly superior to the angels)



The right path (Path to God): Spiritual improvement through Islamic law and constant struggle against oneself (the greater jihad)



**Human beings:** Middle position (comprised of both matter [the flesh] and spirit)



The wrong path: Path to a false God and the fulfillment of material desires (selfishness, carnality and the desire for power)



A human being inferior to the animals

Human perfection as destiny must, however, be pursued not only by the individual but also by society, under the guidance of Islamic jurists, who are God's spokesmen. For example, although compliance with Islamic law is a prerequisite in the pursuit of this destiny, the fact that Islamic law addresses inter-human relationships as well as the relationship between the individual and God is indicative of its social nature. In addition, the general Muslim population, not endowed with the right to interpret the law, must follow its interpretation according to the supreme jurist (*marja'-e taqlid*) because that right is the exclusive domain of the jurist (*mujtahid*). In other words, the destiny of perfection cannot be achieved as an individual. Further, the moral code applied to Muslims (*'amr be ma'rūf va nahī az monker*) emphasized by Khomeinī encourages the creation of a virtuous society based on human relationships in which, however, the scope of individual privacy and freedom are unclear.

### 2.3. Mutual Knowledge

How, then, is this thinking of Khomeinī's viewed by the advocate of liberalism, the USA?

The US *Declaration of Independence* claims:

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness — That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,...<sup>20)</sup>

The foundation for this idea is commonly said to have been established by the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) in his *Two Treatises of Government*, specifically in the latter part, entitled “*An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government*.”<sup>21)</sup> Locke’s thinking can be summarized as follows:

The natural state prior to the establishment of political society is a state in which people have perfect freedom within the scope of the laws of nature (reason). The natural freedom that allows people to act as they think proper is a state where people are not bound by anything except the laws of nature (reason). In their natural state, people are also independent and equal to each other, and the laws of nature (reason) oblige them not to harm anyone’s life, liberty or property, all of which are natural rights enjoyed by every individual. Natural rights also include the right to claim compensation or file a lawsuit seeking the punishment of those who violate any of the natural rights. However, in the natural state these natural rights are secured neither stably nor properly. Therefore, people institute a civil government and abandon or transfer to the government some of their natural rights, such as those to claim compensation and punishment. Nevertheless, the rights to life, liberty and property are inalienable natural rights of individuals. The purpose of a civil government is the protection of these inalienable rights, before which the power of the government is limited.<sup>22)</sup>

These inalienable rights were dubbed “human rights” in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23)</sup>

The US Declaration of Independence posits the right to the pursuit of happiness in place of the right to property, one of the three natural inalienable rights that Locke proposed. The notion of the right to the pursuit of happiness is said to have been influenced by the thinking of the Swiss jurist J.J. Burlamaqui, which appears similar to Khomeini’s thinking in certain areas, such as that it is obvious that God aimed at ... completion ... in creating human beings, and that consideration of the soul (spirit) takes priority over that of the body.<sup>24)</sup>

This similarity, however, highlights “the structural differences” between Khomeini’s thinking and the philosophy behind the founding of the US. The US Declaration of Independence specifies that the right to pursue happiness is an inalienable right bestowed on the individual, and thereby obliges individuals and governments not to interfere with the right to the pursuit of happiness of each individual, that is, the private domain. It also states that governments are instituted to secure the inalienable rights of individuals. Meanwhile, Khomeini says that becoming a perfect human being, which is the happiness advocated by

Islamic jurists, is the socially common purpose that should be pursued, and that governments are instituted to satisfy the prerequisites for that purpose, specifically, to enforce Islamic law.

US liberalism and democracy are also incompatible with Plato's philosopher-king concept, which eschews democratic government. While Plato's political and ethical thinking was used by the German Nazis to defend themselves and attack liberalism, democracy and communism,<sup>25)</sup> the liberal and democratic US and UK side criticized Plato's thinking because of its potential to support the Nazis and Soviet totalitarianism, pointing out, for example, that in his basic thesis, Plato described transition as evil and stillness as good, or that transition represented deviation from the good and led to corruption and moral deterioration. It was also pointed out that the ideal state proposed by Plato results in totalitarianism for the following reason: he formulated a concept of the ideal state as a means of preventing political transition along with the degradation and corruption accompanied by such transition, but in fact, it is rooted in the ideal spawned at the dawn of Greek history and is oriented toward the past. In such a state, the ruling class, which takes the role of shepherd and watchdog, is strictly distinguished from the ruled class, which is like cattle following the shepherd and watchdog. In addition, the destinies of the state and the ruling class are viewed as one and the same.<sup>26)</sup>

These remarks are very nearly true of the society proposed by Islam and Khomeini. Moreover, there is no doubt that such a society would be criticized as totalitarian by the US and other liberal parties, because it imposes a particular set of values for an individual way of life and purpose on the entire society.

The society of the USA, the leading liberal state, is founded on modern Western values that have been constituted by overturning Plato's value system. How, then, is US society viewed from Khomeini's side? In his words,

[We are proud that our enemies are also the enemies of the oppressed peoples of the world and of Islam.] They are truculent and never restrain themselves from any treachery or crime that suits their criminal and evil purposes. They even attack their allies for their filthy purposes and to retain their ruling position. Their leader, the USA, is a terrorist state by nature and sets fire to every place in the world.<sup>27)</sup>

It can be said that Khomeini viewed the US as a corrupt society where the human spirit, which ought to be improved, is passed over in public life, and where the satisfaction of material desires, which are basically the same as those of animals, is condoned in the name of freedom within the private domain of the individual and relentlessly pursued under the principle of competition.

### 3. Discussion in Iran

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#### 3.1 The Discourse of Moḥammad Khātami

Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Khomeini's *Velāyat-e Faqīh* was incorporated into the new Constitution as the directing principle of the new establishment, and Khomeini took office as the supreme leader. Under him was a governmental structure consisting of judicial, administrative and legislative bodies.

Meanwhile, minor conflicts on the border with Iraq immediately after the Revolution developed into the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, triggered by a full-scale Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Iraq, under the rule of the worldly Ba'th Party, which advocated socialism and Arab nationalism based on a modern Western concept of nationalism, regarded the war as between Arabs (Iraq) and Persians (Iran). Khomeini saw the war as between Islam and infidels.<sup>28)</sup>

Iran, however, had grown militarily inferior as the Cold War wound down; the US no longer needed to look to the Soviet Union to put military pressure directly on Iran. Khomeini grieved over the U.N. Security Council ceasefire resolution that Iran had to accept in July 1988, saying that it was worse than swallowing poison. He died on June 3, 1989, within a year after the ceasefire, and his position as supreme leader was passed to 'Ali Khāmene'ī, who was a student of Khomeini's and president under the new *Velāyat-e Faqīh* system.

Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami took office as president in 1997, on the expiration of the eight-year term of 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjāni, who had assumed the presidency while Khāmene'ī held the position of supreme leader. Khātami was elected by a landslide, gathering especially the vote of women and of young people who had not lived through the Revolution. He was an Islamic jurist and an expert in Western political thought. He proposed inter-civilizational dialogue with foreign countries, while with the Iranian people he discussed concepts like "creation of civil society," "the rule of law" and "freedom of thought and expression" that shared something in common with modern Western values. The movement for "freedom of thought and expression" in particular resounded with the younger generations and elicited critical response to the status quo, the *Velāyat-e Faqīh* system that had continued to advocate the purging of Western values and the creation of an Islamic society. The *Velāyat-e Faqīh* system was encountering resistance about 20 years on from the Revolution and 10 years since the death of Khomeini.

What is Khātami's thinking? The discourses below give us some idea.

The rivalry [of the West] toward the Islamic Revolution [of Iran] is based on the principle of liberty. ... It is said [by Western people] that human beings can act according to free will, and that this is compatible with basic human nature. Liberty is, of course,

restricted and limited. The limitations specified in the West are no more than [not violating] the liberty of other persons.<sup>29)</sup> Such limitations are determined by human beings, along with intentions and speculation, as well. In other words, the group with the majority [in majority rule] specifies the boundaries of liberty and establishes its limitations, namely laws.... This indicates that what is required [by Western people] is fascinating to the primitive inclinations of human beings and harmonizes with them. Human beings do not need to acquire such inclinations as are provided to them naturally. ...

Meanwhile, the system proposed by our Revolution [of Iran] is based on what human beings acquire through patience and efforts; for example, we regard piety as the foundation for everything, and piety does not reside in our personality or character by nature. ... It requires patience and effort.

Khātāmī appreciated the value of liberty, saying that “[in fact,] there was nothing as fascinating for human beings, and that human life always tended toward the pinnacle of freedom.

Here, it must be noted that Khomeinī and the modern West differed in the meanings they gave to liberty; liberty as insisted by Khomeinī was liberation from own material desires, while liberty of the modern West is the freedom to satisfy own material desires. According to Khātāmī:

The opponent [of the Iranian system] at present is the Western system that tempts people to the freedom to eat, wear, speak, think and live, that is aimed at achieving one’s purpose in life by enjoying material wealth and amplifying opportunity, that regards such a way of life as the way to reach the supreme, holy purpose of human beings, namely liberty, that uses the natural primitive inclinations of people to build itself, and that tempts most people despite standing farthest from true liberty. In such a world [the present world where the values of the modern West are dominant], we are striving for self-control, temperance and enhancement of virtue, which is the fruit of one’s effort, and seeking a system based on these....

We need to be immunized against Western values [that require no patience or effort to acquire and are compatible with primitive human inclinations]. In other words,... we need to have some kind of relationship and communicate with those who have views that are different from, even opposite to, ours. To become immune, we also need to understand true Islam, not the conservative Islam that Khomeinī criticized in his later years.<sup>30)</sup>

As we can see from the above, Khātāmī recommended against refusing to get to know those Western values based on the approval of primitive desires similar to those of the animals, as well as being very concerned about the inclination of Iranian young people toward such values, he encouraged the Iranian people to dare to get to know Western values so as to become immunized against them and to strive to stand firmly on the foundations of the true Islam. To this end, he proposed an inter-civilizational dialogue:

If people can stand firmly in their own cultures, religions and identities, they can discuss and communicate with others. Such discussion and communication help to enhance cultures. Therefore, we propose inter-civilizational and intercultural dialogue rather than inter-civilizational and intercultural conflict.<sup>31)</sup>"

Further, he pointed to a lack of spirituality as the greatest issue of the human status quo, or contemporary Western-led civilization,<sup>32)</sup> and described a new civilization to strive for:

Western civilization is also a product of human beings, and [as such] it is not the ultimate outcome.... Western values, confronted with issues (such as family affairs [accompanied by the progress of individualism], environmental destruction and separation of science and morality), are reaching an impasse and experiencing decay.<sup>33)</sup> ... What the West needs now ... is to review itself from different perspectives.<sup>34)</sup> In order to create a new civilization superior to the Western one, Islam must revert to its origins, as did the early modern West to Greco-Roman times and its own religious roots.<sup>35)</sup>"

However, Khātāmī specified that reverting to the origins did not signify regressing into the past and denying the present, but rather locating the roots of one's identity.<sup>36)</sup> He argued that standing firmly in the identity of Islam helped to make use of the positive achievements of the West without being infected by the West, and that therefore, advantages of the preceding civilization [of the West] could be used to create a new civilization that satisfied both the material and the spiritual needs of humanity.<sup>37)</sup>

In this manner, Khātāmī explained the need to realize an Islamic civil society so that Islam could play a leading role in the new civilization. While he distinguished Islamic civil society from Western, insisting that the essence of Islamic civil society resided in Medina, the City of the Prophet, he emphasized that the positive achievements of Western civil society must be introduced.<sup>38)</sup>

How, then, did Khātāmī describe the creation of civil society? The following excerpts from his discourses summarize his contentions:

The people's right to governance and God's right to governance are not in contradiction

but have a hierarchical relationship (*tul*) [where the two are not in a parallel relationship (*arz*) but the former is subordinate to the latter]. This is backed by the Constitution, which specifies that governance originates with God, who says that people control their own destiny.... Governance (constituted by administrative and legislative power) is validated by the people and must be under their supervision. This can never happen until the people's right to their destiny is officially granted to them and a civil organization formed so that the opinions and requests of the people may be communicated to the ruler. Such an organization must be created voluntarily by the people, that is, a "civil society"... Such a people-led system can be made to happen not only in the form already realized in the West but also in different forms in other types of societies. Like other types of societies, Islamic civil society is likely to present a uniqueness that differentiates it from other systems. (Quotation marks here and below added by this writer for emphasis.)

It is also necessary to make the constitution take root in society. In [Iranian] society, which consists of 60 million people with diverse ways of thinking (since human beings were created by God to be diverse), rules are necessary. Just as rules are necessary for a soccer game involving only 22 players, civil life needs rules and a foundation, which are agreed on by the people. Such rules and foundation constitute a law that specifies basic rights in the society, in other words, a Constitution. The Constitution serves to establish social order and security.

The government must secure "freedom of thought and expression" [as one of the rights to be secured]. The government uses the Islamic system without exception to establish a series of moral and religious regulations. Therefore, freedom of expression is limited to a specific extent and must not contravene the foundations of Islam or public rights. This does not mean that one ideological group accuses another of being anti-Islamic or irreligious. Such a framework must be prescribed by the law and the assembly. What is important is the "rule of law."

The Constitution grants rights to even those belonging to Islamic schools other than the Shi'ah as well as to other religions. If one agrees to act within the legal framework, one has rights, and one's safety must be secured by the government. No one has the right to violate the law, regardless of title or reason. The rule of law is validated by the supreme leader [Khamene'i].<sup>39)</sup>

These discourses highlight three points. First, Khomeini argued for a society that enforced Islamic law, but Khatami defined the law in terms of a "rule of law" not specified

by God (Islamic law) but through a constitution or act of a national assembly, that is, a positive law prescribed by human beings, based on the concept of the modern Western social contract. Secondly, Khātami took a position that allowed for the rights of non-Islamic people as an extension of that positive law.

At the same time, he grieved over Iranian society, noting that it disregarded the law because it was not based on public opinion but imposed.<sup>40)</sup> There were other reasons, though. One was that while the Shī'ah, who had not had a connection with the effective ruling authorities, extended Islamic law to the minor details of individual and private domains, it was not fully developed in the social and public domains.<sup>41)</sup> The other was a historical inertia: the Shī'ah discounted or denied the validity of the effective ruling authorities and their laws, as represented by the endorsement of tax evasion.

The third point, which is more important than the first two, is that the series of Khātami's arguments is based on the concept that the people possess the right to decide their own destiny. He explains this concept as follows:

One of the major differences between the past and the present lies in the attitude of human beings toward rights and obligations: people in the present [or the modern West] believe that human beings have rights, while those in the past [or the medieval West and culturally comparable present Iran] supposed that most people had obligations.... Do we think that someone should make decisions for human beings and all must obey him? Is our Revolution meant to return to the age when the Islamic world was ruled for 1,200 years [by rogues who established states through force and brought people to heel]? Or, is it meant to invent a new idea [that human beings possess the right to decide their own destiny]?... Islam emphasizes clearly and earnestly the right of human beings to decide their own destiny.... Our society accommodates variations in viewpoints and interpretations of Islam. Some believe that the people are not allowed to make decisions by themselves and need someone superior, a guardian, and that the guardian is not to be chosen by the people but by a third party. They even say that a guardian chosen by God for the sake of the people, guides them freely [as he desires]. These views, however, are not what the Islamic Revolution meant, because the deed, the Constitution, which has already been agreed upon by the people and the Ayatollahs Khomeinī and Khāmene'ī [who were also the leaders], specifies that the people are the rulers of their own destiny.<sup>42)</sup>

Khātami, therefore, concluded that the Islamic system and the *Velāyat-e Faqīh* system were validated through their incorporation into the Constitution, in other words, by the intention of the people. He describes the Islamic system as follows:

Therefore, the Islamic system is based on the intention of the people. The Constitution

is approved based on the intention of the people, and national organizations are also established based on the intention of the people. The name Islamic Republic of Iran [inserting the word Islam into the official state name] signifies that our people are determined to control the state based on Islamic values and criteria.<sup>43)</sup>

Regarding the *Velāyat-e Faqīh* system, he explains:

The *Velāyat-e Faqīh* represents the views of Khomeinī, but it is not necessarily supported by all Islamic scholars and jurists. However, this view has already been incorporated into the Constitution and is no longer another of several juristic views. Opposing the *Velāyat-e Faqīh* does not mean simply taking a position against a particular juristic view but rather denying the foundations of a state system.<sup>44)</sup>

Khomeinī defined the Revolution in his *Velāyat-e Faqīh* as the restoration to what it must be of the governance that had been deviated from since the Umayyad period. However, Khātāmī focuses on the right of the people to decide their own destiny in his interpretation of the Revolution:

The people of Iran were subjected to several centuries of autocracy, and over the past 150 years further suffered the rule of colonialists. The most significant achievement of the Islamic Revolution of Iran was to allow the people to decide their own destiny.<sup>45)</sup>

Furthermore, Khātāmī explains the significance of the Revolution in terms of world history:

The Iranian Revolution is significant because it is an experiment in harmonizing religion with reason, heaven with earth, and spirituality with worldly prosperity. For several centuries since the dawning of the modern age, human beings have believed that reason contradicted religion, and have usually chosen reason, liberty and worldly prosperity. However, we strive to demonstrate that, while being religious, we are capable of pursuing freedom, showing respect for human rights, including the right of the people to decide their own destiny, and enjoying the prosperous and advanced earthly world.<sup>46)</sup>

We can interpret the above comments by Khātāmī as follows: The significance of the Iranian Revolution for world history lies in the creation of a new civilization that accommodates the positive aspects of the contemporary West—liberty, material and worldly factors, and the right of human beings to decide their own fates—and spirituality (virtuousness), which the present civilization of the West lacks. This explanation points to

his notion of overcoming the conflict between Khomeini's political thinking and the values of Western liberalism through inter-civilizational dialogue to create a new civilization.

### **3.2. Differences between Islamic Society and Western Civil Society**

The civil society advocated by Khātami triggered a large number of books on the issue in Iran. One of these was *Jāme'e Dīnī, Jāme'e Madanī (Religious Society and Civil Society)* by Aḥmad Vā'ezī, published by the Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought in 1998. This book outlines the basic values and characteristics of a religious, or Islamic, society:

- 1) Human view: Man consists of spirit and body; the nature of God descends to the spirit, while the body drives man to be self-centered, self-interested and greedy. Man's identity resides in the spirit, and the body is no more than a tool. The happiness of man depends on fulfilling his spiritual desires as well as rationally satisfying his natural, instinctive desires.
- 2) Moral view: In the modern West, man is regarded as the center of values and morality. Consequently, morality is deemed subjective and relative, and gives rise to individualism. In the religious society of Islam, morality is deemed unconditional, objective and man's master. Therefore, Islamic religious society rejects Western individualism.
- 3) Rejection of a utilitarian definition of reason: The modern West defines reason as a mere tool for the satisfaction of material desires, instincts and interests. In contrast, Islam characterizes reason as the guide, the master of human desires and instincts. In addition, Islam does not identify reason as man's sole source of knowledge; revelation and mystical gnosis are also included as sources of human knowledge.
- 4) Ideological aspect: Islam advocates invariable, established models of the ideal human being and society—although these may be modified—and enjoins human beings to follow a specific path toward those models.
- 5) Union of church and state: Islamic law stipulates not only the private domain of the individual but also society and politics, the public domain. In other words, it stipulates that the pursuit of perfection and happiness in the next world involves not only the personal acts of the individual but also social interaction. Consequently, Islamic society rejects laicism that banishes religion from the realm of politics and society.
- 6) Transcendence of Islamic law: In other forms of society, legislation must comply with a constitution. In an Islamic society, legislation must comply in principle with Islamic law.<sup>47)</sup>

The book states that an Islamic religious society with these characteristics could overlap the civil society of the modern West in terms of the control of political authority, participation of the people in politics, and freedom of association, although these become modified in an Islamic society. In what points do these two types of society conflict? A reading of the book with that question in mind provides the following points:

- 1) Modern Western civil society is characterized by the symbiosis of different values and beliefs, but such characteristics are unacceptable to a religious society with a single systemic value or belief. Even when they are accepted, they must be limited.
- 2) Although the views of Islam on human rights are partly in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Islam also advocates obedience to the will of God: the right of God to dominion over human beings or the obligations of human beings toward God. Following on this concept, rights are not granted equally to Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic society.
- 3) Civil society is separated into a public and a private domain, and geared to expanding the private domain (the realm of liberty) to the maximum through the establishment of minimum government. Furthermore, it adopts a neutral posture toward religion in either the public or the private domain. Islamic society, however, does not make a clear distinction between the public and private domains, establishing as important purposes the spiritual improvement of human beings and the control of religious/moral values.<sup>48)</sup>

### 3.3. Counterarguments to Khātami and Characteristics of Conflicts

Khātami, who advocates a civil society peculiar to Islam, may not see any need to resolve every contradiction and conflict with the civil society of the West. To him, the most relevant matter is the right of the people to decide their own destiny, and in this he faces the bruising resistance of the conservative party of the religious community. Following the Iranian Revolution, two major parties, a conservative party and a reformist party have battled with each other. Khātami was a member of the reformist party, and faced intense resistance from the conservatives. Meṣbāḥ Yazdi, conservative stalwart for example, refutes Khātami's basic premise that the people should decide their own destiny:

Regardless of whether the people accept it or not, the truth is that Muḥammad was not chosen by God at the request of the people. He was chosen by God to be a prophet. ... The Twelve Imāms were also elected by God. It is the duty of the people in such a situation to accept their governance.

This is also true in today's era of the Occultation of the Imām. Governance by an Islamic jurist was ordained by God and advocated by the hidden Imām. There is no role for the people with reference to the validity of the governance. However, the feasibility of such governance depends on its acceptance by the people.

There is no role for the people, either, in the selection of a specific individual from among the Islamic jurists [as the leader]. The people "find and know" a qualified jurist, and "finding and knowing" him does not amount to a validation of his governance. This is like the visibility of the new moon; whether or not Ramadan has started is not validated by our sighting of the new moon but by its externalization.

The people have a right to accept or reject this governance. Nevertheless, they should accept it as a matter of course.

He also discusses the relationship between the authority of jurists and the Constitution:

The authority of an Islamic jurist who is leader does not take priority over the commandments of God and the law [Islamic law] but does prevail over the Constitution. Consequently, the Constitution is deemed valid not because it has been accepted by the majority of the people but because it has been approved by the Islamic jurist who heads the state.<sup>49)</sup>

Meşbâh Yazdî argues, in other words, that the people can choose whether or not to accept governance by an Islamic jurist (*Velāyat-e Faqih*), but that the validity of that governance does not depend on their acceptance.

A book entitled *Nezām-e Siyāsī-ye Eslām (The Islamic Political System)*, published by one of organizations operated by Meşbâh Yazdî, Mo'assese-ye Āmūzeshī va Pezhūheshī-ye Emām Khomeinī (The Emām Khomeinī Institute of Research and Education), describes as follows.

Islam (Shī'ah) recognizes that governance requires the consent of the people. However, it is questionable to say that obtaining the consent of the people is sufficient to validate the governance. Islam does not regard the consent of the people as a validation of governance. The consent of the people is requisite to the creation of governance but not sufficient for its validation. The consent of the people is, so to speak, the body, while the spirit, the validation, comes through the mercy of God. ... The validity of the governance originates in God, and the people play a role not in the validation but in the creation of the governance.<sup>50)</sup>

These views are in conflict with Khātami's position advocating the right of the people to decide their own destiny because *Velāyat-e Faqīh* is valid by grace of its acceptance by the people as their Constitution.

To illustrate the relationship between *eidos* and matter, Al-Fārābī likened matter to the timber that is used to make a bed and *eidos* to the bed itself, explaining that matter exists for the sake of *eidos*.<sup>51)</sup> The conservatives appear to imply in this relationship that the people represent matter.

Just as with the conflict between the political thinking of Khomeinī and the modern West, we must reconfirm the commonality of the front line conflict in Iran with the conflict between liberalism and totalitarianism in the West, and, even further, between the Middle Ages and the modern age.

#### 4. Conclusion(Epilogue)

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At the time of the Iranian Revolution (1979), the historical development of the West served as the lens through which world history was understood. A revolution and the establishing of a new country were inevitably believed to be founded on Western political thought, so the Iranian Revolution and its non-Western, Islam-based political philosophy were confusingly beyond the ken of most observers at the time. Indeed, since the modern era and the global expansion of the West, there has been a growing tendency to base non-Western nations and societies on Western political thinking and values, whether capitalistic or socialistic, an attitude that has come to enjoy global acceptance. Iran was no exception: under the wing of the US, the monarchy under Pahlavī was steadily advancing toward modernization, or westernization, especially during the period from the American-supported anti-*Moṣaddeq* coup in 1953 to the Iranian Revolution. But the Iranian Revolution represented a challenge to the globally accepted attitude that the goal of non-Western countries in creating a nation or a society was a sort of modernization that was tantamount to westernization, advocating the philosophy of Islam rather than that of the West.

In this regard, the Revolution was epochal. However, because of that epoch-making Revolution, Iran is faced with internal and external difficulties. In addition, the fact that the philosophy of the Revolution originated in the Iranian doctrine of the Twelve-Imām Shī'ah—for example, the victory of the *Usūli* over the *Akhbārī* within the Twelve-Imām Shī'ah from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century through the early 19<sup>th</sup> century—automatically limited the impact of that school in the Sunni-dominated Islamic world. Meanwhile, it cannot be denied that the Revolution has also stimulated other nations of the Islamic world, albeit indirectly, and inspired Muslim awareness, through the Palestinian issue for example. This has also intensified US policy on Israeli security: the USA put pressure on Iran and showed hostility to it by including it in the "Axis of Evil" in the early 2002.

Was the Iranian Revolution, which challenged the West-centric worldview, a modern milestone in world history? Or was it no more than a ripple in the mainstream? We must refrain from answering these questions too hastily.

Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington posited in his 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?" that in response to the end of the Cold War, conflicts among diverse civilizations would be inevitable, specifically between Western civilization and the combination of Islamic and Confucian civilizations. This thesis echoed globally, and many people were reminded of it by the shocking, simultaneous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

From a different perspective, Professor Huntington's discussion of clashes between Western civilization and Islam or other civilizations may reflect his acute perception of the relativity of the West-centric worldview revealed in these challenges.

Khātami dared to value diversity and advocate dialogue among the variety of views, saying that human beings are created by God to be diverse, and that the diversity of views enhances each one and brings about improvement. Furthermore, he applied his discussion extensively to international society in order to propose dialogue among different civilizations. This proposal was adopted by the United Nations, which positioned 2001, the first year of the 21st century, as the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. The notion reminds us of J.S. Mill's argument in *On Liberty* that diversity brings about improvement, a concept basic to liberalism and supported by liberal societies. However, this concept is limited to diversity among the individuals within a country, and does not apply to an international society consisting of states. For instance, the US practices a human rights diplomacy that advocates core liberalistic values, or human rights, to such states as have values different from it, while seeking to balance its own national interests. In addition, by exercising military force as it has in the Iraq War, the US tries to impose its own values around the world. In other words, the principle of symbiosis and mutual respect for different views and values is not necessarily accepted or secured in an international society that consists not of individuals, but of states. This fact could be raised as an issue here.

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#### NOTES

- 1) This essay was extracted and partially modified from commentary to the translation by this writer of R.H. Khomeini, *Velāyat-e faqīh, jahād-e Akbar, tehran, enteshārāt-e seyyed jamāl*, (Tokyo: Heibonsha Limited, Publishers, 2003).
- 2) Moḥammad Mehdi Nāderi Qomī, *Negāhī-ye Gozarā be Nazariye-ye Velāyat-e Faqīh Bargerefte as Mobāḥṣ-e Ostād-e Moḥammad Taqī Mesbāḥ Yazdī*, Qom: Enteshārāt-e Mo'assese-ye Āmūzesī va Pejūhesī-ye Emām Khomeini, 2000, pp. 79-81.
- 3) Moḥsen Kadivar, *Nazariye-hā-ye Doulat dar Fegh-e Shi'e*, Tehran: Nashr-e Ney., 1997, p. 108.
- 4) Moḥammad Mehdi Nāderi Qomī, *Negāhī-ye Gozarā be...*, pp. 115-119.
- 5) Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran*,

London/New York, I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000, pp. 32, 34-35.

- 6) Ḥamid Ṭālebẓāde, *Ashenāū bā Falsafe-ye Eslāmī*, Tehran: Vezārat-e Āmūzesh va Parvāresh, 1997, pp. 49-56.
- 7) Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, *Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State*, translated by Masataka Takeshita, in *Isuramu Tetsugaku, Chusei Shiso Gentenshusei 11* (Islamic Philosophy—Collected Original Texts of Medieval Thinking, Vol. 11), translated by The Institute of Medieval Thought, Sophia University, Masataka Takeshita, ed. (Tokyo: Heibonsha Limited, Publishers, 2000), p.131.
- 8) For example, Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State. ...*
- 9) It is, however, necessary to take into account the difference between a prophet and an Imām.
- 10) A summary of Yasunobu Fujiwara, *Jiyushugi-no Saikento* (Reconsidering Liberalism), Iwanami Shinsho (Iwanami Shoten Publishers, 1999), pp.55-62.
- 11) Shoji Yoshizaki, *Riberarizumu—Kono Jiyu no Kiro* (Liberalism—Crossroads of Individual Freedom); *Shirizu Gendai Hihan-no Tetsugaku* (Philosophical Critique of the Present) (Aoki Shoten Publishing, Co., Ltd., 1998), pp.10-11.
- 12) Seyyed Mohammad Khātāmī, “Tradition, Modernity, and Development,” *Islam, Liberty and Development*, Binghamton, The Institute of Global Cultural Studies Binghamton University, 1998, pp. 21-22.
- 13) Keishi Saeki, *Amerikanizumu-no Shuen—Shibikku Riberarizumu Seishin-no Saihakken-he* (The Consummation of Americanism—Toward Discovering the Spirit of Civic Liberalism) (TBS. Britannica Co., Ltd., 1993), pp.232-242.
- 14) Aḥmad Vā’ezī, *Jāme’e Dīnī, Jāme’e Madanī*, Tehran, Pejūheshgā-ye, Farhand va Andishe-ye Eslāmī, 1998, pp. 94-95.
- 15) Muhammad Ali Shomali, *Self-Knowledge*, Tehran, International Publishing, 1996, pp. 14, 56, 63, 48.  
Abū Nasr al-Fārābī argued that when one reaches happiness through enhanced spirituality and independence from the material, the spirit endures even after the death of material. Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, *Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State*, pp.134-140.
- 16) Quotations from *Jehād-e Akbar yā Mobāreze bā Nafs*, The Eighth Edit., Tehran: Mo’assase-ye Tanzīm va Nashr-e Āsar-e Emām Khomeinī, 1999, pp. 25, 12, 21, 16.
- 17) *Velāyat-e Faqīh (Ḥokūmat-e Eslāmī)*, The Ninth Edit. Tehran: Mo’assese-ye Tanzīm va Nashr-e Āsar-e Emām Kyomeinī, 1999, p. 21.
- 18) Emām Kyomeinī, *Vaṣīyatnāme-ye Siāsī – Elāhī*, Tehran: Mo’assese-ye Tanzīm va Nashr-e Āsar-e Emām Kyomeinī, 1989, pp. 12-13.
- 19) Quoted from Farhang Rajaei, *Islamic Values and World View, Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics*, Vol. 8, London: University Press of America, Inc. 1983. p. 49.
- 20) Yasaka Takagi, Sanji Suenobu, Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, eds., *Jinken Sengenshu* (Declarations of Human Rights) (Iwanami Bunko, Iwanami Shoten Publishers), p.114.
- 21) Quotations about John Lock and the U.S. Declaration of Independence are from: Mitsunori Fukada, *Gendai Jinkenron—Jinken-no Fuhensei to Fukajosei Hotetsugaku Sosho 8* (On Human Rights in the Present—Universality and Inalienability of Human Rights. Collected Texts on the Philosophy of Law, Vol.8) (Koubundou Publishers Inc., 2000), pp.55-56.
- 22) *ibid.* pp.21-24 (writer’s summary).

- 23) *ibid.* pp.62–63.
- 24) *ibid.* pp.45–52.
- 25) Takeshi Sasaki, *Puraton-no Jubaku* (The Spell of Plato) (Kodansha, Ltd., 2000), pp.147–166.
- 26) Sasaki, pp.249–266, and K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato* (Mirai-sha Publishers, 1980), pp.36–70, 97.
- 27) Emām Kyomeyni, *Vaṣīyatnāme-ye Siyāsī – Elāhī*, ..1989, pp. 6-7.
- 28) Iran was initially invaded by Iraq, but turned the tables after July 1982 and began to invade Iraq. As a result, some Iranians blamed Khomeinī for continuing the war, pointing out that the right to jihad for defense is granted even to the representatives of the hidden Imām, or Islamic jurists, but that the right to jihad for offence is granted to the hidden Imām alone. Khomeinī, however, ignored these accusations, identifying the purpose of the war as to “protect” not the territory but Islam itself. See: Kenji Tomita, *Ayattoratachi-no Iran-Isuramu Tochitaisei-no Mujunto Tenkai* (Contradiction and Development of Islamic Governance of Iran by Ayatollahs) (Daisanshokan, 1993), pp.110–111; note 20 on p. 238.
- 29) This has the same purpose as the phrase that Jean Jacques Rousseau cited in his *The Social Contract*, “In a republic, each citizen is perfectly free to do whatever does not harm any other citizen.” *The Social Contract* (Iwanami Bunko, Iwanami Shoten Publishers), p.191.
- 30) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Bīme Mouj*, Tehran: Mo’assase-ye Sima-ye Javān, 1997, pp.134-167.
- 31) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Eslām, Rūhānīyat va Enqelāb Eslāmī*, Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Tarḥ-e Nou, 2000, pp.189-195.
- 32) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Goftgu-ye Tamadonhā*, Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Tarḥ-e Nou, 2001, p.74.
- 33) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, “Tradition, Modernity and Development,” *Islam, Liberty and Development*, Binghamton: The Institute of Global Cultural Studies Binghamton University, 1998, pp.17-37.
- 34) Moḥammad Khātami, *Dialogue among Civilizations*, translated by Jiro Hirano (Kyodo News, 2001), p.30.
- 35) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, “Tradition, Modernity and Development,” ... pp.17-37.
- 36) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Eslāmī, Rūhānīyat va Enqelāb Eslāmī*, Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Tarḥ-e Nou, 2000, p.149.
- 37) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Bīme Mouj*, ... p.192.
- 38) Khātami’s speech at the Organization of Islamic Conferences on Dec. 9, 1997 ([http://www.persia.org/khatami/s\\_speech\\_farsi.html](http://www.persia.org/khatami/s_speech_farsi.html), 2002, 3, 5.)
- 39) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Touse’e Siāsī, Touse’e-ye Eqtesādī va Amnīyat*, sāl-e Nokhost (jold-e avval), Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Tarḥ-e Nou, 2000, pp.41-51, 55-66; *Eslām, Rūhānīyat va Enqelāb Eslāmī*, Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Tarḥ-e Nou, 2000, pp.163-172.
- 40) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Touse’e Siāsī, Touse’e-ye Eqtesādī va Amnīyat*, ... pp.41-51.
- 41) Moḥsen Kadīvar, *Nazarīe-hā-ye Doulat dar Feqh-e Shi’e*, Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1997, pp.9-10.
- 42) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Touse’e Siāsī, Touse’e-ye Eqtesādī va Amnīyat*, ... pp.83-94.
- 43) Seyyed Moḥammad Khātami, *Eslām, Rūhānīyat va Enqelāb Eslāmī*, ... pp.196-200.
- 44) *ibid.*, pp.163-172.
- 45) *ibid.*, pp.196-200.

- 46) *ibid.*, pp.189-195.
- 47) Aḥmad Vā'ezī, *Jāme'e-ye Dīnī, Jāme'e-ye Madanī*, Tehran: Pejūheshgā-ye Farhang va Andīshe-ye Eslāmī, 1998, pp.93-108.
- 48) *ibid.*, pp.93-108, 110-111, 122-123.
- 49) Moḥammad Mehdī Nāderī Qomī, *Negāhī-ye Gozarā be Nazariye-ye Velāyat-e Faqīh Bargerefte as Mobāḥṣ-e Ostād-e Moḥammad Taqī Mesbāḥ Yazdī*, Qom: Enteshārāt-e Mo'assese-ye Āmūzeshī va Pejūhesī-ye Emām Khomeinī, 2000, pp.56, 61-62, 71-74, 118.
- 50) Moḥammad Javād Nourūzī, *Nezām-e Siyāsī-ye Eslām*, Enteshārāt-e Mo'assese-ye Āmūzeshī va Pejūhesī-ye Emām Khomeinī, Qom, 1381 (A.D.2002), pp.149-150.
- 51) Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, *Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State*, translated by Masataka Takeshita, in *Isuramu Tetsugaku, Chusei Shiso Gentenshusei 11* (Islamic Philosophy —Collected Original Texts of Medieval Thought, Vol. 11), translated by The Institute of Medieval Thought, Sophia University, Masataka Takeshita, ed. (Tokyo: Heibonsha Limited, Publishers, 2000), p. 86.