

# International Intervention in the Solomon Islands by RAMSI: A Critical Appraisal of Its Acceptance by the Local Population

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## Abstract

In the post-Cold War era, the relationship between local legitimacy and international intervention was scrutinized in light of the corruption that was reported by post-conflict societies such as Rwanda and Afghanistan. This study argues that international intervention offers acceptable means to resolve conflicts and establish long-term, an legitimate peace in the eyes of locals. It also considers the case of the Solomon Islands in the Melanesia region in Oceania, which accepted international intervention — by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (hereinafter, RAMSI) — and accomplished the process of recovery in the aftermath of its national conflict.

Although previous research has highlighted the importance of legitimacy as a prerequisite for the effectiveness and success of international intervention, there is a lack of clarity on the type of intervention that can best address the needs of locals, and how it can be recognized as legitimate and credible by them. In contrast, this study aims to examine how RAMSI achieved its legitimacy through

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its unique approach, and how the Solomon Islanders — through the intervention that was offered by RAMSI — discovered a means to stabilize their country in the aftermath of its domestic conflict with foreign assistance. In terms of the research methods that were employed by this study, an examination of the response of the locals to the activities of RAMSI was performed based on the annual surveys it conducted throughout its intervention, and original interviews were conducted by the first author of this paper with Solomon Islanders about the roles of RAMSI and their evaluations of its intervention five years after the mission ended in 2017.

Our findings revealed that it was indispensable to include every relevant actor in the intervention process. In particular, the Australian government chose to remain neutral even though it was widely recognized as a regional power with a significant military presence that can help to establish legitimacy, not only in terms of informing the locals about the mission and activities of RAMSI, but also in providing resources and cooperation that were needed by the local communities. These were important factors that can lead to their satisfaction and the establishment of local legitimacy, which were crucial to ensure a successful outcome of international intervention.

**Keywords**

International intervention, Local legitimacy, Post-conflict, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), Solomon Islands

## 1. Introduction

After the Cold War ended, there have been growing calls for intervention that is aimed at international peacebuilding due to the rise of frequent intrastate conflicts (Barfield 2004; Coleman 2017; Karlborg 2013; Karlborg 2014). However, due to a lack of clarity in the relationship between local legitimacy and international intervention, this led to political problems that inhibited the process of developing better means of interventions that can end conflicts and provide stability in their aftermath. The resolution of conflicts require cooperation between armed groups and local governments and, at times, a need for international intervention that can help to end the conflict. However, international interventions can cause antipathy in armed groups, which raises a pertinent question: what are the motivations that drive armed groups and local governments to follow international norms, rules, and commitments in the first place? Ian Hurd claims that there are “three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: (1) because the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999, 379).

There are two reasons that have prompted this study to focus on the issue of legitimacy. First, there is a lack of clarity of how locals accept and provide legitimacy to international intervention. Second, there is a need to understand how the peace process can be sustained after the cessation of international intervention has occurred. In their book, Richmond and Mac Ginty have highlighted the significance of local legitimacy in international intervention after recent calls were made by academia and policymakers who demanded a clearer understanding of the way in which peace processes can become widely accepted by a local society (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2020, 1–38). This suggests that there is a need to explain local legitimacy and

international intervention by both academic and actual practices.

The focus of this study is on the Solomon Islands — a cluster of tropical islets that lie in the Melanesia region of Oceania — as a typical case of a post-conflict society and a target of international intervention. The Solomon Islands was one of the few cases in which international intervention and peacebuilding had succeeded in the aftermath of internal conflict in Oceania. The roles and functions of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands have been widely debated, analyzed, and evaluated in terms of its success as a mediator in securing sustainable peace. According to Hayward-Jones, the peacebuilding efforts that were made by RAMSI had “restored law and order in Solomon Islands; it has reconstituted a shattered economy; and it has helped rebuild the broken machinery of government” (Hayward-Jones 2014, 1). RAMSI succeeded in ending the ethnic conflict that erupted in the Solomon Islands and brought peace to the island country which has persisted after its mission ended in June 2017.

The main contribution of this study is an identification and an analysis of the mechanisms by which external interventions are interpreted as legitimate by every relevant actor in the country of conflict. The findings of this study have critical implications in maintaining long-term peace in the aftermath of conflicts for similar cases throughout the world.

The research question of this study is formulated as follows: why did the Solomon Islanders accept RAMSI’s intervention, and how did they come to perceive it as being legitimate? In order to address this research question, an extensive literature review and in-depth qualitative research were undertaken. An analysis was performed on the results of the surveys that were conducted by RAMSI and its local staff in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 during its intervention in the Solomon Islands from July 2003 to June 2017, which included general questions about itself and the response of the locals. The first author of this paper also conducted original interviews with nine individuals who lived in the Solomon Islands in 2022.

This study is structured as follows. First, it provides a literature review of international intervention and the brief overview of the process of RAMSI's intervention and its activities. Second, it describes the general perceptions of Solomon Islanders toward RAMSI by using the RAMSI annual reports from 2006 to 2013 during their presence in Solomon Island until 2017. Third, it examines how and why the Solomon Islanders accepted RAMSI as a reliable and legitimate authority by conducting original interviews which aims to recollect RAMSI's activities five years after the withdrawal of its intervention. Finally, in the conclusion, it discusses the main findings on the local legitimacy of international intervention in the Solomon Islands and their global and practical implications for post-conflict societies in other parts of the world.

## **2. Literature review**

Recent studies have demonstrated the necessity of legitimacy — as it is viewed by the locals — as a key component of international intervention, which has deeply impacted international society. A reason for this need was attributed to the failure of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. According to the former US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, “the Soviets had lost in Afghanistan largely because the fierce and nationalistic Afghans saw them as invaders and destroyers” (Feith 2008, 76).

In the case of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, why did international intervention fail to succeed? The literature argues that there are two possible reasons for the failure of intervention by the Soviets: (1) local and international trade-off situations, and (2) a lack of local satisfaction and accommodation. Coleman has mentioned the importance of common features that are shared between the troops in local countries and those by intervention troops (Coleman 2017, 342). The coalition-builders in the International

Security Assistance Force (hereinafter, ISAF) had ignored two common practices that were crucial to ensure its legitimacy. It is said that “few states with cultural, regional, or religious affinities to Afghanistan were included in the initial coalition; despite indications of interest from its neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Indonesia, the 18 initial ISAF participants were all unambiguously Western ones, except for NATO-member Turkey” (Hoon 2002).

In this study, “legitimacy” is based on the definition that is provided by Ian Hurd: “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution” (Hurd 1999, 381). As mentioned earlier, armed groups and local governments are coerced to follow international norms, rules, and commitments since they fear the punishment that will be meted out against them when they fail to do so. Coercion refers to an asymmetrical distribution of physical power among agents, and this asymmetry is applied in order to alter the behavior of a weaker agent through the use of fear or “compellence” since fear is known to produce acquiescence. Thomas C. Schelling (1966) defines the term as the ability of one state to coerce another state into action, usually by threatening punishment or direct action that persuades the opponent to give up something that is desired.

Although compliance with rules is attributed to a belief that it can promote self-interest, if the intervention lacks legitimacy — or there is a lack of understanding of it as being legitimate — as a form of help, the institution or organization needs to pay more to complete the mission. Dahl and Lindblom have observed that “legitimacy is not indispensable to all control. Nevertheless, lack of legitimacy imposes heavy costs on the controllers” (Dahl and Lindblom 1992, 115). When the locals are not convinced by the legitimacy of international intervention, it will not be accepted by them.

In the past decades, international institutions have attempted to establish some form of legitimacy in one way or another. However, in the case

of Afghanistan, Wilder has indicated the weakness of the legitimacy of Soviet occupation. He maintains that international legitimacy-building sometimes relies on a top-down approach, and that “the attempt to create legitimacy through service delivery and governance is both alien and problematic, as they imply expectations for tangible action, whereas the traditional bases for legitimacy are ideational” (Wilder 2012, 59). Consequently, a question is raised: how are international intervention and the peace process legitimized by the locals? In his analysis of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Lieven has argued this point by claiming that “no ‘Western force’ would be perceived ‘either useful or acceptable to a majority of Afghans’ because ‘any international force and authority will need legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans, and [...] such legitimacy can only be Islamic’ ” (Lieven 2001).

Thus, we argue that legitimacy is not decided and given solely by an international army, but is more dependent on a specific local context. If this is the case, why do the locals oppose international intervention occasionally? According to previous research, there are three possible causes of friction between locals and international intervention: (1) a difference in the basis of legitimacy; (2) a top-down relationship; and (3) a lack of understanding of local needs.

First, and occasionally, misunderstandings arise over the rationale for an intervention. If this rationale is different from the local opinion, it will be difficult for the intervention to conduct its mission. As pointed out by Lieven (2001) earlier, in the case of Afghanistan, legitimacy was considered to be conferred only by an Islamic military intervention. Second, the top-down structure in international “legitimacy-building” has been criticized by some as a critical weakness. As stated earlier, although the traditional bases for legitimacy are ideational, however, legitimacy-building sometimes relies on the top-down approach (Wilder 2012). Third, a lack of understanding of the needs of locals also negatively affects their acceptance of international intervention. This is a criticism that is often directed at missions which

overemphasized the provision of top-down security management and other governmental services while being less responsive to local expectations, priorities, and needs. This type of international intervention may be met by severe resistance from locals, as a neglect of their needs is bound to provoke various responses from the local populace (Hellmüller 2013).

On the other hand, some researchers have argued that international intervention will never be accepted by locals. For instance, Lemay-Hébert claims that “host citizens may condemn the element of intervention itself and the idea of being ‘pushed to conform to outside notions’ of how peace should be constructed” (Lemay-Hébert 2011, 1827).

Nevertheless, previous research had failed to clarify some issues. Specifically, what would constitute an intervention that accommodates the needs of the locals? And how can it be recognized as being legitimate and credible by them? This study attempts to provide a more nuanced and detailed response to these questions by using the Solomon Islands — one of the island countries that lie in the Pacific Ocean, especially in Oceania — as a case study. The roles and functions of RAMSI have been discussed and evaluated by the literature in terms of its successful commitment as a mediator in order to achieve sustainable peace in the island country. RAMSI had succeeded in ending the ethnic conflict in the island country and peace has been maintained for almost 5 years — as of this writing — after its mission concluded in June 2017.

### **3. Timeline of intervention by RAMSI**

In this section, we provide a brief history of the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands, which occurred in its capital of Honiara in Guadalcanal Island toward the end of 1998. The conflict mainly pitted two armed groups — the Isatabu Freedom Movement (hereinafter, IFM), which comprised the

South Guadalcanal natives, and the Malaita Eagle Force (hereinafter, MEF) — against the government after IFM threatened and excluded inhabitants from Malaita. The IFM had accused the Malaita natives of robbing the South Guadalcanal people of their lands and awarding job opportunities to members from their own community (Ishimori 2013, 102–106). After the reconciliation talks that were held by the government in May 1999 fell through due to the continued attacks that were launched by IFM, the Malaita natives fled Guadalcanal and lost their properties (Fujii 2018, 512–513). Subsequently, they demanded the government compensate them for their damages and losses. However, their request was rejected by the government, which led to reprisals that were taken by MEF against IFM. Since MEF had connections with a Malaitan police officer, they took control of the capital in early 2000 by claiming to protect inhabitants of Malaita who live in Honiara. Ultimately, MEF executed a coup d'état and dismissed the incumbent prime minister by installing his successor in June 2000. The new prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, also attempted to reach a peace settlement — called the Townsville Peace Agreement — in October 2000. However, that effort also ended in failure (Fujii 2018, 513–514).

It has been argued that the causes of the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands were attributed to the declining living standards and deepening poverty level of its population, both in rural and urban areas (Anere et al. 2000). As the government of the Solomon Islands lacked the resources to manage the conflict on its own, its prime minister appealed for assistance from the Pacific Islands Forum (hereinafter, PIF) in April 2003. At the decision of the PIF, the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (hereinafter, RAMSI) was established and dispatched to the Solomon Islands in July 2003. RAMSI comprised 2,200 police and armed forces from five countries, namely, Australia — a regional power with a large army, economic, and human resources, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. RAMSI described its mission as “helping the Solomon Islands lay the

foundations for long-term stability, security and prosperity.” RAMSI comprised the Office of the Special Coordinator (OSC), the Participating Police Force (PPF), the Combined Task Force (CTF), and the civilian development programs (RAMSI Report 2013). RAMSI ended its intervention in the Solomon Islands on June 30, 2017 (RAMSI Report 2015).

Table 1: Timeline of intervention

DATE	EVENT
1998	The Isatabu Freedom Movement (hereinafter, IFM) which consisted of the South Guadalcanal people threatened and excluded inhabitants from Malaita.
1999.5	The reconciliation rite happened.
1999.5	The further attack by IFM occurred.
1999	Inhabitants from Malaita escaped from Guadalcanal.
2000	The Malaita Eagle Force (hereinafter, MEF) took control of the capital.
2000.6	MEF carried out a coup d'état and replaced the sitting prime minister with a new one.
2000.10	Manasseh Sogavare tried to make a peace agreement of Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA), but it failed.
2003.4	Manasseh Sogavare requested the help to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
2003.7	Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (hereinafter, RAMSI) was formed and sent to the Solomon Islands.
2017.6	The RAMSI mission concludes on 30 June 2017.

Source: Compiled by the authors based on Fujii (2018) and Ishimori and Niwa (2013).

## 4. Research methods

The research methods that were employed by this study included an analysis of official reports and semi-structured interviews that were conducted online. Since the goal of this study was to understand the gradual process by which the Solomon Islanders accepted and legitimized the foreign intervention that was launched by RAMSI, their perceptions and evaluations of the mission were analyzed. For this study, we examined the official annual surveys that were conducted by RAMSI from 2006 to 2013 which recorded the opinions of the locals toward RAMSI. Through a analysis and comparison

of the results of these surveys, this study identified how RAMSI gained the recognition of the Solomon Islanders and examined the changes in their perceptions toward it over the years.

Nevertheless, the information yielded by the surveys were not sufficient for this study to gain a thorough understanding of an acceptance of RAMSI and its intervention by the locals. Consequently, this study also used semi-structured interviews that were conducted online by the first author in order to understand the underlying opinions which the locals may have about RAMSI. The interview raised specific questions that addressed their perceptions of RAMSI and obtained a fuller understanding of the nuanced opinions and feelings of every participant. The semi-structured interview included nine participants from the Solomon Islands and was conducted online using six questions. The participants were recruited based on their age since the domestic conflict occurred 25 years ago. The interviews were conducted from July 20 to August 25 in 2022. Half of the interviewees were recruited from one of the author's previous field research in the Solomon Islands and the rest were found through snowball sampling.

## **5. RAMSI surveys**

In this section, we examined how the residents of the Solomon Islands recognized and accepted RAMSI through an analysis of the annual surveys that were conducted by the mission from 2006 to 2013. The surveys were conducted by ANU Enterprise P/L and the Australian National University (ANU) on behalf of RAMSI and staff from the Solomon Islands (hereinafter, RAMSI Report 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, respectively). Every single survey was constructed as a questionnaire and participation was voluntary. It also aimed to obtain a representative sample of a cross-section of the Solomon Islands' population by taking into consideration

various factors such as age, education, gender, income level, and geographic location.

Although the questionnaire included over ten sections, this study only focused on one section which contained seven questions that were related to RAMSI activities. These questions were assumed to be representative and included the following: (1) whether participants had seen and spoken to a RAMSI officer in the last three months; (2) whether they preferred to report a crime to RAMSI or the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (hereinafter, RASIPF); (3) perceptions of RAMSI's role; (4) whether violent conflict could return; and (5) whether the respondent supported RAMSI overall. The response to the questions that were collected from this singular section were analyzed to better understand what the locals thought about RAMSI.

Generally, based on the results that were collected by the surveys, RAMSI was well-known throughout the Solomon Islands from 2006 to 2008, and most locals had seen RAMSI police and army officers regularly. However, according to the 2007 and 2008 surveys, very few locals had spoken to members of the RAMSI forces.

In 2006, almost all respondents (99.4%) had heard of the RAMSI police and 91.5% had seen them. However, only 32.4% of respondents had spoken to the RAMSI police. In 2007, 63% of respondents had seen the RAMSI police and 46.3% had seen the RAMSI army. Nevertheless, the 2006 survey stated that only 11.8% of respondents had spoken with the RAMSI police and only 8.4% had spoken with a member of the RAMSI army. In 2008, the figures in each section had decreased when 58.6% and 42.0% of respondents reported that they had seen a male and female RAMSI police officer, respectively, and 49.5% and 36.4% reported that they had seen a male and female member of the RAMSI army, respectively. It was noted that 25% of respondents had not seen anyone from RAMSI and 80.9% of them had spoken to neither the RAMSI police nor army.

Table 2: the Solomon Islanders' knowledge and interaction with RAMSI, and their perceptions (%) of risk of violent conflict if RAMSI leaves soon in 2006

	Heard of RAMSI	Seen RAMSI	Spoken to RAMSI	Violence would return			Total Number
				Yes	Maybe	No	
Choiseul	100.0	97.5	35.0	76.3	13.8	12.6	80
Guadal canal	98.5	90.5	27.9	69.5	20.2	10.2	262
Honiara	100.0	97.5	44.5	66.4	18.5	15.0	238
Malaita	99.7	83.7	24.7	53.8	27.0	19.1	344
Western	99.4	98.1	37.3	77.0	14.3	18.7	161
Rural	99.3	88.9	27.8	63.8	22.2	14.0	766
Urban	99.7	97.8	43.6	69.3	16.9	13.3	319
Man	99.6	94.8	40.3	75.4	13.1	11.5	268
Woman	99.6	90.6	18.5	64.9	26.8	8.2	276
Young Man	100.0	95.2	46.2	54.9	25.3	19.3	273
Young Woman	98.5	85.4	25.0	66.8	17.2	15.5	268
Total (%)	99.4	91.5	32.4	65.3	20.6	13.5	
Total Number				710	224	146	1,085

Source: RAMSI Report 2006, pp. 29-30.

Note: Although the total number (1,085) is not the same with the sum of the three answers, "Yes" (710), "Maybe" (224), and "No" (146), the miscalculation is the original's, not the authors'.

Table 3: Responses (%) in "Have you seen and spoken to a RAMSI officer in the last 3 months?" in 2007

	Seen Police	Spoken Police	Seen Army	Spoken Army	Seen Other	Spoken Other	Seen None	Spoken None
Man	68.3	20.6	29.2	11.3	4.8	2.0	24.8	71.3
Woman	52.5	5.7	51.1	4.4	8.0	1.4	24.9	87.9
Young Man	72.4	15.6	56.4	14.5	10.4	1.7	14.5	68.8
Young Woman	58.9	5.4	48.8	3.3	3.1	0.4	24.5	91.2
Rural	58.7	10.2	42.7	8.1	5.5	0.9	26.1	81.4
Urban	84.3	19.9	64.1	9.7	11.8	3.5	3.2	71.9
Central	58.9	6.5	16.1	1.7	1.0	0.0	31.8	92.1
Choiseul	45.1	4.0	17.7	1.8	11.1	2.7	42.0	81.0
Guadalcanal	68.8	9.4	62.3	7.6	5.9	0.0	19.8	80.0
Honiara	83.5	16.5	75.5	10.6	13.4	3.0	4.5	73.7
Makira/Ulawa	79.6	26.1	73.4	21.7	3.1	1.3	18.0	71.3
Malaita	52.3	11.3	46.9	11.7	4.8	1.1	25.3	78.1
Temotu	24.5	4.4	4.0	1.0	9.4	2.3	55.0	82.9
Western	68.3	14.0	40.2	4.0	9.3	2.4	16.9	81.7
Ysabel	86.8	15.0	15.0	1.1	1.8	0.4	6.8	91.1
Total	63.0	46.3	46.3	8.4	6.6	1.4	22.2	79.8

Source: RAMSI Report 2007, p. 46.

Table 4: Responses (%) in “Have you seen a RAMSI officer in the last 3 months?” in 2008

	Seen Police Male	Seen Police Female	Seen Army Male	Seen Army Female	Seen Other Male	Seen Other Female	Seen None	Total Number
Man	68.0	51.6	54.8	39.8	20.2	15.8	21.2	1,120
Woman	46.7	28.9	37.0	27.8	12.1	10.7	33.5	1,084
Young Woman	66.7	48.8	61.5	43.5	16.0	9.6	19.0	1,050
Guadalcanal	52.9	38.7	44.8	34.5	12.3	10.9	22.2	1,050
Makira	60.2	29.6	16.4	10.4	8.9	7.0	23.7	415
Malaita	55.3	43.4	39.2	34.4	13.8	8.7	36.4	1,554
Renbel	98.3	61.7	75.0	57.5	57.5	53.3	0.0	120
Western	64.2	46.1	35.4	24.2	10.9	8.4	27.9	763
All Non Honiara	56.8	39.1	44.5	32.1	12.9	9.6	28.0	3,751
Honiara	71.2	62.0	83.4	65.6	30.7	26.6	4.5	553
All respondents	58.6	42.0	49.5	36.4	15.2	11.8	25.0	4,304

Source: RAMSI Report 2008, p. 53.

Table 5: Responses (%) in “Have you spoken to a RAMSI officer in the last 3 months?” in 2008


	Spoken Police Male	Spoken Police Female	Spoken Army Male	Spoken Army Female	Spoken Other Male	Spoken Other Female	Spoken to None	Total Number
Man	15.5	4.6	8.1	2.6	3.3	1.7	76.2	1,120
Woman	6.5	4.1	5.3	3.3	1.9	2.0	84.4	1,084
Young Man	11.7	3.6	10.5	2.7	2.3	1.2	76.7	1,050
Young Woman	5.0	3.1	3.9	3.1	1.2	1.2	86.5	1,050
Guadalcanal	6.6	2.4	12.3	3.8	1.1	0.7	78.9	899
Makira	3.4	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.5	94.5	415
Malaita	8.8	3.9	5.0	2.1	1.2	0.5	82.2	1,554
Renbel	14.2	7.5	8.3	2.5	4.2	2.5	75.0	120
Western	12.2	3.3	2.1	0.9	1.3	0.8	82.6	763
All Non-Honiara	8.5	3.1	5.7	2.1	1.2	0.7	82.6	3,751
Honiara	18.1	8.7	15.2	8.7	9.0	7.6	69.3	553
All Respondents	9.8	3.9	6.9	2.9	2.2	1.6	80.9	4,304

Source: RAMSI Report 2008, p. 55.

From 2006 to 2008, in their response to the question of “to whom the respondents would be more likely to report a crime, RAMSI or RSIPF?,” most respondents indicated that they preferred to report a crime to RSIPF and more than 30% of them reported that they would report it to RAMSI. Over the next two years, the rate decreased. However, 27.3% and 23.6% of respondents in 2007 and 2008, respectively, indicated that they would prefer to report a

crime to their chief. In the context of the Solomon Islands, the chief is the leader of an ethnic tribe. Generally, before the outbreak of the national conflict, most disputes and issues were resolved by the chief of every tribe. Consequently, we can attribute the high percentage of answers that cited a preference for reporting a crime to their tribal chiefs to the cultural background of the locals. However, RAMSI also enjoyed the same level of trust as the chiefs and RSIPF in the reporting of crimes by the locals.

Figure 1: Changes in Percentages for the question of “To whom respondents would report a crime” in 2006-8



Source: Compiled by the authors based on RAMSI Report 2006, pp. 30-31; RAMSI Report 2007, p.74; RAMSI Report 2008, p.88.

Note: RSIPF stands for Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.

In 2006, in their response to the question on “understanding the role of RAMSI,” 86.5% of respondents answered that they “know RAMSI’s mission.” In 2007, among the most common perceptions of the role of RAMSI, 62% of them reported that they were in their country to “keep the peace,” 42% believed they were there to “improve law and justice,” 22% cited it was their goal to “arrest criminals,” and only 19% thought they can “help run the country.”

Similar to 2007, in 2008, the most common response to the role of RAMSI was to “keep the peace” (66%). It was followed by “improve law and justice” (37%), “arrest criminals” (28%), and “help run the country” (23%).

Table 6: Perceptions (%) of RAMSI's role in 2006

	RAMSI should intervene	Know RAMSI's mission	Preferred method of service provision		Total Number
			By RAMSI	By Trained Solomon Islanders	
Choiseul	77.5	98.8	31.3	66.3	80
Guadalcanal	76.0	84.4	33.2	59.2	262
Honiara	79.4	92.9	14.7	80.3	238
Malaita	69.2	79.1	18.6	73.3	344
Western	75.2	90.1	38.5	55.9	161
Rural	73.2	84.5	27.2	67.1	766
Urban	77.1	91.2	20.4	73.4	319
Man	83.6	95.1	31.7	67.5	268
Woman	75.4	85.9	27.9	68.5	276
Young Man	62.3	87.5	21.2	74.4	273
Young Woman	77.2	77.2	19.8	65.3	268
Total	74.6	86.5	25.2	68.9	
Total Number			273	748	11,085

Source: RAMSI Report 2006, pp. 31-32.

Table 7: Perceptions of RAMSI's role in 2007 (up to three responses)

	Total percentage	Total Number
Keep the peace	62.0	3,193
Help run the country	19.3	996
Provide technical assistance	5.0	258
Arrest criminals	22.0	1,132
Improve law and justice	40.5	2,088
Improve the economy	5.2	268
Improve democracy and government	3.4	177
Train Solomon Islands	3.1	162
Assist/ strengthen weak areas/ help development	0.7	37
Patrol/ security	0.6	32
Raise awareness/ promote human rights	0.1	7
Work with/ look after the people/ help Solomon Islanders	1.0	51
Promote national unity/ confidence	0.1	4
Collect/ destroy weapons/ guns	0.7	38
Positive comment about RAMSI	1.0	52
Complaint or negative comment about RAMSI	1.2	62
Know but did not specify	3.8	195
Don't know	4.8	245
Wouldn't like to say	0.1	5
No answer	1.3	65

Source: RAMSI Report 2007, p.48.

Table 8: Perceptions of RAMSI's role in 2008 (up to three responses)

	Total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total Number
Keep the peace	65.7	65.0	66.4	2,829
Improve Law and Justice	37.2	48.0	26.1	1,599
Arrest criminals	27.8	23.7	32.0	1,198
Help run the country	23.3	15.1	31.6	1,002
Provide technical assistance	12.0	15.8	8.2	517
Improve the economy	4.4	5.8	3.0	191
Train Solomon Islanders	3.9	4.6	3.1	166
Don't know	3.7	4.0	3.4	127
Improve democracy and government	2.6	3.6	1.5	110
Complaint/ negative comment on RAMSI	2.2	2.4	2.0	94
Positive comment on RAMSI	1.6	2.4	0.8	70
Collect/ destroy weapons/ guns	1.1	0.6	1.5	46
Work with/ look after people/ help Solomon Islanders	0.7	0.8	0.6	31
Patrol/ security	0.8	0.8	0.6	30
Promote national unity/ confidence	0.4	0.6	0.3	21
Assist/ strengthen weak areas/ help development	0.2	0.3	0.2	12
Other/ not specified	0.2	0.1	0.0	10
Raise awareness/ promote human rights	0.1	0.2	0.1	6

Source: RAMSI Report 2008, p. 56.

Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents who felt that RAMSI was able to “provide technical assistance” increased from 5% in 2007 to 12%. Similar to 2009, in 2010, “keep the peace” was the most common answer given by 65.7% of respondents.

When the respondents were asked whether they thought violence would return after RAMSI leaves, the number of people who answered “yes” decreased every year. In 2006, 65.4% of respondents thought the conflict would return after RAMSI leaves. However, this figure decreased to 52.5% and 47.7% in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In 2009, the figure rose to 53.1%. Notably, the percentage of respondents who answered “no” to the question of “Would violence return to the Solomon Islands if RAMSI left soon?” did not decrease significantly as their figures were 13.5%, 7.0%, 10.3%, and 6.5% in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively.

Table 9: Responses (%) in “Would violence return to Solomon Islands if RAMSI left soon?” in 2007 and 2009

PROVINCE/EA	2009					2007				
	Yes	Maybe	No	Don't Know	Number	Yes	Maybe	No	Don't Know	Number
CENTRAL PROVINCE (Sandfiy)	67.2	16.0	10.0	6.4	251	54.6	29.2	4.8	11.0	292
CHOISEUL (Katupika)	52.3	29.5	5.7	12.1	264	37.2	34.5	10.2	16.4	226
GUADALCANAL	58.9	34.1	1.4	5.6	912					
Duidui	48.1	48.6	0.0	3.4	208	63.6	25.8	1.5	6.6	198
Isuna	40.0	47.0	3.0	10.0	100					
Moli	64.0	27.9	1.1	7.0	272	63.8	23.1	2.3	10.7	310
Tandai	70.8	14.6	4.2	10.4	48	45.5	49.1	1.8	1.8	55
Tangarare	66.5	28.2	1.8	3.5	284	70.1	21.6	0.8	6.1	267
HONIARA	52.2	32.5	7.0	8.0	575					
Kola'a	50.9	34.3	7.4	7.4	108	46.9	20.8	13.1	19.2	132
Ngossi	59.6	21.9	9.6	8.8	114	56.9	16.2	17.7	8.5	130
Vavaea	44.8	38.2	4.2	11.5	165	47.8	25.4	11.9	12.7	136
Vura	54.8	33.0	7.4	4.8	188	44.4	34.4	6.9	13.1	161
HONIARASETLEMENTS	57.4	30.4	6.3	5.6	303					
Burns Creek	49.5	38.6	3.0	8.9	101					
Green Valley	57.8	25.5	10.8	4.9	102					
Independence										
Valley	65.0	27.0	5.0	3.0	100					
MALAITA	41.4	34.1	9.9	14.3	1549					
Asimae	59.2	28.4	5.3	7.1	169	56.7	24.7	8.2	10.3	97
Atoifi	47.9	40.6	5.2	6.3	96					
Buma	21.4	29.1	14.8	33.0	182	41.3	27.1	13.3	17.9	218
Fo'ondo/Gwaiiau	34.4	47.6	4.9	12.2	288	55.7	20.4	8.2	15.4	318
Kwaimela/Radefasu	41.7	29.1	4.6	24.5	151	45.3	35.8	5	13.9	201
Matakwalao	25.0	30.6	27.1	17.4	144	61.5	20.5	4.0	14.0	200
Takwa	51.2	35.0	5.9	7.9	303	41.2	25.1	14.3	18.1	441
Waneagu/Taelansina	47.7	26.4	15.7	10.2	216	57.1	22.6	7.1	13.1	84
TEMOTU (E.Lata/Nenumpo)	70.7	23.3	1.4	4.7	215	55.0	23.8	2.3	9.1	298
WESTERN PROVINCE	56.7	25.0	7.1	10.5	677	55.0	23.8	2.3	9.1	
Bara'ulu	47.5	25.8	15.8	8.3	120					
Central Ranongga	62.8	25.6	3.3	7.4	121	65.7	20.6	5.9	7.8	105
Gizo	47.9	29.9	4.2	18.0	167	60.1	28.1	5.9	5.9	306
Noro	65.0	22.5	2.5	10.0	120	60.0	36.1	1.0	2.9	205
Vona Vona	62.4	20.1	10.1	6.7	149					
ISABEL (Kia)	62.5	22.9	4.2	9.7	289	41.4	39.6	3.9	14.6	280
RESPONDENT TYPE**										
Men	45.1	34.9	10.3	9.0	1,307					
Women	50.1	33.7	3.0	12.7	1,266					
Young Men	54.2	28.4	8.4	9.0	1,238					
Young Women	63.7	23.5	4.2	8.3	1,224					
TOTAL SAMPLE	53.1	30.2	6.5	9.8	5,035	52.5	26.9	7.0	12.4	4,660


Source: RAMSI Report 2009, p. 116.



Burns Creek	69.3	11.9	17.8	101				
Green Valley	95.1	2	2.9	102				
Indendence Valley	100	0	0	100				
MALAITA								
As ima e	78.1	8.9	13	169	93.8	3.1	2.1	97
Atoifi	71.9	11.5	16.7	96				
Buma	78	13.2	7.1	182	89	4.1	6.4	218
Fo'ondo/Gwaiau	81.6	6.6	10.1	288	90.6	5	4.1	318
Kwa imela/Radefasu	95.4	0	4.6	151	91	2	7	201
Matakwalao	61.8	25	12.5	144	82.5	7	10	200
Ta kwa	77.9	6.9	14.9	303	81	6.3	11.1	441
Wanea u/Taelansina	77.3	11.1	11.6	216	94	4.8	1.2	84
TEMOTU (E.Lata/Nenumpo)	95.3	1.4	3.3	215	87.9	1.7	0.7	298
WESTERN PROVINCE								
Bara'ul u	85.8	10.8	1.7	120				
Central Ranongga	92.6	4.1	2.5	121	96.1	2	2	105
Gizo	95.8	1.8	2.4	167	92.2	2.9	4.6	306
Noro	97.5	0.8	1.7	120	120	94.1	1	4.4
Vona Vona	96.6	2.7	0.7	149				
ISABEL (Kia )	98.6	0.3	0.7	289	96.4	1.1	1.8	280
RESPONDENT TYPE**								
Men	83	10.5	6	1,307				
Women	89.7	1.9	7.8	1,266				
Young Men	88.9	4.8	6	1,238				
Young Women	89.1	2.5	8.1	1,224				
TOTAL SAMPLE	87.6	5	7	5,035	90.4	4.4	3.8	4,660

Source: RAMSI Report 2009, p. 117.

Figure 3: Changes of Responses in “Do you support RAMSI?” in 2007-10



Source: Compiled by the authors based on RAMSI Report 2007, p. 49; RAMSI Report 2009, p. 117; RAMSI Report 2010, p. 96.

Urban respondents were more likely to support RAMSI's interventions than their rural counterparts. When one considered the areas that were most adversely affected by the ethnic conflict, residents in Malaita and Honiara, which were urban centers, expressed greater support for RAMSI's interventions because they were more badly affected than those who lived in the rural areas.

Table 11: Responses (%) in "RAMSI should intervene?" in 2006

	Yes
Rural	73.2
Urban	77.1
Man	83.6
Woman	75.4
Total	74.6

Source: RAMSI Report 2006, pp. 31-32.

Some questionnaires also included interviews that were conducted at the end of the survey. In 2006, a report mentioned that some respondents stated their preference for RAMSI "to train the Solomon Islanders to provide services rather than to provide them" (RAMSI Report 2006, 8). In response to their preference, RAMSI subsequently offered training in areas such as administrative support for government staff and legal training for lawyers.

Other locals who supported RAMSI expressed their hope to see a bigger presence by RAMSI. In the 2006 report, a local man was reported to have said, "People in our community want RAMSI to stay on and monitor what is going on in our communities. Our country is not straight yet" (RAMSI Report 2006, 58). In the 2008 report, it was mentioned that "RAMSI needs to do more community policing, in rural as well as urban areas" (RAMSI Report 2008, 92) and "Another common response in both data sources is that RAMSI should provide more training and transfer of skills" (RAMSI Report 2008, 92).

Nevertheless, some people expressed unease about the situation after RAMSI leaves the Solomon Islands. In the 2007 and 2008 reports, several

misgivings were expressed about the lingering hostilities between police officers from Guadalcanal and Malaita, and the destabilizing effect these hostilities would have on the country if RAMSI were to leave (RAMSI Report 2007, 49–50; RAMSI Report 2008, 118).

A Guadalcanal man also mentioned the uneasy relationship that existed between the natives from Guadalcanal and Malaita. He answered, “Since RAMSI have come and worked with our police, no matter if they are from Guadalcanal or Malaita, they work well together, but if it was just them, I think it would not be good because there would still be some ill feeling between them. But RAMSI means they can work well together, which is why I say RAMSI needs to stay to help them work together” (RAMSI Report 2007, 118).

However, some respondents were against the intervention made by RAMSI. In the 2008 report, a respondent criticized RAMSI’s activities by saying, “It is not the same today as before. When RAMSI first arrived, they did their work better than now. Today, even if they came across people taking ‘kwaso,’<sup>ii</sup> they would not arrest them” (RAMSI Report 2008, 109).

Although some respondents did not criticize RAMSI, however, they commented on the intervention that was carried out by RAMSI. In the 2008 report, a Guadalcanal man voiced his concern about human rights and gender equality between the Solomon Islanders and RAMSI. According to him, “I have the right to teach and discipline my children and wife if I ever have any, I have the right to physically scold them; however, I would be imprisoned if I did this nowadays. This is not acceptable according to my culture and for me I think it’s not right or good, because I am responsible to teach my children and my wife to follow my rules” (RAMSI Report 2008, 119).

Another respondent commented on the organization of RAMSI as “They are doing quite a lot of work but ... they seem to be doing their own thing instead of working with the existing institutions” (RAMSI Report 2008, 121). The respondent also proposed an alternative to collaborate with

RAMSI: “So while RAMSI is trying to do its own thing with the same group, why not do it with the other group to help those human resources and finance resources, in that way it will help build local capacity” (RAMSI Report 2008, 121).

The surveys that were conducted by RAMSI had helped to clarify the general opinions that were held by the locals about its presence, their perceptions of its mission, the level of their support for it, and its reliability. However, they did not reveal the reasons for the views that were held by the locals about RAMSI and their acceptance of it. In the next section, we addressed this issue based on the interviews that were conducted by the first author.

## 6. Interviews

A total of nine Solomon Islanders were interviewed by the first author of this paper through either an online semi-structured or paper-based interview that was conducted from July 20 to August 25 in 2022. The inclusion criteria for the participants were citizens of the Solomon Islands, age, and their relationship to the peace process and RAMSI. Since the ethnic conflict occurred between 1998 and 2003, and RAMSI supported the Solomon Islands from 2003 to 2013, the interview included participants who were aged over 30. The interview aimed to examine how the Solomon Islanders accepted RAMSI and their evaluation of its impact.

The interview included six questions as follow: (1) how did you feel about RAMSI coming to stop the war?; (2) how did you feel about Australia at that time?; (3) would you have felt differently if RAMSI consisted of other countries such as Indonesia, Fiji, or China?;<sup>iii</sup> (4) were you satisfied with the involvement of RAMSI?; (5) do you feel that the United Nations (UN) need to conduct the mission to stop the conflict? Or RAMSI?; and (6) do you feel

RAMSI was a trustworthy partner to stop the conflict and peacebuilding? The general information and the background of interviewees are shown in Table 12. Every interview was conducted via an online video call, and a paper-based questionnaire was used for participants who did not own electronic devices. All interviews and questionnaires were conducted and collected from July to September of 2022.

Table 12: Background of the 9 respondents

No.	Name	Age	Sex	Occupation	Background	Date
1	J	20	Man	No information	Victim	Aug 24 <sup>th</sup> 2022
2	A	50	Man	Security Officer	A Malaita Eagle Force Ex Militant	Aug 25 <sup>th</sup> 2022
3	D	65	Man	A Former Politician	A man who part of the Peace agreement signed at Townsville	Sep 5 <sup>th</sup> 2022
4	L	39	Man	Lecturer in the Solomon Island National University	Victim	Sep 6 <sup>th</sup> 2022
5	F	54	Man	Primary School teacher	Guadalcanal Province	Sep 6 <sup>th</sup> 2022
6	J	49	Man	No information	Malaita Province	Sep 6 <sup>th</sup> 2022
7	D	36	Man	Physical Education teacher	Malaita Province, Victim	July 20 <sup>th</sup> 2022
8	M	40	Women	Lawyer	Western Province & Isabel province	Aug 24 <sup>th</sup> 2022
9	N	65	Women	No information	Former staff of the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Committee	Aug 3 <sup>rd</sup> 2022

Note: Although respondent 9's answers are not complete, they are included here as they are indispensable for her sole socio-economic background of working for the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Committee.

In their response to the first question, most respondents mentioned that they felt relieved, protected, and that normal life had resumed. In the words of respondent 1, “After 1 year and 6 months of sleeplessness, fear, agony, and bloodshed all over our islands, I felt relieved and stressless and joyful about the coming of RAMSI to stop the war. I felt thankful for RAMSI and would like to send gratitude to the Government of Australia for this effort to return peace, law, and order to the country” (Paper-based questionnaire,

August 24, 2022). A more noteworthy answer was given by respondent 3, a former Malaita Premier: “I was pressured a lot from militants about their wishes and support I will render for them. Some of the sacrifices and deadly threats I have encountered with the militants from Malaita were scarier. Hence, the coming of RAMSI to stop the war was a hope for me and my provincial government to take the initiative of leading the ordinary Malaita’s for revive peace and security” (Paper-based questionnaire, August 25, 2022). However, respondent 2, who was a former militant, felt otherwise: “I felt disappointed about RAMSI coming to stop the war. This is our war and let one of the ethnic groups triumph. Isatabu Freedom Movement started the war. They chased all Malaitans and burned properties, so they need to face our aggressiveness for retaliation. Why did RAMSI come? Hence, I am feeling insecure about RAMSI since I am a militant” (Paper-based questionnaire, August 25, 2022).

In his response to the second question, respondent 1 expressed his recognition as “Australia is a big country and very well armed and equipped under the UN, where economically rich, it has massive military equipment with many armed forces. So, it will definitely revive and restore peace and unity in the Solomon Islands” (Paper-based questionnaire, August 24, 2022). Other respondents also mentioned the army, economy, and support of Australia. Respondent 4 also stated that: “During that time, I felt Australia was very supportive and the government was urgently accountable to the prime minister’s request. I felt Australia is capable of handling the conflict here looking at the troops they have, the armed forces, and Navy Seals are ready to deploy to the Solomon Islands” (Paper-based questionnaire, September 6, 2022). Respondent 7 recalled that when RAMSI arrived on the Solomon Islands, they used “one thing, that ‘Helping Friends’. They use it as a slogan. ‘Helping Friends’ is to provide assistance for friends that RAMSI provides us” (Video call interview, July 20, 2022). However, respondent 9 reported that she had a poor image of Australia because her ancestors had

handed down their memories of the legacy of blackbirding that was previously practiced by the country (video call interview, August 3, 2022).

In their response to the third question, some respondents compared the military prowess of Australia, Indonesia, Fiji, and China. Respondent 2 opined as follow: “I see Indonesia and Fiji cannot manage the peace and security here since they have inadequate military equipment compared to Australia” (Paper-based questionnaire, August 25, 2022). Other respondents cited the issue of language barrier as follow: “if Indonesia and China were members of RAMSI, it would have big differences in terms of languages and the sense of closeness.” However, respondent 7 affirmatively said, “I don’t think we invite the military, army, or peacekeeping force from those countries such as Indonesia, Fiji, or China because we don’t have any solidarity. But now we have diplomatic ties with China, China is helping us” (Video call interview, July 20, 2022).

The fourth question elicited a positive response from every participant. Respondent 3 was satisfied with “the involvement of RAMSI in its contribution of: (1) revive peace and security; (2) provide military support and policing; (3) programs of disarmament; (4) law and order; and (5) technical support of local officers” (Paper-based questionnaire, September 5, 2022). Remarkably, other respondents evaluated RAMSI in terms of its contribution to the development of local workers. Respondent 8 averred that “I started my work and we were really supported by RAMSI lawyers in court cases. So, they focus more on professional development of the local people on the Solomon Islands. In that aspect, I was really satisfied, because they trained the locals. In my view, RAMSI’s contribution at that time was the professional development of local people like myself” (Video call interview, August 24, 2022).

In their response to the fifth question, most respondents declined any involvement by the UN Peacekeeping Force. According to respondent 3, “I think this conflict only required RAMSI, looking at the small scale of conflict, so I think RAMSI best suit the unrest in providing peace and security” (Paper-

based questionnaire, September 5, 2022).

For the last question, every respondent reported that RAMSI was a trustworthy partner. Respondent 3 explained his reason as follow: “Their corporation for this country by bringing back peace and security was highly appreciated and works, dedication and commitment they have rendered for this mission” (Paper-based questionnaire, September 5, 2022). Respondent 7 also thought that RAMSI was trustworthy because they were “friends.” He described RAMSI members as “They are Melanesian friends. Fiji or Papua New Guinea are Samoans” (Video call interview, July 20, 2022). Respondent 4 evaluated RAMSI as “I know that RAMSI is a trustworthy partner which accomplished stopping the conflict and made MEF (The Malaita Eagle Force) and IFM (The Isatabu Freedom Movement) to signed to the agreement. RAMSI plays a perfect role for negotiation for a peace agreement” (Paper-based questionnaire, September 6, 2022).

After the interview, some respondents were followed up with further questions. When respondent 3 was asked for her opinion on “how the Solomon Islanders accept RAMSI?,” she replied, “RAMSI came to the Solomon Islands, and they gave the people some confidence to move around freely. Knowing the fact that because the RAMSI was there, people were protected” (Paper-based questionnaire, September 5, 2022). However, respondent 8 replied to the question of “Do you think the image of Australia have changed?” as follow: “Yes, there is a very big difference. Before the ethnic crisis, we were not really open to Australia. But after the ethnic crisis, during the period of the rule of law and stabilizing itself, we really needed help. In the current situation, we are more open to Australia. It was the same with other countries” (Video call interview, August 24, 2022). Moreover, respondent 9 — who claimed that she had an unfavorable image of Australia because of its history of blackbirding — reported that “[Australia’s] image has changed in a good way after seeing the corporation of RAMSI” (Paper-based questionnaire, August 3, 2022).

Overall, based on the findings of the interviews, the “relationship of local country and the country involved in the international intervention” was crucially important since respondents had referred to the relationship between the countries which formed RAMSI with other countries such as China and Indonesia. One respondent claimed that she had an unfavorable impression of Australia because of its history of blackbirding, implying that some people in the Solomon Islands held a negative view of Australia. The inclusion of other countries from Oceania in RAMSI and its contribution to the Solomon Islands had led to its acceptance and positive evaluation by the locals. Moreover, some respondents often mentioned the technical contributions that were made by RAMSI to the social infrastructure of their country, including the police force and the legal profession. The primary aim of the interview was to evaluate RAMSI’s role in retrospect in reintroducing law and order to the Solomon Islands and its provision of technical support for the locals. Generally, we argue that RAMSI had addressed the requests of the locals, and had succeeded in earning their satisfaction and positive evaluations.

## **7. Conclusion**

This study has sought to address how the Solomon Islanders accepted the international intervention that was launched by RAMSI, and how they recognized its legitimacy and credibility. Overall, the results of RAMSI’s surveys demonstrated that the locals had understood its role and were mostly supportive of it. Another finding of the analysis of surveys was that an expectation of the emergence of a new violence by the locals was on the wane annually. Finally, RAMSI’s surveys had revealed that the locals held certain views on how they wanted RAMSI to cooperate with local institutions. Consequently, RAMSI supported the local infrastructure and workers by providing them with training and expertise.

As the surveys did not provide a sufficient understanding of how the Solomon Islanders had accepted RAMSI, semi-structured interviews were conducted by the first author of this paper with the locals in 2022. The following two findings of the interviews suggested that the locals believed RAMSI should improve its cooperation with local institutions and workers — such as the police force and the legal profession — by developing their professional skills and providing technical support.

First, the relationship between the intervening states and the states that accepted the intervention should be considered when an international intervention occurs. Second, the intervening states or institutions that decided on the intervention should consider the needs of the target country and respond to them and the requests of the locals. In the case of the Solomon Islands, it was training and technical support for the locals.

This study has three limitations. First, due to the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020, direct field interviews could not be held in the Solomon Islands and were held online instead. Second, although the Solomon Islands are called home by natives who speak various languages, including pidgin, however, the author's limited language skills had restricted the interviews to include only interviewees who could understand English. Third, with the help of local informants, it was possible to conduct interviews with locals who held electronic devices. Consequently, there was no opportunity to interview those who did not own electronic devices; instead, notes were made on paper. Although the incorporation of the RAMSI surveys and use of local informants had addressed some of the limitations of this study, however, it was not possible to eliminate every one of them.

The main contribution of this study was its inclusion of a huge range of surveys and in-depth semi-structured interviews that supplemented them. This study also overcame a limitation of previous research — which was the uncertainty over the acceptance of RAMSI by the locals — through its conduct

of semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, the research methodology that was employed by this study can be used to analyze other similar cases. Finally, as this study demonstrates, online interview via video call or paper-based questionnaire is inevitable and useful in such situations in which field research and person-to-person interview are impossible to conduct in times of national shutdown and global pandemic. Future studies should focus on further field research and how the locals evaluated RAMSI.

### Note

- i This manuscript is based on the first author's master's thesis, "To what extent do Solomon Islanders accept the international intervention of RAMSI?," which was submitted to and accepted by the Department of Politics at the University of York, UK, in September 2022. The second author supervised her BA thesis on the same topic during her undergraduate studies at the Faculty of Global and Regional Studies at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, and helped her revise and develop this publication at her alma mater.
- ii Kwaso, a homemade brew, is an illegal drink in the Solomon Islands. The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) mentioned that "If you are caught with any equipment for producing kwaso, producing it or assisting someone to produce it, selling or in possession of kwaso, you will be arrested and charged." The RSIPF has claimed that kwaso affects the health of people and can lead to social problems.
- iii These countries were selected for the following reasons: Fiji was one of the member countries in RAMSI even though it has a small armed force; although Indonesia was one of the countries that lie in close proximity to the Solomon Islands, however, it did not share its cultural background and language; and while China had sufficient armed resources and political connections, it also had a different cultural background.

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## 小宮和泉・浅羽祐樹

## 要約

ローカルな文脈の正統性と国際的な介入の関係は、アフガニスタンへの介入の失敗をきっかけにクローズアップされるようになった。本稿では、紛争を解決し、現地の人々から見て長期的かつ正当な平和を確立する、国際的な介入を受け入れる方法について議論する。本稿では、ソロモン諸島の人々がどのように国際的な介入を受け入れ、ソロモン諸島地域支援ミッション (the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands: RAMSI) という外部の力を借りて戦後復興を達成したかを考察する。

これまでの研究では、国際介入の前提条件として正当性の重要性が強調されてきたが、どのような介入が現地のニーズを理解していると言えるのか、またどのようにすれば現地の人々から正当で信頼できるものと認識されるのかについては明らかにされていない。そこで本研究では、RAMSIがどのようなアプローチで正当性を獲得したのか、また、ソロモン諸島の人々が紛争後の自国の安定化のために、どのように外部からの援助を利用したのかを検討することを目的としている。

本稿では2006年から2013年にかけて行われたRAMSIに関するアンケートを分析し、またRAMSIに対するソロモン諸島民の意見をオンラインのインタビューをもとに集め、RAMSIの活動をソロモン諸島の人々がどのように受け入れ評価しているのかを検討する。アンケートとインタビューの結果から本稿ではRAMSIの任務と活動を現地に伝え、現地のニーズに沿った協力を提供し、現地のアクターを和平プロセスに含めたことがソロモン諸島の介入の成功の鍵であったことを主張する。

