

# **Rethinking International Student Migration in Japan:**

Imagined Global Jinzai in the Absence of Immigration and  
Cosmetic Internationalization of Higher Education

A Thesis  
Presented to  
The Graduate School of Global Studies  
Doshisha University

In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in  
Contemporary Asian Studies

by

Daesung Kwon  
(1418 17 1203)

June 2020

# **Rethinking International Student Migration in Japan:**

## **Imagined Global Jinzai in the Absence of Immigration and Cosmetic Internationalization of Higher Education**

### **ABSTRACT**

Japan has been averse to immigration due to a strong belief in homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and culture; and although Japan has already turned into a de facto country of immigration, it has continuously maintained a restrictive attitude towards immigration. Mass immigration is constantly a very sensitive topic discussed in Japanese society. However, with its birth rate among the world's lowest, the country consistently faces problems stemming from an aging society, a shrinking labor force, and declining productivity. In order to revitalize its stagnant economy, the third largest in the world, one avenue the government has looked towards is foreign human resources. Observations of Japanese migration policy clearly shows that the government is moving away from a restrictive immigration regime towards a more liberalized and settlement-oriented approach. It has proactively been enticing qualified foreign migrant workers – both the highly skilled and lower skilled - by introducing more flexible working visa systems, whilst at the same time easing the requirements for employment and residence. Meanwhile, the government and private sector are attempting to recruit international students to use as a pool of skilled workers and temporary laborers. Indeed, there is an increasingly growing demand for *ryugakusei* (international students) particularly from the three major stakeholders of the economy - government, universities, and enterprises. Over the last few

years, the number of international students in Japan has hit record highs each successive year, and the employment rate of international student graduates is increasing.

However, despite Japan's rapidly changing structural environment towards 'immigration', which has evolved from the recent liberalization of the country's migration policies and policies towards international students, the notion of *zentei*, or the premise that foreigners are 'temporary being' or 'guests', has remained unchanged. The presence of *zentei* is causing a lack of immigration, and a cosmetic internationalization of higher education. International students are existing as both foreign laborers to be integrated, and 'imagined global *jinzai*'—which refers to international students who only exist in the global *jinzai* discourse, not existing practically in Japanese immigration and internationalization of higher education policies.

Against this background, this study attempts to critically examine and dispel the perceived ambiguity, superficiality, and contradictions of immigration, national identity, and internationalization in higher education in contemporary Japan - particularly through the lens of 'international student migration to Japan'. The findings of this research point to ways in which Japanese society can practically utilize international students as a source of skilled immigrant workers in response to its rapidly aging population, as well as a means of creating a new multicultural society in contemporary Japan by going beyond the fixed premise or *zentei* that foreigners are currently existing in.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	vii
<b>PROLOGUE Begin Reflectively as a Self-Reflexive <i>Ryugakusei</i>.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>21</b>
1.1 Background: International Student Recruitment and Retention Policies at a Glance.....	21
1.2 Questioning the Role of Immigration in International Student Migration to Japan.....	26
1.3 Aim and Significance of the Research.....	38
1.4 Research Design and Research Methods.....	41
1.4.1 Research Design.....	41
1.4.2 Research Methods.....	45
1.5 Limitations of the Study.....	48
1.6 Structure of the Thesis.....	49
<b>CHAPTER 2 Rethinking International Student Migration (ISM) to Contemporary Japan: An Alternative Policy Option to Mass Immigration.....</b>	<b>53</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	53
2.2 An Overview of Skilled Migration to Japan in the Contemporary Context of Immigration and an Aging Society.....	57
2.3 Highly Skilled Migration Policies.....	62
2.4 Lower Skilled Migration Policies.....	70
2.5 ISM to Japan in the Context of Immigration and Settlement.....	78
2.6 ISM as an Alternative Policy Option for Mass Immigration in Japan.....	90
2.7 Rethinking ISM as an Immigration and Settlement Issue.....	101

**CHAPTER 3 The Role of Immigration in Recruitment, Retention, and Settlement of International Students.....106**

3.1 Introduction.....106

3.2 Reviewing Immigration and Immigrant Integration in Contemporary Japan.....109

    3.2.1 Newcomer Immigration to Japan.....109

    3.2.2 Controlling Immigration and Integrating Immigrants  
        in an Ethnically Homogenous Society.....113

    3.2.3 Multicultural Discourse in Contemporary Japan.....116

    3.2.4 Multicultural Coexistence/ Cosmetic Multiculturalism.....120

3.3 The Role of Immigration in International Student Migration.....125

3.4 The Presence and Absence of Immigration in ISM to Japan.....135

    3.4.1 The Recruitment: Internationalization of Higher Education.....139

    3.4.2 The Retention: ‘Domesticated’ International Graduates.....143

    3.4.3 The Settlement: Welcome but No Citizens.....148

3.5 Rethinking the Role of Immigration in ISM to and in Japan.....152

**CHAPTER 4 Internationalizing Japanese Higher Education as Nation Branding: Cosmetic Internationalization, Revamping the Lost Image, Constructing New Identity.....156**

4.1 Introduction.....156

4.2 Japan’s Image Problem: Fostering New Japanese Identity through Nation Branding....157

    4.2.1 Japan is Back : New Japan, Beautiful Japan.....158

    4.2.2 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy: Solutions to Japan’s Image Problem....161

    4.2.3 Cool Japan: Creating a New Cool Japanese Identity.....164

4.3 Branding Cool Japanese Universities? Internationalizing Japanese Higher Education as Soft Power.....171

    4.3.1 Higher Education as Soft Power.....171

    4.3.2 Internationalization of Higher education as Part of Nation Branding: A Way of Fostering World-Class Universities (WCUs).....175

    4.3.3 Internationalizing Japanese Universities under the Abe Administration:  
        Enhancing National Competitiveness and Fostering A Competitive Country’s

Image and Identity.....	179
4.4 Internationalization as the Solution to Japan’s Image Problem, but “From Within”...188	
<b>CHAPTER 5 International Students as Imagined Global <i>Jinzai</i> in Immigration and Higher Education in Contemporary Japan.....</b>	<b>194</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	194
5.2 International Student Migration and Global Talent Mobility.....	196
5.3 Japan’s Running the Global Race for Talent.....	201
5.3.1 Recruiting Global Talent through Labor Migration.....	205
5.3.2 Fostering the Global <i>Jinzai</i> through <i>Uchinaru Kokusaika</i> .....	207
5.4 Internationalization at Home : A National Policy Strategy to Fostering Global <i>Jinzai</i> through Internationalizing Campus.....	211
5.4.1 Cultivating Global Human Resources in IHE.....	211
5.4.2 The Birth of Imagined Global <i>Jinzai</i> : Is Global <i>Jinzai</i> a Replica of the Image of Desired Japanese ( <i>Kitaisareru Ningenzo</i> )?.....	217
5.5 Questioning the <i>Zentei</i> , Contradictory Internationalization.....	224
5.5.1 <i>Itsu Kaeru No?</i> : A <i>Zentei</i> Immortalized in <i>Ryugakusei</i> ’s Everyday Life.....	225
5.5.2 Contradictory <i>Kokusaika</i> on Campus.....	229
5.5.3 Beyond the Imagined Global <i>Jinzai</i> .....	236
<b>CHAPTER 6 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>239</b>
6.1 International Student Migration as an Alternative to Mass Immigration.....	239
6.2 The Role of Immigration in the International Student Migration to Japan.....	244
6.3 Demystifying Cosmetic Internationalization, Actualizing the Imagined Global <i>Jinzai</i> in Immigration and IHE.....	248
6.4 Toward an Opening Possibility, Beyond the <i>Zentei</i> .....	251
<b>EPILOGUE A Reflection on Being a Foreign Graduate in a Time of Crisis.....</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>1</b>

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

### LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Points-based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals (HSFP)

Table 2.2 Working Visa: Specified Skilled Worker (i), (ii)

Table 3.1 Factors for the Underperformance of the Education Pathway

Table 3.2 International Students with Multiple Identities

Table 5.1 Key Skilled Migration Pathways

### LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Emblems

Figure 2.1 The Number of The Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (2012~2019)

Figure 2.2 The Estimated Number of Foreign Workers Needed Over the Next 5 Years (2018~)

Figure 2.3 Special Features on Immigration in Japanese Magazines and Journals (between 2018 and 2019)

Figure 2.4 The Annual Growth in International Student Mobility (2000 to 2012)

Figure 2.5 The Number of International Students in Japan (1978 ~2018)

Figure 3.1 Job Fair Advertaintments for International Students

Figure 3.2 Job Fairs for students from ASEAN Countries

Figure 4.1 Top Global University Japan Project

Figure 5.1 Internationalization at Home and Abroad in Internationalization of Japanese Universities.

Figure 5.2 The Fostering of Global *Jinzai* in Japanese Universities.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

**ADB**I Asian Development Bank Institute

**ASEAN** Association of Southeast Asian Nations

**BCCJ** The British Chamber of Commerce in Japan

**EU** European Union

**FDI** Foreign Direct Investment

**HEIs** Higher Education Institutions

**HRST** Human Resources in Science and Technology

**HSFP** The Points Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals

**IHE** Internationalization of Higher Education

**IBJ** Immigration Bureau of Japan

**ISAJ** Immigration Services Agency of Japan

**ISM** International Student Migration

**IaH** Internationalization at Home

**ILO** International Labor Organization

**IPSS** The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research

**JAPI** Japan Association for Promotion of Internationalization

**JASSO** Japan Student Services Organization

**JICO** Japan International Training Cooperation Organization

**METI** Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry

**MEXT** Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

**MIC** Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

**MLIT** Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

**MOJ** Ministry of Justice

**MOFA** Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MOL** Ministry of Labor

**NAFSA** Association of International Educators

**NSSZs** The National Strategic Special Zones

**OECD** Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

**PMC** The Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century

**STEM** Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics

**UN** United Nations

**UN ESCAP** United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

**UNESCO** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

**UNSECO-UIS** UNESCO Institute for Statistics

**UNFPA** United Nations Population Fund

**UNICEF** United Nations Children's Fund

**WCUs** World-Class Universities

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

From the early stage of this research until now, when I was a PhD student with the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, I have received wonderful assistance, guidance and help from the institution. I would like to thank so many things that they have offered me throughout the years.

In addition, during the many years I have taken to complete this thesis, numerous people have provided help, support, and encouragement to help make the end of this long journey possible. Particularly I owe a special debt of gratitude to many individuals I have met in the U.K, Korea and Japan. First of all I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors. When I was and became a foreign student in England for the very first time in my life, at the University of Warwick, I owe particular thanks to David Baker and Shirin M. Rai. Both encouraged me to overcome my personal and academic limitations, and supported my hesitant plan to take a next step, starting with a Master's degree program in Migration Studies at the University of Sussex. At Sussex, I will always remain thankful to Anthony Fielding for his invaluable and inspirational class about contemporary migration in Japan. Without him, I would not have come to Japan to pursue my doctoral research in migration related issues.

During the painful-mission incomplete years at APU, I was deeply indebted to Professor Jeremy Eades. Although he left Japan many years ago, his lasting and positive legacy still lives on incredibly and vividly in my current life, here in Japan. I also owe my deepest thanks to the wonderful scholars at Doshisha, Professor Gregory Poole, Professor Robert Aspinall, and

Professor OYAMADA Eiji, They were always there when I needed them. Professor TOMIYAMA Ichiro, I could not think of a better role model of supervisor whom all doctoral students could hope for to have and to become. He is a true inspiration.

I also would like to express deepest appreciation to my friends and family. Dear Flat13ners Kamimura Yasu, Kamimura Yumiko and Wing Lam. Justin Rayment, Paul Capobianco, SON Kiyong, PARK Yuha, JEONG Kyungsoo, and YOO Kyoungwon - They are always encouraging me to complete this long-arduous journey with enjoyment and positiveness until today.

My family has always showed great patience and provided encouragement, support and prayers as I have pursued the long years of my doctoral studies that took a lot more time than I had expected. A special thank goes to my parents and parents in law in Seoul and Kochi. They have been all waiting so patiently until I completed this thesis. Last, but certainly not least, Kanako has been a constant companion, critic and confidante throughout this entire journey. I am truly grateful for all she has offered patiently, generously, and gracefully. Without her presence in my life, I could not have completed this long journey. Therefore I especially dedicate this thesis to her, and also my Son, Shion who will continue to travel with me in this life journey.

## PROLOGUE

### **Begin Reflectively as a Self-Reflexive *Ryugakusei***

It's happening around,

but it's already not someone else's problem

*(Katawara de okite iru kotodaga, sudeni hitogotode wanai)*

— Tomiyama Ichiro,

*Kayokai*, 2014<sup>1</sup>

### **A Life of a Legal Alien as an International Student on the Shores of Awkward Diversity**

One afternoon on a beautiful spring day of 2018, I went on a visit to the Tokyo Itabashi ward office, to handle some administrative issues for my move to Tokyo from Fukuoka city in a month. Although it was morning, there were already quite a lot of people dealing with what was necessary for themselves - which might include any personal complaints and so on. Somehow, I consulted with a staff member at the reception desk as to where to go, how, and what to do. After that, taking a numbered ticket, I had to wait for some time until my number was called by another staff member in charge at the very counter that I had to be at. While I was seated on a couch near the neat, clean, and spacious lobby, an intriguing object suddenly attracted my attention. On the ceiling was a huge hanging banner advertising the Tokyo 2020 Olympics in the center of the lobby, accompanied by the official slogan of the Games, 'Unity in Diversity' (See Figure 1.1).

---

<sup>1</sup> Tomiyama Ichiro, 巻き込まれるということー「火曜会」という構想 (7), June 14, 2014, Accessed April 5, 2020, <http://doshisha-aor.net/place/169/>.

*Figure 1.1 Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Emblems*



Source: <https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/games-vision/>.

While I kept looking at the Olympic Games’ slogan “Unity in Diversity” on the banner, two similar mottos came into my mind, not surprisingly but naturally. The first one is the European Union’s official Latin motto, “*In varietate concordia* (Unity or United in Diversity in English). As a supranational entity of 28 member states with 24 official languages, and a vast array of differences among countries, regions and individuals, the identification with Europe’s internal diversity has been crucial and inevitable. And the second is a traditional (unofficial) motto of the United States, “*E pluribus unum*”(out of many, one in English), which was adopted by the Founding Fathers in the late 18 century as part of the Great Seal of the United States, intended to represent the federal nature of the nation – out of many states, one country.<sup>3</sup> And the motto continuously applies to the contemporary America which is not only traditionally a country of immigrants, and but has also been one of the most popular destination countries for international migrants in the world, accommodating a large

---

<sup>3</sup> David Niose, “E Pluribus Unum Becomes Controversial,” *Psychology Today*, March 13, 2011, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/our-humanity-naturally/201103/e-pluribus-unum-becomes-controversial> .

immigrant population and many different cultures and ethnic groups. In this regard, when it comes to the nature of these identifications to construct collective identities in the EU or in the U.S, it is not surprising to see that the presence of a symbolical slogan, ‘Unity in Diversity’, seems to have been necessary in creating favorable environments in which social coherence and integration can be achieved, against the backdrop of existing differences and increasing ethnic and cultural diversity. Then, how about Japan? The slogan, ‘Unity in Diversity’, can it be also be interpreted in the context of ethno-cultural diversity in contemporary Japanese society?

After a complaint alleging plagiarism on an earlier design, a new official emblem of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics was selected and unveiled on April 2016. According to the Tokyo 2020 Olympic organizing committee, the circular pattern of varying rectangular shapes in the newly selected emblem represents “a coming together of different countries, cultures and ways of thinking.”<sup>4</sup> The representation is in keeping with “unity in diversity”, one of the three core concepts as its vision for the Games, along with the other two concepts “achieving personal best” and “connecting to tomorrow”. And now, the Olympic Games’ slogan is everywhere in Tokyo, the capital of Japan, and we can see it from ward offices, subway stations, department stores, parks in ordinary residential areas, to electronics retailer chains such as Big Camera where people can buy the Tokyo Olympics official licensed products.

A year later since the official logo was publicly announced, on April 2017, in a luncheon in Tokyo hosted by the BCCJ (The British Chamber of Commerce in Japan), the special guest

---

<sup>4</sup> The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, Accessed April 01, 2020, <https://tokyo2020.org/en/games/emblem/>.

Ms. Koike Yuriko,<sup>5</sup> Tokyo's first ever female governor, talked about the future of Japan and Tokyo, and particularly her goals as the governor for Tokyo as the host city of the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games, throughout a specific interview and a Q&A session with BCCJ members.

While talking about the Games, she emphasized as below,

The Tokyo 2020 Games will foster a welcoming environment and raise awareness of **unity in diversity** among citizens of the world. Educating young children in Japan to embrace **diversity** will be a big part of this. (emphasis added).<sup>6</sup>

When I read what she addressed, it begged a few simple questions for myself : What is it really about “unity in diversity” in contemporary Japanese society?, What does it really mean to “embrace diversity” and what is “unity in diversity” as a concept, idea or value,? Is it just constrained within the domain of the Olympic ideals along with the upcoming event in Tokyo? Or is it something beyond the domain, which is likely to become a common goal for the Japanese people and entire society to pursue? Is it something more beyond the domestic boundary, which is extensively related to a national project of internationalizing or globalizing Japan such as fostering global citizens? When the Tokyo governor Koike referred to “unity in diversity” among the citizens of the world, and “embracing diversity”, what did she really mean?

---

<sup>5</sup> In this thesis, Japanese names are written following the East Asian convention (family name followed by given name) except for those authors who write principally in a Western language for example in English language publications.

<sup>6</sup> Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko at the BCCJ, *The British Chamber of Commerce in Japan(BCCJ)*, April 21, 2017, Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://bccjapan.com/news/tokyo-governor-yuriko-koike-at-the-bccj/> .

According to an interview with a monthly English magazine, *Metropolis* in June 2018, in response to the question - “Tokyo is competing for the accolade of leading city in Asia; how can you advance this effort and assist the international community in regaining its strength?”, she answered as follows:

Since I was appointed Governor of Tokyo, I have been working to ensure that Tokyo possesses three qualities. First, that it is a ‘safe city’ . . . . . The second quality is *diversity*. There is a need to create a city in which men, women, children and adults, as well as persons with disabilities and LGBT people can all shine equally. The third is that Tokyo is a smart city . . . These are my goals . . . . . there are around 520,000 people from 186 countries and regions living in Tokyo in this foreign community as of January 2018. I would also like to convey the three qualities of Tokyo, which I previously mentioned, so that all people who have come from overseas can thrive in their everyday lives, their working lives and in making their livelihoods. In addition, I believe that Tokyo is a safe city in which people feel a sense of reassurance, and is a place where there are many delicious things to eat, and where there is work, all of which contribute to allowing such a huge number of international people to live in Tokyo. I will support both Japanese people and foreign people equally with respect to diversity. *I want Tokyo to be a city of diversity.* (emphasis added).<sup>7</sup>

In the interview, basically she tried to spell out the meaning of ‘diversity’ as one of Tokyo’s important qualities as a global city. Although her answer appeared relatively simple, and abstract, what she answered may show us to what extent and in what ways she intended to use the term, ‘diversity’ for the most part.

---

<sup>7</sup> Governor of Tokyo Koike Yuriko, A Conversation About the Future of the City, *Metropolis*, June 07, 2018, <https://metropolisjapan.com/interview-governor-tokyo-yuriko-koike/>.

First of all, she practically refers to ‘diversity’ in the more extensive meaning of multiculturalism. In this sense, ‘embracing diversity’ obviously includes not only ethnic minority groups, namely foreign communities, but also other types of minority groups such as LGBT communities or the disabled. Indeed, since Ms. Koike was elected the governor of Tokyo, the Tokyo municipal government launched an ‘LGBT friendly Tokyo’ campaign in 2018, and she pledged an anti LGBT discrimination ordinance.<sup>8</sup> Moreover it is also clear that she primarily emphasizes the equality of women’s status, the lives of children and those with disabilities in the context of diversity. Secondly, given that the term ‘diversity’, does often refer to a demographic reality such as ethno-cultural diversity particularly caused by migration, she also categorizes the lives of foreign residents as belonging to the group of diversity. Additionally, she recognizes the presence of various types of foreign communities in Tokyo, and called for both Japanese people and foreign residents to equally respect their differences.

When listening to her ambitious multicultural dreaming of Tokyo before and post-Tokyo Olympic Games 2020, many might feel assured that Ms. Koike would try to place great efforts on building a genuinely multicultural society in which all kinds of ‘diversity’ are fully recognized and equally respected. In a way, many might also recognize that the origin of her multicultural vision was politically born, and should be understood as both the cause and consequence of the upcoming Tokyo Olympic Games - which will obviously be a big event for her political career as the Tokyo governor. What about myself then as a legal alien, living in Japan, and more specifically in Tokyo? I am aware again of my existence as an important

---

<sup>8</sup> Thisanka Siripala, “Japanese Universities Make Efforts to Be More LGBT Friendly,” *The Diplomat*, June 06, 2018, Accessed April 22, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/japanese-universities-make-efforts-to-be-more-lgbt-friendly/>.

part of the multicultural co-existence (*tabunka kyosei*) in Japanese society; and therefore an integral part of Ms. Koike's multicultural vision for the Tokyo Olympic Games. Surely, I must be vigorously participating in the cosmopolitan project, because I feel it is also my duty as a member of *the* international community, as more importantly I will continue to live in Japan during the Olympic Games 2020 as an eyewitness, here in Tokyo and afterward.<sup>9</sup>

Then, is that all? Did the simple answer provided by Ms. Koike, satisfy my curiosity about the meaning of 'unity in diversity' - in particular, Ms. Koike's usage of 'embracing diversity'; what is the idea of 'unity in diversity'; and is that the ultimate image of what the current Japanese society might pursue? Interestingly, it did not take long before I found that nothing is still clear, but rather everything is becoming more confused, puzzled, and perplexed. This time, it is not from what Ms. Koike *says*, but from what she *does*.

In September 2017, several months later after she gave her speech at the meeting of BCCJ in April 2017, Ms. Koike had a regularly scheduled press conference as the governor of Tokyo, at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Building. During the press conference, she also spoke to the press in her capacity of the head of the newly established 'Party of Hope (*Kibo no To*)', claiming that her party would position itself as a tolerant and reform-minded conservative party (*kanyona kaikokuhoshu seito*) that supports tolerance and places value on *diversity* - just as we can see among the core principles of *Kibo no To*'s party platform, one of the principles is the "realization of a society where *diversity* is respected."<sup>10</sup> Although it seems obvious that she and her party are locating themselves on the shores of 'embracing

---

<sup>9</sup> At the time of finishing this thesis, the Tokyo 2020 Olympics has been postponed until 2021 due to the coronavirus crisis.

<sup>10</sup> Yuki Tatsumi, "Koike Yuriko's New Party: A Real Game-Changer for Japanese Politics?," *The Diplomat*, September 28, 2017, Accessed April 22, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/yuriko-koikes-new-party-a-real-game-changer-for-japanese-politics/>.

diversity’; there is however, a significant self-contradictory problem. Her apparent prejudice against foreign residents in Japan is a particularly xenophobic stance especially toward Korean residents in Japan. Most notably, unlike what she says in terms of diversity, she continues to show her remarkable bias against Korean residents in Japan, through such acts as tacitly denying that thousands of Koreans were slaughtered by Japanese mobs in 1923 during the Kanto earthquake, and demanding opposition to voting rights for Japan’s resident foreigners.<sup>11</sup>

Firstly, customarily Tokyo governors have sent tributes to an annual ceremony commemorating Korean people murdered in the chaos that ensued after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. While Koike herself also sent one in 2016 on the first year she was elected as the governor, she suddenly bucked tradition by not paying tribute at the ceremony. Moreover, Koike has been a guest speaker at *Zaitokukai*-supported events, although she only gave an evasive answer by saying that she doesn’t remember the circumstances.<sup>12</sup> *Zaitokukai* is the most controversial hate speech group which has led the anti-Korean resident movement.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, as revealed in the general election campaign in 2017, the initial chapter of the Koike’s ‘Hope Party’ required all members to pledge opposition to giving foreign residents the right to vote in elections. Her party required those from the moribund opposition Democratic Party (*Minshuto*) - which was hoping to run in the general election on the ticket

---

<sup>11</sup> Jake Adelstein, “The Pride And (Anti-Korean) Prejudice Of Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko Is A Big Problem,” *Forbes*, October 19, 2017, Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/adelsteinjake/2017/10/19/the-pride-and-anti-korean-prejudice-of-tokyo-governor-yuriko-koike-is-a-big-problem/#111db13b774f>; “Tokyo governor skips tribute to Koreans murdered after 1923 quake,” *Kyodo News*, September 1, 2017, Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/09/6ac88cff4a6a-tokyo-governor-skips-tribute-to-koreans-murdered-after-1923-quake.html>.

<sup>12</sup> *Koike yuriko shi ga hyōjō kowabara seta “zaitokkai to no mitsugetsu” tou koe*, *Nikkan Gendai Digital*, October 17, 2016, Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://www.nikkan-gendai.com/articles/view/news/185408>. (in Japanese).

<sup>13</sup> The group’s full name is *Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai* (Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi Koreans).

of the “Party of Hope”, to sign a policy agreement that controversially included a provision that they would stand against giving foreign nationals living in Japan on the right to vote in local elections.<sup>14</sup> Although foreigner suffrage is commonly a contentious issue in many other immigrant host societies, there is a growing global tendency that more states are attempting to permit some form of non-citizen voting (Castles, De Hass, and Miller 2014, 303). Several Asian states also allow foreigner suffrage, including the Republic of Korea, which permits foreign residents after three years on permanent residence to vote in municipal elections, albeit the number is still not so many. In Japan, by 2001, more than 1400 local governments had adopted resolutions urging voting rights for foreign residents in local elections because they believed that foreign residents, especially permanent residents have closed relationship with local communities in their daily lives, and they should be granted local voting rights (Shipper 2010, 531). Since 1995, when the Supreme Court decision that granting suffrage to foreign residents at local levels was “not constitutional” and should be left to the National Diet to legislate, all political parties except the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP or *Jiminto*) have begun to support local suffrage for foreign residents (Shipper 2010, 531).

Considering all these from what she *does*, her remarks and favorable emphasis on embracing diversity, and promoting public awareness of diversity all seem somewhat awkward, and even highly self-contradictory. At this point, all things become more perplexed and puzzled. How then can I now understand and spell out the meaning of ‘diversity’? Although it is still vague and unclear, a short answer is available for myself, as I am living in contemporary Japanese society as a foreign resident, and more specifically as an international student. I myself would often sense that Japanese society continuously remains close to an

---

<sup>14</sup> Koike's opposition to foreign residents' right to vote clashes with her call for diversity, *The Mainichi*, October 4, 2017, Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20171004/p2a/00m/0na/019000c> .

image of ‘*Diversity in Unity*’, rather than that of ‘*Unity in Diversity*’. Therefore, it seems to me, what should primarily be examined is not the catch phrase of ‘*Unity in Diversity*’ but instead that of ‘*Diversity in Unity*’.

### **Diversity in Unity’, Another Name for Cosmetic Internationalization and Cosmetic Multiculturalism**

Certainly, Japan is a de facto country of immigration. According to a survey of population dynamics announced by Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 10 July 2019, as of January 1st of 2019 (*Heisei* 31), the country’s registered foreign population numbered 2,667,139, making up about 2 percent of the total population (127,443,563).<sup>15</sup> Although the number of foreign population has continuously showed a relatively smaller portion than that of other host societies in the West,<sup>16</sup> and even smaller than its neighboring country, South Korea comprising 4.0 percent as of November 2018,<sup>17</sup> the number of foreign residents in Japan has continued to increase, showing remarkably a 6.79 percent year-on-year increase and the highest number ever.<sup>18</sup> Another key takeaway from the survey shows that the majority of foreign residents (85.7 percent or 2, 268,941) falls between the ages of 15 to 64, the working age population, and the largest age group among foreign residents are those in in their twenties, making up about 31.8 percent of the total foreign population throughout Japan. When those in their thirties are included, more than half

---

<sup>15</sup> Population, Demography and Number of Households Based on the Basic Resident Registers, *The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications*, January 01, 2019, Accessed April 8, 2020, [http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu\\_news/s-news/01gyosei02\\_02000193.html](http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01gyosei02_02000193.html) .

<sup>16</sup> If the number of naturalized Japanese, particularly those among oldcomer immigrants – Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese, is included, the size of non-Japanese population must be much bigger.

<sup>17</sup> No. of foreign residents in S. Korea hits record 2.05 mln in 2018, *Yonhap News*, October 31, 2019, Accessed January 8, 2020, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191031003500315> .

<sup>18</sup> Summary of Population, Demography and Number of Households Based on the Basic Resident Registers, *The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications*, January 01, 2019, Accessed April 8, 2020, [https://www.soumu.go.jp/main\\_content/000633277.pdf](https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000633277.pdf). (in Japanese).

(52.5 percent) of foreign residents are in their ages of twenties and thirties, which reflects that the foreign residents in Japan are significantly young populations. More strikingly, reportedly in the Tokyo metropolis serving the Japanese capital, one out of ten in their twenties are foreign-born, which also shows a rapidly changing profile of Japan's foreign populations.<sup>19</sup>

Its ethno-cultural diversity driven by various types of migration has been continuously growing. Given the country's seriously and consistently declining population and becoming an aging society, Japan desperately seeks more foreign labor, and a significant increase in the number of foreign populations has been remarkably observed the past few years. In this situation, some critics claim that immigration is not only necessary but also inevitable. Sakanaka Hidenori, one of the leading critics of Japan's immigration policies, argues that immigration policy is the only solution to address various issues stemming from Japan's drastic population decline and labor shortages (Sakanaka 2018). He has continuously urged that Japan needs a large scale immigration by insisting that Japan may accommodate 10 million foreign immigrants in the next years (Sakanaka 2007, 2018).

However, the country has neither officially recognized that it is a country of immigration, nor has considered any formal, mass immigration programs, despite its shrinking working population due to its rapidly aging society and low birth rate. Undoubtedly, while it has been observed over recent years that the country's immigration policies have been liberalized in many ways - particularly by trying to ease requirements to acquire the permanent residency for foreign migrants with certain qualifications; the way of

---

<sup>19</sup> Kanako Watanabe, "One in ten Tokyoites in their 20s are now foreigners," *Nikkei Asian Review*, July 12 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-immigration/One-in-ten-Tokyoites-in-their-20s-are-now-foreigners> .

becoming a Japanese citizen is still constrained by its restrictive citizenship regime. Having maintained restrictive attitudes towards immigration in the society, while being mindful of criticisms of multicultural policies in the West, the society is continuously reluctant to allow foreign populations to settle for good and become fellow citizens. In this regard, the myth of ethnic homogeneity has still continuously significant implications on its immigration policy regime, most notably on citizenship.

Although the origins of its insularity are complex, and admittedly its ethnic and cultural homogeneity is a myth, Japan has been widely known as a relatively homogenous society in terms of culture, language, history and ethnicity. As Morris-Suzuki points out, “there is no denying that its insularity and myths of ethnic homogeneity have helped to shape public and official attitudes to immigration” (Morris-Suzuki 2010,3). As a result, it has maintained one of the most restrictive immigration policies among all industrially advanced countries. Moreover, it goes without saying that one of many things Japanese people take for granted about their daily lives is *Wa*, which is a virtually indefinable cultural concept, usually translated as harmony. Although the origins of *Wa* are also complex, perhaps as a modern invention, it is today functioning as “a ubiquitous signifier of Japanese collectivism” (Kimio 1998, 37). No one can deny that harmony and consensus are commonly considered integral to Japanese society, and strife is seen as an odd behavior, and in many cases, even unacceptable (Kimio 1998, 37). As such, Japan, at least as far as I’m concerned, is a country in which the description, the idea of ‘Diversity in Unity’ is continuously superior to that of ‘Unity in Diversity’ when it comes to the core characters of its national identity.

In the past few years, more specifically under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s administration, Japan has been gearing to open up its society through a re-internationalization

process, whereby the government has been attracting more foreign tourists, foreign workers and foreign students. In the process of re-internationalizing Japan, the management of the nation's image has been at the center of the government's key activities in which "nation-branding" (Szondi, 2008, 4), in parallel with developing the capacity of using soft power, and shaping public diplomacy, plays a crucial role in reconstructing and revamping its national image as a cool brand, so that it may restore the nation's damaged collective esteem and pride in the face of insecurity and anxieties generated by its long economic stagnation, natural disasters, and an increasingly fierce regional competition, - particularly with China and South Korea. As the main theme of this thesis, it seems to me that the two intricately combined subjects - Immigration and Internationalization of Higher Education may also be understood in the context of Japan's re-internationalization and re-nation branding process. Hence, I think, by making the two subjects into one and interrogating and examining it thoroughly, my questions on the issue of 'Diversity in Unity' in Japan are expected to be answered in a certain academic way.

At a panel discussion in the World Economic Forum on ASEAN on September 13, 2018 in Hanoi, in response to a question from an audience on Japan's foreign human resources management in the context of its rapidly aging population, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro said, "*It's good to have diversity. It's good to have an open policy.*", after he emphasized by saying that:

We are opening up our country. We are opening up our labor market to foreign countries. We are now trying to come up with a new work permit policy so I think everyone shall be welcome in Japan if they are willing to assimilate into Japanese

society.<sup>20</sup>

Once again, in a similar way to my question on Ms. Koike's term, 'diversity', what does the term, 'diversity' really mean when Mr. Kono said: "it is good to have diversity". More specifically given that he insisted on opening Japan's labor market up for foreigners, then what does that mean by saying "it's good to have diversity" in the context of Japan's foreign human resource management related to labor migration?

In addition to the country's moving towards a more liberalization of immigration policies for highly skilled foreign professionals under a new point-based system - namely HSPF visa, Japan is eager to open its door for lower-skilled workers such as those who are not eligible to apply for the existing skilled and highly skilled categories to enter the country. In April 2019, a hotly debated new visa program is slated to be launched, through which Japan could accept up to about 340,000 additional foreign workers over a five-year period according to government estimates. As noted earlier - most notably in the process of liberalizing its immigration policies, the country seems to remarkably ease conditions to allow foreigners with skills to stay and work in Japan much longer, and even proactively encourages them to live on a more permanent basis rather than temporarily. What is more striking is that the government is also considering allowing lower-skilled foreign workers in a certain category to bring their family members under the new visa program which seems a very drastic measure, not commonly found in any other foreign worker's policies toward less-skilled workers being implemented by other countries.

---

<sup>20</sup> Japan's Foreign Minister Says Country to Open to Foreigners, *AP News*, September 13 2018. Accessed April 8, 2020, <https://apnews.com/8a36dc9d5a8243acb8d1c553996e88e9/Japan's-foreign-minister-says-country-to-open-to-foreigners> .

This dramatically changing immigration regime reflects two levels of reality facing contemporary Japanese society. Firstly, Japan's labor shortage must be literally bad, more specifically in certain industries for which local Japanese would not willingly want to work - such as nursing care and construction. Indeed, no one can deny that the country's economy suffers from its shrinking working-age population due to one of the lowest birth rates in the world, and its rapidly aging society. In this situation, the government's fierce efforts to reopen its labor market for lower-skilled foreign workers may be understood as a desperate economic strategy to alleviate its serious labor shortage. Secondly, it is also obvious that the liberalization of its immigration policies occurs as part of Japan's nation-branding strategy which falls under the purview of 're-internationalization'. The new point-based system to attract highly skilled foreign workers is a good example and evidence in that the HSFP visa system was primarily introduced, not as a migration policy strategy practically designed and intended to lure highly skilled foreign professionals, but rather as a way of branding its country's positive images as a tier-one nation.

It should be noted, that unlike the government which ostensibly takes active steps to make the HSFP visa scheme more appealing, it has continuously underperformed in this area. While more fundamental problems have been found in terms of practical merits given to would-be applicants for the visa, the purpose of the visa consistently remains unclear, and application procedures remain ambiguous (Green 2017). What is more surprising is that there are no specific labor market tests or caps on the number of HSFP visa issued, which clearly reflects that the highly skilled migration scheme is neither designed by rigorously established objective evidence nor has a clear policy goal. In this respect, the HSFP visa is essentially functioning as something like an act of 'virtue signaling'. In other words, it is the Japanese government's bid to be seen as internationalizing Japan, which is a country that holds an

assortment of internationally recognized policies. By means of removing its insular image as one of the few non-immigration countries among the most economically developed countries, the country wants to declare that ‘we have a liberal immigration policy’, and ‘we are a good member of the global society and well-internationalized society in which ethno-cultural diversity should be respected’.

Resulting from the situation centering around the liberalization of Japan’s immigration policies, what we can find out, is that the process of attracting more foreign workers – whether they are highly skilled or lower (or unskilled) skilled workers, has less to do with building a genuine multicultural immigrant society where its national identity does not excessively rely on the blood-based and ethnically homogenous identity anymore; but rather, it is newly established on a new civic identity, by recognizing and embracing its ethno-cultural diversity within the society, not symbolically but practically and more legitimately. In short, the current Japanese government’s attitude of accommodating more foreign workers is not intrinsically related to promoting diversity in the society or creating a society where ‘unity in diversity’ is the core value. Rigorously speaking, if ‘unity in diversity’ is becoming the core value in the society, the question of ‘who is Japanese’ should be answered in a quite different way.

As I have attempted to reveal throughout this research by using the lens of international student migration and more specifically by employing the concept of ‘the Imagined Global *Jinzai*’ in internationalization of higher education in Japan, the recent liberalization of Japan’s immigration policies has nothing to do with rethinking its national identity and citizenship regime, simply because how to liberalize its immigration policies is mainly aimed at easing entry and exit rules to help foreigners to enter Japan to travel, work and study in Japan as

temporary sojourners. It is certain that loosening requirements for eligibility to acquire permanent residency is undoubtedly a positive change. However, to acquire citizenship continuously remains almost impossible for non-Japanese unless a foreign national gets married to a Japanese citizen or is born to a Japanese national. This means, what the Japanese government intends is focused on more flexibly utilizing foreign human resources when it is necessary, but not on extending its citizenship regime. That is why, as I shall argue throughout this thesis, regarding international student migration to Japan, the settlement of international students after graduation has been continuously ignored. Only recruitment and retention of international students has been highlighted and discussed.

In short, in the context of ‘diversity’, the recent liberalization of Japan’s immigration policies mainly operates in a form of cosmetic internationalization and cosmetic or perfunctory multiculturalism. Given that immigration policy is a “state’s official attitude on who should be allowed to become its members, under what conditions, and of what kind (Parekh 1994, 92),” nothing has significantly been changed by the liberalization process from its previously restrictive manner toward immigration and diversity generated by migration within the society. On the surface, the phrase, “it’s good to have diversity” makes the country appear that the society seems to be taking steps into building a more internationalized and more cosmopolitan society. However, beneath the surface, everything just remains no more than the status-quo. This is what I would like to call, ‘*cosmetic internationalization*’. And when the meaning of cosmetic internationalization is used to address multiculturalism in Japan, I would like to use the term, “*cosmetic multiculturalism*” as I borrow from Morris-Suzuki (2002a, 2002b) in a similar vein, which means that multiculturalism only exists on a superficial and descriptive level in the society.

Admittedly it is not known for sure which is really better for the current and future Japanese society – whether or not Japan should literally open its door toward formal immigration or mass immigration in response to its low birth rate and rapidly aging society. However, what is clear is that Japan is already a de facto country of immigration and the society will become more and more a heterogeneous society caused and encouraged by its migration-induced growing ethno-cultural diversity. Furthermore, considering that “once migration occurs, acts of migration become self-sustaining social processes which develop their own dynamics” (Castles and Miller 2009, 29), the heterogenization process in terms of ethnicity and culture is inevitable and irreversible in the society. Immigration is always a highly controversial and fiercely contested issue in every society in the world and Japan is no exception. Moreover, it is certain that immigration is economically and politically intractable. Despite the nature of immigration however, it is a very optional alternative. In this respect, it is still possible for Japan to opt for formal immigration to address its serious population decline in a different way. It is not necessary for Japan to opt for sweeping changes. What is increasingly needed is the process of rethinking about immigration, doing away with stereotypical views toward immigration, and instead exploring new possibilities and alternatives, and testing them out more thoroughly with an open conclusion about immigration in the context of how to build a future Japanese society.

Indeed, there are literally numerous research findings as academic papers and books published on various aspects of Japan’s immigration issues evidences every year. I admit that this thesis may be simply one of them. I do however, attempt to explore a realizable policy dimension among some answers to a myriad of questions on Japan’s immigration issues in response to its population decline and aging society. Far from answering simply yes or no to immigration, I will attempt to suggest a possible policy option as a pretest of Japan’s

capability to accept foreign immigrants through a formal immigration program. The settlement of international students, more specifically international student graduates is considered as a pretest, and therefore my answer as a policy recommendation is on an attempt to rethink Japan's policies toward 'international students' in the context of 'settlement', through critically reviewing immigration and internationalization of higher education in contemporary Japan.

As a foreign resident or an international student who belongs to the Japanese society, experiencing a vividly ongoing internationalization of the society and particularly of its higher education, I have been going through an interesting dimension of immigration, internationalization and multiculturalism in contemporary Japanese society. As Claude Lévi-Strauss noted once, I also believe that observer is part and parcel of the object that the observer study or do research about.

To call the social fact total is not merely to signify that everything observed is part of the observation, but also, and above all, that in a science in which the observer is of the same nature of his object of study, the observer himself is part of his observation. (Lévi-Strauss 1987, 29).

Therefore, throughout this research, I attempt to try to locate myself as part of the object itself. It is not certain whether my attempt to create a space for self-objectification is successful in the end of this research project. Nevertheless, I would like to say that I endeavor to develop a capability to objectify myself as the observer as well as the object.

As I have illustrated so far, questioning the confusing and puzzling meanings of

‘diversity’ has always been at the center of the dimension. This thesis is an answer that I have found in response to questioning ‘awkward diversity’ in contemporary Japanese society, and one of many solutions to address the ‘awkward diversity’. Although I have attempted to investigate some historical and philosophical background of immigration in Japan to some degree, reminding again, the answer comes to a conclusion not in a form of speculative thoughts, but in the form of practical policy recommendation. This may be the reason why I primarily put an emphasis on ‘feasibility of solution’ as a policy recommendation in the beginning chapter of this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis is not a conventional policy analysis that attempts to do a cost-benefit analysis, but rather it is an interpretative policy analysis that focuses on “the meanings that policies have for a broad range of policy-relevant publics” (Yanow 2000, 8). As we have seen what Ms. Koike and Mr. Kono said, we can commonly observe that people often articulate what Japan (as a nation) or Japanese society has, hold and does. And we also can often observe that a government policy is being chosen and used as an example or a proof to support their assertion. But what I would like to investigate is not whether or not Japan has, hold and does in terms of policies and policy implementation, but why Japan’s policies itself and implementations exist superficially and as a form of the imagined-something and the imagined-doing. In this respect, this thesis is also an anthropological investigation about policies through its unique analytical edge that enables us to “understand the meanings and subjective understandings of policy makers, and to challenge received wisdom and think outside of the conventional policy box” (Shore and Wright 2011, 8).

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background: International Student Recruitment and Retention Policies at a Glance

In many countries today, a large part of contemporary migration intake is entwined with influxes of international students, and international student migration (hereafter ISM) often comes under the purview of highly skilled migration policies.<sup>21</sup> According to the International Institute for Education (IIE 2015), the number of international students rose from 2.1 to 4.5 million between 2001 and 2014 and the number has steadily and significantly increased (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014,16). Undoubtedly, as we are living in an age of massive international student migration (Liu-Farrer 2011, 2), this trend can be best understood “in relation to the diverse drivers underpinning the rapid globalization of *higher education*” (Findlay, King and Stam 2017,19 emphasis added). It is not at all uncommon for industrially advanced countries, particularly most immigrant receiving societies to design specific policies toward international student mobility – including both inbound and outbound students. Many countries consider international student migration a top policy agenda (ADBI, OECD, and ILO 2014, 15), and many governments, in particular in

---

<sup>21</sup> According to a definition by OECD (OECD 2014, 352), ‘international students’ refers to students who left their country of origin and moved to another country for the purpose of study. Due to their cross-border mobility as the most significant character of the group, international students are often described and defined as “internationally mobile students” (UNESCO 2015). The group of internationally mobile students includes both ‘international students’ and ‘foreign students’. While the term, ‘international students,’ is used in a context of their residence – living abroad to study, the term, ‘foreign students,’ refers to students who do not hold the citizenship of the country they are currently studying in. In studying international students in Japan, both terms are often interchangeably used, in particular when a clear definition is not provided for analysis. In this thesis in general the term, ‘international students’ refers to internationally mobile students in Japan which principally indicates foreign students who have a “college student visa”, staying more than 6 months in Japan for the purpose of study, unless otherwise stated.

industrially advanced economies, are developing policies strategically designed to attract international students as part of their skilled and highly skilled migration policies (Hawthorne 2008, 1), mainly along with powerful economic narratives such as globalization, internationalization, competitiveness, and the era of the knowledge-based economy (Arimoto 2010; Sum and Jessop 2012; Tight 2019; Yamada 2012; Ziguara and Law 2006).

As Geddie found out (2015), particularly during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we witnessed considerable interest among governments in the recruitment and retention of international students and early career researchers. Several countries introduced a series of strikingly similar international student mobility policies and initiatives, and by and large the policy convergence has continued up to the present.<sup>22</sup> The increasing convergence of policies and initiatives is mainly observed in two areas: first, in the process of internationalization of higher education (hereafter IHE) such as policies related to “overseas educational branding and marketing campaigns”(Geddie 2015, 235); and second, in regulating immigration policies on pre-and post-study phases of international students. In the former case, among the three major gatekeepers – governments, higher education and companies in global talent flows (Kerr 2018), governments and higher education institutions (hereafter HEIs) have sought to recruit more international students mainly through overseas educational branding and marketing campaigns via IHE such as Australia, Canada, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK. In the latter case, government, as the primary agency in immigration policy-making and implementation, have been implementing new immigration regulations

---

<sup>22</sup> In the research (Geddie 2015), she chose Australia, Canada, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom as one group to compare in terms of policy-convergence in overseas educational branding and marketing campaigns, and Australia, Italy, USA, Canada, France, Germany, UK and New Zealand as another group to compare in the case of policy-convergence in immigration regulation toward international students.

affecting recruitment and settlement of international students such as Australia, Canada, USA, Germany, UK (Geddie 2015, 235).

From a conventional government perspective, the recruitment and retention of international students is discursively framed as desirable to the extent that international student mobility can bring both the direct economic benefits as an export service industry and the indirect economic benefits as potential skilled immigrants in the labor market, which is likely to help enhance competitiveness of the national economy (Becker and Kolster 2012; Bolsmann and Miller 2008; Knight and de Wit 1995; Knight 2004). In the case of the U.S. for example, as the most popular destination country for international students, the continued growth of international students coming to the U.S for higher education has had a significant positive economic impact on its economy. According to the globally recognized association of international educator, NAFSA's economic analysis (NAFSA 2018), during the 2017-2018 academic year, international students contributed \$39.4 billion to the U.S economy and supported 455,622 jobs. For every seven international students enrolled, three U.S. jobs are created and supported by spending occurring in the higher education, accommodation, dining, retail, transportation, telecommunications and health insurance sectors.<sup>23</sup> In the United Kingdom, as the second most popular country for international students, international students has also made an important contribution to both national GDP and export earnings. In 2014-2015, for example, on-and-off campus spending by international students and their visitors generate £25.8 billion in gross output for the UK economy which contributed £13.8

---

<sup>23</sup> International Student Economic Value Tool, *NAFSA (the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers)*, <http://www.nafsa.org> .

billion gross value added to GDP. 80% of this impact is attributable to students from outside the EU.<sup>24</sup>

As mentioned, international students are considered human capital that will also bring an indirect benefit as future highly skilled immigrants. In OECD countries - which refers to a group that is mostly composed of wealthy, post-industrial countries, and hence of the largest student migrant-receiving countries, although international students account for only 6 percentage of total enrolment in tertiary education, they represent 26% of enrollment in doctoral programs, based on the latest OECD annual report on education – ‘*Education at a Glance 2018*’ – which compares various statistics between its 35 member states (OECD 2018:218). Drawing on this report, international tertiary students favor fields in so-called, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). One-third of the students enrolled in STEM areas in 2016 (OECD 2018, 218). Such a high proportion of doctoral-level research students and those in STEM fields among international students, clearly shows us that international student graduates are highly likely to integrate into domestic labor markets in host countries in which a growing demand of highly skilled workers is witnessed; in that highly educated-international student graduates may contribute to knowledge creation, innovation and economic performance in the era of the knowledge economy.

Most notably in countries like the U.S., Australia, Canada typically categorized as classic countries of immigration, it is evident that the education pathway is the pipeline for the global talent flows, by which international students can settle down as skilled immigrant

---

<sup>24</sup> The Economic Impact of International Students, *Universities UK*, March 2017, <https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2017/briefing-economic-impact-international-students.pdf> .

workers in a host society through tertiary education (Kerr 2019, 82-83). Universities function as a magnet that attracts the best and brightest students to come in, particularly through IHE, train them professionally through the higher education system, and produce skilled and highly skilled labor force to employers (Kerr 2018, 83). The U.S case is the most notable. Looking at the field of science and engineering, about 29 percent of the country's college-educated workforce in these areas is foreign born, and that share rises to 52 percent when we isolate those who hold doctorates (Kerr 2018, 25). It goes without saying that the H-1B visa program is one of the most important pathways into the U.S for skilled work, which helps international students facilitate the transition from study to work permit status after graduation.<sup>25</sup> As a country case in Asia, the city state Singapore also shows us that the country officially views international students as the future of highly skilled labor force at the point of entry (Yang, Yang, and Zhan 2017). 'Contact Singapore', a government agency jointly administrated by the Ministry of Manpower and the Economic Development Board, plays an important role in attracting highly skilled workers to Singapore. The agency is exclusively focused on international students as the highly skilled workers in the future workforce in Singapore (Iwasaki 2015, 7). Although the government tried to curb the number of international students since 2011, the level of percentage of international students in higher education remains high, particularly in higher degree programs such as Master and Doctoral degree programs. As statistics show, 76.2 percent of students in master and doctorate degree programs were foreign students in 2012 (Iwasaki 2015, 9).

As such, so-called, the commodification of higher education in most advanced economies allows and encourages HEIs to profit greatly from the importation of international

---

<sup>25</sup> See The U.S. Department of Labor, Accessed April 09, 2020, <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b> .

students (Dooley 2006; James-MacEachern 2018; Lomer 2017, 184-186). More specifically through IHE, many economically advanced countries strive to recruit the best and brightest students, and through the education pathway, attempt to incorporate them into their labor market after graduation as skilled and highly skilled workers. Hence, international students are often encouraged to settled down, and become more permanent residents, and potential citizens from the point of entry into the national migration policy framework. As the country as a case study that this thesis examines, in Japan, how is international student migration viewed, understood, and practically treated as a policy issue? More specifically by the government and universities as the two major gatekeepers, in recruiting international students to Japan through promoting the ‘internationalization of higher education’.

## **1.2 Questioning the Role of Immigration in International Student Migration to Japan**

Japan is one of the most popular destination countries for migrant workers and students in Asia. With their birth rates among the world’s lowest, the country faces the problems of aging societies, shrinking labor forces and declining productivity. Although allowing mass immigration would be the fastest and easiest way to tackle these economic and demographic problems, the government is not likely to use this as a solution. Although public opinions are divided and contesting as to opening immigration or against it, it is no doubt that government policies toward immigration has been continuously restrictive, and is reluctant to allow foreign populations to settle for good and become fellow citizens. In my personal view, being aware of criticisms of multicultural policies in the West, to some degree the government seems to be skeptical about building a multicultural immigrant society. In this regard, it is

assumed that the myth of ethnic homogeneity has still continuously significant implications on its immigration policy regime, most notably on citizenship.

Despite attempt to avoid mass immigration as a solution, it is also certain that the government well understands the urgency and significance of foreign human resources – both less-skilled and highly skilled foreign workers. Japan needs to revitalize stagnant economy and maintain its advanced economic power as the third largest economy in the world, and to deal with its serious labor shortage in certain industries thereby enhancing its national competitiveness in a highly competitive regional and global market.

Ostensibly, Japan has long officially banned the entry of unskilled foreign workers; instead, as back door or side door policies, since the mid-1980s it has been utilizing foreign technical intern trainees and international students as temporary laborers to tackle labor shortages in certain industries (Komai 2001; Shimada 1994; Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). Moreover, through an ethnic-selective migration policy, it has been utilizing the labor force of *Nikkeijin* migrants, the descendants of Japanese nationals who migrated to Latin America, mostly from Brazil and Peru (Ishi 2008; Takenaka 2003, 2009; Tsuda 2008). However, the labor shortages have become more deeply chronic and fiercely serious once again amid its recovering economy from the Lost 10 Years (*ushinawareta junen*) under the influence of Abenomics. After all the Abe administration has decided to accept lower-skilled foreign workers under a new labor migration policy from April 2019.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> In the case of Japan's new foreign workers policy, foreign workers who are eligible to apply for the new type of working visa, called '*tokutei gino*' (specified skills) are principally considered 'specified skilled workers'. In this regard, it is reasonably accepted that they are not literally unskilled or low-skilled foreign workers. However, in comparison to those in the highly skilled foreign professional category, foreign workers in the designated skills are given considerably less incentives about their residential status and other benefits. Also, unlike what the new working visa system advertises, it is doubtful whether or not the new system is practically used to recruit only 'experienced skilled foreign workers'. There is much concern about the misuse of the system, and criticism of the

Regarding policies to recruit highly skilled foreign workers, although Japan has not been closed to highly skilled migration (Oishi 2014), Japan is relatively a latecomer in the global competition for foreign talents (Green 2014). Most remarkably the government has recently introduced a new points-based system, officially named ‘The Points Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals’ or called The Highly Skilled Professional Visa (often referred to as the HSP or HSFP visa), which took effect in May 2012. Compared to any standard work visa, the special visa category offers more advantages and incentives to talented foreign workers with advanced and specialized skills.

In addition to its labor migration policies, just as aforementioned cases in many other high-income countries, the Japanese government is also using international student migration as a way of stimulating skilled migration, by attracting foreign students as a source of labor in future workforces. Regardless of the actual efficacy, this is a common approach and view toward international student migration to Japan. As one of the more popular destinations for international students and migrant workers in Asia, in principle its policies towards international students also officially come under the purview of highly skilled migration policies, implemented by the government with slogans such as – ‘War for Talent’ or ‘The Race for Global Talent’. The recruitment of international students is considered by the Japanese government as part of major policy approaches to attract highly skilled or skilled migrants (ADBI, OECD and ILO 2015, 29), which is a so-called “academic-gate approach” by which governments aim to gain foreign highly skilled and skilled workers from the pool of international students (Abella 2006, 18-19). As a recent OECD territorial review on Japan

---

new system in that it can be simply an extension of the existing Technical Intern Trainee Program, which is literally a way to recruit less-skilled foreign migrant workers. In this respect, I would like to call those workers in the new working category as ‘lower-skilled’ foreign workers which refers to those in between the highly skilled and low-skilled (or unskilled) workers.

(OECD 2016, 65) also points out, the Japanese government is attempting a skilled migration approach which promotes the employment of international students in Japan after graduation. To this end - to recruit and retain international students after graduation, the government has mainly been promoting 'internationalization of higher education'.

Although internationalization has been central to both national government policy and institutional action in Japan's university sector since at the late 1980s (Breaden 2014, 5), internationalization of Japanese higher education has been more accelerated since the late 2000s (Ishikawa 2011; Stigger 2018; Yamada 2012). Struggling with its long-stagnating economy, the Japanese government started attempting to regain the lost edge in its competitiveness, and internationalization of the nation is one of the most significant Japanese 'revitalization' strategies in which the internationalization projects of higher education is deeply engaged as part of it. With the tremendous impact of neo-liberalism on higher education globally, Japanese universities are no exception. Both national and private Japanese universities must survive for themselves supported by less public budget in a free-for-all and highly competitive situation. Furthermore, with Japan's rapidly aging population and its declining birth rate, Japanese higher education institutions have been seriously affected by financial loss and retrenchment (Yamada 2012). Under these circumstances, both as a cause and a consequence of Japanese universities' internationalization, the recruitment of international students becomes more significant for both the government and universities. In particular, it is increasingly more observable that Japanese universities are competitively using 'internationalization' as an advertisement to attract domestic students mainly to address their financial difficulties and not as a strategy for actual reform of institutional systems of education, research, and governance that would enhance their actual international competitiveness.

Concerning the government policies to recruit international students, the 300,000 International Student Plan, which was a successor of the 100,000 Foreign Student Plan in 1984, was announced by the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008. The plan aimed to increase the total number of international students up to 300,000 by 2020. As of May 1, 2018 the number of international students was 298,980 (208,901 in HEIs and 90,079 in language institutions (JASSO 2019). Considering the average annual growth rate, the goal will undoubtedly be accomplished by 2020. Meanwhile most notably, the ‘Global 30’ Project was also introduced in 2009 by the MEXT (The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), through which 13 selected universities started to offer degree programs in English with a considerable amount of funds from the government budget. Primarily, the project aimed to provide advanced learning environments for international students for low tuition fees and generous scholarship, and offer them more comfortable environments for studying without the language barrier (MEXT 2017; Watanabe, Sato and Murasawa 2018, 8). Moreover, it was followed by a new MEXT-led subsidy program named “Re-Inventing Japan” project in 2011, and “Top Global University Japan” project in 2013. Both government-led initiatives have been interested in the strategic acceptance of international students through IHE.

As the Japanese government has repeatedly declared through various government initiatives, it has continued to emphasize that the acceptance of international students will contribute to nurturing and developing its human resources in response to globalization (ISAJ 2019a; MOJ 2015; The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development 2011). Therefore, it promises to strengthen support for the employment of international students and aims to increase the share of international students who find jobs within Japan after graduation (MEXT 2014, 2018, 2019). In this situation, numerous media

and government reports, and academic studies on international students in Japan, often argue about various problems on the employment of international students after graduation (Murakami 2015); and how to improve the employability of international students (Harada 2010; MEXT 2018, 2019); and increasing the employment rate of international student graduates seems to be regarded as a positive sign of successful international student recruitment and internationalization of universities (Breaden 2018, 122; Kakuchi 2017).<sup>27</sup> However, is it really enough to affirm the positive link between student migration and skilled migration in Japan?

As Japanese media reports recently, the number of international students who could get a job after graduation hit a record high in 2018.<sup>28</sup> It is obvious that the employment rate of international student graduates is increasing. Nevertheless, it is still questionable if the link between student migration and skilled migration is apparently strong. The percentage of international students who remain for employment after graduation is still relatively low in Japan. According to JASSO's reports on the employment status of foreign students graduating from Japanese colleges and language schools between 2005 and 2016, the average employment rate of foreign students graduating and obtaining authorization to work for Japanese companies shows only 20 to 30 percent.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, this figure itself literally shows

---

<sup>27</sup> On a special issue on internationalization of Japanese universities published by the Japan Times, it is not difficult to find out how Japanese universities highlight the employment issue of foreign students after graduation when they advertise their universities to recruit international students, "Internationalization of Japanese Universities, *The Japan Times*, October 22, 2018, Accessed April 10, 2020, [https://info.japantimes.co.jp/ads/pdf/20181022-Internationalization\\_of\\_Japanese%20Universities.pdf](https://info.japantimes.co.jp/ads/pdf/20181022-Internationalization_of_Japanese%20Universities.pdf) .

<sup>28</sup> Number of foreign students seeking jobs in Japan after graduation hits record high, *The Japan Times*, October 23, 2019, Accessed April 15, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/23/national/foreign-students-seeking-jobs-after-graduation-japan/#.Xbo2XkX7RTY> . ; Record 25,900 foreign students landed jobs in Japan in 2018, *Nikkei Asian Review*, October 23, 2019, Accessed 30 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-immigration/Record-25-900-foreign-students-landed-jobs-in-Japan-in-2018> .

<sup>29</sup> 外国人留学生進路状況・学位授与状況調査 (The survey of foreign students' status of employment and degrees conferred), *JASSO*, Accessed September 15, 2019, [https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/intl\\_student\\_d/index.html](https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/intl_student_d/index.html) .

that the employability of international students in Japan is not so particularly weak in comparison with the situation of post-study work in other popular destination countries for international students. However, as this issue will be discussed in more depth later - particularly in chapter 3, some characteristics of international student migration to Japan and profiles of international students in Japanese universities, obviously show significant factors that has continued to weaken the link between student migration and skilled migration. For example, when examining job categories and types which are available for international student graduates, their choices are very limited in that the majority of international graduates - particularly dominated by Chinese nationals, are involved in interpretation and translation services, and sales and marketing, by using their multilinguistic skills. In addition, not so many international graduates could find jobs in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) in which international student graduates are more likely to improve their career status to literally become highly skilled workers per se. Although in general there is less demand for foreign graduates from Japanese industries related to STEM, practically speaking this is mainly because not so many international students are in postgraduate degree programs, particularly in doctoral programs in STEM subjects. In this situation, it is questionable if the increased number of international students who could find a full-time job after graduation may simply reflect a strong link between student migration and skilled migration. This situation particularly raises questions whether or not the education pathway really does work for international student graduates.

Additionally, and of more importance the settlement issue should be also be noted here. At least it is obvious that student migration cannot be a major channel through which international students find jobs, and a longer and permanent settlement in Japan through the acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship. Mainly, three factors need to be considered

to explain the situation: (1) international students' migration decisions to come and study in Japan; (2) employment opportunities for international students in domestic job markets in Japan; (3) immigration policies for the settlement of international student graduates.

Although all three factors may explain why the education pathway does not practically work in Japan, the 'immigration policies' should be the most important aspect that we need to carefully look at. These three factors can assist in explaining the contradictory situation (1) between the government's strong wish to recruit more international students and almost zero immigration policies for their permanent settlement; (2) between the government's various measures to support the employment of international students and the relatively low employment rate of international student graduates, and (3) between the official indication that international student recruitment is under the purview of highly skilled migration policies and the reality that international students are simply being utilized as temporary migrant workers in limited job categories, in which the recruitment of highly skilled foreign professionals are not necessarily crucial.

As this research continues to explore, it is certain that the contradictory situation is intrinsically related to how 'immigration' is viewed by Japanese government and society, and how 'immigration' plays a role in the internationalization of higher education – a major gateway for international students to come and study in Japan and find a work after graduation. In practice, without questioning the role of immigration, we cannot explain why the case of Japan is so different from other countries, which also take active steps to attract international students as part of a national scheme for skilled migration while attempting to retain international students as potentially important human capital with incentives for permanent settlement.

In fact, ‘immigration’ plays only a small role in the settlement of international students in Japanese society after graduation, while it merely takes a major role of recruitment. In reality, in the current status of IHE in Japan, international students seem to be largely viewed as nothing more than temporary sojourners, temporary laborers, and “passing presences”(Hall 1998a)<sup>30</sup>. At best they are often described in government rhetoric as ‘transnational bridge-builders’, which may implicitly convey a message of – ‘welcome now but please go back home later’. To put it simply, the process of recruitment and retention of international students cannot practically be translated into permanent settlement. This point marks a significant difference between Japan and other popular destination countries for international students around the world, in terms of how to view international student migration to and in Japan.

As some might argue about the settlement of international students, it is certain that international student mobility is often characterized by the pattern of ‘returning home’ after graduation. In this respect, as I will continue to argue throughout this thesis, it is no surprise to hear the *zentei* or premise from the Japanese government, claiming that not all want to stay and live for good after graduation and that most international students want to leave and return to their own home countries after graduation. Hence, it is reasonably accepted that the Japanese government continues to emphasize a traditional value of “the influence and soft power of alumni”(Lomer 2017, 100) when it comes to international student migration to and in Japan.

---

<sup>30</sup> In the Japanese edition of the book “Cartels of the Mind” (Hall 1998a), the term, “passing presences” is translated to “通り過ぎていく人たち (*torisugite iku hito-tachi*)” (Hall 1998b).

In this regard the *zentei* itself is not something wrong. However, it is problematic because the premise is not just something related to international student migration, but it is rather a fixed belief that has continuously existed with its blood-based national identity, and a dominantly-stereotyped perspective toward immigration in Japan. In other words, Japan wants ‘migrants’ who can never be part of its national identity, not ‘immigrants’ who can be official members of the nation regardless of different ethnic backgrounds. This perspective has not been significantly changed until the present day. This thesis particularly has an interest in the *zentei* in Japanese society towards international students as a group of foreign migrants, since the premise is intrinsically related to how Japanese society views the influx, presence and settlement of non-Japanese populations within its society – that is, how to view foreign migrants who are the migration-induced ethno-cultural diversity within its society.

As such, to understand it is important to ask a new question about international student migration to and in Japan; that is, a new question about the role of immigration in the process of recruitment, retention and settlement of international students as follows:

(Q1) Unlike other countries, why is immigration not importantly considered in the case of international student migration to Japan?

(Q2) In other words, why is the permanent settlement of international students not importantly considered by the Japanese government at the point of entry when international students come to Japan for study and after graduation?

In my opinion, the answers should be related to public and official attitudes to immigration in Japanese society. Which means that the answers should be found by questioning what kind of immigration policy Japan currently has in that: “an immigration

policy refers to the state's official attitude on who should be allowed to become its members, under what conditions, and of what kind” (Parekh 1994, 92). As mentioned earlier, by maintaining its restrictive public attitudes toward immigration, it seems that Japanese society is continuously skeptical about building a genuine multicultural immigrant society - despite its growing ethno-cultural diversity which is generated by migration, and is therefore reluctant to allow foreign populations to settle for good and become fellow citizens. In a way, the myth of ethnic homogeneity has helped the society to maintain “cosmetic multiculturalism” (Morris-Suzuki 2002a, 2002b) or perfunctory multiculturalism as the foundation of its immigrant integration policies.

It is certain that Japan’s immigration policies have been remarkably liberalized over the past few years, particularly in terms of the granting of permanent residency; firstly, toward elite migrants or highly skilled foreign workers, and possibly toward much less skilled foreign workers under the new labor migration scheme which began in spring 2019. However, the liberalization of its immigration policies has not necessarily led to the liberalization of its citizenship policy, and it seems unlikely to happen in the near future that the Japanese government will more proactively liberalize its citizenship policy to extend the perception of its Japanese national identity within a multicultural society. In this regard, without considering immigration, will Japan’s ‘internationalization’ or ‘re-internationalization’ project be feasible? More specifically as the major theme of this study, without discussing immigration, will Japan’s project on internationalizing its higher education be successfully achievable? As emphasized again, without considering the permanent settlement of international students, can the recruitment of ‘the best and brightest’ international students be possible?

In order to answer these questions: firstly, it is important to examine the nature of Japan's re-internationalization project particularly under the Abe government, which operates as a nation-branding strategy. In this regard, Japan's recent move towards liberalizing its immigration policies and internalizing its higher education may be understood as a form of cosmetic internationalization. Secondly, it is necessary to question again the meaning of diversity, national identity, and citizenship in contemporary Japanese society in the context of immigration and an aging society. While Japanese society is reluctant to accept mass immigration to tackle its population decline and aging society, the migration-induced ethno-cultural diversity is continuously growing, which is challenging the society's notions of national identity and citizenship. In doing so, we may understand why the absence of immigration is in international student migration, internationalization of higher education, and in the government policies towards international students

As such, the Japanese government has been liberalizing its foreign worker policies towards both highly skilled and lower-skilled migrant workers, by offering incentives to them, such as easier accessibility to the domestic labor market, better residential status - including an opportunity to live and work longer, and furthermore permanent residency. However, as I shall argue more in detail throughout the following chapters, it is important to note that the accessibility and chance to acquire Japanese citizenship is continuously limited and literally denied while Japan's foreign worker policies have been liberalized. This means, unlike the government's strong interests in improving its policies on the recruitment and retention of foreign workers, the settlement of foreign workers is continuously missing in the liberalization of Japan's labor migration policies toward foreign workers.

### 1.3 Aim and Significance of the Research

Against this background, this research attempts to critically examine and dispel the perceived ambiguity, superficiality and contradictions of immigration, national identity, and internationalization in education in contemporary Japan - particularly through the lens of ‘international student migration to Japan’, which is increasingly driven by recent practices of the powerful national agenda such as ‘re-internationalization’; namely ‘Revitalizing Japan’ under the Prime Minister Abe’s government.

In response to the question - why rethinking international student migration to Japan is important? This study aims to avoid rehashing what has usually been discussed about the *ryugakusei* issue in Japan, by opening up new perspectives, and probing for new views and vistas, furthermore creating a new room for discussion on the recruitment, retention and settlement of international students in Japan through the context of immigration. Ultimately, this study also aims to extend our ‘take-it-for-granted imaginations’ and ‘interrogations’, beyond a conventional belief of how to become Japanese; that is, regarding the question about Japanese national identity and citizenship as paramount. In this regard, although by and large this study is partly designed as a policy analysis, it is not mainly interested in studying policies and conducting a mere policy analysis, but rather it is interested in “the meanings that policies have for a broad range of policy-relevant publics”(Yanow 2010,8).

Concerning the purpose of this study, first of all, by trying to locate the issue of ‘international student migration to Japan’ in the center of immigration debates in the context of an aging society, this research attempts to challenge a conventional view of Japan’s immigration, particularly towards international student migration. Previous and existing

studies on international students have dominantly focused partially on foreign human resource management especially the presence of international students as a core component of IHE (Aya 2017; Breaden 2014; Conrad and Meyer-Ohle 2019; Kuroda et al. 2018; Kuwamura 2009; Oishi 2014; Yamamoto 2018; Yamaguchi and Maeda 2015; Yonezawa 2011, 2014). Only a few studies attempt to explore the presence of international students in the context of immigration (D'Costa 2016; Kwon 2017a; Liu-Farrer 2009, 2011). This is simply because there has been no immigration policy concerned with the settlement of international students through the education pathway, by which international students can settle down as skilled immigrant workers in a host society through tertiary education.

Hence, addressing the issue of settlement, firstly, this research criticizes the absence of immigration in international student migration, while at the same time, considering the possibility and feasibility of developing a formal immigration policy in contemporary Japanese society. This might begin with considering the settlement of international student as a pretest, which is a novel attempt to approach the issue of international students and international student migration to and in Japan.

Secondly, by questioning the role of immigration in the recruitment, retention and settlement of international student migrants, this study attempts to contemplate and highlight major factors underlying Japan's restrictive immigration policies, by revealing how the unwillingness and restrictiveness toward immigration and immigrant integration - embedded in Japanese society in a form of cosmetic multiculturalism, would affect the settlement of international students, and why the situation is problematic. Previous and existing studies have often explained the reasons why the link between student migration and employment is so weak by illustrating cultural obstacles and linguistic barriers. While it is partly true, unlike

other studies, this research attempts to explore more fundamental reasons related to perception towards immigration. In other words, how immigration is viewed and understood by the government and Japanese society.

Thirdly, by demystifying the nature of Japan's internationalization projects, particularly under the Abe government, and by examining how and why internationalization is exercised as a nation-branding strategy, this study also attempts to spell out how negatively the superficiality of internationalization - namely cosmetic internationalism, would affect many aspects of IHE in Japan, especially the retention and settlement of international students.

Fourthly, by thoroughly examining the global *jinzai* issue, I will argue the cosmetic and superficial nature of the global talent cultivation project through IHE, and examine its link with the resurgence of cultural nationalism and the emphasis of Japaneseness. In so doing, eventually this research will reveal reasons why the Japanese government and universities are only interested in fostering Japanese global *jinzai* - more specifically through promoting International at Home (*Uchinaru koku saika*), rather than recruiting foreign global *jinzai*. Furthermore, why the situation in which international students become imagined global *jinzai* would deteriorate resulting in many valuable opportunities that both Japanese society and universities can take and enjoy through the presence of international students.

Lastly, the findings of this research may be to point to ways in which the Japanese society can practically utilize international students as a source of skilled immigrant workers in response to its rapidly aging population, by using them as a means of creating a genuinely multicultural society in contemporary Japan by accepting them as would-be fellow citizens.

## **1.4 Research Design and Research Methods**

### **1.4.1 Research Design**

To address the research questions discussed earlier, this study presents a case study of international student migration as a contemporary phenomenon in Japan, the extent to which the recruitment, retention and settlement of international student migrants through the internationalization of higher education has raised questions on Japan's stance toward immigration, national identity, and citizenship, and the policy responses of the Japanese government.

Above all, a clear and simple answer to the question of "What is a case study?" is found in Keith Punch (2005):

The basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seems appropriate. While there may be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible (Punch 2005, 144).

As Punch also notes,

The case study aims to understand the case in depth, and in its natural setting, recognizing its complexity and its context. It also has a holistic focus, aiming to preserve and understand the wholeness and unity of the case. Therefore, the case study is more a strategy than a method (Punch 2005, 144).

The case study approach is widely used and applied in social research (Tight 2010), and it is one of the most frequently used qualitative research methodologies (Yazan 2015). However, despite its popularity among researchers, its status and practices often remain unclear – whether it is a method, a methodology, a strategy, a design, an approach or something else? (Tight 2010, 329). There is no doubt that as a methodology, the case study has long been in a contested and confused terrain, which is surrounded by proponents and opponents (Tight 2010; Yazan 2015). Nevertheless, as a research strategy, case studies offer certain advantages for this research. Drawing upon Yin (2009), there are two points that may explain why I employ case study as a strategy for this research.

First, it is advantageous for researchers to empirically investigate a contemporary phenomenon, particularly when researchers have little control over a set of events.

Although myriad definitions of case studies can be found in a variety of the generic social research methods literature (Bryman 2004; Chadderton and Torrance 2012; David and Sutton 2011; Punch 2005; Silverman 2010), one that fits this research is that of Yin (2009), who defines a case study as an empirical investigation:

A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 2009,18).

As Yin points out, as an empirical investigation of events that are taking place in a contemporary context, the case study approach enables researchers to explore a contemporary

phenomenon in that context, which is a new and ongoing process that is little understood (Hartley 1994).

Regarding international student migration as a main topic in this study - although Japan has been accepting international students since 1881 (Maruyama 2011), in the context of contemporary migration, international student migration through the internationalization of higher education is relatively new and in particular it is one that has developed recently, if it is considered part of skilled migration in the context of immigration. There is, therefore, a continuing need for new empirical research to not only explore international student migration to Japan as a contemporary migration phenomenon in contemporary Japanese society, but also examine the migration phenomenon in different contexts – for example, particular characteristics of international student migrants in the context of internationalization of higher education, and immigration and integration, and examine the challenges arising from their migratory process in the context of policy-making, and socio-cultural transformations etc.

According to Eisenhardt (1989, 548-549), case studies are “particularly well suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate.” As discussed, there is little research on international student migration to Japan in the context of immigration and immigration policies as most studies have been interested in international student migration to Japan in the context of foreign human resource management and internationalization of higher education. Hence, there is a continuing need for research to develop new theoretical understandings and approaches to address international student migration to and in Japan, especially in the context of immigration, which is the focus of study.

Second, the case study has a unique strength in its ability to collect and deal with a variety of evidences about phenomenon where it is actually occurring.

As Yin puts it:

The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. The case study relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian's repertoire: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons involved in the events. Again, although case studies and histories can overlap, the case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations – beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study. (Yin 2009, 11)

As a researcher who has been academically trained and conducting qualitative research in Migration Studies, which clearly indicates a very interdisciplinary setting – involving Politics, Human Geography, History, Sociology and Cultural Anthropology – I attempt to utilize a variety of ways to collect data for analysis. When I deal with contemporary Japanese society as part of country case studies, and international student migration as a specific case study within a specific country setting – Japan, case study research allows me to be equipped with versatility in data-collecting process since case study can be applied as a research method beyond a fixed disciplinary boundary. This helps me by not being limited to, and bounded by methodological constraints in data-collection and analysis.

There is also a comparative dimension in this case study. Japan's experience with

international student migrants is an intriguing case that can help us understand how other countries have viewed international student migrants in various contexts, more specifically in the context of immigration and aging populations in a comparative perspective. For instance, the Japanese government's policies toward the recruitment and retention of international students can be studied as a case of how a non-immigration country with a strong sense of an ethnically homogeneous national identity views the study-migration pathway in comparison with other countries who are more willing to construct student pathways, particularly among a wide range of OECD countries. This thesis, therefore, includes a comparative study of the recent development of immigration discourses, government practices toward international student migration, skilled migration, and internationalization of higher education between Japan and other countries.

#### **1.4.2 Research Methods**

Concerning the research methods which I have used for data-collection and analysis, the methods utilized in the empirical research for this thesis are mainly the classic ethnographic data-gathering methods (Powdermaker 1966; Wax 1971; Werner and Schoepfle 1987) - including participatory observation, formal and informal interviews (mostly semi-structured informal interviews), documentary collection and analysis.

First of all, through observations of the internationalization process of higher education in Japan, I examine the characteristics of internationalization of higher education and the degree of the process in a variety of ways. Given that I am an international and comparative researcher who is conducting a case study on contemporary Japanese society, and an international student who came to Japan through the internationalization of higher education;

my background and position, in other words, how I view myself in the research process, cannot be simply defined by a fixed dichotomous entity as outsider or insider (Arthur, McNess and Crossley 2016). In addition as a cross-cultural researcher I have been actively negotiating my position in the research process and field. In this regard, I view myself as a liquid “inbetweenner” in this research (Milligan 2016).

Secondly, I continue to examine the above by carrying out in-depth interviews both formally and informally through ethnographic interviews with many international students and educators (mostly university professors) who used to be and are currently studying and teaching mostly in Japan and elsewhere such as South Korea, Australia and Hong Kong. Although my field work with the interview project is only part of my doctoral research, it has nevertheless helped me to better understand some other realities facing international students coming and studying in Japan - which are not often tangible on government documents, by giving me a much better understanding of some of the superficial aspects of the internationalization of higher education in Japan.

Thirdly, since this research is also partially but importantly designed as a policy analysis on immigration and internationalization of higher education in contemporary Japan, document collection and analysis were extremely significant for this research - especially analyzing and interpreting government documents and print media (newspaper articles and reports). Although this research does not significantly rely on quantitative methods, it uses statistical data when it is available, to provide evidence of the wider regional or international context. Doing research in both immigration and education policy settings, which means, in places, processes and relationships where Japan’s migration policies and policies for internationalization of higher education are made, I shall be trying to contribute to a new

meaningful argument in favor of a more informed, lively, and practical contestation of policies for international student recruitment and settlement - particularly in the context of immigration and aging society by all stakeholders, including the Japanese government, policy makers, higher education institutions, enterprises, and a research community of Japanese and international researchers.

Lastly, it should be noted that this research is essentially migration research with a perspective of interdisciplinary research. Observing that international migration is an integral component of the globalization process rather than as a temporary phenomenon, it has resulted in greater scholarly attention from a variety of academic disciplines (Bommes and Morawska 2005,1). As Castles points out (2010,1569), the inflow of new researchers into the field of migration studies has increased, and they have attempted to apply the conceptual and methodological tools of their own academic disciplinary traditions. However, these discipline-based approaches often focus on limited aspects of the migratory experience rather than the whole migratory process, and thus migration research has been “compartmentalized, with little analytical and methodological collaboration across boundaries.” (Castles 2010,1569). During the 1990s, there was a growing awareness of the need for a multidisciplinary approach, and a number of studies were based on cooperation between different academic disciplines (Bommes and Morawska 2005, 3). Researchers also attempted to bring together theoretical approaches from across disciplinary boundaries (e.g. Brettell and Hollifield, 2000). Admittedly it is still challenging for migration researchers who are from different disciplinary boundaries to develop an integrative approach, rather than it seems additive (Castles 2010,1569).

However, in researching and analyzing contemporary human migration as an important

phenomenon shaping contemporary societal process, it is inappropriate to employ only a single disciplinary perspective because contemporary migratory flows are increasingly becoming a highly complex phenomenon for which an inter-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary approach is essential. According to Castles (2010,1569),

Migration embraces all dimensions of social existence, and therefore demands an interdisciplinary approach.

It seems certain that it is not easy for an individual researcher alone to use an integrated interdisciplinary approach to migration research, given that generally it should involve joint research projects by many researchers using different conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools. Nevertheless, in this research, I attempt to carry out my research using an interdisciplinary perspective, at the interdisciplinary level in order to address and understand complexities of the realities underlying the process of liberalizing immigration policies and internationalizing higher education in contemporary Japanese society. In doing so, I expect that we may be able to better understand changes and challenges in the two different policy issues – immigration and internationalization of higher education, in a more integrated angle across a single academic disciplinary boundary.

### **1.5 Limitations of the Study**

Since the liberalization of Japan's labor migration policies, and internationalization of higher education are still a relatively new and ongoing process, the availability of empirical data is still limited and to some degree for it is not sufficient for a sophisticated analysis, in particular a longitudinal study of the recruitment, retention and settlement of international

students who have come to Japan through specific internationalization projects which have been implemented by the government over the recent years. In addition, until quite recently, studies of international student migration to Japan have predominantly focused on issues in the context of global human resource management. There have been few studies in the case of Japan, which attempted to examine the recruitment of international students in the context of immigration and immigration policies. This situation also creates some constraints of availability for existing studies and data collection, which would further limit my analysis in the case of Japan.

Lastly, it should be noted that this research relies considerably on literature written in English rather than those written in Japanese. Although the reason for this is mainly that this thesis is written in English rather than in Japanese; as a non-native Japanese researcher who is conducting research in the case of contemporary Japanese society, I cannot deny that accessibility to available published data, resources, and interviewees was considered most importantly when I designed this research. In this regard, the empirical findings from this research would be relatively viewed as an outsider's perspective and opinion.

## **1.6 Structure of the Thesis**

Chapter 2, followed by the introduction as Chapter 1, mainly provides a comprehensive overview on international student migration to Japan, and a literature review of previous and existing research on international student migration to Japan. Reviewing the development of government's policies to recruit international students through internationalization of higher education, particularly in the context of immigration and aging society, this chapter poses a significant question of why immigration does not matter in Japan's international student

recruitment policies in stark contrast to cases of other countries. It also explores a possibility of implementing a formal immigration program through international student migration to tackle its demographic and economic problems.

Chapter 3 continues to explore international student migration to Japan in the context of immigration and settlement. In particular, this chapter examines international student recruitment policies in the light of cosmetic multiculturalism and immigrant Integration. By questioning the role of immigration in the recruitment, retention and settlement of international student migrants, this chapter attempts to contemplate and highlight major factors underlying Japan's restrictive immigration policies. It also reveals how the unwillingness and restrictiveness toward immigrants and immigration have been embedded in Japanese society, and through a form of cosmetic multiculturalism, affects the settlement of international students, and why it is problematic.

Chapter 4 attempts to demystify the nature and meanings of 'internationalization', and examines the superficiality of Japan's internationalization project, more specifically under the Abe administration. In the early part of the chapter, I examine why and how Japanese government attempts to deal with its image problems by using 'internationalization'. In this respect, Japan's current internationalization projects are essentially related to 'nation-branding' as its operating principle. In this regard internationalization of Japanese universities may be understood and reviewed in the same context because it is also essentially part of the Japanese government's nation branding strategy in response to its image problems. Reviewing how the Japanese government views higher education as soft power and public diplomacy, and how the major role of higher education as soft power has significantly changed to the state's nation branding strategy, this chapter will reveal how the ultimate goal

of the *kokusaika* project is aimed at re-enhancing national identity by means of a celebrated ethno-cultural essence at the same time, through a universally-circulating tool on the globe which is the popular label of ‘internationalization’.

Chapter 5 continues to extend my argument about the superficial and cosmetic internationalization to a specific context as the global *jinzai*, which is one of the most salient policy issues related to international student migration as well as internationalization of higher education. By thoroughly examining the global *jinzai* issue, I will argue about the cosmetic and superficial nature of the global talent cultivation project through IHE, and examine its link with the resurgence of cultural nationalism and the emphasis of Japaneseness. In doing so, eventually this research will reveal reasons why the Japanese government and universities are only interested in fostering Japanese global *jinzai*, more specifically through promoting ‘International at Home’ (*uchinaru kokusaika*), rather than recruiting foreign global *jinzai*. Furthermore, why the situation in which international students become ‘the imagined global *jinzai*’ would deteriorate many valuable opportunities that both Japanese society and universities can take and enjoy through the presence of international students. In the very last chapter of this chapter, it also includes some personal narratives of international students. By examining students’ personal narratives, in particular, by questioning the *zentei* or premise that foreigners are ‘temporary being’, and contradictory internationalization and unpreparedness, we will be able to more understand some aspects of how, and to what extent, the lived experiences of international students in Japanese universities are influenced by the cosmetic nature of immigration, and the internationalization of higher education.

Chapter 6 as the concluding chapter summarizes the major research findings and revisits

major arguments discussed and presented in the previous chapters. The findings of this research may be to point to ways in which the Japanese society can practically utilize international students as a source of skilled immigrant workers in response to its rapidly aging population, as well as use them as a means of creating a new multicultural society in contemporary Japan by going beyond the fixed premise or *zentei* that foreigners are ‘temporary being’.

**CHAPTER 2**

**RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL STUDENT MIGRATION (ISM) TO  
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTION TO MASS  
IMMIGRATION**

**2.1 Introduction**

Japan has been averse to immigration due to the strong belief of homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and culture; and although Japan has already turned into a de facto country of immigration, it has continuously maintained a restrictive attitude toward immigration. Mass immigration is constantly a very sensitive topic discussed in Japanese society, while completely off the debating table of the government. Moreover, surprisingly immigration is considerably less politicized in politics in comparison with other industrially advanced countries since issues of immigration cannot be an important determinant of politicians' electoral success or failure.

This situation is resulting in a low level of public awareness regarding immigration. Mindful of the failure of multiculturalism in the West, it appears that the Japanese government, policy makers, and the society are particularly skeptical about building a multicultural immigrant society. For example, while over the past few decades an average of 10,000 foreign citizens acquired Japanese nationality every year through naturalization, examining Japanese naturalization policy, “the produces and criteria for making a final decision to become Japanese citizens continuously remains ambiguous and hidden in a veil of bureaucratic secrecy.”(Lee 2016, 41). Also, as Sheftall has described (2016, 36), it is questionable if the Japanese society is “psychologically prepared to accept large numbers of

cultural others, either as meaningful participants or even just as friendly neighbors” in the cultural space. Indeed, we may say that in Japanese society generally perfunctory multiculturalism can often be found in very symbolical and cosmetic ways.

However, with its birth rate among the world’s lowest, the country consistently faces problems resulting from an aging society, a shrinking labor force and declining productivity while Japan is still the 11<sup>th</sup> populous country in the world. In order to revitalize its stagnant economy and govern the third largest economy in the world, the government understands the urgency and significance of foreign human resources, most notably under the Abe government’s ambitious economic growth strategy, widely known as the ‘Japan Revitalization Strategy (*nihon saiko senryaku*).

In this situation it is certain that the government’s migration policy approach is recently moving from its restrictiveness towards a more liberalized and settlement-oriented approach with apparent and substantive measures. It has proactively been enticing qualified foreign migrant workers, mainly by introducing a more flexible visa system while continuing to ease the requirements for permanent residency under the new points-based system. Moreover, the Japanese government is also relaxing its labor migration policies toward lower-skilled foreign workers. For example, from April 2019, technical intern trainees have been allowed to stay longer to work in Japan under a new residential status in designated industry areas - up to ten years from the current maximum 5 years. In addition to these policy changes toward foreign workers, as with most industrially advanced countries, international student recruitment comes under the purview of highly skilled migration in Japan. The number of international students has been considerably rising in recent years through the process of internationalization of higher education, hitting a record high in 2019. International students

are now, at least, ostensibly considered as a valuable policy commodity by the government, universities, and enterprises, although commonalities and differences vary among stakeholders in terms of why they want to recruit international students.

It should be noted that international students have particularly become an indispensable source of temporary labor to solve acute labor shortages in the course of a recovering Japanese economy over the last few years. In a survey of the life of self-financed international students conducted in 2015 by JASSO (Japan Student Services Organization), a leading public agency offering various support services for international students in Japan, 74.8 percent (4,516) of 6,036 respondents had part-time jobs.<sup>31</sup> This number shows that most international students are working as temporary laborers in various forms during the period of their study. Another illustration is seen in the book, titled “*Konbini Gaikokujin* (Foreigners at convenient stores)” (Serizawa 2018) written by a Tokyo-based writer Serizawa Kensuke who has published books on various social issues in contemporary Japanese society. Based on the author’s own empirical research with numerous interviews with foreign students in Japan, he illustrates vividly the growing presence of foreign students working as temporary workers particularly at convenient stores, which is becoming a greater reality in everyday scenery in Japan. According to his research, as of 2017, more than 40,000 foreign clerks were working in over 55,000 convenient stores run nationwide by three major convenient store chains. Most of the foreign clerks at the convenience stores were various types of young students such as university students, exchange students and language school students. As such it is certain that international student recruitment is practically desirable, if not inevitable.

---

<sup>31</sup> 平成27年度 私費外国人留学生生活実態調査概要 (*Heisei 27-nendo shihigaikokujin ryūgakusei seikatsu jittai chōsa gaiyō*), JASSO, September 2015, Accessed April 18, 2020, [https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/ryuj\\_chosa/h27.html](https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/ryuj_chosa/h27.html).

Considering these points could we then say that Japan is eventually moving towards opening its door to immigration? Will the recent liberalization of its migration policies in response to its drastic labor shortages pave the way for Japan to formally introduce a mass immigration program in the near future? Can the Japanese government really develop a clear-cut approach to tackling its aging society and low birth rate through immigration? In other words, does the Japanese government really consider ‘replacement migration’ as a solution to offset its aging population? Indeed, answers remain elusive, puzzling and confusing. The answers are just as ambiguous as the status of Japan: *Japan is a de facto country of immigration but not officially a country of immigration*. Ironically however, the ambiguity would help to clarify how the Japanese government views mass immigration. Simply put, *‘Japan needs foreign human resources, but not permanent immigrants.’*

Against this background, this chapter critically reviews the recent liberalization of Japan’s labor migration policies towards both highly skilled and less-skilled foreign migrant workers; particularly through the lens of international student migration to Japan, which is increasingly driven by the recent practices of a powerful national agenda, such as ‘re-internationalization’ - namely ‘Revitalizing Japan’ under the Prime Minister Abe government. Assuming that the Japanese government will continuously stick to the solution that attempts to “ensure that only the brightest and best can come”<sup>32</sup> with a very limited quota, Japan is unlikely to accept mass immigration. Additionally, the Japanese government keeps repeatedly emphasizing how to utilize foreign human resources under policies that will in fact preclude mass migration. In the conflicting situation between the government and society’s

---

<sup>32</sup> Home Office and the RT Hon. Theresa May MP, “Immigration: Home Secretary's speech of 5 November 2010, November 5 2010, Accessed April 18, 2020, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/immigration-home-secretarys-speech-of-5-november-2010> .

unwillingness towards mass immigration and the growing importance of utilizing foreign human resources in the context of a rapidly aging population and decline; rethinking ‘international student migration’ may be a good starting point to invigorate public debates about immigration while at the same time using it as an opportunity for a pretest of Japan’s capability to see if Japan can accept foreign immigrants through a formal immigration program in the future.

Also, in this chapter, I shall be significantly trying to locate the issue of ‘international student migration to Japan’ in the center of immigration debates in the context of an aging society. Previous and existing studies on international students (*Ryugakusei*) have primarily focused on foreign human resource management, IHE, and international education, and have been rarely interested in the settlement of international students as would-be Japanese citizens through immigration. This means it is necessary for us to stop viewing international students as temporary sojourners, but to start considering them as would-be permanent residents and potentially Japanese citizens. Hence, this chapter attempts to challenge the conventional view toward immigration in Japanese society, particularly towards international student migration, and alternatively to examine a possibility and feasibility of developing a formal immigration policy in Japan which might begin with the consideration of international student migration.

## **2.2 An Overview of Skilled Migration to Japan in the Contemporary Context of Immigration and an Aging Society**

On September 21, 2016 in New York, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo gave an opening address in dialogue with the New York based business and financial community of Japan. In

his remarks he said:

We should look to the future, rather than worry about the present. Japan may be aging. Japan may be losing its population. But, these are incentives for us.<sup>33</sup>

In the following year, the quotation was used as a key message on the front page of the Japanese government's promotional brochure 'Abenomics', which has been published online by the Cabinet Public Relations Office, several times periodically with updated contents in 2017.<sup>34</sup>

Given that Japan is one of the countries with the world's lowest birth rates and most rapidly aging societies; many commentators have been continuously warning that despite the gravity of the demographic issue, Japan has not come up with any comprehensive measures to deal with these problems. Not only domestic but also the global media often postulate that Japan faces a catastrophic future with the problems of an aging society, a shrinking labor force and declining productivity, that all pose serious problems for the country's social welfare system, particularly medical care and pensions. In this context, what does it really mean that an aging population and decline are incentives for Japanese society, as put forward in the remarks by Prime Minister Abe? Has the Japanese government found a more or the most effective way to solve its population dilemma? Before I move onto a way of finding some answers, it is informative to outline some aspects of Japan's population outlook.

---

<sup>33</sup> Abe Shinzo, "Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo at the Dialogue with the New York based Business and Financial Community of Japan," *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, Accessed April 18, 2020, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201609/1219240\\_11015.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/1219240_11015.html) .

<sup>34</sup> The Government of Japan, "Abenomics", *Cabinet Public Relations Office*, July 2017, Accessed April 18 2020, [https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/\\_userdata/abenomics/pdf/170630\\_abenomics.pdf](https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/_userdata/abenomics/pdf/170630_abenomics.pdf) .

According to a recent population projection for Japan listed by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS, 2017), the Japanese population began shrinking in 2008 and is now aging faster than any other country in the world. Although a slow recovery in its birth rate is under way, since its total fertility rate (TFR) bottomed out at 1.26 per woman in 2005, it is still one of the lowest in the world.<sup>35</sup> As of 2014, Japan's TFR was 1.4 children per woman compared to 2.0 in 1960.<sup>36</sup> In addition, according to a summary report of the 2015 national census in Japan by the Statistics Bureau publicly released in June 29, 2015; by October 1, 2015 the number of the elderly population aged 65 or older accounted for 26.7 percent of 127.11 million total population, while the ratio of the early people was the highest ever recorded - which was bigger than most other countries, such as 22.4 percent in Italia and 21.2 percent in Germany, which increased up to 6.5 percentage points from ten years ago.<sup>37</sup>

According to a Japanese government's official population projection (IPSS 2012), Japan's total population is projected to decrease from approx. 128 million in 2010 to 87 million in 2060. The size of the working-age population (age15-64) is also expected to decline from around 81 million in 2010 to 44 million in 2060, while the ratio of elderly people is estimated to increase dramatically up to 40 percent of the total population in 2060. Based on the population projection, immigration is recently more often discussed at the governmental level in Japan as a possible policy response to its rapidly aging population. In January 2014, at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting, Prime Minister Abe delivered

---

<sup>35</sup> Robin Harding, "Japan Birth Rate Recovery Questioned," *The Financial Times*, February 4, 2016, Accessed April 18, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/d386b5a6-bb56-11e5-bf7e-8a339b6f2164>.

<sup>36</sup> Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman), *World Bank Open Data*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN>.

<sup>37</sup> 平成27年国勢調査(*Heisei 27-nen kokusei chosa. chushutsu sokuho shukei kekka*)(A Summary Report of the 2015 National Census ) (in Japanese), Statistics Bureau of Japan, Accessed April 19, 2020, <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2015/kekka.htm>.

a speech entitled “A New Vision from a New Japan”. In his statement, he outlined that becoming a super-aging society, with a low-birth-rate; Japan will need to find innovative and creative human resources, and that utilizing the female labor force is crucial, for in order to increase women’s participation in the labor market, as he puts it, “support from foreign workers will also be needed for help with the housework, care for the elderly, and the like.”<sup>38</sup> A few months after the speech, in March 2014, a Japanese daily, the *Sankei Shimbun* reported that the Abe administration decided to consider admitting a large number of immigrants, possibly as many as 200,000 a year, to make up for its aging and shrinking population. Although the government officially refuted and immediately clarified that no decision has been made on this issue, it seemed certain that the government was considering increasing the number of immigrants to boost Japan’s potential for long-term economic growth.<sup>39</sup> As such, whether it refers to highly skilled or the less-skilled foreign workers, recent discourses on the importance of importing and utilizing the foreign human resources began to prevail in parallel with a growing concern about declining population and aging society in Japan.

In general the Japanese government has been trying various policy measures to tackle population decline and labor shortages in order to maintain its advanced economy, mainly in three ways: (1) by adopting a series of pro-natalist policies to reverse the declining birthrate; (2) through the promotion of technological innovations to address labor shortages and (3) by utilizing foreign migrants, which include *Nikkeijin* workers (Japanese descendants) from

---

<sup>38</sup> Abe Shinzo, “A New Vision from a New Japan”, *A speech at World Economic Forum 2014 Annual Meeting in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland*, January 22, 2014, Accessed April 19 2020, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/statement/201401/22speech\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201401/22speech_e.html) .

<sup>39</sup> 毎年20万人の移民受け入れ政府が本格検討開始, (*Maitoshi 20manrino imin ukeire seifu ga honkaku kentō kaishi*), *Sankei Shimbun*. March 14, 2014, <http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/140313/pl1403130006-n1.html> (in Japanese ); and an English newspaper, the Japan Times also reported the issue by citing the Sankei news. Yoshida Reiji, “Japan may boost immigrant numbers,” *The Japan Times*, March 14, 2014, Accessed April 20 2020, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/14/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-may-boost-immigrant-numbers/> .

Latin America, foreign trainees, and foreign students. These attempts have accomplished varying levels of success (Green 2014, 14). However, amid an increasing growing concern about shortages of working populations, as well as a growing interest in utilizing foreign human resources to maintain the world's 3<sup>rd</sup> largest economy and revive its long-term stagnant economy under the influence of Abenomics , the government more officially began to show its recognition of the urgency and significance of foreign human resources, by practically responding to demands for relaxing the rules to facilitate the recruitment of foreign workers from business industries that are literally suffering from labor shortages and desperately needed more skilled foreign workers to expand their global business operations, particularly as the Japanese economy has been faced with the rise of neighboring economies in East Asia and the increasing pressure of regional and global competition.

As a result, the government began to more proactively liberalize its labor migration policies toward foreign workers in earnest. For example, in the Japan Revitalization Strategy which was released in June 2016 (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2016), the Abe administration has continuously signified the government's efforts to utilize foreign human resources such as skilled foreign workers, including those particularly in the construction and shipbuilding industry; foreign housekeeping support workers; foreign students in nursing care; and highly skilled foreign professionals. Eventually the government adopted various new policy strategies. These are mainly two aspects of the government's policy approaches – first, highly skilled migration policies and second, lower skilled migration policies (including policies toward both skilled migrants and less-skilled, and temporary foreign workers).

In short, the government initially began to review its highly skilled migration policies to attract highly skilled foreign professionals and introduced a new visa system to attract highly

skilled foreign professionals by providing them preferential entry and residential status. Later, and more remarkably, the Japanese government proactively started opening its labor market toward lower-skilled migrants - rigorously speaking including unskilled migrants, from April 2019 which has now been officially banned. This step is actually an actual realization from the unclear plan and rumors on media as mentioned earlier which came out five years before another new visa system to attract lower skilled foreign migrant workers in response to acute labor shortages in certain industries - as the Japanese economy has recovered, particularly under the Abe administration. In between the two approaches, the government also attempts to promote the recruitment and retention of international students, in that international students can be utilized both as temporary laborers and as a pool of skilled migrants – possibly highly skilled migrants as well.

### **2.3 Highly Skilled Migration Policies**

In fact, the debate on highly skilled migration began in the late 1980s. Thus, it seems certain that Japan had been open to highly skilled migration (Oishi 2014, 422), but it is also true that it is relatively a latecomer in the global competition for foreign talent compared with other industrialized nations (Green 2014, 11). In the 2000's, the government began to enhance its highly skilled migration schemes. At a cabinet meeting in June 2002, the issues of the influx of brain and employment of highly skilled overseas human resources were included in a structural reform plan of the Japanese economy (Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Policy Management and Structural Reform 2002) that the meeting adopted (Akashi 2014, 183).<sup>40</sup> Since then, a series of policy measures on highly skilled migration have been

---

<sup>40</sup> The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy under the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Policy Management and Structural Reform 2002 (Summary)," Accessed April

developed, which included E-Japan Strategy II in 2003 (E-Japan Strategy I already began in 2001), and 300,000 International Student Plan in 2008. After that, in 2009 the Fourth Basic Plan for Immigration Control clearly showed that the government would introduce a new points-based system, officially named ‘The Points Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (HSFP)’, and it took effect in May 2012. Shortly after the introduction of the HSFP, in 2013 the government ambitiously revised the points system to relax requirements for recognition as highly skilled professionals and to offer more incentives to those migrants.

Previously, while the categories of the highly skilled migrants were broader than the current visa system, under the new points-based system, they became narrower and more specified. In the new visa system, based on a specific calculation table including academic background, professional career and experiences, annual income, age, research achievements and Japanese language proficiency etc., points will be set to each category. If a foreign candidate’s total amount of points exceeds 70 points, the applicant will be considered a highly skilled foreign professional, and will be categorized by one of three professional activities: (1) scholars and researchers in advanced academic research activities; (2) ICT workers and engineers in advanced specialized/technical activities; (3) business executives and managers in advanced business management activities (See Table 2.1).

---

20, 2020, [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2002/0621kouzoukaikaku\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2002/0621kouzoukaikaku_e.html) .

**Table 2.1 Points-based Preferential Immigration Treatment  
for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals (HSFP)**

	Highly Skilled Professional (i)a	Highly Skilled Professional (i)b	Highly Skilled Professional (i)c	Highly Skilled Professional (ii)
<b>The Specified Fields of Activities</b>	Permission for multiple activities			
	Advanced academic research activities 「Highly-Skilled Professional(i)(a)」 Activities of engaging in research, research guidance or education based on a contract entered into with a public or private organization in Japan.	Advanced specialized/technical activities 「Highly-Skilled Professional(i)(b)」 Activities of engaging in work requiring specialized knowledge or skills in the field of natural sciences or humanities based on a contract entered into with a public or private organization in Japan.	Advanced business management activities 「Highly-Skilled Professional(i)(c)」 Activities of engaging in the operation or management of a public or private organization in Japan.	In conjunction with the activities "Highly-Skilled Professional(i)" permitted to engage in almost all of the activities of statuses of residence based on employment.  * "Highly-Skilled Professional(ii)" is for foreign nations who have engaged in activities of "Highly-Skilled Professional(i)" for three years or more.
<b>Period of Stay</b>	Grant of the 5 years period of stay			Granted an indefinite period of stay
<b>Accompaniment by Family Members</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Permission for the spouse of the highly-skilled foreign professional to work.</li> <li>▪ Permission for bringing a parent(s) to accompany the highly-skilled foreign professional to Japan under certain conditions.</li> <li>▪ Permission for a domestic worker to accompany the highly-skilled foreign professional to Japan under certain conditions.</li> </ul>			
<b>Entry and residence procedures</b>	Preferential processing of entry and residence procedures.			
<b>Permanent Residency</b>	Relaxation of requirements for grant of the permission for permanent residence concerning the period of stay in Japan.			

Source : Immigration Bureau of Japan (IBJ),

[http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact\\_3/en/index.html](http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_3/en/index.html) (Modified by the Author).

However, the more sophisticated categorization of highly skilled foreign workers does not mean that the definition of highly skilled foreign professional became much clearer and more definite. As Green has argued (2017, 406-407), in Japan's highly skilled professional visa, the definition of the highly skilled migrants provided by the Japanese government is somewhat more inclusive and ambiguous than other countries implementing similar points-based systems such as Canada, U.K and the U.S, in which the definitions of the highly skilled


foreign professionals clearly indicate that applicants for the highly skilled professional visa must be individuals who are “internationally recognized or emerging leader”, “excellent talent” in comparison to other types of foreign workers, and those with “extraordinarily abilities or achievement”. This raises a question if the Japanese government does not have any specific policy goals about recruiting the highly skilled foreign professionals in order for certain technological innovation and developments with concrete long-term plans.

Indeed, as Chizuko has criticized (2015, 13-14), the Japanese government is implementing the points-based system without specific labor market tests; which may deter whether a certain occupation is excluded or not. If a category of occupation is already sufficiently occupied by the domestic workers, there is a possibility that the point system may have negative impacts on the labor market by undermining the labor conditions of domestic workers in Japan. Simply speaking, in the current points-based system, there is no specific annual quota on recruiting highly skilled foreign professionals and there is no limitation on the contents of occupations. This may clearly show an evidence that the Japanese government is not developing and implementing a robust and solid highly skilled migration policy. Hence, at the current stage it cannot be said that the current points-based system is precisely designed and being implemented with a long-term policy direction and goals.

In a similar vein, a sudden increase in the number of HSFP visa holders also reflects the superficiality and ambiguity of the points-based system. As of June 2019, the total number of foreign workers whose working and residential status is the highly skilled professionals was 18,286. This number shows a significant increase for a very short period of time in comparison with only 12 visa holders when the system was introduced in May 2012 (See Figure 2.1). Despite the dramatic increase in number, it is consistently questionable if the

new visa system properly performs to literally recruit the globally, competitive, highly skilled foreign professionals. Can the increased number actually confirm a good performance of the new policy?

**Figure 2.1 The Number of The Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (2012~2019)**



Source : MOJ [http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri06\\_00088.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri06_00088.html)

According to a report on the points-based system produced by the 6th Immigration Policy Discussion Panel, a private consultative group for the Ministry of Justice, which was held in 2013 (MOJ 2014)<sup>41</sup>, when the report was released, 434 professionals were qualified as highly skilled foreign professionals after the first year of implementation of the new points system. Although the number was much smaller than the government expected, since it has continued to relax the requirements, the government evaluated the number very positively

<sup>41</sup> 高度人材に対するポイント制による出入国管理上の優遇制度の見直しに関する検討結果（報告），*The 6th Immigration Policy Discussion Panel, Ministry of Justice, May 2013*, <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000112007.pdf> .

(Chizuko 2015, 12). After the government's immediate response, and efforts to boldly modify and relax the requirements for the recognition of the highly skilled foreign professional status, as a result the cumulative number of cases of recognition has drastically increased from 845 in the end of 2013 up to 3,033 by the end of July 2015. And only 6 years later, the number of the HSFP visa holders became more than 10,000 times bigger than its initial size (See Figure 2.1). However, it should be noted that the sharp increase in the number for the first few years was substantially resulting from absorbing many existing foreign skilled workers in Japan - particularly in the category of ICT workers and engineers, rather than recruiting new foreign professionals from abroad.

Oishi critically argued (2014, 431) about the increased numbers. As she analyzed, based on the same report, as mentioned earlier, by the 6th Immigration Policy Discussion Panel (MOJ 2014), among the 434 foreign professionals who were observed when the report was released, there were only 17 newly arrived foreign professionals who were recognized through the new system between May 2012 and March 2013; the rest of them were those who already resided and worked in Japan and had changed their visa status to fit in with the new points-system. In this respect, the point system did not practically help to increase the number of new arrivals of foreign professionals, but rather it only offered existing foreign skilled or highly skilled workers more incentives to stay longer in Japan (Oishi 2014, 431). It is certain that the situation is changing over the past few years. Nevertheless, it is still questionable to ask if the new visa system is properly performing as a policy to attract highly skilled foreign professionals to come, work and live in Japan.

Examining details of the available statistics of the highly skilled foreign professional visa holders (ISAJ, 2019b), the vast majority has consistently been Chinese nationals since

the introduction of the points-based system. For example, 176 or 56.2 percent in 2012, 1,442 or 63.4 percent in 2014, 5,970 or 67.0 percent in 2017, and 7,642 or 65.6 percent in 2018.<sup>42</sup> Based on this situation, we may assume that the largest stakeholder in the HSFP is Japanese business industries, more specifically Japanese companies that are operating their global business including R&D related to China. That is the reason why the companies actively seek many Chinese workers with advanced skills and knowledge. In this respect, the HSFP itself performs appropriately as an effective government response to demands from the Japanese business industries. But it is not certain if the new points-based system can perform properly to make Japan appear as an attractive place to migrate, to work, and to live for highly skilled foreign professionals.

According to the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2014 published by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland - from which many authors often cite to indicate the world rank of national competitiveness, Japan ranks 50th in “attractiveness to foreign-born highly skilled professionals” out of sixty countries surveyed. There are some factors which may be considered the reasons for Japan’s low ranking, including relatively lower income for the highly skilled foreigners compared to other advanced industrial countries, geographically poor accessibility from North America and Europe, Japanese corporations’ reluctant attitudes to hire foreign workers, and the limited number of English-speaking workplaces (also see Kodama 2015, 13 ; Oishi 2012, 2014). According to a study from the Business Roundtable (Business Roundtable 2015) - an association of chief CEOs of leading U.S. companies, working to promote public policy around issues affecting the U.S. economy and aimed at identifying and evaluating the best

---

<sup>42</sup> The Highly Skilled Professional Visa Holders by Nationality, *Immigration Services Agency of Japan (ISAJ)*, Accessed April 20, 2020, <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001244280.pdf> .

immigration policies for promoting economic growth, by using a comparative case study of the top 10 advanced economies including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The study rated each country's immigration policies in six key categories – key aspects of immigration in economic and business-related categories including: (1) hiring highly-skilled foreign nationals; (2) lawful permanent residence for high-skilled workers; (3) transferring highly-skilled employees across borders; (4) retention of international students postgraduation; (5) hiring lower-skilled workers and (6) attracting foreign entrepreneurs. In all categories, Japan was ranked as the lowest or near the bottom. The result of this study eventually shows that Japan ranked 10th out of 10 countries. It is obviously questionable if Japan is really viewed and considered an attractive country for highly skilled foreigners to come, work and live.

As evidenced, considering Japan as an attractive destination for globally mobile highly skilled foreign professionals, we may see various types of disadvantages, and particularly, as the report by Business Roundtable pointed out, Japan's restrictive immigration policy has been a significant factor that may discourage foreign professionals to come to Japan to work and live. In this respect, it is obvious that the new points-based system continues to relax the requirements for entry and residence, and dramatically change its rules to make the eligibility for permanent residency easier. However, it should be noted that the points-based system is not encouraging highly skilled foreign professionals to settle down for good as fellow Japanese citizens, although the highly skilled foreign professionals are considered a group of 'desired migrants' in contrast to other types of foreign migrants.

As I will continue to argue about this issue on the absence of immigration in Japan's recent liberalization of migration policies toward foreign workers, including international

student migration to Japan, unlike what we can easily see from discourses on the importance of importing foreign human resources, the issue of ‘permanent settlement’ of foreign human resources is usually missing. Perhaps some will argue that the continuous relaxation of acquiring ‘permanent residency’ should be enough, particularly because a common feature of the highly skilled migrants is their flexible mobility. However, what I would like to challenge is the *zentei* or premise that foreign workers are temporary sojourners, and they will return home or move to third countries, and the unacknowledged assumption that foreigners would not want to become ‘Japanese citizens.’ This attitude of the Japanese government towards foreign migrants may not surprisingly apply to the case of lower skilled migrant workers and international students in the same way, which continues to generate superficiality, ambiguity, and contradictions in Japan’s recent attempt to liberalize its policies towards non-Japanese migrants. Then, let us move onto the lower skilled migration policies which have recently been introduced in early 2019.

#### **2.4 Lower Skilled Migration Policies**

In addition to the development of the highly skilled migration policies, from April 1, 2019, Japan has launched another new visa system to recruit a sizable number of less-skilled and lower-skilled foreign workers. Under the new visa system, named “Working Visa: Specified Skilled Workers (i)/(ii) (*Tokutei ginou 1 go and 2 go*), companies including both small sized and middle-sized firms in industries that are having difficulty in domestically recruiting human resources are permitted to hire foreign nationals who possess specialized knowledge or skills in designated categories, and the visa system may facilitate the foreign workers to be able to work immediately. Most notably, in contrast to those in the specified skilled workers (i), foreign workers in the category of “specified skilled workers (ii)” are

even permitted to accompany their family members (spouse and children) if conditions are satisfied. Although it is limited, this is a remarkable change in the Japanese government's attitude towards foreign workers who are not in the visa category of highly skilled professionals (See Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2 Working Visa: Specified Skilled Worker (i), (ii)**

	The Specified Skilled Worker (i)	The Specified Skilled Worker (ii)
The Specified Industrial Fields	(1) Nursing care (2) Building cleaning (3) Material Processing industry (4) Industrial machinery manufacturing industry (5) Electric and electronic information related industry (6) Construction (7) Shipbuilding and ship-related industry (8) Automobile maintenance (9) Aviation (10) Lodging (11) Agriculture (12) Fisheries (13) Food and beverages manufacturing industry (14) Food service industry  <b>*Specified Skilled Worker (i) can be accepted in all 14 industries.</b>	Construction Shipbuilding and ship-related industry  <b>*Specified Skilled Worker (ii) can be accepted only in the two industries (Construction, and Shipbuilding and ship-related industry).</b>
Period of Stay	Maximum stay up to five years in total with renewals every one year, six months, or four months.	Renewable (every three years, one year, or six months), and no limitation to the length of stay)
Exams for Skill Standards	Skill levels will be confirmed by an exam, etc ( those who have completed technical intern training are exempt from the exam)	Confirmation by an exam
Japanese Language Proficiency	Japanese language skills necessary for day-to-day activities and work, confirmed by an exam, etc. (those who have completed technical intern training are exempt from the exam)	Not required
Accompaniment by Family Members	In principle, not permitted	Permitted if conditions are satisfied (spouse and children)
Support by Accepting or Registered Support Organization	Eligible	Not eligible
Eligibility for Permanent Residency	Not permitted	Possible

Source : **JICO** (Japan International Training Cooperation Organization) <https://www.jitco.or.jp/en/skill/>; **MOFA** (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000459527.pdf>. (Modified by the author).

The new working visa system was introduced under pressure from business industries struggling with the tougher labor shortage in the past decades. Although a large-scale influx

of foreign workers, particularly less-skilled workers, has been traditionally banned, the government has eventually been forced to ease its tough rules to accept less-skilled workers in response to strong demand from businesses. Through the new visa system, the government initially expected to welcome as many as 47,550 foreign workers in the first year, and envisioned importing more than 345,000 foreign workers in 14 job categories to Japan over the next five years.<sup>44</sup>

According to a report in the 3rd meeting by Cabinet Committee on the Acceptance of Foreign Nationals and Harmonious Coexistence<sup>46</sup>, the largest number of labor shortage is found in nursing care (60,000), followed by food service industry (53,000), construction (40,000), building cleaning service (37,000), and agriculture (36,500) (See Figure 2.2).


As such, unlike the government's policies to attract highly skilled foreign professionals, in the case of the less or lower-skilled migrant worker policies, the Japanese government provides more sophisticated plans for the recruitment and retention of foreign workers in specific industries with estimate numbers that each industry would need yearly, up to the next five years. Hence it is no doubt that the case of importing lower-skilled foreign workers is directly related to the issue of its declining working-age population and viewed as a solution, that is to say, utilizing foreign human resources per se, to address an aging society.

---

<sup>44</sup> The Lower House Judicial Affairs Committee, held on November 16, 2018, Accessed November 13, 2019, [http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb\\_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181116004.htm](http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181116004.htm) .

<sup>46</sup> 外国人材の受入れ・共生に関する関係閣僚会議 (第3回), *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, December 25 2018, Accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gaikokujinzai/>.

**Figure 2.2 The Estimated Number of Foreign Workers Needed  
Over the Next 5 Years (2018~)**



Source : The Cabinet Office, <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gaikokujinzai/kaigi/dai3/siryou2-1.pdf>.

More importantly the second point which should be discussed, is that the new visa system has triggered an immigration debate in a very real sense - unlike the introduction of the HSFP. By the time this new visa system has been launched, there has been much criticism and concern surrounding the introduction of this new migrant worker policy. Most notably, all of sudden it has become an immigration debate which has attracted media and public attention. The issue of the new visa system, along with other types of foreign migrants particularly including international students, has been specially featured and highlighted in numerous weekly quarterly, monthly magazines, academic journals, and books - particularly since 2018 (See Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Special Features on Immigration in Japanese Magazines and Journals  
(Between 2018 and 2019)



In a column on Nikkei Asian Review in 2018 by Peter Tasker - a writer and regular columnist for many influential media conglomerates related to various issues in Japan, has warned that large-scale immigration would be bad for Japan, and has severely criticized the Abe government’s decision to accept significant numbers of foreign manual workers through the new five years working system, which he states would possibly risk creating social and political tensions. Furthermore, he urges Japanese society to take warning from the Western precedent for mass-immigration and multiculturalism by saying:

Rather than committing to an ill-considered program of radical, irreversible change, Japan should maintain as much flexibility and discretionary power as possible in immigration policy. Over the years Japan has learned much that was useful from

Europe. Now it has an opportunity to learn from Europe's mistakes.<sup>47</sup>

In contrast to Tasker's opinion but with consistent criticism on the new visa system, a leading proponent of opening immigration, Sakanaka Hidenori, director of the Japan Immigration Policy Institute and former head of the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau, has also criticized the government's plan to accept more foreign workers as temporary workers in an interview article in the 2018 December issue of *Sekai* - one of the most liberal political magazines in Japan. In the interview, he has insisted that the only way to address various issues stemming from Japan's seriously declining population should be 'immigration', more specifically through a formal immigration policy, and called for a national debate on an actual immigration policy (Sakanaka 2018). Moreover, he has stressed that it would be possible for Japan to accommodate 10 million immigrants over the next 50 years, and it would be possible for the society turn into a "Japanese style immigration country (*Nihon-gata imin kokka*) as he has continuously argued (Sakanaka 2007).

Between the government and political parties, there has also been heated debates on the new visa system. One of the most contentious topics in the debate, has been on if the new influx of a sizeable number of foreign workers that will lead to opening its door toward immigration, and to permanent settlement of those workers in the *tokutei ginou* visa system. Most fiercely, just before the new bill to bring in more foreign workers passed in the Diet on December 8, 2018, a series of discussions have been held in the Lower House Committee on Juridical Affairs throughout November until early December in 2018, in which the Justice

---

<sup>47</sup> Peter Tasker, "Why large-scale immigration would be bad for Japan", *Nikkei Asian Review*, November 16 2018, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Why-large-scale-immigration-would-be-bad-for-Japan> .

Ministry presented details of the new visa system - including the estimated numbers of foreign workers that fourteen major industries desperately demanded due to acute labor shortages.<sup>48</sup> In a discussion of the Lower House Committee on Juridical Affairs on November 14, although the Justice Ministry were strategically equivocating in replying to all answers, it has repeatedly confirmed that the new visa system will not lead to the permanent settlement of foreign workers who come to Japan through the new visa system in one way or another.<sup>49</sup>

Indeed, in May 31 2019 the Immigration Services Agency of Japan more concretely revised the previously ambiguous guidelines for granting permanent residency to foreign workers to assuage concerns that the *tokutei ginou visa* could lead to the permanent settlement of foreign workers who come through the newly introduced visa system - which was one of the most contentious topics in politics regarding the new visa system.<sup>50</sup> Briefly, according to the specific guidelines, even though foreign workers under the type 1 status are allowed to work and live in Japan up to five years, the period of their stay will be excluded from the eligibility for permanent residency. Until recently, attaining permanent residency in Japan requires foreign nationals to have lived in Japan for at least 10 years or more, and have stayed for a minimum of five years of living continuously with a residential status that permits employment. Hence, simply put, what the revision is intended to do, is undoubtedly to prevent a possibility for the permanent settlement of foreign workers from the point of entry.

---

<sup>48</sup> 第197回国会 法務委員会 第3号, *The House of Representative, Japan*, November 14, 2018, Accessed April 20, 2020, [http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb\\_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181114003.htm](http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181114003.htm) .

<sup>49</sup> 第197回国会 法務委員会 第2号, *The House of Representative, Japan*, November 14, 2018, Accessed April 20, 2020, [http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb\\_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181113002.htm](http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000419720181113002.htm) .

<sup>50</sup> 永住許可に関するガイドライン, *Ministry of Justice*, May 31, 2019, Accessed April 20, 2020, [http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyukan\\_nyukan50.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyukan_nyukan50.html) .

As has been illustrated and discussed, the recent liberalization of both Japan's highly skilled and lower skilled migration policies has been mainly driven by the awareness about the growing urgency and importance of utilizing foreign human resources. In particular, the government has been taking the lead in the liberalization of foreign worker policies in response to pressure and demand from business industries suffering from acute labor shortages, which is resulting from the country's declining working-age populations - in the context of population decline and an aging society. As a result of the liberalization of migration policies, it seems certain that the Japanese government's foreign worker policies are shifting towards a more settlement-oriented approach. However, the shift is continuously limited to a premise that foreign residents, more specifically foreign workers are temporary sojourners. In this situation what is more surprising is the reality that a way of becoming a Japanese citizen is continuously restrictive, and principally closed to the highly skilled foreign professionals, despite their category as 'wanted migrants', unlike 'unwanted migrants' such as low-skilled foreign workers, refugees or asylum seekers in general. Hence, from my point of view, the country, at least the government and politics, consistently presupposes that Japan cannot be a country of immigration and furthermore Japan should not be a country of immigration. The same reasoning applies to the case of international students who are considered both 'wanted' and 'unwanted migrants'. In this regard, international students are also mainly viewed as temporary sojourners and passing presences. Given how they are viewed, it is no surprise to see that there is no discussion about the settlement of international students in the government policies towards them.

As the main argument in this chapter is: the conflicting situation between the growing importance of utilizing foreign human resources, due to its aging society and the Japanese government's efforts to preclude mass immigration; 'international student migration' may be

considered an alternative policy approach to address its declining working-age population with less social and political burden owing to specific reasons. Additionally, rethinking ‘international student migration may be a good starting point to invigorate more public debates about immigration in earnest, while at the same time using it as an opportunity for a pretest of Japan’s capability, to see if Japan can accept foreign immigrants through a formal mass immigration program and international student migration. In the following sections, the possibility and feasibility of international student migration as an alternative policy approach will be discussed.

## **2.5 ISM to Japan in the Context of Immigration and Settlement**

The increasing transnational flow of student migration on a global scale is not a new topic in academic research, and in many countries international student migration is high on the policy agenda (ADBI, OECD and ILO 2014).<sup>51</sup> In particular, experiencing population decline and aging, most advanced economies seek skilled workers to augment its shrinking workforces and eagerly recruit top-end global talents to enhance its national competitiveness in the age of the knowledge economy. In this situation, international students are often viewed as valuable human capital by governments in most industrialized countries.

International student education is a large, glowing and lucrative industry in many developed countries in that international students help to maintain domestic institutions’

---

<sup>51</sup> As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, according to a definition by OECD (OECD 2014, 352), International students refers to students who left their country of origin and moved to another country for the purpose of study. Due to their cross-border mobility as the most significant character of the group, international students are often described and defined as “internationally mobile students” (UNESCO 2015). In this thesis, in general the term, international students refers to internationally mobile students and international students in Japan principally indicates foreign students who are having “student visa”, which refers to those who are staying more than 6 months in Japan for the purpose of study, unless otherwise stated.


competitiveness, and they may become an important pool of skilled migrants for governments wishing to recruit ‘tried and tested’ individuals into their labor forces (Hawthorne 2008, 1).

Most notably, Asia has been the main driver behind the increasing international mobility of students and its position both as a major source and as a destination has increasingly become important (ADB, OECD and ILO 2014). In 2012, more than 4.5 million students were studying in tertiary education outside their country of origin. The average annual growth rate in international student mobility between 2000 and 2012 was 7 percent, increased from approx. 2.09 to 4.53 million during the period (OECD 2014, 342) (See Figure 2.4). Compared to the numbers of international students in 1975, the number of students abroad in 2012 increased more than five times (OECD 2014, 344). According to the UN’s Asia-Pacific Migration Report 2015 (UN ESCAP 2016, 43-46), the number of students at the tertiary level from Asia and the Pacific studying abroad more than doubled, from over 700,000 in 2000 to almost 1.76 million in 2012. Notably, while we may observe huge flows of tertiary students from Asia and the Pacific who move to study outside their country of citizenship, countries in the region also receive large numbers of international students. For example, the number of international tertiary students studying in the region substantially increased between 276,000 in 2000 to 968,000 in 2012, while the total number of international students more than tripled during the same period.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> According to a recent report published in 2018 by the British Council on international student mobility, global outbound student mobility is projected to slow in the next ten year, largely because of the growth in local tertiary enrollment ratios at global level. Available from: <https://www.britishcouncil.us/research-and-reports-2> .

**Figure 2.4 The Annual Growth in International Student Mobility (2000 to 2012)**



Source : Education at a glance 2014 (OECD 2014).

As the world’s third largest economy, Japan has been in the list of the most popular countries as destinations for international students in the region. According to a UNESCO indicator based on various data collections in 2013, Japan ranked 7th out of the top 10 destination countries in the world for tertiary-level international students, which accounted for 3 % of total overall students.<sup>53</sup> The majority of international students in Japan are overwhelmingly from Asian countries (ADBI, OECD and ILO 2014, 9). In particular, Japan is one of the countries which host the largest number of Chinese students in the Asia-Pacific region along with Australia and South Korea (UNESCO-UIS 2014, 155).


In Japan, the number of international students has increased significantly over the past decades. Since Yasuhiro Nakasone administration’s internationalization plan launched in 1983, the number of international students has risen fivefold over the first decade from

<sup>53</sup> UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx> .

10,428 in 1983 to 52,405 in 1993. This number continued to increase to 109,508 in 2003, finally recruiting more than 100,000 international students as the target set by the scheme after almost two decades (Hennings and Mintz 2015, 242), and in 2015 the number surpassed 200,000 international students (208,379 students) for the first time. Based on government statistics (JASSO 2019), as of May 1, 2018, the total number of international students was 298,980, and increased by 31,938 or 12.0 percent compared to the previous year of 2017 (267,042). Compared to only 5849 international students were recorded in 1978, the current number of international students shows a remarkable increase (See Figure 2.5). Among all international students, almost 70 percent or 208,901 students were enrolled in higher education and the other 30 percent or 90,079 students were in Japanese language institutions.

A striking feature of international students in Japan is that the vast majority of the international students by nationality are Chinese. Although the influx of Chinese students has gradually decreased, Chinese students have continuously made up almost half of all international student populations until recently. As of May 1, 2018, figures showed that 114,950 or 38.4 percent were Chinese nationals, and Vietnamese (72,354 or 24.2 percent) consisted of the second largest group of international students followed by Nepalese (24,331 or 8.1 percent) and South Korean (17,012 or 5.6 percent), and Taiwanese (9,524 or 3.1 percent). It should also be noted that among all foreign residents in Japan, Chinese are also the largest group. According to MOJ Japan (2016), at the end of 2015, the total number of foreign residents (including medium/long-term residents and special permanent residents) was 2,232,189; of which Chinese nationals were 665,847, followed by South Korea (457,772), Philippines (229,595), Brazil (173,437) and Vietnamese (146,956). Chinese nationals comprised almost 30 percent of all foreign population in Japan.

*Figure 2.5 The Number of International Students in Japan (1978 ~2018)*



Source: Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO).

[http://www.jasso.go.jp/en/about/statistics/intl\\_student\\_e/index.html](http://www.jasso.go.jp/en/about/statistics/intl_student_e/index.html)

As illustrated earlier, Japan has vigorously promulgated specific policies to recruit skilled and highly skilled foreign workers. The recruitment of international students is considered by the Japanese government as part of a major policy approach to attract highly skilled or skilled migrants (ADB, OECD and ILO 2015, 29), which is termed the so-called “academic-gate approach” (Abella 2006, 18-19) by which governments aim to attract skilled foreign human resources from a pool of international students. As a recent OECD territorial review on Japan (OECD 2016, 65) points out, the Japanese government is attempting a “skilled migration approach” which promotes the employment of international students in Japan after graduation. Indeed, the government seems to be increasingly promoting the retention of international students after graduation. For example, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (*kosei rodo sho*) is providing foreign students with a variety of job-finding information through the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka Employment Service Center for

Foreigners, employment support (career guidance) starting from an early stage after admission, an internship program, and job interview meetings.<sup>54</sup>

As shall be discussed elaborately in chapter 3, by examining the three major processes of international student migration to Japan in a receiving country's perspective: the recruitment, retention and settlement, despite the government's articulation linking student migration and skilled migration, and a positive increase in the employment rate of international student graduates, it is continuously questionable whether international student migration to Japan may be successfully translated into a pool of skilled migration. Moreover, when it comes to the settlement issue of international student graduates, it is even more questionable whether international students are literally encouraged to stay in Japan after their study, or in other words, whether the Japanese government really views them as a group of desirable foreign migrants at the point of entry and has a sophisticated policy to encourage them to stay on long-term and even permanently.

Rigorously speaking, it seems obvious that student migration cannot be a major channel through which international students obtain jobs and permanent residency or citizenship for permanent settlement in Japan. Although the employment rate has been increasing gradually, and in particular rebounding since the East Great Earthquake in 2011, the percentage of international students who remain for employment in Japan after their study (language or degree program) is still relatively low. According to JASSO's reports on the employment status of foreign students graduating from Japanese colleges and language schools between 2005 and 2016, the average employment rate of foreign students graduating and obtaining

---

<sup>54</sup> Study in Japan Comprehensive Guide, *The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Accessed May 17, 2018, <http://www.studyjapan.go.jp/en/inj/inj04e.html> .

authorization to work for Japanese companies shows between 25 to 30 percent. Only considering foreign graduates from college level institutions except Japanese language schools, in 2005 7,911 students successfully started working among 29,813 foreign graduates, which accounted for 26.5 percent. In the latest statistics on 2017 foreign graduates' employment status; 16,242 graduates started working among 51,636 which accounted for 32.4 percent.<sup>55</sup> As such it does not seem that the employability of international student graduates has become meaningfully stronger over the past decade.

Moreover, some might argue that the employment rate of international student graduates in Japan is not so significantly worse than other popular destination countries for international students. Nevertheless, considering the link between student migration and skilled migration, is incessantly questionable. For example, as shall be discussed more in chapter 3, examining the details of job categories that are usually offered to international student graduates, the categories of jobs that international student graduates may choose from are not so diverse. The majority of international student graduates find full-time jobs in translation, interpretation, trading and restaurant services; while there are less chances for them to enter into the STEAM fields - which is one of the most common pathways for international students to integrate into a destination country's job market after graduation whereby international students are more likely to become part of highly qualified workforces. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between employability (from students to full-time workers) and versatility (from students' migrants to skilled or highly skilled workers).

Then, why is the link consistently weak between student migration and skilled migration

---

<sup>55</sup> 外国人留学生進路状況・学位授与状況調査 (The Survey of Foreign Students' Status of Employment and Degrees Conferred), JASSO, Accessed April 20, 2020, [https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/intl\\_student\\_d/index.html](https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/statistics/intl_student_d/index.html) .

in the case of international students in Japan?

Firstly, it is necessary to think about discursive constructions of international students as ‘temporary sojourners’, ‘passing presences’ or ‘transnational bridge builders’ rather than ‘settlers’ or ‘immigrants’.

The government’s policy measures to recruit international students through internationalization of higher education have not viewed student migrants in the context of immigration and settlement. It is therefore not surprising that existing studies on international students in Japan has not viewed the influx of international students in the context of immigration debates, but rather most studies have overly discussed international students in the context of ‘internationalization of higher education’, which has been promoted by the government’s human resource management policies (Aya 2017; Breaden 2014; Conrad and Meyer-Ohle 2019; Kuroda et al. 2018; Kuwamura 2009; Oishi 2014; Yamamoto 2018; Yamaguchi and Maeda 2015; Yonezawa 2011, 2014), through particular emphasis on enhancing ‘national competitiveness’ and increasing ‘national interests’ in the age of the knowledge economy (Hennigs and Mintz 2015; Nagamatsu 2013; Ota 2014; Yonezawa 2014).

According to the 2015 Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (MOJ 2015a), the Japanese government clearly shows that it recognizes the significance of the flows of international students for the Japanese society as follows:

The acceptance of foreign students has great significance for the future of our country. Through welcoming more foreign students to our country, it is thought that more

foreign nationals will come to understand and have an affinity with Japan, and this will lead to the strengthening of future mutual understanding. Moreover, mutual understanding and friendly relations will be strengthened in the areas of politics, the economy, academia and culture after the students return to their home countries, and this in turn will also lead to promotion of the overseas expansion and trade of Japanese companies. In addition, through foreign students working for Japanese companies after their graduation, there is the possibility that they will develop into human resources who will at some point lead the economic development of Japan and since it is possible that some of the foreign students will potentially possess highly-skilled professional skills, it is thought this will also lead to developing the potential seeds of highly-skilled professionals (MOJ 2015, 25).

As we can see from the government report on its immigration policies, the emphasis on the significance of international students is mainly focused on their role as international alumni as ambassadors, that is, “the soft power of alumni” (Lomer 2017). In the discursive construction of who they are as international students (foreign students), the Japanese government expects international students to build a transnational bridge between Japan and their countries of origin during and after their studies, and then to generate influences for Japan. In this case, the statement is tacitly based on the premise that in principle international students are expected to return home, and if any remain to work after graduation if only for a certain period of time, which means ‘temporarily’, they are expected to leave Japan eventually.

As I will illustrate in Chapter 5 through an interview analysis with an international students, government has sought and wanted to recruit students who would be able to enhance the soft power of alumni as a transnational bridge builder between their home countries and Japan after their studies. In this respect, in my view, international students in

Japan are principally viewed as a “passing presences” (Hall 1998a), not as ‘potential Japanese citizens’ from the point of their entry, based on the premise that international students are staying here temporarily, and they will leave Japan and return to their home countries.

In addition, as mentioned in the report, the government expects the retention of international students to help revitalize the Japanese economy in a way as a potential highly skilled foreign human resource. Seemingly, this part relates to an immigration and settlement issue. However, as I noted earlier, Japan’s highly skilled migration policies do not seriously consider the citizenship dimension. In other words, even highly skilled migrants are not entirely welcome in terms of acquiring Japanese citizenship. Moreover, in practice, international students are often considered temporary workers during their studies, and after graduation only a limited number of the students could be successfully hired as full-timers by Japanese companies. In this situation, international students are consistently viewed as temporarily staying migrants or temporary workers, rather than potentially permanent residents or citizens. In this regard, it is no surprise that the report is not much interested in the other dimensions such as social and cultural benefits that international students may bring in when they settle down as permanent residents, and eventually becoming Japanese citizens.

Secondly, concerning factors affecting the weak link between study and work after the graduation of international students, it is also necessary to think about a mixture of images of *ryugakusei* (international or foreign students) both as the desirable migrant and the undesirable or unwanted one. Although on the one hand the image of international students is positively described and viewed as a potential skilled or highly skilled human capital who may bring benefits to the society regardless of whether or not they actually do, on the other hand

the image of international students is also often negatively described and constructed as “a *dekasegi ryugakusei*, - a migrant worker residing in Japan under false pretenses on a student visa while making a quick yen” (Breaden 2018, 100). Indeed, most shockingly as of March 2019, it was revealed by the Japanese media that a Tokyo-based private university had lost its contact with about 1,400 of its international students since the 2016 academic year, and more specifically the whereabouts of about 700 students enrolled for the 2018 school year are unknown. The foreign students are mostly from Asian countries including Vietnam, Nepal and Myanmar.<sup>57</sup>

This incidence related to *ryugakusei* - particularly Asian students, possibly evokes negative images of Asian students, which are overlapped with stereotyping of Asian migrant workers, which also contributes to increased negative images of them. Given that lower-skilled migrant workers in Japan are mostly from less economically advanced countries in Asia, Asian foreigners are more likely to be treated as ‘the less favored foreigners’. According to a recent quantitative data analysis on Japanese natives’ view toward foreign residents from different countries (Zhang 2018), the research’s findings show that Japanese people are more inclined to accept the numerical growth of foreigners from Europe and North America than those from other Asian countries. Importantly Asian students continue to show their numerical preponderance in Japanese universities and other types of schools by occupying more than 90 percent of all international students. In this situation, I assume that the combined perception toward international students between negative images of Asian students as bogus students or potentially undocumented migrant workers and discursive

---

<sup>57</sup> Univ. campus inspected after 1,400 foreign students go AWOL, *The Mainichi*, March 27, 2019, Accessed April 01 2019, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190326/p2g/00m/0dm/058000c> ; Ministries probe 700 missing foreign students, *NHK World*, March 27, 2019, Accessed April 01, 2019, [https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20190326\\_26/](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20190326_26/) .

constructions of international students as passing presences seems to be deteriorating the positive development of an education pathway when it comes to the settlement of those Asian students. As a result, Japanese immigration policies are more likely to function to restrictively control their presence and settlement as a tool of entry and exit control, rather than to encourage international students to stay and live more permanently in Japanese society.

Thirdly, it is important to note that Japanese society still maintains its restrictive attitude toward immigration in general, which is notably reflected in its immigration policies.

As Oishi argues (2014, 439-440), in the case of highly skilled foreign professionals, due to linguistic, cultural and institutional factors, Japanese companies are not appealing to foreign professionals as workplaces; and thus, not so many highly skilled foreign migrants are willing to come and work in Japan. In the case of international students, unlike the case of highly skilled foreign professionals, they have less language and cultural barriers. Except for those in English-taught international degree programs, international students studying at Japanese universities and other types of schools such as professional training colleges (*Senmon Gakko*) may speak Japanese language fluently and understand local cultural practices. Therefore, they are linguistically and culturally more swiftly ready to work and integrate into the Japanese society more than any other types of foreign migrants. However, as seen earlier, in practice relatively a small number of international students may remain in Japan for employment after graduation. In this regard, the reason for the weak linkage between study and work is not only attributed to linguistic, cultural and institutional factors; but also to various other factors, such as unfavorable social and political climates towards immigration in Japan as a non-immigration country - including political concerns, objections and growing anti-immigrant sentiments to some degree. Most importantly, Japan continues to

place a high value on their ethnic and racial homogeneity and remains uncomfortable with migration-driven ethno-cultural diversity, although it has already become “a recent country of immigration” in Asia (Tsuda 2006) regardless of its unwillingness to acknowledge the reality.

Not surprisingly, there are few studies conducted on the transition from international students into permanent residence in Japan, simply because of the situation whereby the Japanese government does not offer foreign students who study in Japan the opportunity for permanent settlement in Japanese society after graduation. In this regard, the very important question here is again, without changing the government and society’s attitudes toward immigration, and without providing international students the incentive to become permanent residents or potential citizens, can the Japanese government’s ambitious policy initiatives and its objectives to attract more high caliber international students to enhance the study-work pathway be successfully accomplished ? In the next section, I will discuss this matter by arguing that, as long as the Japanese government genuinely wants to recruit more international students to utilize them as a pool of skilled foreign workers, international student migration may be strategically used by the Japanese government and society as an alternative to mass immigration in Japan, and that ultimately, their settlement may help the society effectively address various issues stemming from the country’s declining population and an aging society.

## **2.6 ISM as an Alternative Policy Option for Mass Immigration in Japan**

Based on various statistical resources, some scholars argue that mass immigration cannot be a solution to Japan’s population decline and aging. For example, as demographer Tsuya Noriko points out (Tsuya 2014), based on her analysis using a UN estimation on the

level of replacement migration, that the future Japanese society would need from 2000 to 2050 in order to maintain the same total population, to receive 343,000 foreign migrants per year, and in order to keep the same working-age population, to host 650,000 migrants annually, and to maintain the ratio between the working-age population (those aged 15-64) and the elderly population (those aged 65 and above), to absorb over 10 million migrants per year. Hence, she concludes that “it is unrealistic to counter the future population’s aging and decline in Japan solely through international migration.” (Tsuya 2014, 7). Similarly, as Shinkawa also points out, using another statistical resource from NISSPR (National Institute of Social Security and Population Research), Japan would need to import 770,000 migrant workers annually between 2005 and 2055 to maintain the proper ratio of the productive-age population to the whole Japanese population. Thus, he concludes that “the annual acceptance of 770,000 immigrant workers is unimaginable in Japan where the homogeneity of society is taken for granted and immigration is regarded as usual and exceptional” (Shinkawa 2012, 1124).

Indeed, mass immigration is continuously a radical view in the Japanese society where the belief of ethno-cultural homogeneity is deeply and powerfully embedded in the society and people’s thinking. Although historically, Japan has been accommodating oldcomer and newcomer foreign immigrants, immigration is not viewed as part of its national identity. As noted earlier, in order to address its demographic shortfall, while the government places high priority on policy measures to activate and utilize its elderly and female labor force and establish gender equality in employment, and to use robotics to handle graying Japanese society, immigration seems to be considered as “a means of last resort” (Shinkawa 2012,

1124).<sup>58</sup>

However, admittedly it is also uncertain whether various policy measures in the works favored by the government to activate senior and female population as a productive workforce instead of immigration, will produce successful policy outcomes. Hence, there is still a necessity for the Japanese government to consider a type of formal immigration as a significant policy option to address its demographic problems. Considering that the Japanese society has been continuously opposed to immigration due to various factors and if immigration is politically too burdensome for the Japanese government, it may be reasonable to suggest that the government may attempt to use international student migration more strategically. Compared to other types of migrants, international students are young, educated, potentially skilled or even highly skilled, culturally more adoptable with better language skills and cultural understandings of the Japanese society. Given the characteristics of student migrants, it is no doubt that they have a huge potential to contribute not only economically, but also socially and culturally to the host society in both the short and long term.

According to Abella (2006, 17-19), there are four different approaches adopted by countries to attract foreign skills (Human Capital, Labor Market Needs, Business Incentives, and Academic Gate Approaches) (Abella 2006). (1) *Human capital approach* is used by traditional countries of immigration, particularly Canada, which hosts skilled foreign workers who may enrich a country's stock of skilled human resources over the long term by providing

---

<sup>58</sup> Graying Japan wants automation, not immigration, *The Japan Times*, August 28 2017, Accessed November 16, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/08/28/commentary/japan-commentary/graying-japan-wants-automation-not-immigration/>.

incentives such as permanent residency, the right to full mobility in the labor market, and eventually citizenship by naturalization. In this approach, countries have their own specific admission policies with different criteria that allocate specific points for various human capital characteristics, and specific skills of applicants in certain fields that a country lacks or needs. (2) *Labor market needs approach* as the most common model, aims to address and solve cyclical shortages for skills in the labor market by permitting foreign workers with specific experiences and qualifications to stay and work on a temporary basis without the settlement of the workers and their families. (3) *Business incentive approach* aims to promote more trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) by facilitating the entry and stay of investors, executives and managers, including their family members. (4) *Academic gate approach* is aimed at securing talents from the pool of foreign students after their studies from local education institutions, and encouraging them to remain to stay and work, or carry out research.

Drawing upon the typology, Oishi argued (2014, 425) that in order to attract skilled foreign labor, the Japanese government has never adopted the “human capital approach” but has usually been adopting a synthesis of the “labor-market needs approach” and the “academic-gate approach”, with a minimum level of the “business incentive approach”. In addition, she added: the new points system shows a combination of the enhanced business incentive approach and the expanded labor market needs approach (Oishi 2014, 425). As such, what is significantly missing in the development of the Japanese policies to attract foreign human resources is ‘the presence of immigration’. This means that there is ‘the absence of immigration’ in the country’s skilled migration policies. In other words, while the government is keen on utilizing foreign human resources in some ways, it never officially considers foreign migrants as permanent residents or would-be fellow citizens.

Some may argue that Japanese immigration policy has become increasingly settlement-oriented since the mid-2000s (Komine 2014). This argument should be true, particularly to highly skilled migrants and their families who are viewed by Japanese government as the most desirable migrant category. In contrast lower-skilled workers including those under the new visa system commencing in April 2019, are commonly treated as unwanted migrants, and as a major target of immigration control. Therefore, as already discussed earlier, foreign workers under the new visa system are excluded from a possibility of settlement. In this regard, they may be labelled as 'Japan's guest workers' once again which was a term commonly being circulated among scholars and media more than two decades ago (Shimada 1994). Moreover, the new visa system is not literally new in that the visa system has been designed and introduced based on the same assumption as one that the Japanese government had when they literally began to accept unskilled foreign workers to work since the mid-1980s. The assumption is that foreign workers are guests temporarily staying, and they will or must eventually return to their home countries (Shimada 1994, 9).

In the case of international students, it seems certain the Japanese government's attitude toward international students has continuously been ambivalent in that student migrants are viewed both as desirable and undesirable. In other words, international students may be viewed in a wide range of types of migrants by the Japanese government as potentially undocumented migrants, less-skilled or skilled migrants, and possibly highly skilled migrants in the long run. Thus, due to their ambiguous categories or classifications, it seems that the government's policies toward international students continues to remain blurred and ambiguous.

It is worth mentioning that international student migration has been viewed and

considered by governments and scholars in receiving countries within the dual context of skilled migration and the internationalization of higher education (King and Raghuram 2013, 129). Similarly, in Japan, attempts to theorizing the phenomenon of international student mobility and empirical research on the presence of student migrants in Japan are also being conducted within the dual context. However, the dominant views over international students in Japan has overly focused on the latter context – the internationalization of higher education rather than skilled migration. More recently it is certain that the government and companies are more becoming interested in various employment issues of international students. Nevertheless, it still cannot be said that international student migration is equivalently viewed both as an issue of skilled migration and an issue related to internationalization of higher education. As I continue to argue about this point in the next section, it can be said that international student migration is not even seriously considered as a migration issue in Japan compared with foreign workers' issues due to their ambiguous position in between less-skilled (or lower skilled) and skilled (or highly skilled) migrants.

As a central argument of this thesis and particularly in this chapter, if the Japanese government and society continue to retain their attitudes toward immigration and migration policies in a restrictive and ambiguous manner, the successful performance of Japan's skilled and highly skilled migration policies is far from guaranteed in the long run and not even in the near future. In fact, it is also certain that no one really may affirm if Japan will continuously maintain its position as a popular destination country for economic migrants and international students in the Asia-Pacific, particularly for foreign workers and international students coming from countries in Asia.

More recently Japan's major daily *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reported that since Korea and

Taiwan are more increasingly vying for the recruitment of foreign workers, many foreign workers are leaving Japan to move to Korea and Taiwan.<sup>59</sup> Since Abenomics continuously propels the yen weakness and thus the wage gap between Japan and Korea, and between Japan and Taiwan is not so large anymore. Moreover, because of a much longer length of stay in Taiwan (maximum up to 12 years) and a more flexible opportunity to transition into the skilled worker category from the low-skilled in Korea, these may all cause Asian foreign workers in Japan to leave and migrate to Korea or Taiwan where both countries continue to receive foreign workers in certain needed sectors. As the news article continued to point out, it seems obvious that East Asia's competitiveness to attract foreign talent and international students has already been accelerated since economic interdependence has increased among the three neighboring countries – Japan, China and Korea. All three countries need qualified skilled workers from one another mainly due to China's rapid economic growth, and in both countries - Korea and Japan, populations are aging and rapidly in decline. Notably, in the specific STEM field competition seems fierce. China depends on skilled workers from Korea and Japan, and Japan wants young brains in IT industries from Korea and China, while Korean enterprises also know full well the significance of Chinese and Japanese talent. Under these circumstances, it is crucial for the Japanese government to view the recruitment of foreign workers not under a newly-reviewed guest worker policy, but under a skilled migration policy in a practical sense.

In addition, as I continue to discuss the regional competition for the recruitment of foreign human resources among China, Japan and South Korea, it is also crucial to view the

---

<sup>59</sup> 外国人労働者、陰る日本の魅力 韓国・台湾と争奪 (*Gaikokujinrōdōsha, kageru Nihon no miryoku Kankoku Taiwan to sōdatsu*), *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 18 2016, Accessed April 20, 2020, <http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLZO04967950X10C16A7NN1000/>.

recruitment of international students more practically under the purview of skilled migration. Therefore, it is important to view the internationalization of higher education, not only as a recruitment strategy to achieve numerical growth of international students in Japanese universities - as part of the government's nation branding strategy and universities' surviving strategy, in globally commercialized and highly competitive higher education markets; but also as a strategic gateway for practically attracting and securing talented students who are more likely to bring positive benefits as potentially skilled and highly skilled foreign workforces. It is this link that I will investigate more thoroughly, throughout the following chapters of this thesis.

Concerning international student migration, particularly in the higher education sector in the context of regional competition among the three most popular destination countries for international students in Asia – China, Japan and South Korea, each country has been developing its own promotion and recruitment plans and policy-initiatives. In the case of China, according to the Ministry of Education of the PRC (2015),<sup>60</sup> in 2014 there were almost 380,000 international students who arrived in the Chinese mainland from more than 200 countries. The Chinese Ministry of Education launched 'the Study in China' plan in 2010, which set the goal of attracting 500,000 international students by 2020. To achieve this goal, several policy initiatives are being implemented which include bilateral cooperation such as the China-EU high level people to people dialogue, enhanced scholarship programs, more English-taught programs and increased opening up of work opportunities for international students.

---

<sup>60</sup> Ministry of Education, The People's Republic of China, Accessed April 1 2019, [http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe\\_2809/201503/185164.html](http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2809/201503/185164.html) .

In July 2015, The Korean education ministry announced new initiatives to nearly triple the number of international students by 2023, from almost 85,000 international students in 2014 to 200,000 international students by 2023. This is a three year extension of the previous ‘Study Korea 2020’ project, which originally set a goal of recruiting 200,000 students by 2020 and has shown little sign of success. The new initiatives include new regulations to allow Korean universities to launch new departments and programs exclusively for international students, more government funding and scholarship programs to support Korean universities to recruit international students, and enhanced employment supports for international students after their studies in Korea.<sup>61</sup> More recently, from 1 June 2016 the Korean government has introduced a new study-work visa system to relax requirements for issuing employment-related visas to international students, particularly for government-invited students under a scholarship program.<sup>62</sup>

In July of 2008, the Japanese government announced ‘the 300,000 Foreign Students Plan’, which aimed to increase the number of international students in Japan to 300,000 students by 2020. In 2009, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) launched the ‘Global 30’ project by which 13 universities were selected for internationalization to function as core schools for receiving and educating international students. The Global 30 project was concluded in 2014 and replaced with ‘the Top Global Universities’ Project (2014-2023) as a follow-on policy initiative. According to the official introduction of the project by MEXT, it aims to enhance the international compatibility and competitiveness of Japanese higher education, creating an environmental infrastructure for

---

<sup>61</sup> Korea Aims for 200,000 Foreign Students by 2023, *ICEF Monitor*, October 13, 2015, Accessed April 20, 2020, <http://monitor.icef.com/2015/10/korea-aims-for-200000-foreign-students-by-2023/> .

<sup>62</sup> S. Korea to Lower Barrier on Issuing Student Visas, *The Korea Times*, May 18 2016, Accessed April 20, 2020, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/05/116\\_204998.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/05/116_204998.html) .

fostering globally competitive and talented graduates. As a funding project, it also provides support for world-class (Top Type: 13 universities) and innovative universities (Global Traction Type: 24 universities) that lead the internationalization of higher education in Japan.<sup>63</sup>

Amid the development of the government's initiatives to attract and recruit international students in the three East Asian countries, there has also been the acceleration of the regionalization of higher education in East Asia. For example, 'Campus Asia' first appeared in March 2009 as an Asian version of the Erasmus program as the EU's student exchange program, which is one of the most successful EU initiatives as the flagship project of European integration. Launched in 2012 as a new multilateral student mobility program initiated by China, Japan and Korea to promote cooperation among universities and to develop mutual understanding by institutionalizing various exchange programs, including faculty members and students between universities in the three countries, it is anticipated that the program will contribute in the long run to the establishment of a broader East Asian Community (Byun and Um 2014, 135).

Considering all these governments' efforts to internationalize their higher education institutions, and establish a regional educational network and cooperation, what is clear is that the transnational flow of international students will continuously increase substantially in the years to come - though there have been some historical disputes which have created diplomatic upheaval among the three nations over the past few years. Thus, various institutional developments will also be enhanced to facilitate the flow of student migrants, not

---

<sup>63</sup> Top Global University Project, *MEXT*, Accessed April 20, 2020, <http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/1395420.htm>.

only within East Asia, but also within the whole Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In this context, it is increasingly necessary for Japan to rethink the impacts of student migration particularly with regards to their aging population and the decline in the context of 'immigration'.

Given that the Chinese have been the largest proportion of foreign resident and international students, plus Korean residents who have also been a significant part of foreign residents and international students; both Chinese and Korean residents and students make up the core components of Japan's growing ethnic and cultural diversity, which is mainly driven by migration. In the light of 'the academic-gate approach', considering the reality that more Japanese companies are operating global businesses in Asia - particularly with China and South Korea, these businesses will continue to need more skilled workers from both China and South Korea; thereby utilizing the human resources of *ryugakusei* from China and South Korea must undoubtedly be an excellent choice. If the Japanese government really believes that skilled migration will continue to be a major contributor to economic development and growth in Japan for the foreseeable future - especially relating to its aging population and decline, student migration should be increasingly encouraged by the government, with a more specific policy design in the context of skilled migration through the utilization of the human resources of international students as skilled workers.

In the light of 'the creation of a multicultural immigrant society', international students should also be regarded as more significantly noteworthy. Japanese society has already been accommodating a significant size of foreign-born populations, and the number of foreign residents has continuously increased - although the number is still relatively smaller than those in most other immigrant receiving countries in the West. It is well accepted that "once

started, acts of migration become self-sustaining social processes which develop their own dynamics” (Castles and Miller 2009, 29). In this regard, it is no doubt that experiencing the growing ethno-cultural diversity produced by migration in Japan becoming a more heterogeneous society in terms of ethnicity and culture is inevitable and irreversible. Hence, it is necessary for the Japanese government to approach a direction of its migration policy-making in the context of ‘building a multicultural immigrant society’, beyond its cosmetic and restrictive multiculturalism, within the context of ‘immigration control’ and ‘migration management’.

As noted, given that the largest percentage of foreign residents in contemporary Japanese society comprises Asian migrants, a central aspect of the migration-driven growing ethnic-cultural diversity in Japan should be discussed in an ‘Asianized multicultural society’. While the majority of the foreign population are Asians in the Japanese society, Asian migrants have often been negatively stereotyped and perceived by the government and the media, typically as less-skilled migrant workers, irregular migrants and visa overstayers. In this context, a successful integration and settlement of Asian international students, who are the largest portion of international students, are likely to contribute to creating more positive images of Asian migrants in the Japanese society. The retention of international students could have a great effect on the quality of the mode of immigrant integration in Japan - commonly called ‘multicultural coexistence’.

## **2.7 Rethinking ISM as an Immigration and Settlement Issue**

Japan has been averse to immigration due to the strong belief of homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and culture which is deeply embedded in the society. Although Japan has already

turned into a de facto country of immigration, the issue of immigration has continuously been a radical topic in the society. However, undergoing a serious working-age population marked by its rapid population aging and decline and suffering severe labor shortages, the government eventually seems to be moving forward towards a more liberalized labor migration policy agenda by easing rules for the entry and employment of foreign nationals. In particular, in order to revitalize its stagnant economy and maintain its advanced economic power as the third largest economy in the world, the government understands the urgency and significance of foreign human resources, and particularly under the Abe administration, it has more proactively been attempting to recruit more qualified foreign migrant workers, skilled workers and highly skilled foreign professionals; most notably through the introduction of the points-based system to entice highly skilled foreign professionals. Moreover, more recently due to acute labor shortages, the Japanese government has decided to receive a considerable number of lower-skilled foreign workers through a new visa system. In addition, as with many industrially advanced countries, the government is also attempting to recruit more foreign students through the internationalization of higher education to enhance its national competitiveness; thereby utilizing international students as temporary and skilled laborers, and possibly highly skilled migrants.

It is evident that we may see some numerical growth in the importation of foreign human resources, particularly with the new points-based system and international student recruitment - at least owing to the government's primary concern, to increase 'the number' in the visa category. In this regard, it is certain that the recent liberalization of the Japanese government's migration policies has been successful to some degree in achieving its quantitative goals. However, it does not practically mean that the liberalization of Japan's migration policies towards foreign workers, will encourage foreign nationals to settle down

on a more permanent basis in Japan which would address the country's serious demographic problem. It is certain that the requirements for permanent residency has become more relaxed, particularly for those in the highly skilled migrant category. However, as have been discussed in this chapter, whether foreign workers are less-qualified (unskilled or less-skilled) or more qualified (highly skilled), they are all continuously regarded as 'temporary sojourners' in the society, and are neither viewed as permanent residents nor potential citizens at the point of their entry. The old *zentei*, or premise that foreign workers are guests and that they will return to their home countries, has not been significantly changed from more than two decades. This premise also applies to the case of international students in a similar or same way as 'guests'.

As briefly noted, in order to address its demographic shortfall, the Japanese government mainly focuses on the increasing economic participation of women and the elderly population in the labor market, as well as technical development such as robot technology instead of immigration. For some scholars, mass immigration is consistently viewed as unrealistic and unreasonable, and even impossible (Shinkawa 2012; Tsuya 2014). However, it is also uncertain whether all the Japanese government's attempts without mass immigration will always produce successful policy outcomes. More importantly, as a self-sustaining social process, the act of migration will never stop in Japan and thus, the society will continue to experience a growing ethno-cultural diversity produced by migration, which the society has consistently experienced to date. Hence, despite the fact that the Japanese government and society are not ready to implement a formal immigration scheme, there is a need for the government and society to continuously discuss policy feasibility and immigrant settlement in a mass migration context both more openly and publicly.

In the conflicting situation between the government and society's unwillingness towards immigration, and the growing importance of utilizing foreign human resources in the context of a rapidly aging population and decline; rethinking 'student migration' as a significant immigration and settlement issue may be a good starting point to invigorate public debate about immigration, while at the same time using it as an opportunity for a pretest of Japan's capability to accept foreign immigrants through a formal immigration program. Considering the characteristics and intentions of student migrants in Japan, for instance - since they are mostly from the Asian countries of China, Vietnam, Nepal and South Korea, Asian students are more likely to develop shared historical and cultural values, and regional identity with the Japanese society. Moreover, as the majority of international students in Japan, Asian students have higher levels of acculturation as well as cross-cultural and bilingual experiences, plus there are a range of potential benefits when they start to settle and work after graduation - both as skilled and highly skilled migrants. Furthermore, most importantly they are young generations. Therefore, there are many reasons why they should be more encouraged by the government and the society to settle as more long-term and permanent residents, and even potential citizens.

Managing the world's third largest economy, and facing its rapidly aging and shrinking working-age population, it is highly likely that the Japanese government will continue to liberalize its immigration policy in some ways, and its increasing ethno-cultural diversity will produce pressures to change Japan's reluctant attitude toward immigration. In this situation, as this chapter continuously argues, student migration may be strategically viewed by the Japanese government to tackle demographic and economic problems. Although various challenges and concerns will continue, it is necessary for both the government and the society to rethink the flows of student migrants through a different lens, not as temporary stayers, but

as potentially permanent residents and would-be citizens. It is also necessary for policy elites to acknowledge not only the economic benefits of student migrants, but also the socio-cultural benefits that they bring. At the same time, general public debates about changes generated by the presence of foreign immigrants need to expand to be more open and lively, by shifting from dominant views on the negative impacts, to more positive outcomes with the recognition that the diversity can also be good for Japanese society.

In this chapter, I have discussed the possibility and feasibility of international student migration as an alternative policy option for a formal mass immigration program, in order to address various problems stemming from the graying Japanese society. However, there is one precondition for the alternative approach, which is a new condition that goes beyond the preoccupied premise that foreign migrants are guests, temporary sojourners and passing presences. In other words, without considering the permanent settlement of international students, we may not continue to argue about the possibility of international student migration as a pretext of Japan's capability to see if Japan may accommodate foreign immigrants through a more comprehensively mass immigration program in the future. This issue is closely related to the government and society's views towards immigration and immigrants; and more specifically to the Japanese immigration policies which may reflect the state's official attitude towards the presence of foreign populations.

In the next chapter, I will continue to explore international student migration as an immigration and settlement issue, and will delve into deeper questions about why 'immigration matters' in international student migration to Japan.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION IN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

#### 3.1 Introduction

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Japanese government has been committed to addressing serious shortages of labor in various ways which stems from its rapidly aging population. More recently, it has been trying to utilize foreign human resources by attracting foreign workers through the liberalization of highly skilled and lower-skilled migration policies; which means that the government has attempted to ease visa rules for foreign workers in terms of entry, employment and residence. In addition, the government has attempted to increase the number of international students by recruiting them - particularly through the internationalization of higher education, to utilize as a source of temporary labor, and possibly skilled workers after graduation.

Despite the recent liberalization of Japan's migration policies toward foreign workers and international students, and the government's efforts to attract them to come, live and work in Japan through various proactive measures, it is somewhat odd to observe 'the absence of immigration' amid the recent changes in the government's move toward more settlement-oriented discourses and migration policies toward non-Japanese populations. On the one hand, the government proactively emphasizes the importance of foreign human resources to address its demographic problems, and even promotes positive images of new Japanese society as an open-international society with non-Japanese populations, respecting its ethno-cultural diversity within the society under the phrase such as "it's good to have diversity". On the other hand, however, the government continuously attempts to prevent

foreign nationals from settling down in Japan permanently. It is no surprise to see that the immigration control related to the settlement of foreign nationals is continuously limited to lower-skilled migrants in a restrictive manner, including those categorized under the new 'specified skilled workers' working visa system. Although the recent liberalization of its migration policies has dramatically loosened its requirements for permanent residency towards highly skilled foreign professionals - via the new points-based visa system, even for the desirable migration group, becoming a Japanese citizen is an issue in a very different dimension.

This situation applies to the case of international students in the same way who are an important part of foreign human resources. Given international students are more ambiguously viewed as both a desirable and unwanted group of migrants, the issue of settlement for international students seems more complicated; in that the government proactively promotes the recruitment and retention of international students, while their settlement issue seems to be deliberately ignored and even often underrated. In this context, the previous chapter suggests a policy recommendation that international student migration should be strategically viewed by the government as an alternative approach to a mass immigration program that the government continues to avoid, considering it as a solution for addressing various issues stemming from its demographic problems. Simply put, if considering and allowing mass immigration is too risky - because it would possibly create many social and political tensions; the settlement of international students, as a specific group of immigrants, could be used as a pretest of Japan's capability to see if Japan can accommodate foreign immigrants through a more formal, mass immigration program in the future. However, in order to implement the alternative policy approach, there is one precondition that should be considered, which is the possibility and feasibility of the

settlement of international students as permanent residents and possibly fellow Japanese citizens.

This chapter continues to explore international student migration to Japan in the context of ‘immigration’ and ‘settlement’. In particular, this chapter also examines international student recruitment and retention policies, in the light of cosmetic multiculturalism and immigrant integration. By questioning the role of immigration in the recruitment, retention and settlement of international student migrants; this chapter will attempt to contemplate and highlight major factors underlying Japan’s restrictive immigration policies, by revealing how the unwillingness and restrictiveness towards immigrants and immigration is embedded in Japanese society in a form of cosmetic multiculturalism, which affects the settlement of international students, and furthermore why it is problematic.

In the early part of this chapter, I will attempt to provide a brief overview of immigration and immigrant integration in contemporary Japanese society, including a brief historical development of contemporary international migration to Japan. In addition, this chapter will examine some of theoretical understandings about multiculturalism to spell out ‘multicultural coexistence’ as a current model of immigrant integration in Japanese society and ‘cosmetic multiculturalism’ as actual reality of how immigration and immigrants are viewed in contemporary Japanese society. To understand both concepts, it is essential to continue discussing the superficiality of Japan’s international projects, and internationalization in higher education throughout the following chapters; because, as I shall continue to argue, superficial and cosmetic internationalization is part and parcel of something creating, producing and generating superficiality, contradictions and ambiguity in international student migration to Japan. In the latter part of this chapter, I will discuss how

the cosmetic views toward immigration and immigrant integration affect the three consecutive processes of international student migration to Japan, that is, the recruitment, retention and settlement of international students in Japan.

### **3.2 Reviewing Immigration and Immigrant Integration in Contemporary Japan**

#### **3.2.1 Newcomer Immigration to Japan**

For a long time Japan has regarded itself as a uniquely homogenous country in terms of ethnicity and culture, and has formed the belief that it has been an immigration free nation. Adhering to the myth of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, Japan has maintained one of the most restrictive immigration policies among the advanced industrialized countries. However, in recent decades, under the pressures of global migration, Japan has become a net country of immigration, and more and more foreign migrants have become a permanent presence through ethnic community building. As a result, the presence of foreign populations has raised a variety of multicultural questions particularly concerning the integration of immigrants and has brought about significant pressure toward multiculturalism in the society. Regarding its contemporary migration experiences, particularly with the influx of newly arrived migrants since the late 1970s, Japan's policy response to the newly arrived migrants has by and large been to maintain restrictive border controls. Despite a serious labor shortage in certain industries, Japan has attempted to solve their labor shortage through the back door - that is to say, using quasi guest-worker systems, including foreign technical trainees and foreign students, without implementing a mass immigration program. Japan also began to implement immigrant integration policies under the label of "multiculturalism," and managing diversity in the society in which ethno-cultural homogeneity is continuously highly

valued, by maintaining its citizenship rule based on *jus sanguinis* (right of blood).

Over the last few decades Japan has become a major labor importer in Asia, mainly through an influx of foreign migrant workers and the rapidly increasing rate of international marriage. Strictly speaking, the issue of immigration and immigrant integration is not a new phenomenon in Japan. As Erin Aeran Chung pointed out (Chung 2010b, 19), the problem of immigrant incorporation has been debated among politicians and pundits since at least the Meiji period (1868-1910) when Japan's first citizenship law was instituted. 'Oldcomer' migrants include a large number of *Zainichi* Koreans (Korean residents in Japan), originally present in Japan as a result of colonialism and forced migration. In fact Japan had no experience of any large scale immigration until the late 1970s, but since then, as it has made a significant transition from a country of net emigration to that of net immigration, the country has joined in an ally of new nations of net immigration together with Spain, Italy and Korea (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004; Hugo 2008, 12; Tsuda 2006).

Komai (2001, 16-17) distinguishes four groups of foreign migrants into Japan from the late 1970s: female workers in the entertainment industry, Indochinese refugees, Japanese returnees from China, and businessmen from Europe and North America. Women entertainers began to arrive at the end of the 1970s, while the large-scale influx of male workers began later (Douglass 2000, 2006). The overwhelming majority was from the Philippines, but later they were followed by others from Korea, Thailand, China and Russia. Many worked in the *mizu shobai*, the "water trade," often a euphemism for the sex industry (Faier 2009, 16). In the 1980s, only around 8,500 Filipina women entered Japan on entertainment visas each year. By 1991, the number had jumped to more than 57,000, reaching 80,000 in 2003 and 2004, before the Japanese government cracked down on these visas. Many of the women worked in

major metropolitan or regional cities, though some also moved to rural areas, where they married local men (Faier 2009).

The second group were Indochinese refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In April 1978, the Japanese government decided to allow refugees to settle permanently for the first time in the post-war period. Subsequently, in October 1981 Japan acceded to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and to its 1967 Protocol. At the end of 1988, the number of Indochinese refugees resettled in Japan was 5,921. In 1989, the refugee inflow into Japan reached its peak with 3,498 Indochinese refugees arrived (Mukae 2001).

The third group were Japanese returnees from China. They included Japanese women and “war orphans” who had been left in China at the end of World War II and who began to return to Japan in the 1970s (Komai 2001, 60). After the diplomatic normalization of Sino-Japan relations in 1972, it became possible for them to return to Japan. Between 1972 and 2002, about 20,000 people moved from China to Japan. About half of them were officially classified as war orphans (*zanryu koji*, literally “staying-behind orphans”) together with their families; the remainders were categorized as having been “left behind” for some reason (*zanryu hojin*, literally “staying-behind compatriots”) (Narangoa 2003, 142). Fourth, with Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, business personnel from Europe and North America began to arrive in larger numbers.

In addition, after the first influx of newcomer migrants during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Japan started to import a considerable number of foreign migrant workers, mainly low-waged laborers both documented and undocumented. Due to the high value of the Japanese yen and severe domestic labor shortages, the country attracted migrant workers

mostly from less-developed countries in Asia, and *Nikkeijin*, the descendants of Japanese nationals who migrated to Latin America. Between 1990 and 2008, the total number of migrant workers increased from 260,000 to 900,000, and came to compose 1.4 percent of Japan's total working population of 66,500,000. The workers classified as 'trainees' and 'technical interns,' increased from 3,000 to 121,000. In addition, the number of *Nikkeijin*—mostly from Brazil and Peru – increased from 71,000 to 370,000. These migrant workers became the de facto unskilled foreign workers in Japan (Koyama and Okamoto 2010, 4-5).

Another important group of newcomer migrants were foreign wives. Since the issue began to attract public attentions in the mid-1980s, more foreign wives, mainly Asian women, have arrived, especially from China, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Foreign wives are particularly sought after in rural areas because of the rural-to-urban migration of young women, leaving men responsible for running the family farms (Oishi 2005, 36). By the late 1980s, 56 percent of Japan's local governments suffered from a shortage of Japanese women wishing to marry single farmers (Shipper 2008, 35). Until the 1970s, the annual number of international marriages ranged between 5,000 and 7,000, but it began to increase rapidly during the 1980s with the booming Japanese bubble economy. In 2006, the number of international marriages was 44,701 and couples consisting of Japanese men and foreign women accounted for 80 percent of them (Yoshitaka 2010, 3).

In recent years, the profiles of newly arriving migrants are becoming more diversified, including professionals, skilled workers, international students, asylum seekers and refugees. In this sense, Japan is also participating more increasingly in what Douglass calls "global householding," which includes: mixed and trans-border marriages, bearing children and adoption, educating and raising children (and adults) abroad, hiring foreign household

workers, and importing caretakers for the elderly, labor migration from low to high-income economies, and conversely from high-income economies to low economies such as retired migration (Douglass 2006, 2010, 2012; Ishii 2010, 2). Various types of migrants in the process have become permanent residents, and have created multi-ethnic and multicultural communities in their destination countries. They have set up ethnic businesses including restaurants, shipping and travel agencies, ethnic schools and their own religious institutions. As a consequence, the presence of newcomer foreign residents has brought about, and is even more likely to bring about significant multicultural challenges to Japanese society, despite the continuing myth of a homogeneous society.

### **3.2.2 Controlling Immigration and Integrating Immigrants in an Ethnically Homogenous Society**

Despite the transition from emigration to immigration and a mass influx of newcomer migrants, Japan still has a relatively small number of foreign populations compared to other OECD countries - only about 2 percent of its total population.<sup>64</sup> However, considering the myth of homogeneity - which is deeply embedded in the society's culture, and people's minds, the influx has increasingly challenged ideas about national identity, citizenship, immigration law and policies. It is therefore interesting to see how the government has been dealing with newcomer immigrants and their integration.

It should be noted that, while Japan is one of the most advanced economies in the world, Japan is not officially implementing a mass immigration program, unlike the U.S., Canada or

---

<sup>64</sup> The population of foreign residents in Japan hit a record high of 2.5 million people as of January 1, 2018, accounting for 2.0% of the country's total population (Japanese and foreign residents) (Okada, 2018).

Australia. In response to its serious shortage of labor, instead, the country continues to be relying on the import of temporary foreign migrant labor - who are only allowed to stay for a limited period, and preferences professionals and highly skilled workers through a recently introduced points-based system. With regards to the policy of foreign worker's, Japan introduced a new immigration policy through the revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which passed the Diet in December 1989, and came into effect in June 1990. In this situation, the government continued to prohibit the entry of unskilled foreign workers, but decided to facilitate the entry of highly skilled and professional foreign workers, particularly information technology (IT) professionals (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004, 37-38; Tai 2009, 318;; Yamanaka 2008,190). Meanwhile, as briefly mentioned earlier, through an ethnic-selective migration policy, it has been utilizing the labor force of *Nikkeijin* migrants, the descendants of Japanese nationals who migrated to Latin America (mostly from Brazil and Peru) based on the belief that the presence of *Nikkei* Brazilians would have less impact on social cohesion in the society than other foreign migrants (Takenaka 2003; Tsuda 2008; Yamanaka 2004). It is important to point out that the *Nikkeijin* migrants have received preferential treatment for length of stay and employment. But despite this, prejudices and discrimination have been a recurrent issue for many of them (Ishi 2008). For instance, in the wake of the global financial crisis, in April 2009, the Japanese government started to encourage *Nikkei* workers and their families to accept government financial support to return to Latin America. Under this repatriation aid program, 21,675 *Nikkei* workers returned to their home countries. Hence, the Japanese government's repatriation program clearly reflects how the government views these ethnic migrants.

Despite the government's efforts, the labor shortage has become deeply chronic and fiercely serious once again - amid a recovering economy from the long-term economic

recession, under the influence of Abenomics. As already examined previously in chapter 2, the Abe administration has decided to accept lower-skilled foreign workers under a new visa system from April 2019. Although Japan is relatively a latecomer in the global competition for foreign talents (Green 2014), it has continuously developed its migration schemes towards highly skilled migration. Most remarkably the government has recently introduced a new points-based system, and it took an effect in May 2012.

Concerning immigrant integration, amid the growing ethno-cultural diversity generated by the influx of newcomer migrants, as Chung pointed out (Chung 2010a, 662), by the mid-2000s, the Japanese government could no longer ignore the growth of foreign immigrant populations within the society, and eventually announced a comprehensive proposal for immigrant incorporation, known as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication's Plan for 'Multicultural Coexistence Promotion in Local Communities'. Indeed, local governments have been more responsive than the national government in implementing immigrant incorporation policies.

As Tsuda and Cornelius and (2004, 464-465) described:

Municipal governments in cities with large immigrant populations have generally been more receptive, supporting foreign workers with health insurance, counseling, public housing, informative handbooks and pamphlets, ethnic festivals, language classes, assistance with alien registration, and even limited political representation.

Debates over immigrant integration also led to new discourses in the society, and the term *tabunka kyosei* (multicultural co-existence) became a buzzword. While the term became

more increasingly a popular term circulating in various activities and policy implements related to foreign immigrant integration, there has been much criticism on it, in that the discourse of multicultural coexistence often tends to ignore normative concerns of multiculturalism such as the protection of immigrant rights or the political integration of immigrants. The main direction of the government's immigrant policies is mainly to assimilate foreign migrants rather than create a genuinely multicultural immigrant society.

### **3.2.3 Multicultural Discourse in Contemporary Japan**

It is widely recognized that the term “multiculturalism” is not a fixed notion, and has no a clear-cut definition. Indeed, the term means different things to different people in different contexts. As Wang (2004, 302) pointed out,

It is a very controversial issue related to social phenomena, cultural values, identity, political struggle, policy and form of citizenship.

According to Leach (2009, 186), it can be addressed at two levels:

At one level multiculturalism is a shorthand term simply used to describe the extent to cultural diversity in many modern states and societies including Britain. At another level it is a policy that accepts and promotes cultural diversity, as an alternative to past policies emphasizing integration and assimilation in the interests of cultural homogeneity.

Will Kymlicka (2009, 16) uses multiculturalism as follows:

I am using multiculturalism as an umbrella term to cover a wide range of policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups, whether those groups are new minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or “old minorities” (e.g. historical settled national minorities and indigenous people).

As Murphy also points out (Murphy 2013, 12),

There are so many multiculturalists, and so many different theories of multiculturalism on the market, that many are finding it difficult to say what exactly multiculturalism is and what it stands for.

Considering a more specific national case with a focus on the context of immigrants and immigration, Satzewich and Lioudakis (2007,123-125) have also attempted to define the term in four interrelated ways based on Canadian social reality; as a demographic reality; as a pluralistic ideology; as a form of struggle among groups for the acquisition of political and economic resources; and as a set of policies and accompanying programs.

First of all, it can refer to the demographic reality in a society in which various ethnic groups live together, as in Canada. Second, it can refer to an ideology closely related to “pluralism” and “cultural relativism” (and opposed to “ethnocentrism”). Pluralism implies tolerance of cultural diversity, and even promotes the idea that such cultural diversity is compatible with national unity and the progress of society. Cultural relativism implies the idea that different cultures should not be judged by any external standards other than those of the culture in question. In the case of Canada, “multiculturalism brings about sets of

economic, political and social practices in the society, which in turn provides guidelines for ethnic and racial relations to maintain social order or manage social changes” (Liodakis and Satzewich 2003, 147).

Third, it can refer to competition between ethnocultural groups for economic and political resources. In this sense, multiculturalism can be used as a political program and a mechanism to solve conflicts between these groups. In Canada, for instance, it emerged out of social and demographic pressures, and from the need to counterbalance western alienation and Quebec nationalism, as well as for the Liberals to acquire ethnic electoral support in urban centers (Satzewich and Liodakis 2007, 124). Fourthly, it can refer to a set of “initiatives and programs that aim to realize multiculturalism as ideology and transform it into a concrete form of social intervention and organization” (Satzewich and Liodakis (2007, 124).

Others distinguish between multiculturalism as a descriptive term and normative term (Heywood 2007, 313-314; Kim 2009, 14). As a descriptive term, it refers to cultural diversity arising from the presence of racial, ethnic or language differences within a society in which two or more ethnic and cultural groups coexist, and whose cultural practices create a sense of collective identity – for example, a description of the state of cultural diversity in a society. As Heywood has also pointed out, the term can also be used to describe governmental policy responses to ethnic or cultural diversity (Heywood 2007, 313). As a normative term, it refers to “a positive endorsement or celebration of communal diversity” (Heywood 2007. 314) – for example, the acknowledgement of cultural rights, especially of minority groups, and respect for different ways of life and cultural identities among different ethnic or cultural groups. In this sense, ‘multiculturalism’ can be used as a political ideology aimed at legitimizing the

integration of ethnic and cultural diversity within a society.

In addition, Tiryakian (2004, 4-14) distinguishes between ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism,’ terms that often seem to be confused or misused. As he puts it, “multicultural” refers to a society accommodating two or more ethnic groups whose cultural characteristics are enough to establish distinctive cultural identity and community. In contrast, multiculturalism is “a normative critique of the institutional arrangements of the public sphere that are injuring or depriving a minority of its rights” (Tiryakian 2004, 9). It may include claims to enhance the rights and opportunities of minority groups in the public spheres. In this sense, Tiryakian sees multiculturalism as taking three forms: cultural nationalism (e.g. social movements launched by various minorities); state policy; and social philosophy.

The term, ‘multicultural’ in Japanese society is continuously and mostly used as a descriptive term, which describes a demographic change in the ethnic composition of the society, and indicates that Japan is becoming more multicultural by accommodating newcomer migrants. In response, both national and local governments have been developing and implementing their own policies under the common multicultural slogan as ‘multicultural coexistence’ (*tabunnka kyosei*). However, given that Japan has never adopted multiculturalism as public policy, its immigrant integration policy actually functions as an assimilation policy in many ways despite the cosmetic use of “multicultural.” Interestingly, the noun “multiculturalism” is rarely used in any discussion of the government’s policymaking toward foreign residents or immigrants.

### 3.2.4 Multicultural Coexistence/ Cosmetic Multiculturalism

As the influx of newcomer immigrants into Japan has continued since the 1990s, calls for *harmonious multicultural coexistence with immigrants* became popular.

As Yamanaka (2007, 5) notes,

Many citizens have found this slogan appealing to their global and transnational interests, while many local governments have adopted it as a solution to their increasingly diverse constituency. Even the national government has joined this campaign, mobilizing popular celebrities in posters and advertisements.

According to Takaya (2007, 48), the word, *kyosei* first began to emerge in academic debates, in the 1990s, particularly in political philosophy and sociology, and was used by scholars to criticize assimilationism in Japan. The combined term *tabunka kyosei* was made popular by an NGO helping foreign residents that named itself “*Tabunka Kyosei Center*” in 1995 while supporting efforts for reconstruction in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 (Bradley 2014; Ohtsuki 2018). Since then, the phrase has become more popular in central and local government and business, particularly since the announcement of The Basic Plan for Immigration Control in 2005. In the same year, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) announced its decision to promote *tabunka kyosei*, and established a committee consisting of researchers, representatives from advocacy groups for foreigners, and local government administrators to carry out research. The outcome was published in March 2006 as “The Report of the Working Group on Multicultural Coexistence Promotion” which provides general guidelines for immigrant integration as “multicultural

community building” (Aiden 2011, 214; Chung 2010a, 664-665; Tai 2009, 326-327). It also started to be used in relation to *Zainichi* Koreans.

As Chapman notes,

Through a form of ‘multicultural coexistence’ (*tabunka kyosei*), positive recognition and acceptance of ethnic and racial alterity can be achieved in Japanese society. The term *kyosei* has therefore become synonymous with multiculturalism (*tabunka shugi*), often appearing in broader Japanese discourse and now increasingly reflected in *zainichi* discourse (Chapman 2006, 97).

However, the concept remains poorly defined and remains vague (Befu 2006, 2; Kashiwazaki 2013, 39; Ohtsuki 2013, 44; 2018, 7; Yamanaka 2007, 5). The vagueness and obscurity work to hide various discords, conflicts and problems which innately exist in the relationship between Japanese people and foreign nationals who reside in Japan, while the term, ‘coexistence’ is creating an illusion that can function as a cure-all.

As Onai pointed out,

It is possible that [the term] works to disguise a relationship that innately hold the buds of hard-to avoid discord, conflict or tension as a relationship of which all the problems may be resolved by one magic world of ‘coexistence’ without plotting the exact paths to overcoming the discord, conflict or tension. In other words, the concept of coexistence may be used as a camouflage to hide serious problems or discord (Onai 1999, 123-124, cited in Ohtsuki 2013, 44).

Similarly, there has been little critical interrogation of the meaning of “multiculturalism.” Indeed, aforementioned, in the Japanese context, it is mainly used as a descriptive term and a symbol rather than leading to a normative critique of Japanese institutions, as implied by Morris-Suzuki’s phrase, “cosmetic multiculturalism” (2002a, 2002b) which suggests a vision of national identity in which diversity is celebrated, but on condition that it remains essentially a form of exterior decoration that does not demand major structural changes to existing institutions (Morris-Suzuki 2002b, 171).

According to Morris-Suzuki (2002b, 171), in the form of cosmetic multiculturalism, the concept of “culture” itself is narrowly defined, as an aesthetic framework separated from politics and from people’s everyday lives. For example, the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law primarily supports the preservation and transmission of the language, music and legends of the Ainu, not of the historical memory of the Ainu struggle for social and civil rights. Similarly, “cultural diversity” should only be represented and expressed as well-organized ways in controlled forms and spaces: ethnic music or dance such as Okinawan music, or Balinese dance performed in national or international events or multicultural festivals is welcomed, but a group of Africans playing rock music in a club is different. Cultural difference is only acceptable on condition that foreign immigrants who are visibly different display their loyalty to “the unifying symbols of the nation state” (Morris-Suzuki 2002b, 171). “Multiculturalism” as developed in Western liberal philosophy attempts to cope with diversity by recognizing and respecting cultural differences, but is seen by the Japanese state as being opposed to cohesion. Therefore, cosmetic multiculturalism aims to assimilate, standardize, and integrate ethno-cultural diversity into the ideology and practice of a single homogenous nation-state by eliminating the cultural differences of non-Japanese residents rather than enabling them to maintain their cultural origins and traditions (Yamanaka 2007,

2).

It is no doubt that Japanese cosmetic multiculturalism does recognize the pluralistic and multicultural reality within Japanese society caused by the presence of newcomer foreign residents. Central and local government do support the social integration of foreign residents, and encourage them to be actively engaged in “building multicultural coexistence in local communities rather than remaining passive recipients of official support policies” (Chung 2010a, 665; Aiden 2011, 225-229). However, the normative issues in multiculturalism such as the protection of the cultural rights of minorities and the political integration of immigrants continue to be excluded from the discussion. Therefore, “multicultural society” may be interpreted as a new type of a homogenous society in which the inclusion of non-Japanese residents is limited. They can be foreign residents under the slogan of multicultural coexistence, but they can never be “Japanese” or “*Nihonjin*”. While they are allowed to reside and work, and even sometimes are able to acquire Japanese nationality, they remain excluded from part of the Japanese national identity.

According to Parekh (2006, 6), a multicultural society is a society that accommodates two or more cultural communities. A multicultural society might choose one of two ways in response to cultural diversity within its society. First, one might welcome and cherish its cultural diversity and communities and respect their cultural demands. Second, one might attempt to assimilate it into its mainstream culture. As he argues, although both societies are all multicultural societies, the former is only a multiculturalist society but the latter is monoculturalist in its orientation and ethos (Parekh, 2006, 6). In this categorization, Japanese society can be considered a multicultural society but it is a monoculturalist society rather than a multiculturalist society because the government continuously seeks to assimilate its ethno-

cultural diversity into the mainstream culture. In this sense, based on Parekh's distinction between 'multicultural' and 'multiculturalism' (Parekh, 2006, 6), only the term, 'multicultural' as the fact of cultural diversity can be applied to Japanese society, while 'multiculturalism' as a normative response to the fact of cultural diversity has been continuously ignored by the Japanese government.<sup>65</sup>

As seen so far, contemporary Japanese society is a multicultural society but rigorously speaking it is not a multiculturalists society, but it is a monoculturalist society. Regardless of what type of society it is, more importantly what is clear is that Japan is continuously becoming a more heterogenous society in terms of ethnicity and culture, mainly generated by an influx of newly arriving foreign migrants; and this migration-induced multiculturalization and heterogenization will continue, because acts of migration are self-sustaining social processes which tend to develop their own dynamics (Castles 2000, 106; Castles and Miller 2009, 29). In this context, challenges and changes from the growing ethno-cultural diversity induced by migration will also be accelerated and intensified, and all will push the society to keep questioning its national identity.

Therefore, considering that international students are also an important group of foreign residents, who are bringing about various challenges and changes produced by migration - particularly with the continuing multicultural questions (Hall 2000) to contemporary Japanese society; as the main theme of this study, 'international students recruitment' should not simply be regarded as an independent policy issue in studies of human resource

---

<sup>65</sup> See Kwon's analysis on contemporary South Korean society in a similar way through a lens of the categorization of Parekh between a multicultural-multiculturalist society and multicultural-monoculturalist society (Kwon 2017b, 125-126).

management, internationalization of higher education, or international education. With that caveat, it is crucial for us to examine the issue of international students, by linking it with and locating it within a more comprehensive discussion of immigration, multiculturalism and national identity in contemporary Japanese society. In the next section, I will attempt to locate the issue of international student recruitment within the debates of immigration and settlement, and more specifically with regard to the role of immigration in international student migration to Japan. Subsequently, I will argue how the cosmetic perception of immigration, multiculturalism, and immigrant integration affects the process of recruitment, retention and settlement of international students.

### **3.3 The Role of Immigration in International Student Migration**

Briefly summarized again to remind us, Japan is one of the most popular destination countries for migrant workers and students in Asia. With their birth rates among the world's lowest, the country faces the problems of aging societies, shrinking labor forces and declining productivity. Although allowing mass immigration would be the fastest and easiest way to tackle these economic and demographic problems, the government is not likely to use this as a solution. Having maintained relatively restrictive attitudes toward immigration within the society, it is reluctant to allow foreign populations to settle for good and become fellow citizens. In this regard, the myth of ethnic homogeneity has continuously placed significant implications on the immigration policy regime and most notably on its citizenship regime.

Despite attempts to avoid mass immigration as a solution, it is also certain that the government well understands the urgency and significance of foreign human resources – both less-skilled and highly skilled foreign workers. Japan needs to revitalize stagnant economy

and maintain its advanced economic power as the third largest economy in the world, and to deal with its serious labor shortage in certain industries and to enhance its national competitiveness in a highly competitive regional and global market. More recently, the labor shortages have become more chronic amid its recovery from the Lost Decade of economic stagnation under the influence of Abenomics. In this situation - as examined thoroughly in the previous chapter 2, the Abe administration decided to accept lower-skilled foreign workers under a new labor migration policy from April 2019. This was a dramatic movement subsequent to the introduction of a new points-based system adopted in 2012, in order to attract highly skilled foreign professionals - officially named 'The Points Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals' or called The Highly Skilled Professional Visa.

In addition to the recent liberalization of labor migration policies for foreign workers – in line with many other high-income countries, the Japanese government is utilizing international students as a source of the labor workforce, and is promoting international student recruitment through the internationalization of higher education as a way of attracting foreign students. As one of the more popular destinations for international students and migrant workers in Asia, in principle, Japan's policies towards international students officially falls under the highly skilled migration policy umbrella implemented by the government. The recruitment of international students is considered by the Japanese government as part of major policy approaches to attract highly skilled or skilled migrants , which is the so-called “academic-gate approach” (Abella 2006, 18-19) by which host governments aim to gain skilled labor from the pool of international students, or an “education pathway” (Kerr 2018) by which international students move to other countries from their home countries to study, mostly in tertiary education or more advanced degree

programs, and after graduation they become skilled and highly skilled foreign workers in host countries or in the third countries. Similarly, as a recent OECD territorial reviews on Japan outlined, it can be said that the Japanese government is attempting a “skilled migration approach” (OECD 2016, 65) which promotes the employment of international students after graduation to utilize them as a source of skilled workforce. Therefore, to this end - to recruit and retain international students after graduation, the government has mainly been promoting internationalization of higher education which is the major gate that may facilitate the recruitment of international students.

Considering international student recruitment in the context of internationalization of higher education, although internationalization or *kokusaika* has been central to both national government policy and institutional action in Japan’s university sector since at the late 1980s (Breaden 2014, 5), internationalization of Japanese higher education has been increasingly accelerated since early 2000. Struggling with its long-stagnating economy, the Japanese government started attempting to regain the lost edge in its competitiveness, and internationalization of the nation is one of the most significant of Japan’s ‘revitalization’ strategies, in which the internationalization projects of higher education is deeply engaged. With the tremendous impact of neo-liberalism on higher education globally, Japanese universities are no exception. Both national and private Japanese universities must survive by themselves, supported by less of the public budget in a free-for-all, highly competitive situation. Furthermore, with Japan’s rapidly aging population and its declining birth rate, Japanese higher education institutions have been seriously affected by financial loss and retrenchment (Yamada 2012). Under these circumstances, both as a cause and a consequence of Japanese universities’ internationalization, the recruitment of international students became more significant for both the government and universities. In order to recruit international

students, a series of government-led plans have been made and implemented including: the 100,000 Foreign Student Plan in 1984, the 300,000 International Student Plan in 2008, the ‘Global 30’ Project in 2009 and the “Top Global University Japan” project in 2013. These government-led initiatives have been interested in the strategic acceptance of international students by internationalizing higher education.

As the Japanese government has repeatedly declared through various government initiatives, it continues to emphasize that the acceptance of international students will contribute by nurturing and developing its human resources in response to globalization. Therefore it promises to strengthen support for the employment of international students and aims to increase the share of international students who find jobs in Japan after graduation (MEXT 2014; Prime Minister’s Office of Japan 2016).

As a government report emphasized as follows:

The acceptance of foreign students has great significance for the future of our country.....through foreign students working for Japanese companies after their graduation, there is the possibility that they will develop into human resources who will at some point lead the economic development of Japan and since it is possible that some of the foreign students will potentially possess *highly-skilled professional skills*, it is thought this will also lead to developing the potential seeds of *highly-skilled professionals* (MOJ 2015, 25, emphasized added).

Indeed, the Japanese government is increasingly promoting the retention of international students after graduation. Despite the government’s efforts to encourage international student

graduates to work in Japan - and more increasingly students themselves wish to stay, work and live after graduation, however, as I have already discussed in Chapter 2, the link between student migration and skilled migration is consistently weak in reality. It is important to be reminded that, although the employment rate is not so high, this figure itself literally shows that the international student employability in Japan is not so particularly weak in comparison with the situation of post-study work in other popular destination countries for international students. However, considering the link between student migration and skilled migration, it is arguably questionable whether international student migration to Japan may successfully be transformed into a pool of skilled migration. Moreover, when it comes to the settlement issue of international student graduates, it is even further questionable whether international students are literally encouraged to stay in Japan after their study, or in other words, whether the Japanese government really views them as a group of desirable foreign migrants at the point of entry and has a policy to retain them.

Assuming that student migration cannot be a major channel through which international students obtain jobs and permanent residency or citizenship for longer and permanent settlement in Japan, three factors mainly need to be considered to explain this situation. In other words, these three factors may explain why the education pathway does not practically work in Japan : (1) international students' migration decisions to come and study in Japan; (2) employment opportunities for international students in domestic job markets in Japan; (3) immigration policies for the settlement of international student graduates (See Table 3.1).

Although this chapter will focus primarily on the last factor – immigration policies as the most important aspect that we need to consider, all three factors may explain the contradictory situation (1) between the government's strong wish to recruit more international

students and almost zero immigration policies for their permanent settlement; (2) between the government’s various measures to support the employment of international students and the relatively low employment rate of international student graduates, and (3) between the government’s official articulation that international student recruitment is under the purview of highly skilled migration policies, and the reality that international students are simply being utilized as temporary migrant workers in limited job categories, in which the recruitment of highly skilled foreign professionals are not necessarily crucial.

**Table 3.1 Factors for the Underperformance of the Education Pathway**

Factors	Major Questions
<b>Migration decisions of international students made to come and study in Japan</b>	<b>When deciding and moving to study in Japan, do international students really have job prospects in Japan after graduation?</b>
<b>Employment opportunities for international students in domestic job markets in Japan</b>	<b>Do Japanese companies really want international students as important human resources?</b>
<b>Immigration policies for the settlement of international student graduates</b>	<b>Do Japan’s immigration policies view international students as potentially long-term staying foreign residents and would-be citizens at the point of entry?</b>

Concerning the first factor - based on my in-depth interviews with international students, most of the interviewees mentioned that the biggest motivation to come to Japan for study was a personal interest in Japanese culture – mostly pop culture and language, compared with other countries. They also mentioned Japanese universities’ academic reputation in specific research fields, a good living environment, plus generous scholarship opportunities.

One of my interviewees was Chow, a doctoral student from Hong Kong, who is conducting his research in Engineering in Tokyo.<sup>66</sup> He revealed his cultural interest in Japan as a primary reason why he was motivated to come to Japan.

*Chow:* “There are mainly two reasons to choose Japan. The first one is, I love Japanese culture.”

*The Author:* “Anime kind of ?”

*Chow:* “Yeah something like that.”

Another interviewee was Ahmed, an undergraduate student from Saudi Arabia, who is studying Social Science in Tokyo. When asked the same question, he vividly talked about the cultural influences through his family, who are all interested in East Asian culture including films, music and so on.

*Ahmed:* “Because of my cultural influences....somehow I grew up with interests in East Asian culture.....for some reasons, I was grown up in an Asian fanatic household. It was one of those things, my sister loves K-pop all the time, always trying to learn Korean. My mother and father have been obsessed with Japanese culture.....it was like, always touched with that culture. We barely understood, but we were always looking at it....my family was a factor in a way.”

According to a quantitative research recently conducted on migration decisions (leave or stay after graduation) of foreign students in Japan (Liu 2016), the study revealed that economic factors such as income and living conditions do not significantly affect migration

---

<sup>66</sup> I use a pseudonym upon his request

decisions of foreign students to stay or leave in Japan after graduation, but instead their cultural interest in Japan or interests in Japanese culture including language could have a significant effect on migration decisions of whether they will leave or stay in Japan after graduation. Since the study primarily focused on the retention of foreign students after their studies, it did not directly examine reasons why foreign students choose Japan for study. Nevertheless, it shows us that for foreign students studying in Japan, their interests in Japanese culture should be a significant factor to motivate their migratory decisions rather than economic factors.

As such, it is questionable if the most primary motivation for international students who wish to come to Japan for study is practically related to their career expectations in Japan - more specifically in terms of their expectations to train themselves to become skilled and highly skilled workers through degree programs offered by Japanese universities. Among major reasons why they want to come, study and stay in Japan, a low level of their career prospects in Japan after graduation might be a factor that may cause the underperformance of an education pathway in international student migration to Japan.

In relation to the first factor, as regards the second factor - employment opportunities for international students in domestic job markets in Japan; it is questionable if Japanese companies really seek international student graduates as skilled workers and highly skilled workers, and if the companies want to retain them with a more long term or permanent contract.

According to a statistics provided by MOJ, which shows that industries and job types of international students hired by Japanese companies (JASSO 2019a), as of 2017, the majority

of international student graduates were hired in translation/interpretation (23.8 percent) and sales/marketing (14.1 percent), followed by those in commerce (trading) (9.5 percent), computer-related service (7.7 percent), and restaurant industries (food and drinks services) (5.2 percent) and hospitality industry (hotels and inns) (5.0 percent). Considering the industry and job contexts, the employment opportunities for international student graduates are usually places that they may use their language skills; and areas related to Japanese companies overseas businesses, which also seek international students with bilingual or multilingual language skills. As I will continue to argue on this point, although it is not always the case, the current employment status of international student graduates is not likely to lead to their career development for common categories of jobs as skilled and highly skilled workers.

As seen, there is less demand from Japanese companies for international student graduates with advanced and high skills and knowledge. This situation can also be considered a factor that may cause the underperformance of education pathway in international student migration to Japan.

While the first two factors are undoubtedly important considerations to understand the underperformance of education pathways, the unsolid link between international student migration and skilled migration, and international student recruitment and settlement - as this research continues to explore, makes it certain that the contradictory situation is intrinsically related to how 'immigration' is viewed by Japanese government and society, and how 'immigration' plays a role in internationalization of higher education through universities which is the major gateway and gatekeeper for international students to come and study in Japan and find a work after graduation. In practice, without questioning the role of

immigration, we cannot explain why the case of Japan is so different from other popular destination countries for international students - which also take active steps to attract international students through a migration policy scheme for skilled migration, and attempt to retain international students as potentially an important human capital with incentives for permanent settlement.

In fact, 'immigration' only plays a small role in the settlement of international students in Japan after graduation, and it merely takes a role of recruiting them. In reality, the current status of internationalization of higher education in Japan, international students seem to be largely viewed as nothing more than temporary sojourners and temporary laborers, and passing presences. At best they are often described in government rhetoric as 'transnational bridge-builders', which may implicitly convey a message of – 'welcome now but please go back home later'.<sup>67</sup> To put it simply, the process of recruitment and retention of international students cannot practically be translated into permanent settlement. This point marks a significant difference between Japan and other countries around the world, in terms of how to view international student mobility. The following sections tackle this issue of the settlement of international student graduates as potential skilled and highly skilled workers in Japanese society, by questioning the role of immigration – through the presence and absence of immigration in the three major stages: recruitment, retention, and settlement of international students. In doing so, we may find some answers to questions on the post-study work and settlement of international student graduates in Japan.

---

<sup>67</sup> See an interview with Said, an Algerian doctoral student in Chapter 5.

### **3.4 The Presence and Absence of Immigration in ISM to Japan**

As the world's third largest economy, Japan has been on the list of the most popular countries as destinations for international students in the region. According to a UNESCO indicator based on various data collections in 2013, Japan ranked 7th out of the top 10 destination countries in the world for tertiary-level international students, which accounted for 3 percent of total overall students. The majority of international students in Japan are overwhelmingly from Asian countries, particularly from China (ADB, OECD and ILO 2014, 19; UNESCO-UIS 2014, 155). Based on a government's statistics (JASSO 2019), as of May 1, 2018, the total number of international students was 298,980, and increased by 31,938 or 12.0 percent compared to the previous year of 2017 (267,042). Compared to only 5849 international students who were recorded in 1978, the current number of international students shows a remarkable increase. Among all international students, almost 70 percent were belonging to higher education and the other 30 percent were in Japanese language institutions.

Considering the smaller percentage of international students in higher education populations, in comparison to other population destination countries for international students, the direct economic benefits that international students may bring are less significant. Nevertheless, there is a growing demand in Japan to attract international students, mostly by the three major stakeholders in the recruitment of international students – the government, enterprises, and universities.

There are three aspects to explain reasons why the major three stakeholders are eager to attract international students.

First of all, for the government, the recruitment of international students is in principle considered by the Japanese government as part of major policy approaches to attract highly skilled or skilled migrants (ADB, OECD and ILO 2015, 29), which is termed, the so-called “academic-gate approach” (Abella 2006, 18-19), by which governments aim to attract skilled foreign human resources from a pool of international students. Emphasizing a knowledge-based society or knowledge-based economy, all governments across the globe recognize the role of highly skilled or knowledge workers who can bring human capital, creativity and innovation to societies, and attempt to obtain, secure and foster those workers - Japan is no exception.

Moreover, struggling with its long-stagnating economy and the damaged image of the Japanese nation as the first non-Western imperial power and the world’s second largest economic juggernaut in the past, the Japanese government has started attempting to regain the lost edge in its national competitiveness. Internationalization of the nation is one of the most significant of Japan’s ‘revitalization’ strategies, whereby the internationalization projects of higher education as its nation branding strategy is deeply engaged. Therefore, internationalizing its universities, via operating as part of its nation-branding strategy, is closely related to establishing its globally competitive image. For example, the government’s tremendous support in improving Japanese universities’ global rankings is essentially related to this issue. The presence of international students is a key element of internationalizing Japanese universities, and their presence and activities significantly affect Japanese universities’ international outlook and positive scores in world university rankings. Hence, recruiting international students is a crucial and essential step to internationalizing its universities.

Secondly, for enterprises at a practical level, international students are becoming more of an indispensable source of temporary labor – particularly over the last few years, in solving acute labor shortages in the course of a recovering Japanese economy. Essentially, it is certain that international student recruitment is practically desirable, if not inevitable.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, under the force of globalization, Japanese enterprises face a number of challenges, particularly as to how to continuously innovate technological development to maintain the market competitiveness of Japanese products, most notably amid the rise of neighboring economies in East Asia, and how to equip its workforce for global business engagement (Breaden 2015, 93). At the same time, experiencing a serious demographic transformation – its rapidly aging population and among the world’s lowest birth rate, Japanese firms feel more and more the necessity of expanding their business further to the regional and global market beyond the domestic market (Yonezawa 2014, 37). In this context, companies increasingly need globally competitive foreign human resources, and *ryugakusei* specifically graduating from Japanese universities are considered as young global talent, or recently described as *kin no tamago* (golden eggs).<sup>69</sup>

Third, Japanese universities are not immune to the tremendous impacts of neoliberalism on higher education. Both national and private Japanese universities must survive while being supported by less public budget in a highly competitive situation. Moreover, due to Japan’s rapidly aging population and its declining birth rate, the population that is attending college is consistently dropping. Japanese higher education institutions have been seriously affected by financial loss and retrenchment, particularly in universities in smaller cities (Yamada 2012).

---

<sup>68</sup> Robin Harding, “Japan opens door to temporary foreign workers,” *Financial Times*, September 14, 2016, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/21a5aef8-7a4d-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43>.

<sup>69</sup> *Ryugakusei sodatsu-sen kin no tamago ni muragaru sangyokai to daigaku* (War for Foreign Students - industries and universities flocking to the golden eggs), *Wedge*, Vol.30, No.12, December 2018.

In this context, the internationalization of their institutions is becoming a crucial strategy for surviving. When it comes to national university and world university rankings, improvements in international scores will help universities more possibly become a recipient for large-scale government funding schemes for internationalization. Given that the number of international students, foreign staffs, exchange programs, and courses in foreign languages, in particular in English language, are all the key areas in internationalization scores in any university rankings, it is not surprising that universities strive to increase the number of international students on their campus.

Among the three major stakeholders, the Japanese government has been most proactively attempting to recruit international students and increase the number in Japan, particularly by promoting and enhancing internationalization of higher education. Given that the number of international students to Japan has been significantly increased particularly over the past decade, it can be said that international student recruitment is relatively successful and the government support and its policy strategies to promote internationalization of higher education, has been effective for the quantitative growth. However, when it comes to issues around retention and furthermore the settlement of international students, it is highly questionable.

If the Japanese government, enterprises, and universities want more international students to come to Japan, study, and work after graduation, does that mean that they all want international students to settle in Japanese society on a more permanent basis? In other words, could it be said that the Japanese government, companies, and universities view international students as potentially permanent residents and furthermore fellow citizens in Japanese society? If not, how can we really see and interpret all three stakeholders' demands

and attempts to recruit and retain international students? Do they only want international students to come to Japan, and study and work after graduation on a temporary basis to meet their own needs? In this regard, could it be said that we want international students now, but only temporarily? By attempting to critically review the process of recruitment, retention, and settlement of *ryugakasei* in Japan, the following sections particularly seek to dispel the perceived ambiguity, superficiality, and contradictions in policy directions, objectives, and implementation in Japan's immigration and international higher education policies toward international students; and argues about the role of immigration in the settlement of international students in Japanese society as potentially permanent residents and furthermore fellow citizens.

### **3.4.1 The Recruitment: Internationalization of Higher Education**

Inbound mobility of international students to Japan has been on the rise and continuously increased over the last decades (except two short periods of time - by 2008 in financial crisis, and around the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011), hitting a record high every subsequent year. Particularly since 2011, as the government's official statistics began to include non-degree seeking international students in Japanese language institutions, the total number of international students began to increase more intensely. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the majority of international students have continued to belong to higher education institutions – whether he or she is a student in any degree program or exchange student. Considering these numerical figures of international students coming to Japan, it seems to indicate that the government's ambitious goal of increasing the number of foreign students in Japan up to 300,000 has been successful. Simply calculating the increasing rates over the last few years, its achievement level is ahead of schedule. And it is no doubt internationalization

of higher education initiatives, particularly under the Abe administration, can play a role in facilitating the growth of international students in Japanese universities in number.<sup>70</sup>

At a government level, the goal of the internationalization of Japanese higher education is mainly aimed at heightening global competitiveness – firstly through creating world-class universities that are placed high on global rankings - which is closely related to Japan’s nation branding strategy; secondly and more practically, by fostering globally competitive young Japanese, so-called *gurobaru jinzai* or global *jinzai* (global human resources), through more enhanced international education and environments on university campuses. In this situation, the recruitment of international students is necessary and important, because international students will provide universities with an international atmosphere and create a unique environment for intercultural and knowledge exchanges. For example English-speaking environments will in turn help Japanese universities change and improve their educational systems, curricula, and research environment - particularly in STEM fields. To achieve these goals, Japanese universities need to make themselves more internationally appealing by for example, setting up more English-taught degree programs, conducting more classes in English as a medium of instruction, and making their semester system more flexible by which international students can enroll both in spring and autumn semesters. However, the numerical achievement does not mean that the Japanese government and the universities’ internationalization projects are operating successfully in every aspect; as the recent title of an article in the Japan Times illustrates: “Foreign student numbers don’t tell whole tale”.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> Foreign Student Numbers don’t tell whole tale, *The Japan Times*, April 12, 2019, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/04/12/commentary/japan-commentary/foreign-student-numbers-dont-tell-whole-tale/>.

<sup>71</sup> Foreign Student Numbers don’t tell whole tale, *The Japan Times*, April 12, 2019, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/04/12/commentary/japan-commentary/foreign-student-numbers->

Although the internationalization of higher education helps increase the number of international students on Japanese university campuses, it is constantly questionable if this international project makes university campuses truly internationalize in terms of the diversification of the geographical origin and ethnicity of international students. By region, Asian students were the thumping majority group (92 percent) followed by Europe (3.5 percent), North America (1.5 percent), Africa (1.1 percent). By nationality, students from China (42.2 percent or 79,502) were the largest group, followed by Vietnam (18.8 percent), Nepal (7.9 percent), South Korea (7.2), and Taiwan (3.7 percent) (JASSO 2018). It is important to note that Vietnamese students are dramatically pouring into Japan over the last decade - growing more than 12-fold in the six years between 2012 and 2016, as Southeast Asia is becoming a key investment destination for Japan, and an important source of talent in business industries.<sup>72</sup> This trend of inbound student mobility to Japan from neighboring countries in Asia and massively from China is holding steady (Kuroda et al., 2018).

Another striking feature in the status of international students in Japanese higher education institutions, is that students are overwhelmingly concentrated in humanities and social sciences majors rather than in STEM fields. In the same dataset (JASSO 2018), students were enrolled in humanities (24.2 percent) and social science majors (35.9 percent). In contrast, the number of students in STEM were fairly low - Science (1.8 percent) and Engineering (16.4 percent), which is a remarkably different feature when compared with other popular destination countries for international students. Drawing upon Education at a Glance 2018, which compares various statistics between its 35 OECD member states (OECD

---

dont-tell-whole-tale/.

<sup>72</sup> Vietnamese Students Are Pouring Into Japan, Bloomberg, 25 May, 2017, Accessed November 21, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-24/japan-opens-new-front-in-race-for-booming-southeast-asia-markets> .

2018, 218), international tertiary students favor fields in STEM, and one-third of the students were enrolled in the STEM fields in 2016 (OECD 2018, 218). In the case of the U.S., which is the most popular destination country for international students, as of May 2017, there were 1,184,735 international students. Among them, 43 percent study the STEM fields and 18 percent study in business.<sup>73</sup> Despite the low number of international students in the STEM fields in Japan, it seems certain that some higher educational institutions began to attract more talented international students to the STEAM fields. For example, in JAIST (Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), a postgraduate university located in Ishikawa prefecture, more than half of the students at the graduate school came from outside Japan. In 2016, of the total 819 students, 445 were international students with 33 different nationalities, showing a fourfold increase from 2004, the institution had only 124 international students in the year.<sup>74</sup>

However, the case of JAIST is one of a few specific cases, which is not common at all. As illustrated earlier, according to a recent employment status of international students based on government statistics shows (JASSO 2019) a fairly low number of international students can be found in the STEAM fields. The majority of students who can successfully change their status of residence (visa) from students to employers are found in commerce(trading), computer-related service (not IT), and restaurant industries, and those in translation/interpretation consist of the vast majority. This specific employment outlook of international student graduates does raise a serious question about the possibility of their long-term residency in Japan. In general, many governments in other popular destination

---

<sup>73</sup> Biannual Report on International Student Trends, *U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement*, June 2017, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/byTheNumbersJun2017.pdf> .

<sup>74</sup> The Japanese University That Is Going Global, *Nikkei Asian Review*, December 08 2016, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Science/The-Japanese-university-that-is-going-global> .

countries for international students are keen to prioritize international student graduates in STEM fields over general studies (AUIDF 2017, 5). In this respect, it is no surprise that talented foreign graduates in STEM are commonly more treated as highly qualified workforce and therefore encouraged to stay to work than those in non-STEM, particularly in the case of U.S. Considering this situation, the case of Japan is somewhat unique. In principle, the Japanese government seems to view international students as potentially skilled and highly skilled workers. However, as the statistical figure shows, it does not seem that the Japanese government is proactively attempting to increase the number of international students in STEM and offer STEM students incentives for post-study work and residency as many other governments commonly do. In this regard, it is questionable again to ask if international students are literally considered potentially highly skilled workers by the Japanese government.

### **3.4.2 The Retention: ‘Domesticated’ International Graduates**

As Japan’s economy is recovering under the Abe administration, it is certain that non-Japanese graduates are enjoying “unprecedented celebrity status” in Japan’s domestic job market (Breaden 2014). More and more Japanese enterprises wish to hire international students and it is now commonly seen that there are numerous job fairs for international students being held nationwide - often sponsored by conglomerates and even directly by government agencies (See Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Job Fair Advertisements for International Students



Source : JAPI (Japan Association for Promotion of Internationalization) Facebook (LEFT), and KyoTomorrow Academy Facebook (RIGHT). URL: <https://www.facebook.com/clubjapi/> (JAPI), <https://www.facebook.com/KyoTomorrowAcademy/> (KyoTomorrow Academy)

Indeed, the government seems to be increasingly promoting the retention of international students after graduation. For example, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (*Kosei Rodo Sho*) is offering foreign students a variety of job-opportunity information through the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka Employment Service Center for Foreigners, employment guidance, guidance visits via close cooperation with universities, internship information, job interview meetings and career counselling.<sup>75</sup>

In December 2018, a Japanese business monthly magazine, *Wedge*, wrote a feature

<sup>75</sup> Study in Japan Comprehensive Guide, *The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Accessed May 17, 2018, <http://www.studyjapan.go.jp/en/inj/inj04e.html> .

about international student issues entitled: “War for foreign students - industries and universities flocking to the golden eggs (*Ryugakusei sodatsu-sen `kin no tamago' nimuragaru sangyo-kai to daigaku*)”. According to the featured articles, it seems obvious that in recent years, more Japanese companies have been expanding employment opportunities for international students in anticipation of their globally competitive work-ready forces, with good intercultural communication skills in the companies’ globalized business operations.

At the same time, it seems certain that more students wish to stay, work and live after graduation. *Toyo Keizai* reported in August 2018 based on a MEXT data, that 64 percent of international student graduates who have finished their studies wish to work in Japan after graduation.<sup>76</sup> Another survey conducted by JASSO (Japan Student Services Organization) for the 2016 academic year, shows that nearly three-quarters of international students in Japan who completed degree programs at universities and other educational institutions, except language schools, wish to remain in Japan to work or study in advanced degree programs.<sup>77</sup> Another survey shows a similar finding. According to a recent career survey on international students conducted by Pasona Inc.- a Tokyo based Japanese multinational corporation, which is the second largest staffing company in Japan that provides a variety of staffing services, including temporary staffing, recruiting, outplacement, and outsourcing, out of the total respondents (810 persons); 99.2 percent wish to work in Japan, and among them, 32.3 percent want to stay in Japan until permanent residency status followed by more than 10 years (19.9 percent), and 1 to 3 years (16.3 percent).<sup>78</sup> As such, this survey shows that many

---

<sup>76</sup> *Hitodebusokunanoni `gaikokujinryugakusei' wa shushoku-nanda*, *Toyo Keizai Online*, August 17, 2018, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/233419> .

<sup>77</sup> Most International Students Opt to Stay in Japan After Graduation, *Nippon.Com*, May 21, 2018, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00197/most-international-students-opt-to-stay-in-japan-after-graduation.html> .

<sup>78</sup> 2018 Foreign Students Survey – Career Survey on Foreign Students in Japan, March 6, 2018, Accessed April 21, 2020, [https://www.pasonagroup.co.jp/english/news/tabid770.html?itemid=2351&dispmid=1331\\_](https://www.pasonagroup.co.jp/english/news/tabid770.html?itemid=2351&dispmid=1331_)

of respondents wish to stay, work, and live in Japan after graduation on a long term, as well as on a permanent basis.

There is still a big discrepancy however, between companies and international students whereby both sides – namely Japanese companies and international students, want and need each other. It has something to do with how to become a Japanese employee. In other words, it is important for job-seeking foreign graduates, as to whether they possess ‘a certain degree of domestication’ to a desired level for becoming a Japanese employee. Through the international student job-application process, what is most importantly considered by Japanese companies are undoubtedly ‘Japanese Language proficiency’. However, the language proficiency is not sufficiently all that is required. A proper level of understanding Japanese corporate customs and work practices, in other words, a level of understanding of ‘Japanese business culture’ is also crucial.

In this situation, it is no surprise that talented Asian graduates, or *Azia jinzai*, appears as a specific category of international student graduates that many companies prioritize in the hiring process because of their adaptability in terms of language and culture (Breaden 2014, 2018). In addition, in recent years many Japanese companies specifically look for international student graduates from ASEAN countries as Japanese companies attempt to expand their business operation to ASEAN countries in the midst of growing competition in the ASEAN market with China and South Korea. Therefore, there are many job fairs being held, which are specifically prepared for job-seeking Asian students from ASEAN countries (See Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Job Fairs for Students from ASEAN Countries



Source: Oshigoto.Com, an online career information service run by JAPI(Japan Association for Promotion of Internationalization), <https://japi-oshigoto.com/>.

In this situation paradoxically, a certain category of students has been overlooked, underrated, and ignored. That is a group of international students, who come to Japan for their studies through English-taught degree programs, that are increasingly expanding in Japanese universities and through which the government encourages universities to set up and launch. Whether the students are Asian or non-Asian students, for many reasons they are one of the core elements of Japan's current internationalization of higher education. However, their employability is a big concern. In many cases, due to their lower level of Japanese language proficiency, and their less Japanized (domesticated) cultural background, it is much harder for these students to pursue employment in Japanese domestic market after graduation - except through limited opportunities in language education or the tourism industry; where they can more frequently utilize foreign language skills by using English as their mother tongue rather than Japanese.

As mentioned above, a significant growth in English taught degree programs is a typical wave in the process of internationalizing Japanese universities, mainly in order to attract more non-Japanese speaking foreign students to Japanese higher education. It is expected that more Japanese universities will join the trend to launch English taught degree programs under the current development of internationalization of higher education that has been tremendously supported by the Japanese government. If so, it is likely that the issue of retention of non-Japanese speaking international student graduates in English taught programs will undoubtedly become a more critical concern in terms of their employability in Japan.

### **3.4.3 The Settlement: Welcome but No Citizens**

It is certain that international students are importantly viewed by the government, enterprises, and universities, because these three stakeholders need international students for their own purposes and goals and a specific common ground that they all share is “internationalization” or *‘kokusaiika’*. However, it is also certain that international students are only considered guests or visitors in its current immigration and citizenship regime. To put it simply, the process of recruitment and retention of international students cannot practically be translated into permanent settlement. This point marks a significant difference between Japan and other popular destination countries for international students where education can be a major channel through which international students obtain jobs and permanent residency or citizenship for permanent settlement in host countries. This difference is intrinsically related as to how to view immigration and what kind of immigration policies Japan has in that: “an immigration policy refers to “the state's official attitude on who should be allowed to become its members, under what conditions, and of what kind”(Parekh 1994, 92).

Admittedly, although immigration policies in traditionally immigrant host societies such as the U.S., Australia, and Canada are more welcoming to international students, it is also true that they are not always categorized as ‘wanted migrants’. Images of international students are often caught in negative discourses rather than positive ones. This is mainly because international students have multiple identities, representing both wanted and unwanted migrants, for as Raghuram points out: “student migrants essentially traverse various boundaries and categories in the space of migration in their destination societies, with unclear identities both as students and workers” (Raghuram 2013, 140-141).

*Table 3.2 International Students with Multiple Identities*

Degree students	Non-degree students
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undergraduate</li> <li>• Postgraduate</li> <li>• Advanced research students</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Language students</li> <li>• Exchange students</li> <li>• Students at miscellaneous schools and technical college</li> </ul>
Wanted	Unwanted
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A source of revenue</li> <li>• A contributor to Japan’s Internationalization (local cities)</li> <li>• A key component of Internationalization of Higher Education</li> <li>• A pool of temporary/skilled workers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Irregular migrants (side-door for unskilled labor importation) (e.g. Chinese students in the early to mid-1990s (Liu-Farrer 2011))</li> <li>• Asian migrants (negatively stereotyped)</li> <li>• Certain types of migrants with particular cultural and religious backgrounds (negatively stereotyped)</li> </ul>

International students are welcome when they are considered a source of revenue for national and local economies, and higher education institutions, due to their tuition fees and economic contributions; a key component of internationalization of higher education; practically a pool of temporary workers and potentially skilled or highly skilled workers; a contributor to Japan’s internationalization in some cases in depopulated local towns and cities particularly where there is a growing importance of tourism promotion related to growth and

revitalization strategy. On the contrary, they are also unwelcome when they are considered undesirable and unwanted migrants, mainly because international student migration is often used as a way to become undocumented or irregular migrant workers. In addition to the image of bogus students, sometimes international students with a specific nationality or religious background are considered persons of interest by the host society related to public or national security issues (See Table 3.2).

In the context of Japan, Asian students, as the vast majority of international students, are particularly viewed in an ambivalent way – both positive and negative. As Breaden argues (Breaden 2015, 108) as follows:

The terms ‘Asian student’ and ‘work’ evoke a variety of images of Japan. There is the image of the Asian student working at the local convenience store or supermarket, at best an honest scholar scraping together enough income to fund a dream of academic success, at worst a *dekasagi ryugakusei*, a migrant worker residing in Japan under a false pretenses on a student visa while making a quick yen. There are of course other international students working in Japan, but it is students from Asia who dominate in the public sphere, owing not only to their numerical preponderance but also the congruence between images of the working student and other discursive constructions of Asian-ness.....which celebrate the Asian appetite for Japanese expertise and economic opportunity and make the active exploitation of work opportunities, whether virtuous or fraudulent, appear a perfectly natural behavior.

In March 2019, a striking news report appeared in Japanese media, reporting that since 2016 about 700 foreign students have gone missing at a private university which has campuses in Tokyo and Gunma Prefecture. According to the university’s statement, among

the 2,711 research students, about 700 had been expelled because they failed to pay their tuition, or have expired visas, or have been unable to be contacted for three months and their whereabouts is unknown.<sup>79</sup> This news has pushed the government and universities to question the quantitative growth of internationalization of higher education in Japan and in a way easily facilitated to reproduce a negative image of Asian students that has been stereotypically and uncritically accepted by the public. Furthermore, in a similar vein there is a newly growing concern about the dramatically increasing number of Vietnamese students. Reportedly, authorities have been cracking down on Japanese language schools for forcing foreign students including many Vietnamese students to work illegally long hours.<sup>80</sup> Under these circumstances, it is certain that there should be a mixture of public sentiments toward international students and their images. Therefore, it is hard to establish a clear-cut category between the unwanted and wanted migrants. At least until now, it is difficult to say that international students are viewed more as a group of wanted and desirable foreign migrants and residents, rather than unwanted and undesirable.

Concerning the issue of immigration, maintaining its restrictive public attitudes toward immigration, in my point of view, Japanese society is continuously skeptical about building a multicultural immigrant society despite its growing ethno-cultural diversity generated by migration, and is reluctant to allow foreign populations to settle for good and become fellow citizens. In a way, the myth of ethnic homogeneity has helped the society to maintain ‘restrictive multiculturalism’, and ‘cosmetic multiculturalism.’ As Iwabuchi argues (Iwabuchi 2015, 250):

---

<sup>79</sup> 700 foreign students missing, ministries start investigation, *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 26, 2019, Accessed April 20, 2020, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201903260047.html> .

<sup>80</sup> Language Schools Use Vietnamese Students to Illegally Fill Japan's Labor Shortage, *NHK Newslines*, December 6, 2018, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/nhknewslines/backstories/languageschoolsusevietnamese/> .

While it seems that the recognition of Japan as a homogenous nation has become less plausible with the intensification of multicultural situations, migrants and even settled ethnic minorities are still regarded as “foreign residents,” not as members of the Japanese nation; they are in, but not of Japan.

It is certain that Japan’s immigration policies have been remarkably liberalized over the past few years, particularly in terms of the grant of permanent residency, firstly toward highly skilled foreign workers and possibly towards much less skilled foreign workers under the new labor migration scheme beginning from April 2019. However, the liberalization of its immigration policies has not necessarily led to the liberalization of its citizenship policy, and it also seems unlikely to happen in the near future that the Japanese government will more proactively liberalize its citizenship policy to extend the perception of its Japanese national identity within a genuinely multicultural society. In this regard, international students are simply considered one group of foreign residents. No matter who they are, they are welcome to stay and work for a limited time as long as it is beneficial to Japanese society. But there is no chance, in principle, for them to consider becoming a Japanese citizen, even if they want to become.

### **3.5 Rethinking the Role of Immigration in ISM to and in Japan**

As seen in this chapter, in addition to the dramatic changes in its foreign worker policies, the Japanese government is using internationalization of higher education as a way of stimulating skilled migration by attracting foreign students as a source of labor. However, it is questionable if international student migration can successfully translate into a pool of

skilled workers in Japan. The employment rate of international student graduates is still relatively low and among the successful graduates who succeed in obtaining full-time employment after graduation, their job categories are quite limited, and they do not seem to be part of the professionally skilled and highly skilled job categories.

In this situation, a reality of what we can see is that international students are simply being utilized as temporary migrant workers in limited job categories, in which the recruitment of highly skilled foreign professionals are not necessarily crucial. Simply speaking, immigration does not play a significant role in the process of recruitment, retention, and settlement of international students to and in Japan. This means that there is no formal opportunity to settle down in Japan for international students who wish to live in Japan more permanently after graduation. Therefore, Japan's international student recruitment is considerably superficial in that international students are mostly viewed as temporary foreign workers from the point of entry, mainly to meet acute labor shortages in certain industries. This situation is not significantly different from a reality where certain industries urgently needed lower-skilled foreign workers. A recent case of a dramatic increase in the number of foreign students who entered nursing schools that train state-certified care workers is a clear example.

As this research continues to argue, and I repeatedly emphasize, it is certain that Japan is continuously becoming a more heterogenous society in terms of ethnicity and culture, mainly generated by an influx of newly arriving foreign migrants, including international students, and the heterogenization process will continue because “acts of migration are self-sustaining social processes which tend to develop their own dynamics.” (Castles 2000, 106; Castles and Miller 2009, 29). In this situation challenges and changes from the growing ethno-cultural

diversity induced by migration will also be accelerated and intensified, and all will push the society to keep questioning its national identity and citizenship. In this situation, as I assume at a certain point of time, it is highly likely that Japan should consider an introduction of formal immigration policies toward non-Japanese population in one way or another.

In the conflicting situation between the government and society's unwillingness toward immigration, and the growing importance of utilizing foreign human resources in the context of a rapidly aging population and decline, as I insist again, rethinking 'student migration' may be a good starting point to invigorate public debate about immigration, while at the same time using it as an opportunity for a pretest of Japan's capability to accept foreign immigrants through a formal immigration program. Considering the characteristics and intentions of student migrants in Japan, there are many reasons why they should be increasingly encouraged by the government and the society to settle as more long-term and permanent residents.

In addition to the issue on the absence of immigration, there is another important dimension that should be examined and discussed in international student migration to and in Japan. It is 'internationalization' or '*kokusaika*', or more specifically speaking, the superficiality of internationalization which the next chapter will explore thoroughly.

As examined so far, in the situation where the role of immigration is absent in the settlement of international students, there is no doubt that international students are continuously viewed as guests and visitors through Japan's current immigration and citizenship regime. Nevertheless, it is also certain that they are importantly viewed by the government, universities, and enterprises simply because the three stakeholders need

international students for their own purposes and goals. In this respect very interestingly, we can see that there is a very specific common ground that the government, universities and companies (or industries) all share together now in recruiting and retaining international students, that is, 'internationalization'. The government, particularly the Abe government, are proactively and actively attempting to internationalize all aspects of society, universities are also striving to internationalize their institutions, and companies who need international students as their workforces are also desperate for internationalizing their organizations and business boundaries. Therefore, we can see that internationalization is the keyword and rigorously speaking, it is one of the major reasons why the Japanese government, universities, and companies want to recruit them.

The next chapter will deal with an important perspective in reviewing 'internationalization' as nation branding or a nation branding strategy set by the government. In so doing, we may come much closer to a point at which we start to understand the cosmetic nature of immigration, national identity and diversity in contemporary Japanese society which is lying behind 'internationalization' as an indispensable keyword in international student migration to Japan. The demystification of 'internationalization' is also particularly important in order to understand the superficiality, contradiction, and ambiguity of global *jinzai* discourse in chapter 5, which will lead us to the conclusion of this research.

## CHAPTER 4

### INTERNATIONALIZING JAPANESE HIGHER EDUCATION AS NATION BRANDING: COSMETIC INTERNATIONALIZATION, REVAMPING THE LOST IMAGE, CONSTRUCTING NEW IDENTITY

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to demystify the nature and meanings of ‘internationalization’, and examines the superficiality of Japan’s internationalization project, more specifically under the Abe administration. In the early part of this chapter, I will examine why and how the Japanese government attempts to deal with its image problems by using ‘internationalization’. Going through Japan’s identity crisis - losing its national confidence due to economic recession, natural disasters, various challenges from globalization, the Japanese ruling elite attempts to revamp Japan’s national identity as the proud, beautiful, strong and new nation through rebranding the Japanese national identity. Meanwhile the resurgence of nationalist discourses in Japan has been observed. In this situation, the Japanese government’s attempts to exercise nation branding as a soft power tool, not only capitalize on Japan’s popularity, and but also ideologically control national images facing challenges from a rapidly globalizing world. Furthermore, ultimately all nation branding exercises are aimed at creating a new competitive identity of Japan as a new country identity, which has been further enhanced under the Abe government with its ambitious growth strategy through the so called, “Japan Revitalization Strategy.”

As I will discuss throughout this chapter, Japan’s current internationalization projects are essentially related to ‘nation-branding’ as its operating principle. In this regard, the

internationalization of Japanese universities or higher education, may be understood and reviewed in the same context, because it is also essentially part of the Japanese government's nation branding strategy in response to its image problems. Reviewing how the Japanese government views higher education as soft power and public diplomacy, and how the major role of higher education as soft power has significantly changed to the state's nation branding strategy, this chapter explores contextual influences of how higher education is incorporated into the state's international project.

In doing so, I argue that while the Japanese government, more specifically the Abe government, adopts internationalization as the solution to Japan's image problem, its internationalization project is operating as "*Internationalization From Within*" which reflects the current substance of internationalization of Japanese higher education. This can be considered as the government's actual policy direction which is lying behind a slew of activities and environments for cosmetic internationalization in Japanese higher education. Standing very ambiguously in between a 'closing in' and 'opening up' strand of internationalization - and remaining a defensive response against, and an adaptation to globalization, the ultimate goal of the *kokusaika* project is aimed at re-enhancing national identity, by means of a celebrated ethno-cultural essence; while at the same time identifying through a universally-circulating tool on the globe, which is the popular label of 'internationalization'.

#### **4.2 Japan's Image Problem: Fostering New Japanese Identity through Nation Branding**

#### 4.2.1 Japan is Back : New Japan, Beautiful Japan

On 22 February 2013, in Statemen’s forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Prime Minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo stated in his opening remarks:

Last year, Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Michael Green and others published a paper about Japan in which they asked if Japan would end up becoming a Tier-two nation. Secretary Armitage, here is my answer to you. Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, *I am back, and so shall Japan be*..... So today.....I make a pledge. *I will bring back a strong Japan*, strong enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world (Italics and emphasis added).<sup>81</sup>

As Prime Minister Abe Shinzo declared, “Japan Is back” – but what did he really mean? If Japan is back, which Japan or what kind of Japan was he talking about? Since the message was delivered, the confident assertion has been widely debated with a lot of questions and confusions such as Brad Glosserman’s criticism: “Japan: from muddle to model?”(Glosserman 2014) and Hugo Dobson’s argument entitled: “Is Japan really back? The “Abe Doctrine and Global Governance”(Dobson 2017). Regardless of what it means, at least inasmuch as his remarks implicitly articulated the success of Abenomics, undoubtedly it implied that the Abe government has been successfully reviving the Japanese economy to a certain degree, so the PM Abe’s remark was a sort of diffusion of self-confidence. And at the same time, the declaration implied a promising message publicly, that in the course of

---

<sup>81</sup> Japan is Back”, Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 22, 2013, Accessed April 21, 2020, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96\\_abe/statement/201302/22speech\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201302/22speech_e.html) .

revitalizing its economy, Japan will be better able to “restore the nation’s damaged collective esteem and pride in the face of insecurity and anxieties generated by economic stagnation, natural disasters, and increasing regional competition with China” (Shibata 2016, 81).

According to Shibata’s analysis on Japan’s identity crisis (Shibata 2016, 81), Japan’s social crises of the 1990s leading up to the unprecedented 3.11 earthquake disaster undermined the confidence and sense of security and selfhood of many Japanese. Meanwhile, the Japanese ruling elite are attempting to revamp Japan’s national identity as a proud, beautiful, strong and new nation through rebranding the Japanese national identity. Meanwhile the resurgence of nationalist discourses in Japan has been observed – usually through reinterpreting and reshaping its war memory, and it can be understood as an effort to newly recover its losing identity. It is widely known and recognized that in particular, since the current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo came returned to power in 2006, his revisionist policies have been infiltrating into Japanese society, politics and identity, while antagonizing other Asian states. Notably, he has offered a vision of building a “new” Japan, which he calls “beautiful Japan (*utsukushiii kuni*)” (Abe 2006, 2013) by criticizing that Japan’s post war history is “masochistic”, and envisioning that “Japan will re-take its rightful place as a first rank or tier one country of capitalist powers - similar to how Japan sought recognition before World War II” by means of the reconstruction of Japan’s national images and identity emphasizing on unique qualities, spirit and traditions inherent to Japanese society (Kolmaš 2019, 54, 121).

Indeed, this is not a new attempt at all. As Joseph Nye pointed out (Nye 2004, 87), on the whole Japan reinvented itself twice before – after the Meiji revolution in the nineteenth century, and after World War II. The quest for a new identity of Japan has never been

discontinued since then. It goes without saying that the emergence of the discourse of *Nihonjinron* in the late 1970s was the most prominent. Initially, it was a scholarly attempt to explain Japan's economic strength in terms of its cultural attributes, but soon came to be endlessly engaged in discussions of the unique characteristics of Japanese culture and people. After all, the discourse even became an attempt to "seek the restitution of *Japan's* lost identity in national terms"(Iida 2002, 164, *Italics* added). After the wonder of the Japanese miracle eventually and gradually disappeared from international attention by the mid-1990s, Japan made a transition to an era called "Japan Passing". During the 1990s, the country went through serious economic recession, the massive Kobe earthquake of 1995, and an incident of domestic terrorism (*Aum Shinrikyo* subway gas attack). Amid all the agonizing experiences, by the early 2000s, the government-led "Cool Japan" project was born as "a vanguard of popular culture" (Thorsten 2012, 1-2), which shows a tangible evidence of the Japanese government's exercises of nation-branding and public diplomacy, which are somewhat different but intricately linked to each other by "sharing similar goals with regard to fostering positive perceptions and images of a country"(Dinnie 2008, 8).

Regarding the quest for creating a new Japanese identity as a main theme in this chapter, it is particularly crucial for us to inspect closely the development and circulation of the Cool Japan strategy, in that the government-led Cool Japan project shows us how the Japanese government manages its national images as: "defensive responses against and an adaptation to globalization" (Mori 2011, 40, cited in Burgess 2015, 25). As I will discuss later in the next section, internationalization of Japanese universities may be interpreted in the same formulation because it is also essentially part of Japanese government's nation branding strategy in response to its image problems. Before I move onto a more detailed discussion of Cool Japan as nation branding and public diplomacy, it is necessary to ascertain what is

nation branding and public diplomacy by briefly examining the recent evolution of nation branding in Japan, and more specifically over the last two decades at the time of the birth of the Cool Japan project and after.

#### **4.2.2 Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy: Solutions to Japan's Image Problem**

Although the conceptual debates about the term, 'nation branding' vary across different academic disciplines (Anholt, 2007; Aronczyk, 2013; Dinnie, 2016; Kaneva 2011; Tamaki 2019; Valaskivi 2013), it can be broadly defined as a conscious strategy by which states distinguish and differentiate themselves to enhance their international image and reputation.

More specifically according to Dinnie (2016, 5),

The nation brand is defined as the unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences.

As a working definition adopted from Kaneva (2011, 118), nation branding may also be defined as:

A compendium of discourse and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms.

As Aronczyk points out (Aronczyk, 2013, 16-17), nation branding is defined as "a particular form of national consciousness that has emerged in recent years", and "its

rationales and strategies have been adopted in countries with emerging market economies and established capitalist economies alike, and with vastly different geopolitical and historical legacies”. Regarding practical exercises in nation branding, they include “a wide range of activities, ranging from ‘cosmetic’ operations, such as the creation of national logos, and slogans, to efforts to institutionalize branding within state structures by creating governmental and quasi-governmental bodies that oversee long-term nation branding efforts” (Kaneva 2011, 118). For example, UK’s Public Diplomacy Board was established in 2002, and South Korea’s Presidential Council on Nation Branding was founded in 2009. In the case of Japan, Cool Japan Promotion Council was established under the Cabinet Office in 2013.

Efforts to boost export promotion, inward investment, and tourism are also in the key commercial objectives of nation branding (Dinnie 2008). In the case of Japan, for instance, corporate megabrands such as Sony and Toyota have certainly contributed to the positive associations of the ‘Made in Japan’ label. Notably the role and function of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) is focused on promoting and enhancing positive images of Japan’s nation brand through coordinating export promotion efforts and encouraging inward investment. By projecting positive images of a country’s tourist attractions, tourism promotion such as ‘Yokoso Japan’ is also one of the most prominent activities of nation branding.

The term, ‘public diplomacy’ is also often used with nation-branding, in particular when it comes to a state’s soft power policies. Public diplomacy can be defined as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize resources that produce soft power to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, not just other governments” (Nye, 2008, 95). Although nation branding and public diplomacy are increasingly being used in the same context both in

academic literatures and in practice, the relationship between the two concepts remains anecdotal and ambiguous (Szondi 2008, 1). Nevertheless, for this study, particularly addressing the case of Japan, it is reasonable to view that public diplomacy could be considered a subset of nation branding, that is, that public diplomacy is part of nation branding (Dinnie 2008, 8; Szondi 2008, 19-22).

In a policy speech delivered by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to the National Diet in January 2005,<sup>82</sup> while mentioning the importance of promoting Japan's animation and film industries, the word '*brand*' appeared meaningfully for the first time in the recent context of Japan's nation branding as follows:

Japanese animation has caught the imagination and dreams of children around the world. The government will endeavor to promote a nation that utilizes our wealth of culture and arts by promoting businesses that capitalize on contents such as films and animation and strengthening Japan's appealing *brand* message in areas such as fashion and food. With the aim of realizing a "nation founded on intellectual property" the government will tighten measures against counterfeit and pirated copies, which is increasingly becoming a serious issue overseas (Italics and emphasis added).

As Cannon pointed out (2012, 109), PM Koizumi's 2005 address was the very first reference within a prime minister's policy speech to fostering Japan as a "brand" and by that time it was observed that the government was already attempting to improve the country branding more explicitly. For example, under the Koizumi administration, the government

---

<sup>82</sup> General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 162nd Session of the Diet, January 21, 2005, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech0501.html> .

was particularly interested in promoting Japanese pop culture to the world, nurturing the content industry and promoting intellectual property business such as anime and games.

In this situation, hence, the Intellectual Property Basic Act was enacted in 2002, and went into force in March 2003, and the Intellectual Property Headquarters was established by the Cabinet Office in July 2003, which may be considered the earliest efforts by the government at nation branding. Subsequently a “Working Group on Japan Brand” has been established in November 2004 under the Intellectual Property Headquarters and the final official report was released in February 2005 entitled “*Nihon burando senryaku no suishin — miryokuaru Nihon o sekai ni hasshin* (The Promotion of Japan Brand Strategy: Exporting Attractive Japan to the World)”.<sup>83</sup> The report gave emphasis to exercising “soft power” in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the era of cultural power, claiming that cultivating ‘cultural power’ is the key to making Japan become a nation that is loved and respected by the world (Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, 2005, Section 1.1).

#### **4.2.3 Cool Japan: Creating a New Cool Japanese Identity**

In the meantime, the phrase, ‘Cool Japan’ appeared and was used by the government as early as 2005 when the Japanese government came to realize the soft power potential of Cool Japan. Indeed, the concept of ‘Cool Japan’ has been circulating since 2002, and its origin derived from an article outside Japan. When Douglas McGray wrote an article in 2002 entitled “Japan’s Gross National Cool” in the journal *Foreign Policy* (McGray 2002) in

---

<sup>83</sup> Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, *Nihon burando senryaku no suishin — miryokuaru Nihon o sekai ni hasshin* (Promoting Japan’s Brand Strategy: Delivering the Attractive Japan to the World), February 25, 2005, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents/houkoku/050225hontai.pdf>.

which he illustrated Japan's growing global cultural presence and success as an "increasingly powerful global commercial force"(McGray 2002, 53) including pop music, consumer electronics, architecture, fashion, animation, manga, cuisine and life style, suggesting that its soft and cultural powers held tremendous potential. What he argues was that Japan was reinventing superpower again 'culturally' as it did 'economically' in the 1980s, and the new cultural popularity has created a new image for Japan, which would have a positive impact on the nation's GDP - although there is uncertainty about the long-term political impact of Cool Japan as a phenomenon (Valaskivi 2013, 488; Thorsten 2012, 120).

As Japanese popular culture defines Cool Japan along with its international popularity, it is no surprise that the government has realized the soft power potential of *anime* and *manga*. Annually hosting the Japan International Contents Festa or Cofesta since 2007 is a clear example. Just as to how Japanese traditional arts and crafts are perceived, the government views the Japanese popular culture as a tool of public diplomacy which may help the publics abroad foster a deeper understanding of Japanese culture and society, and the understanding may enhance Japan's international legitimacy and trustworthiness (Tourism Agency, 2011, 103, cited in Tamaki 2019, 115). Since 2010 Cool Japan became more prominent particularly when Cool Japan Shitsu (Creative Industries Promotion Office) was established under the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in June 2010 whereby a new national growth strategy to promote a culture-oriented industry was announced (Burgess 2015, 113). METI organized a series of meetings to discuss how to package the concept - 'Cool Japan' (Tamaki 2019, 115). Since then, Cool Japan has appeared as various forms of a government strategy led by different government agencies, including as industrial policy by METI, as cultural diplomacy by MOFA(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as global tourism strategy by MLIT(Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism), and as content industry and

media arts by the Agency of Cultural Affairs, a special body of the MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) (Matsui, 2014).

More recently, the Abe government has drawn up a bill aimed at easing special economic zone regulations on foreigners seeking to work as designers, animators or cosmetics experts at Japanese companies. The National Strategic Special Zones (NSSZs) are an initiative set up by the Abe government to establish brand-new economic zones with business-friendly conditions by means of promoting bold deregulations.<sup>84</sup> This move comes as the government seeks to further tap Cool Japan project in sectors such as fashion and animation, and to boost cultural exports as well as tourism to increase the number of foreign visitors.<sup>85</sup> Reportedly the Abe government also plans to make it easier for foreign nationals with expertise in animation and illustration, dubbed as ‘Cool Japan talent’, to obtain permanent residency in a bid to attract foreign talent and further promote Japanese pop culture overseas. Moreover, with regard to obtaining working visas for jobs related to Cool Japan initiative after graduation, a new smooth visa treatment will be available to international students who are studying Cool Japan-related subjects such as Japanese cuisines and animation production, particularly at vocational schools.<sup>86</sup>

As we can see, the Abe administration continues to consider the Cool Japan initiative a key growth strategy through promoting soft power – Japanese culture and products overseas,

---

<sup>84</sup> This initiative is one of key policies of the “Japan Revitalization Strategy” aiming at enhancing international competitiveness of Japan by breaking traditional “bedrock regulations”. This initiative was first authorized at the 2013 Diet and followed by appointment of six specific zones; “Tokyo area”, “Kansai area”, “Niigata city”, “Yabu city”, “Fukuoka city” and “Okinawa prefecture” in May 2014. (See this report by SMAM [https://www.smam-jp.com/documents/www/english/market\\_info/2014/10/22/SMAMMarketKeywordNo018.pdf](https://www.smam-jp.com/documents/www/english/market_info/2014/10/22/SMAMMarketKeywordNo018.pdf) ).

<sup>85</sup> Japan To Ease Visa Rules On Foreign Animators, Designers, *Nikkei Asian Review*, March 02, 2016, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-to-ease-visa-rules-on-foreign-animators-designers>.

<sup>86</sup> Shrinking Japan: Foreigners eager to promote 'cool Japan' face obstacles to work visas, *The Mainichi*, 20 November, 2018. Accessed April 22, 2020, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181120/p2a/00m/0na/006000c>.

and furthermore, continues to expand the range of initiatives in a variety of ways including migration policies toward foreign talent and international students. Indeed, at the outset, the Abe government manifested its ambitions to create a new Japan with a new national identity, through using tools of soft power - broadly speaking, exercising nation branding, and more in practice using Cool Japan initiative. Let us then take a look in more detail at the issue – fostering a new country identity or new national identity under the Abe administration.

It is important to note that efforts for fostering a new country identity through nation branding started to increase more robustly when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo went into office in 2006. In his first policy speech to the Diet in September 2006, right after he took power, he stated as follows:

It is also important to appeal to the world the charms of "*a beautiful country, Japan.*" In the past, "Made in Japan" was synonymous with poor quality. The late Akio Morita strove to rectify this image, unabashedly emphasizing in the U.S. the high quality of Japanese products, and winning the recognition in the world as a high-quality *brand*. It is quintessential for Japan to present its *new "country identity"* for the future to the world, that is, our country's ideals, the direction in which we should aspire, and the way in which we convey our *Japanese-ness* to the world. I will gather wisdom from across Japan to implement a strategy for overseas public relations.....Our country Japan possesses a beautiful nature, long history, culture and traditions, which we could be proud of in the world. With this tacit pride in our hearts, the time has now come to take a step forward toward a new nation building (*Italics and emphasis added*).<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet, September 29, 2006, Accessed April 21, 2020, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2006/09/29speech\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2006/09/29speech_e.html) .

In the speech, his choice of vocabulary and expressions clearly shows us “an intentional departure from the notion of branding as his predecessor Kozumi had conceived it” (Cannon 2012, 111). The establishment of the Council for the Asian Gate Initiative in 2007 was one of the continuous steps for nation branding actively taken under the Abe administration. It highlighted the need for “regional branding with international competitiveness” by “envisioning Japan acting as a bridge between Asia and the world in the flow of people, goods, money, culture and information, and thereby achieving growth together.”<sup>88</sup> Through the initiative, the Abe administration attempted to replace a somewhat negative characterization of Japan’s changing place in Asia as “its vertical relationship with Asia emphasizing the difference between the two” with a more positive characterization of Japan, along with a more buoyant image and vision in which Japan is heading toward a “horizontal and strategic relationship with other Asian countries by emphasizing Japan’s role as a gateway connecting Asia and the World.” (Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative 2007, 2). This initiative is particularly important with regard to the problem of “positing Japan for the twenty first century” (Mouer 2015), by addressing the question of where Japan can be positioned regionally and globally?

As I shall examine and discuss this issue more precisely in the context of fostering global *jinzai* or global talent in chapter 5 - specifically over the last two decades, political elites and policymakers in Japan have been making great efforts to strategically reorient Japan to the outside world through a re-internationalization process. For example, as Mouer illustrated as follows:

---

<sup>88</sup> Council for Asian Gateway Initiative, *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, May 16, 2007, Accessed April 21, 2020, [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/gateway/index\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/gateway/index_e.html) .

...enhancing the involvement of Japanese in global network by hiring more foreign labor, lifting the stature of tertiary education on internationally recognized league tables and creating favorable images of Japanese culture and society abroad (Mouer 2015, p.4).

Under the Abe administration, these efforts have been further enhanced in that he continues to show his ambitions by assuming a greater role in global leadership, bringing Japan back to its rightful place in global politics and the economy, and reasserting its place in the world - particularly using 'soft power' to achieve this by, breaking away from the lost decades of economic stagnation, political turbulence, and natural disasters. After all, attempts to rebrand the nation, is aimed at enhancing Japan's international competitiveness through creating a new competitive and cool image of Japan, mainly by means of its soft power or cultural power. In this regard, it is no doubt that engagement or re-engagement with Asia is the most crucial policy task for the Abe administration, covering all aspects of policies toward Asia - economic, politics, history, culture and education (particularly higher education).

Indeed, there has been much criticism of various government policies related to Japan's nation branding – particularly of Cool Japan initiatives, as the government attempts to re-imagine Japanese uniqueness. Most notably, in a series of the 'Contents Business Research Group meetings' under the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, there has been much discussion about the vagueness and fuzziness of the government-led nation branding project mainly in terms of definitional matters: for example, "What actually is meant by Cool Japan?" (Kantei 2011) and "What is it about Cool Japan that we (Japan) want to sell to the world?" (Kantei, 2012). According to Tamaki (2019, 119), who argues that: "Cool Japan suffers from vagueness, as the two main components – identity representation and trade

promotion, fail to fully integrate”.

In the absence of a coherent image of Cool Japan, and in the conceptual emptiness left by the Cool Japan project, the familiar residues of the Japanese uniqueness myth re-emerges - reconstructing the national identity narratives, as the familiar narratives of Japanese identity (Tamaki 2019, 119-120). In this regard, Cool Japan as a nation branding exercise is not a process of literally creating a new identity of the country and culture, but rather it is a process of summoning its lost identity which is the Japanese uniqueness myth. This situation is “making it convenient for policy makers and stakeholders in the Cool Japan initiative to upload anything which can be associated with an abstract idea of Japaneseness” (Tamakai 2019, 120). In this situation the Abe government effectively takes advantage of the Cool Japan project to revamp Japan’s image, breaking away from the aggressor country in Asia to a “beautiful and new country (*utsukushiii kuni* and *atarashii kuni*)” (Abe 2006, 2013), from an insular country to a globalizing country, and from a stagnant society to a revitalizing society, and from a closed society for foreigners to an open society for foreigners.

In short, of particular interest in this chapter are the Japanese government’s attempts to exercise nation branding as a soft power tool, not only to “capitalize on Japan’s popularity, but also to ideologically control national images facing” challenges from a rapidly globalizing world (Burgess 2015, 17). Furthermore, ultimately all nation branding exercises are aimed at creating a new competitive identity of Japan as a new country identity. In particular, under the Abe government, the nation branding strategy and exercises including Cool Japan are a major tool to promote its growth strategy which can be commonly called, “Japan Revitalization Strategy”. As the main subjects in this study, Japan’s recent liberalization of labor migration policies and internationalization of higher education can also

be critically reviewed in this context. As I shall continue to argue throughout the following parts of this thesis, the recent moves accelerated by the Japanese government toward a more open, and internationalized, globalizing Japanese society in migration policy-making and internationalization of higher education remains incoherent, ambiguous and contradictory. Given that the government efforts on internationalization are mainly considered exercises of nation branding, the move also aims to create a new positive image more successfully than any other purpose. In this respect, it is questionable whether liberalization of immigration policies, and internationalization of its universities truly intend to achieve their goals by liberalizing immigration policies, and internationalizing universities in the practical sense. Before I move to seek proper answers, I will examine some aspects of internationalizing higher education in the context of nation branding, more specifically the relation between soft power and the internationalization of higher education.

### **4.3 Branding Cool Japanese Universities? Internationalizing Japanese Higher Education as Soft Power**

#### **4.3.1 Higher Education as Soft Power**

Soft power has become a buzzword in international higher education circles. The term is on the lips of scholars, policy makers, and education leaders alike (Knight 2014). Soft power is a term first coined by Joseph Nye in 1990, and further developed in his famous book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Nye 2004). Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”, and this “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye 2004, p.x). It is popularly understood as “the ability to influence others and achieve national

self-interest(s) through attraction and persuasion, rather than through coercion, military force, or economic sanctions—commonly known as hard power” (Knight 2017, 381). Therefore, “when a foreign audience respects and admires a country’s practices, values and ideals, soft power is taking root.”(Chia 2015, 2). It seems certain that higher education has been drawn to the concept of soft power by scholars and policy makers particularly since mid 2000 (Knight 2014). However, the fact that higher education as soft power is nothing new, as it was already a source of soft power since the Middle Ages, when the first universities were created. Italian institutions such as Università di Bologna, and the Sorbonne in Paris had a tremendous impact on the intellectual life of European elites across the European continent. The mobility of students and scholars through universities, and their exchange facilitated to spread and diffuse knowledge and ideas, and exchange cultures. Since then, the scale of the exchange of students and scholars has changed considerably to a larger scale, and the phenomenon has continued more dynamically (Wojciuk 2018, 343-344).

Higher education or university education has always functioned as an “international force” (Altbach and Peterson 2008, 37), influencing intellectual and scientific development and spreading knowledge and ideas around the world. Moreover, university education has helped to shape and determine how people will see the world, and what kind of attitude they may have toward their own and other societies, and different cultures (Altbach and Peterson 2008, 37). As such, considering the influence of higher education as an “international force”, it is no surprise that many countries have recognized the soft power potential of tertiary education, like exercising “a modern branding campaign by using culture and media to win over foreign publics, particularly international students” (Knight 2014). The exercise of branding high education as soft power is usually actualized in a particular form of higher education, often described as ‘internationalization of higher education’.

Traditionally international activities in higher education are characterized by public diplomacy, a term covering various government-sponsored efforts and activities intended to influence the public in other countries and promote favorable relations among nations. Given that “soft power is dependent on the strength of ideas and culture, to influence the friendship and disposition of others, higher education is an ideal vehicle for soft power” (Peterson 2014, 2). Various types of government scholarship programs to attract foreign students is an excellent example of public policy in international higher education. The Fulbright Scholarship program sponsored by the US Department of State, Chevening Scholarship - mainly funded by the British government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The European Union’s Erasmus Mundus Scholarships, CSC Scholarship awarded by Chinese Scholarship Council and MEXT Scholarship funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and so on. Many international students on scholarships are considered potential leaders who eventually return to their home countries to take up senior positions in the public and private sectors where they diffuse the knowledge and ideas learnt through their university education in countries where they were educated (Chia 2015, 3). Through promoting the international education exchanges - offering scholarships for study and sponsoring education exchanges between higher education institutions, countries seek to develop their own brand of educational diplomacy, and extend national diplomacy through education (Peterson, 2014, 2).

In this regard some have criticized that internationalization of higher education is operating as educational neocolonialism, particularly with regard to the influence of western educational approaches in non-western countries and societies (Nguyen et al. 2009). Despite such criticism, it is generally accepted that international educational exchanges , particularly through student migration can bring positive outcomes to both sending and host countries. As

Chia points out (Chia 2015, 3), “there is a general consensus that the international educational exchanges, especially through students provide a largely positive outcome for all the parties involved”. For example, on the one hand, sending countries may obtain new skills, knowledge networks by the students who return home from studying abroad; on the other hand, host countries may realize their foreign policy objectives, and furthermore more practically utilize a pool of skilled labor, and diversify revenue streams for their higher education institutions (Altbach 1989, 127).

It should be noted that, as Peterson argued (2014, 3), “entering a period of more accelerated global engagement, country-to-country education diplomacy is being overtaken by institution-to-institution relationship and a broad array of actors”. For governments, although cross-border activity among colleges and universities is continuously viewed as an important part of their public diplomacy, it seems certain that governments are losing their status as the prime actor, higher education institutions are engaging more independently in broader activities related to internationalization of higher education with their own strategies and motivations (Peterson 2014, 3-5). In the meantime, facing the influence of globalization and the growing importance of knowledge in national economic and social policy, neoliberal knowledge society and economy policies have more increasingly influenced universities in various national contexts (Ward 2012). In this situation, in my opinion the government’s traditional soft power approach to higher education as public diplomacy has considerably changed to a more enhanced nation branding strategy, which is intrinsically related to a country’s national competitiveness and its growth strategy mainly in response to the force of globalization and the development of the knowledge economy.

### **4.3.2 Internationalization of Higher education as Part of Nation Branding: A Way of Fostering World-Class Universities (WCUs)**

Following the onset of rapid globalization during the 1990s, in response to various challenges of globalization, particularly to the competitive nature of globalization driven by neoliberal rationale, many governments have taken various policy initiatives in the process of devising and implementing a strategic response of higher education. At the more fundamental level, the influence of the competitive nature of globalization is articulated most notably in the economic school of thoughts widely known as neoliberalism. Dating back to the concept of the invisible hand of market forces coined by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century (Smith 1776/1999) that free markets will determine and find its equilibrium in the supply and demand without any intervention including government, it holds the notion that through the competition in free markets among economic rivals, they are naturally directed towards better efficiency, better products, and higher level of innovations (Shields 2013, 66). Based on the ideas, neoliberalism also argues for the benefit from the competition in free market by emphasizing that “the competitive forces of the market are beneficial: as individual and businesses compete with one another they adopt practices that are more innovative and efficient.” (Shields 2013, 66).

In the neoliberal perspective, the key element of globalization is how to remove barriers to international or global competition (Shield 2014, 66), which has widely and directly pushed universities to restructure their status, role, function and size worldwide. In this situation, eventually we have witnessed the birth of “enterprise university” (Marginson and Considine 2000) or “entrepreneurial university” (Etzkowitz, 2008), being transformed from the traditional university, playing in the new neoliberal order with “a heightened focus on

innovation, vocationalism, knowledge transfer, marketability, workforce needs and adherence to the cost-saving and moralizing discipline imposed by the bottom line” (Ward 2012, 145). As Ward points out, the *raison d'être* of universities is turned to “serve the need of society which has become reconfigured to mean markets and economy” (Ward 2012, 145).

In the meantime, governments are more increasingly interested in the new role and function of universities or higher education, which may serve to enhance a country’s national competitiveness. One clear example is attempts to build world-class universities (WCUs). “World-class universities”, commonly used interchangeably with global research universities, flagship or first-class universities, are “cornerstone institutions embedded in any academic system and play an important role in developing a nations’ competitiveness in the global knowledge economy.” (Cheng, Wang and Liu 2014). While the concept is still ambiguous, uncertain and contested, it is no doubt that every country wants to have one or more of these institutions (Li 2012, 2). Altbach (2009) attempted to define it by listing some characteristics such as excellence in research, academic freedom, flexible governance, adequate facilities and funding. Mohrman et al. (2008) also proposed eight elements to becoming a world-class university, such as: global mission, research intensity, new roles of professors, diversified funding, worldwide recruitment, increasing complexity, new relationships with government and industry, and global collaboration. From a different angle Shin pointed out (2013), a world-class university can be characterized by the ‘global attribute’ as follows:

In the business sector, we use the term global rather than world-class to describe a company. A global company is one running a business globally and targeting global customers and whose production systems are often globally linked. A similar approach can be applied to defining a world-class university. The world-class university globally attracts

talented students and faculty, the knowledge they produce is globally influential, they educate global leaders, they serve global human as well as national development and finally these activities are globally recognized by academics and people in general. From this perspective, a world-class university is defined by.....global competitiveness (Shin 2013, 17-28).

In the global society, universities compete with each other to bring external resources – funding for education and research as well as talented students and professors into their institutions. In addition, they compete in research productivity and student learning outcomes (Shin 2013, 18; Shin and Kehm 2013, 1). In this regard, efforts to internationalizing (or globalizing) universities can be viewed as an essential prerequisite for fostering world-class universities. It is important to note that the competitiveness of world-class universities is measured by ranking schemes, in particular global university rankings. There are two points that should be considered with regard to rankings.

First, it is important to point out that “a high rank enhances visibility and helps create brand”, and build better reputation (Hazelkorn 2015, 9). Global rankings effectively can make institutions internationally better known to international students, international researchers and scholars, and international student recruitment agencies, and it also makes other universities more interested in establishing various types of partnerships (Hazelkorn 2015, 9). Second, the relationship between rankings and internationalization should be importantly considered, as the global rankings play a key role in international competition in higher education, and because international indicators play a role in positioning higher education institutions (De Wit, 2016). Rankings significantly measure the international indicators such as number of international students, the number of international staff and the

number of international co-authored publications. For example, in the Times Higher Education (THE) world university rankings, these three indicators' weighting amounts to 7.5 percent and in the QS world university rankings it is 10 percent (De Wit, 2016). Hence, if any governments or university leaders aspire to stay high in, or move up their position on the league tables, it is crucial to consider the internationalization scores of their higher education institutions, particularly focusing on those three indicators.

In general, higher education institutions in non-English speaking countries, more specifically in the non-Anglo-American world, are increasingly striving to improve their performance to get higher scores in internationalization, because they are usually rated lower in world university rankings due to the language they use. Undeniably, it is a stark reality that English has become the *de facto* international academic language (Eades 2016, 83). Mostly research productivity or research outcome is measured by publications in English-language journals, which means most of the research published in non-English language is not usually counted in global university rankings. In this context, it is no surprise to see that, to become a world-class university or have a higher rank on the league tables, the very basic step to take for universities or higher education institutions is to change their teaching and researching environments into more English-speaking and English-taught environments such as having more classes and degree programs being conducted in English language.

What then about the case of Japan in terms of internationalization of higher education? How have Japanese government and universities viewed and developed internationalization in higher education particularly as soft power in the context of nation branding strategy?

### **4.3.3 Internationalizing Japanese Universities under the Abe Administration: Enhancing National Competitiveness and Fostering A Competitive Country's Image and Identity**

Drawing on Yonezawa's analysis (2008) on soft power and Japanese education, historically in Japanese macro-policy planning, the soft power of education has been given high priority. It is no doubt that education has assumed a significant role in transforming Japan's military and economic hard power to soft power. Throughout the twentieth century, Japan has tried various means to achieve a position of international influence, once through military power and later through economic power mainly by the hard power approaches which met with resistance and opposition. Beginning in the 1980s, the Japanese government changed its policy toward the active usage of educational soft power to facilitate its transformation into a post-industrial society. However, despite decades of significant investment in its higher education, Japan has had only limited success in internationalizing its higher education sector and being recognized by international rankings (Yonezawa 2007, cited in Lane and Kinser 2017, 267). In this situation, significant changes in Japanese higher education has been incorporated more recently into the country's internationalization strategies, which is closely related to its growth strategy. The government has swiftly changed its expectations of the role of higher education or the role of universities in the context of a more globally competitive economy.

According to Stigger (2018), in order to examine how a higher education system incorporates an international project is contextually influenced, it is necessary to understand key factors influencing the change. Drawing upon her arguments, I would like to extend her argument to a specific context of how Japanese higher educational policies are incorporated

into a government's internationalization project. There are two contextual influences that are worth mentioning. The first point is that historical influences form its experience of internationalization. Indeed, the Japanese term for "internationalization" (*kokusaika*) did not appear in a Japanese dictionary until 1981. It did not take it long, however, to become one of the powerful buzzwords (Aspinall 2010, 2). Then recently the word lively appears once again under the Abe administration alongside his ambitious and enthusiastic efforts to "make Japan great again".

Although the word, *kokusaika* itself can be relatively considered as a recent product, as Mannari and Befu argued (Mannari and Befu 1981), the ideas of internationalization which may contribute to the present day conceptualization of *kokusaika*, has already been penetrating through Japan's modern history, in a variety of forms including "slogans put forward by the Japanese power elite to unify the country behind a common cause" such as: *wakon yosai* (Japanese spirit, Western learning) of the Meiji era and *minzoku kyowa* (multiethnic harmony) within *daitoa kyoei ken* (the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) of the Showa era. During the post-war, democratization, demilitarization, and American ideals and values came to permeate the Japanese society, and most notably the Western concept of *kindaika* (modernization) of the 1960's was also one of them, which may contribute to the present day conceptualization of *kokusaika*.

As such Japan has been receptive to foreign borrowings, yet Japan is a country that historically did not unwelcome the ideas of internationalization (Mannari and Befu 1981, cited in Hadley 2003; Burgess et al. 2010). However, it is important to point out that "while historically welcoming the ideas of internationalization, at the same time Japan is a country that has imposed restrictions as to how internationalization should be incorporated" (Stigger

2018, 7). Most obviously in Japanese educational settings, and more specifically through higher education reform where the term, *kokusaika* has never disappeared as an important discourse and policy agenda, Japan's ambivalent and ambiguous attitudes toward internationalization - which is standing as a position in between openness and closedness, can be clearly observed.

According to a critical analysis on Japanese higher education reform by comparing the two similar but different contexts between *kokusaika* (internationalization) and *guroobauruka* (globalization) in the case of the government-led Global 30 project (Burgess et al. 2010), while both concepts are viewed as multivocal, the term is used in different ways by different people. *Kokusaika* is a kind of defensive reaction to foreign pressure. In other words, it is a process to cope with and respond to outside challenges and criticism. "A key element of it has been to promote the correct understanding of Japan abroad, and furthermore it is inclined to more actively push back against perceived threats to Japanese identity, and protect the identity, national unity and economic power" (Burgess et al. 2010, 463-464). In contrast, *guroobaruka* is "an external process over which Japan has little or no influence, or control". As a government policy it is a passive compromise with external norms which Japan is unable to control (Iwabuchi 2005, cited in Burgess et al. 2010, 464). In short, in the process and development of Japanese higher education reform, there has always been a big dilemma, more specifically a policy dilemma, between the desire to protect Japaneseness against foreign influences and at the same time the attempt to secure goods, knowledge and resources from outside Japan, which make Japan more competitive internationally. This conflicting dilemma is nothing new, but rather something handed down as the prolonged secluded nation mentality that can be found during the Edo period and after and until today, repeatedly showing its 'opening up' and 'closing in' attitude toward foreign influences from the outside

word (Burgess et al. 2010, 471). Hence it is important to remind ourselves that Japan's internationalization of higher education has been developed in this context of historical influences on 'internationalization'.

Second, Stigger points out the changing role of English in Japanese education. After the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the connection between English language learning and economies became more important. Educational policies increasingly started emphasizing the fostering of skills valued in the global marketplace. Among the required skills, the use of English is highlighted as one of the most important skills for Japanese students to develop, and is seen by the government as a strategic tool in boosting and "securing international competitiveness" (Choi 2016, 147, cited in Stigger 2018, 9). In this regard, a typically accepted but vaguely remaining goal of English language learning at a government level, that is, fostering "Japanese with English abilities" (MEXT 2003) is being developed and pursued, and furthermore being intertwined with other goals of international education such as promoting an 'educational environment corresponding to globalization' and "strengthening English education" (MEXT 2015). Hence, all these goals may help Japanese students become "global citizens" (MEXT 2014). This rhetorical formulation has become very common in government reports and statements about education policies, and after all, has become connected with the discourse of global talent (*gurobaru jinzai*) which I will explore more in the next chapter 5.

To put it briefly, in order to enhance Japan's ability to be competitive and successful in the global economy, it is necessary to foster globally competitive human resources, so-called, global talent or global *jinzai*. In order to foster the global talent within Japan, it is crucial to reform the country's education environments, in particular its higher education in an

international context. Hence, one of the major tasks that the government seeks to achieve through the internationalization of higher education, is primarily to create a new international educational environment - more specifically an environment where the teaching, learning and use of English language are promoted and enhanced, and also an environment where more international students and foreign academic staffs appear in Japanese universities. Whether or not the use of English is successfully working, the government-led internationalization of higher education projects, the Global 30 project, at least, significantly marked a watershed in Englishfication in Japanese universities. Hence, the changing and enhancing role of English language in Japanese education is also an important context of how the Japanese higher educational system is incorporated into the government's international project.

Considering these two contextual influences on how Japan's higher educational policies are incorporated into the government's international projects, what is clear is that Japan's higher educational reform has continuously aimed at balancing national interest with international concerns. Facing serious challenges from outside forces, there is an urgent need for the government and universities to manage the challenges by themselves, through opening up to the international environment in a variety of ways. However, it should be noted that 'internationalization' as discourse as well as policy is being implemented by the government as a tactic for discussing Japaneseness, thereby reinforcing nationalism. Hence the state-led deployment of 'internationalization' in higher education serves to paradoxically nationalize identity, and after all enhance national interests (McVeigh 2006, 107). Indeed, the state's attempts at constructing Japanese nationalism via schooling is more apparent under Abe administration. As a recent New York Time's article entitled: "*Japan's divided education strategy*" pointed out, there is an obvious contradiction between Japan's rightward shift on education policy such as rewiring textbooks along patriotic lines, and its strivings to

internationalize its inward-looking education system, such as improving Japanese universities' global rankings, and strengthening teaching staff at universities by hiring more foreign professors and so on.<sup>89</sup> As such, it seems certain that the purpose of the state's attempt at internalizing its universities, is closely linked to enhancing national interests and competitiveness as the role of universities, that is to say, to nationalizing through internationalizing.

By the mid-2000s, right before the Prime Minister Abe took power in 2006 for the first time, the Japanese government began to address more comprehensively that Japanese education as a source of soft power was in crisis, calling for significant changes in education, especially in a global context, in response to the process of globalization. For example, the Japanese government's Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy chaired by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, published a report in April 2005 entitled "*Japan's 21st Century Vision*", that illustrated an ideal image of what Japan will look like in the year 2030 (Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, 2005). Similarly, the Science Council of Japan drafted a report in April 2005, entitled, "*Japan Vision 2050 – Principles of Strategic Science and Technology Policy Toward 2020*" (Science Council of Japan, 2005). Both reports specified human resource development and education as priority areas for policy actions in response to the country's economic atrophy accompanying the falling birthrates and an aging population, and to various challenges from the competitive globalizing world.

The MEXT also published a proposal addressing its international strategy to enhance Japan's international competitiveness through the fostering of global human resources, the

---

<sup>89</sup> Michael Fitzpatrick, "Japan's Divided Education Strategy," *New York Times*, October 12, 2014. Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/13/world/asia/japans-divided-education-strategy.html> .

strengthening of internationalization of higher education, the promoting of soft power, and the strengthening of regional cooperation and exchanges with Asian countries and so on. (MEXT 2005). During the period of time before PM Abe retook office again in 2012, the Global 30 Project was announced in 2008 and launched in 2010, which was one of the most ambitious government initiatives for internationalizing its universities.

**Figure 4.1 Top Global University Japan Project**



Source: The MEXT's digital flyer for Top Global University Japan project, *MEXT*, [https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/downloads/pdf/sgu\\_flier.pdf](https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/downloads/pdf/sgu_flier.pdf).

The Global 30 energetically promoted English as the medium of instruction at all levels in the country's 13 selected prestigious universities with its ambition of recruiting 300,000 international students to Japan by 2020. The Global 30 was concluded in 2014 and replaced with the Top Global University project (in Japanese *supa gurobaru daigaku sosei shien*), which is a state-led huge funding project. The MEXT initially announced 10 billion JPY in support of 10 universities to become "Super Global". At the time of writing this thesis, 13 universities were selected as Type A (Top Type) universities that are conducting world-

leaning education and research and 24 universities were selected as Type B (Global Traction Type) universities that are leaning the globalization of Japanese society. These 37 universities have been working on “*true* internationalization” as the project declares, and university reform.<sup>90</sup> (See Figure 4.1).

On the surface, the major national initiatives to boost the international outlook of Japanese universities are starting to pay dividends. According to a recent report by Times Higher Education (THE) on Japanese universities’ internationalization, based on data from THE 2019 Japan University Rankings, published on March 27 2019, the report shows that large numbers of higher education institutions have improved their performance in key areas related to ‘internationalization’, which is often cited as one of the main weaknesses of Japan’s higher education system.<sup>91</sup> The improvement in international scores may reflect that the large-scale government funding schemes for internationalization have come to be effective, so that Japanese universities may literally increase the number of international students, foreign academic staffs, exchange programs and courses in foreign languages which are the key areas in internationalization scores in the university rankings. However, despite the exterior and numerical improvements, many other concerns remain and there are many unanswered questions about the internationalization of higher education.

In the same report by THE, several interviewees working at Japanese universities as educators and researchers criticized ongoing problems that must be changed in the internationalization of higher education in Japan, such as: the existing rigid recruitment

---

<sup>90</sup> Top Global University Japan, *MEXT*, Accessed June 18, 2020, <https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/index.html> .

<sup>91</sup> Ellie Bothwell, “Japanese universities ‘improving on internationalization,’” *Times Higher Education*, March 27, 2019, Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/japanese-universities-improving-internationalisation> .

system and process to hire foreign academics, unprepared administrative services for international faculty who do not speak the Japanese language, and less flexible teaching and learning systems. Interestingly, in the same THE report, as Yonezawa, director of the Office of Institutional Research at Tohoku University, argued, in contrast to other countries, there was no market-driven or commercial approach to internationalization in the case of Japan, and its universities were implementing their internationalization initiatives, mainly by caring about how to increase their international outlook, which is a result of the top-down pressure from the government, the importance of university rankings, or a way to attract domestic students demanding international experiences. Also, he added, “while this has its advantages, Japan will need to enter a market-based competition in order to recruit global talent for research and teaching and to continue to improve on internationalization”.

As I already argued in chapter 2, this point is also particularly important with regard to Japan’s immigration policies, in that Japan’s immigration policies towards highly skilled foreign professionals are not based on labor market tests or caps, or on the number of HSFP visas issued. In addition to what Yonezawa pointed out, this is also a clear example that Japan’s internationalization initiatives are mainly focused on enhancing ‘how it looks better’, not on ‘how it practically works’. More strikingly one of the interviewees in the same report noted that, while promoting the recruitment of international students, at the same time the Japanese government has continued to considerably cut the government scholarship budget for foreign students, from the budget available for one in 14 students in 2011, but as of 2019, only for just one in 315 students. This is also clear evidence that the Japanese government’s primary interest in increasing the number of international students on its universities has little do with an attempt to secure potentially skilled foreign talents via the education pathway. Rather its primary interest has to do with an attempt to make its universities’ global university

rankings place higher on the league tables.

As I have repeatedly argued about contradictory and puzzling situations generated by de-internationalization measures in the process of internationalization of higher education, the recent internationalization of Japanese higher education is essentially operating in the form of cosmetic internationalization, which is mainly functioning to revamp and construct the Japanese national image and identity - in other words, to exercise the nation branding. Before I move onto further discussion in the following chapter by examining *global jinzai* which is another important topic produced by cosmetic internationalization, the last section in this chapter will continue to argue about a more fundamental factor that influences the superficiality of Japan's internationalization initiatives on higher education, which is "Internationalization From Within" which will be a conclusive part of this chapter.

#### **4.4 Internationalization as the Solution to Japan's Image Problem, but "From Within"**

A noteworthy government report was released both in Japanese and English language in January 2000, entitled "*The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium*" which was published by the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century (hereafter PMC)<sup>92</sup> The original title in the Japanese language edition is *21 seiki nihon no koso: nihon no furontia wa nihon no naka ni*

---

<sup>92</sup> The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium, *Prime Minister's Commission (PMC) on Japan's Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, January 2000, Accessed April 20, 2020, <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/pdfs/index.html> [Accessed 3 April 2019]. ; Japanese edition is also available (21世紀日本の構想：日本のフロンティアは日本の中になる－自立と協治で築く新世紀－), Accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/houkokusyo/0s.pdf>.

*aru — jiritsu to kyojite kizuku shinseki* (Envisioning Japan in the twenty first century: frontier within Japan – a new century built by independence and governance), which is somewhat different from the title of the English edition.<sup>93</sup> The report is the final outcome from findings from a series of discussions over a period of ten months by thirty-three members from all areas of interests in the PMC, which was chaired by Kawai Hayao, a renowned Kyoto University professor in clinical psychology, whose works contributed to Japanese politics and education in many ways - he was also the council chair and advisor to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. Indeed, what the PMC report proposed relied tremendously on his thoughts and previous works on the conditions of Japanese culture and education in the face of globalization (Arai 2016).<sup>94</sup>

On the whole, the PMC report called for a new reinvention of Japan and Japaneseness in the face of globalization. Having acknowledged that Japan had been facing difficulties in the new era of globalization, the report emphasized that Japan could tackle difficulties by solutions, by creating a spirit of self-reliance ‘*within* Japan’ without seeking help from ‘*outside* Japan’. The spirit of self-reliance may refer to the efforts of people who can use their own willpower to help themselves, which is parallel to the concept of “The Frontier Within” (Hashimoto 2012, 177).

In the preface, the report began with a warning of challenges that lay ahead for Japan which was standing at a critical turning point in the nation’s history.

---

<sup>93</sup> As Hashimoto pointed out, “the English version is misleading because the report mainly emphasized on cooperation (described as “a new system of governance” in the report) between the nation and its people who have the latent strength of self-reliance in the new century, rather than the empowerment of individuals who are disadvantaged by or excluded from mainstream society”(Hashimoto 2012, 177)

<sup>94</sup> See The chapter 3 “Frontiers Within” in *The Strange Child : Education and the Psychology in Recessionary Japan* by Andrea Gevurtz Arai (2016). The chapter provide a comprehensive analysis on how Kawai’s thoughts and previous works on Japanese culture and education influenced on the report.

Everyone recognizes that Japan is at a major turning point—one might even say a critical point. Based on that awareness, the report sets forth the new ideals and organizational principles with which Japan should equip itself for the twenty-first century, the qualities it is hoped the Japanese people will possess fifteen or twenty years hence, and the way to get there. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan, while working assiduously to catch up with and overtake the West, managed to retain at least some of its quintessentially Japanese qualities. Thanks to its efforts, Japan today is the only developed country from a non-Western cultural sphere. This is an achievement we can justly be proud of. But when we contemplate the power of globalization, which will envelop the whole world in the next century, we realize that Japan cannot afford to rest on its laurels. (PMC 2000, Preface).

As the report wrote, since the Meiji era, Japan followed a policy of “catch up and overtake the West”, and despite the situation, it successfully managed to retain a certain degree of its genuine Japaneseness. However, as the entire world is in the throes of globalization, the way of “catch up and overtake the West” was no longer effective in the new era of globalization, and therefore, there was a recognition to find proper solutions to handle the difficulties. In this regard, the report emphasized that it is necessary for Japan not to wrap the closedness around themselves but to open and be expansive to the globalizing world. But this does not mean that Japan should give up its good qualities as the authentic Japaneseness, but rather stand still and even pontificate on Japan’s good qualities, at the same time the nation can face the future of the world and devout themselves to participate in it. As the report declared listed below, having this attitude, the Japanese people will realize the latent strengths within themselves, and ultimately see that Japan’s frontier lies within Japan, which means to see and design the nature of their own direction to move toward (Arai 2016, 76).

It is fine for the Japanese to be proud of their nation's good qualities, but that does not mean wrapping a mantle of exclusivity around themselves; this pride must be open and expansive, oriented toward universality. If so, rather than stand still and pontificate on Japan's good qualities, should we not face the future of the world and engage with it body and soul? By so doing, even if sometimes we wrestle with contradictions, surely the good qualities of the Japanese—including latent strengths we ourselves are yet unaware of will be honed into qualities possessing universality. If we live with such an attitude, we will come to see that Japan's frontier lies within. (PMC 2000, Preface).

My observation is that the concept of “The ‘Frontier Within’” may clearly reflect the current nature of internationalization of Japanese higher education, and it can be considered as the government's actual policy direction lying behind a slew of activities and environments for cosmetic internationalization in Japanese higher education. As I shall deal with this concept more comprehensively in chapter 5 with regard to various issues around global *jinzai* or global talent, the government's primary interests in internationalizing Japanese universities is particularly focused on an inward-oriented approach, not outward-oriented. In other words: what the government attempts to do in the process of internationalization of higher education is primarily to enhance ‘Internationalization from *Within* Japan’, rather than ‘Internationalization from *Outside* Japan”, and to foster the Japanese global talent ‘*Within* Japan’, rather than securing the foreign global talent from ‘*Outside* Japan’. As a reminder, this point is intrinsically intertwined with the nature of Japan's soft power policy as nation branding, and more specifically the Cool Japan project.

As I discussed earlier, the state-led Cool Japan project reflects that the Japanese government manages its national images as “defensive response against and an adaptation to globalization” (Mori 2011, 40 cited in Burgess 2015, 25). Burgess viewed the description on

the Cool Japan project, drawing upon Mori (2011) as follows:

This formulation captures the ambiguity inherent in the project: it is both as a *kokusaika* type Japanese-only nationalism that reinforces a “closed” and unique national identity *and* an embrace of globalization that recognizes the need for Japan to open up and rebrand Japanese values as universal values (Burgess 2015, 25 emphasis in original).

As seen, in between the “closing in” and “opening up” strand of internationalization, what the Japanese government really pursues seems to be returning to “a long old political tradition of...‘recurring renovationist nationalism’, which refers to a government-sponsored national project of state-nation construction and improvement” (McVeigh 2006, 11, cited in Dalit-Bul 2009, 260). Hence the ultimate goal of the *kokusaika* project aims at re-enhancing the national identity by means of a celebrated ethno-cultural essence (Dalit-Bul 2009, 260), at the same time through a universally-circulating tool on the globe which is the popular label of ‘internationalization’. In this sense, Japan’s recent re-internationalization project including various initiatives on its higher education can be seen as a familiar slogan in the late nineteenth century - which was the Japanese slogan of “Japanese Spirit and Western Knowledge”(Wakon Yosai). It is therefore quite ironic that the old slogan is still valid, and even lively and alive in disguise.

In the next chapter, issues about the global *jinzai* (global human resources or global talent in English) will be examined. Interestingly, what we have discussed in this chapter by arguing about the concepts – ‘The Frontier Within’, and ‘Internationalization Within Japan’ should be found in the Japanese government’s global *jinzai* discourses in a similar-contradictory form, along with the concept – “The Image of Desirable Japanese (*kitaisareru*

*ningenzo*)” - which appeared in the late 1960s during serious educational reform in the face of a new era of high economic growth. By examining the global *jinzai* issue, I will spell out the cosmetic and superficial nature of Japan’s internationalization and internationalization of higher education. Eventually it will reveal how negatively the superficiality of Japan’s internationalization projects, namely cosmetic internationalization affects international student migration to Japan, and detracts from many valuable opportunities that both Japanese society and universities can take and enjoy through the presence and settlement of international students.

## CHAPTER 5

### INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS AS IMAGINED GLOBAL *JINZAI* IN IMMIGRATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

#### 5.1 Introduction

So far, I continue to extend my arguments about international student migration to Japan from the possibility and feasibility of international student migration policies, as an alternative policy option to a mass migration program (in chapter 2) by questioning the role of immigration in international student migration and more specifically by reviewing how cosmetic multiculturalism and the absence of immigration affects the recruitment, retention and settlement of international students to and in Japan (in chapter 3). In the previous chapter (chapter 4), I attempt to demystify the nature and meanings of ‘internationalization’, and examine the superficiality of Japan’s internationalization project; more specifically under the Abe administration whereby Japan attempts to revamp Japan’s national identity as a more competitive national identity through ‘internationalization’ projects as a part of its nation-branding strategy. The Japanese government’s attempts to exercise nation branding as a soft power tool exists not only to capitalize on Japan’s popularity, and but also to ideologically control national images facing challenges from a rapidly globalizing world.

In this context, with a strong emphasis of discourses on enhancing national competitiveness through global or international education, internationalization of higher education is also significantly operating as part of the country’s nation branding strategy. In this situation, what we can find in the process of internationalization of Japanese higher education, is the government’s goals which aim to re-enhance national identity by

establishing globally competitive higher education institutions, thereby fostering global *jinzai* through the process - which refers to Japanese human resources who are globally complete and compatible, but with the enhanced Japanese national identity.

In addition to the absence of immigration – more specifically the role of immigration is missing in the recruitment, retention and settlement of international students; the substances of government’s internationalization projects as its nation-branding strategy, is also operating as a significant factor that continues to create the superficial nature of internationalization of higher education, whereby, international students not only become temporary sojourners and passing presences, but also the ‘imagined global *jinzai*’. This refers to international students who only exist in the global *jinzai* discourses, and not practically in Japan’s immigration and internationalization of higher education policies.

In this final chapter, by locating the Japanese global *jinzai* issue in the context of international student migration and global talent mobility, I will argue about the unique characteristics of Japan’s global talent cultivation project through internationalization of higher education. And by examining global *jinzai* discourses, which are found in government documents on promoting the fostering of global *jinzai* projects, I will continue to explore links between the global *jinzai* discourses and the resurgence of cultural nationalism and the emphasis of unique Japaneseness. In particular, by comparing the definitions of global *jinzai* and the Image of Desired Japanese (*Kitaisareru Ningenzo*) - which appeared in a policy document in the late 1960’s, and was postulated as an ideal image of Japanese for the new era of high economic growth; I will attempt to reveal reasons why the Japanese government and universities are only interested in fostering Japanese global *jinzai* through promoting International at Home (*Uchinaru kokuzaika*), rather than recruiting foreign global *jinzai*, and

how international students become the imagined global *jinzai* in the situation.

In the very last part of this chapter, some personal narratives of international students coming from Finland, Algeria, China and the U.S. will be illustrated. Through these we may begin to understand some aspects of how, and to what extent, the lived experiences of international students in Japanese universities are influenced by the cosmetic nature of immigration and internationalization of higher education. In particular, through the international students' narratives, by questioning the *zentei*, or premise that international students are always viewed as 'temporary beings' and by contemplating again the contradictory and superficial nature of internationalization in Japanese universities, we may understand more vividly how the presence of international students continues to remain problematic in the reality of international student migration to Japan.

## **5.2 International Student Migration and Global Talent Mobility**

Although the term, global *jinzai*, is commonly rendered and used in English as global human resource or global talent, and even often as global human capital (Breaden 2015), in the Japanese context, the definition is somewhat different from what these English terms usually refer to - as I will discuss more in the next section. As a term in English, global talent usually refers to highly skilled or knowledge workers who can bring human capital, creativity and innovation to societies. Given that those in the category of global talent are often characterized by their flexible international mobility related to employability, global talent often refers to highly skilled migrants or highly qualified migrants. Although the definition of the highly skilled workers is contested, and there is no consistent definition or measurement of who is the highly skilled, and who is not (Lowell and Batalova 2005). Nevertheless, as a

widely accepted definition, “highly skilled workers are normally defined as those having a university degree or extensive equivalent expertise in a given field” (Iredale 2001, 8).

According to a OECD report on international migration, the definition of highly skilled workers may include highly skilled specialists, independent executives and senior managers, specialized technicians or trades people, investors, business people, ‘key workers’, and subcontract workers (Iredale 2015, 1). More recently, HRST may also refer to highly skilled workers. HRST is the abbreviation for Human Resources in Science and Technology, which is often used to assess and measure the international mobility of highly skilled workers.

HRST is found in an internationally agreed conceptual framework which has been jointly developed by OECD and Eurostat to measure human resources devoted to science and technology, which is known as “the Canberra Manual”. In the Canberra Manual, HRST is defined as persons who fulfil one or the other of the following conditions.

- (1) They have successfully completed education at the tertiary level in an S & T (Science and Technology) field of study.
- (2) They are not formally qualified, as above, but employed in a S & T occupation where the above qualifications are normally required.

The “Canberra Manual” definition is based both on notions of educational qualification and occupation and therefore covers a very broad population with either tertiary-level education or an occupation in a field of Science and Technology (S&T). S & T is understood in a very broad sense covering all fields of education and occupation, including social sciences and humanities (OECD 2001,15).

As Van Mol points out (Van Mol 2017, 57), when considering definitions of highly skilled migration, international students often do fit the definition. International students attending any degree courses – whether it is undergraduate or postgraduate level, do not hold their degree yet, which consequently comes into conflict with the definition of highly skilled workers. In addition, with regard to the dimension of employment in S & T occupation, their status is not exactly covered by the definition. Nevertheless, as Raghuram (2013) argues, “the boundaries between international students and highly skilled migrants are increasingly blurring, due to often overlapping and shifting migrant categories through which individuals move” (Van Mol 2017, 57). Indeed, given that international students have multiple identities including present and potential workers – possibly skilled and highly skilled workers in the future, it is not easy to clarify who is in which category of migrant. In this regard, it may be said that the relation between international student mobility and skilled and highly skilled migration is closely linked together.

International student mobility and highly skilled migration - the most notable and observable phenomenon in various flows of international migrants are resulted by contemporary economic globalization. International student mobility is usually encouraged by internationalization of higher education sector, and increasingly linked to the global competition for highly skilled professionals. For example, as Yu has observed (Yu 2017, 93), in the past two decades, studying abroad for an academic degree has become one of the most popular pathways for particularly young students in developing countries to accumulate human capital for better employment opportunities in the global job market. In this situation, more international students tend to stay in the host countries and participate in domestic labor market after graduation. Hence, for the host countries, international students, particularly post-graduate level are considered important human capital sources (Yu 2017, 93) as skilled

or highly skilled workers.

Drawing upon a comparative analysis of international student mobility as part of highly skilled migration in the three countries - Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. - of popular English speaking countries for international students from all over the world (She and Wotherspoon 2013), the study identifies that each country has their own distinct national strategies for managing international student mobility to utilize them as a pool of skilled (immigrant) workers. For example, Canada is a popular example for government as the primary gatekeeper to attract skilled migrants. Following Canada's example, many countries built a points-based systems that score potential immigrants on dimensions like education and language proficiency. Canada proactively views international student mobility as part of highly skilled migration. Particularly since the mid-2000s, the government has launched a series of policy strategies to speed up the processing of study permit applications and enhance access for international students to the domestic labor market during and after their study (e.g. the Off-Campus Work Permit Program, the extension of the period of Post-Graduation Work Permit).

In the case of the U.K, although more recently Brexit would bring about more significant changes in national policies toward international students – possibly toward a more restrictive manner in the future, as a member of the European Union, the U.K. has continuously been involved in flexible labor mobility and skill development programs for students. A new points-based system launched in 2008 apparently eased the requirements of eligible international students, particularly in the science and engineering fields, to stay and work in the UK after graduation. Another case is the U.S. Due to its globally recognized academic reputation, and extraordinary education and research environments, the U.S. has

traditionally been the most attractive destination for international students in the world, especially for those in more advanced, post-graduate level of research and study programs. It is also observable that after a certain period of time after September 11, and again under the Trump administration, various measures have seriously brought down the inflows of international students with enhanced scrutiny related to visa applications. And more recently, the Trump administration has been tightening regulations for the H-1B visa, which is considered for international students a work visa *en route* to a green card after their graduation. Nevertheless, it is no doubt that some occupations for international students, especially foreign students in STEAM fields, is constantly in great demand, and therefore highly transferable.

In Asia, Singapore and South Korea are also implementing policy initiatives to retain international students as skilled migrants particularly by easing visa extension for foreign students during the job-seeking period after graduation. In the case of Singapore, there are a variety of post-study visa options available to international students who wish to remain and work in Singapore after their studies such as Long-Term Visit Pass( LTVP), Employment Pass, S Pass, EntrePass.<sup>95</sup> In South Korea, facing the continuous underperformance of government's efforts to recruit international students, starting from June 2016, a new category of student visa, called D-2-7 Visa was introduced to give privileges to international students who meet certain eligibility requirements, which include the extension of period of stay after graduation and employment opportunities.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> 4 Types of Post Study Work Visa in Singapore, University in Singapore (UiS), Accessed June 10, 2020, <https://universityinsingapore.com/4-types-of-post-study-work-visa-in-singapore/> .

<sup>96</sup> Initially the D-2-7 visa application was only available to the South Korean government-invited students, but it has been extended to international students who receive full scholarship or pursue their degree in engineering with a recommendation from their university presidents.

As such many popular migrant-receiving countries offer various types of visa extensions for international students who want to stay and work after their studies. This is also a good example where governments consider international students as potential skilled and highly skilled workers; and therefore they attempt to retain international student graduates to stay by encouraging them to join their job markets. In the case of Japan, as we have already examined, the education pathway has continuously underperformed, though it is likely that the government, universities and companies might be changing their existing perceptions toward the retention and settlement of international students more in the context of immigration. Nevertheless, as I will continue to argue throughout the following sections, regarding the fostering of global talent, at present what the Japanese government and universities primarily focus on is not the recruitment of foreign global talent but the cultivation of the “Japanese” global talent or global *jinzai*.

### **5.3 Japan’s Running the Global Race for Talent**

In recent years in Japan, the term, “*gurobaru jinzai*” or “global *jinzai*”, has been appearing very frequently in the discourses of human resource development, immigration policymaking, and internationalization of higher education. The term is “a term of convenience, not definitive” (Breaden 2015, 94), which is commonly rendered and used in English as global human resource or global talent, and even often as global human capital. As mentioned earlier, as a term in English, global talent usually refers to highly skilled or knowledge workers who can bring human capital, creativity and innovation to societies. Given that those in the category of global talent are often characterized by their flexible international mobility related to employability, global talent often refers to highly skilled migrants or highly qualified migrants. In the Japanese context, however, it seems the

definition is somewhat differently interpreted and understood.

One of the most representative and comprehensive definitions to date is found in what the national government defines; most notably one that is provided by the Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development, which was established under the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in 2011. According to an interim report by the Council, the concept of global *jinzai* is defined as the Japanese human resources who possesses ‘talent’ in three categories -Factor I, Factor II, and Factor III (Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development, 2011).

Factor I Linguistic and communication skills.

Factor II: Self-direction and positiveness, a spirit for challenge, cooperativeness and flexibility, a sense of responsibility and mission.

Factor III: Understanding of other cultures and a sense of identity as a Japanese.

As I shall discuss in more detail later (particularly arguing about factor III), the concept of global talent in the Japanese context clearly indicates an ideal model of ‘Japanese’ human resources, or an ideal image of the desired ‘Japanese’ workers who can fit the globalizing world that is becoming more rapidly connected, cooperative and competitive. In this regard, the definition of global talent is something that is different from how global talent is usually, and often defined in other migrant-receiving countries.

Regarding the debates over the term, “global *jinzai*” in Japan, enterprises started to initiate the debates over global *jinzai*, then government, and universities joined in the debates. Regardless of what perspective they take toward global *jinzai*, there is one thing they all have

in common, which is by saying: “we are on the global war for talent” and “we need to win the war for talent.” By and large, the so-called ‘global war for talent’, and ‘the global competition for talent’ has been a salient and common policy issue in most advanced economies on the globe, particularly since the late 1990s; though the war for talent began in 1980s (Kerr et al 2016).

In a comprehensive cross-country analysis of the global talent war by the OECD (2008), entitled “The Global Competition for Talent”, it was emphasized that the role of human resources in the era of a knowledge-based society as:

Human resources play a central role in knowledge production and thus in technological and economic development. A knowledge-based society relies on a highly qualified labor force, not only for high-technology sectors and research, but increasingly in all sectors of the economy and society. The growing intensity of knowledge means that all countries have a greater need for highly skilled specialists who are able to access, understand and use knowledge (OECD 2008,18).

Kerr et al.(2016) has also highlighted the significant role of highly skilled workers in today’s knowledge economy.

Highly skilled workers play a central and starring role in today’s knowledge economy. Talented individuals make exceptional direct contributions— including breakthrough innovations and scientific discoveries—and coordinate and guide the actions of many others, propelling the knowledge frontier and spurring economic growth (Kerr et al. 2016, 83).

Indeed, it is widely argued that global economic competitiveness rests on the knowledge and skills of the workforces. No one can deny today that a country's competitiveness and the prosperity of its people in a rapidly transforming economy depends increasingly on high-skilled, high-wage jobs (Brown 2001, 1). In this situation, much attention has been paid to understanding global distribution of talent, particularly the development of international mobility of talent, which is triggered and encouraged by a complex set of drivers including multinational firms, other types of employers pursuing great talent, governments, other gatekeepers evolving in managing the global talent flows with policies, and most importantly individuals seeking their best opportunities for themselves (or families or even broader community) (Kerr et al. 2018, 83; Kerr 2019, 30).

Although how governments manage the migration flow of talent through their migration policies, and the success or failure of governments' policies vary enormously among countries, there is one clear fact that all of the rich countries welcome the global talent, so-called, high-skilled immigration (Alba and Foner 2015, 31). As already examined throughout previous chapters, Japan is no exception. Acknowledging that talent and education are the major drivers of long-term economic growth for any country, the Japanese government also attempts to develop policies towards global talent. There are mainly two routes for Japan to attend the global competition for talent race. The first way for Japan to attend the global competition for talent race is to recruit 'foreign' global talent through immigration, more specifically through highly skilled migration. The second way is to foster 'Japanese' global *jinzai* through tertiary education – more specifically through 'Internationalization at Home' (*uchinaru kokusaika*).

### 5.3.1 Recruiting Global Talent through Labor Migration

First of all, for Japan to attend the global competition for talent race is to recruit global talent through immigration, more specifically through highly skilled migration. Regarding highly skilled migration and policies, although I have already examined in previous chapters, it is helpful to briefly remind ourselves of the topic before I move onto the further discussion about what it means to be ‘Japanese global *jinzai*’ in the following sections. When it is the case in the context of labor migration, the goal is directed at importing and recruiting so-called, global talent or the skills– skilled and highly skilled foreign professionals - outside Japan through liberalization of its immigration policies. There are mainly four migration pathways to attract talents from outside Japan: permanent skilled migration, temporary labor migration, bilateral or multilateral agreements, and the study-migration pathway (Hawthorne 2018, 196; See Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1 Key Skilled Migration Pathways**

<b>Permanent Skilled Migration</b>	Migrants are selected by defined criteria on a sponsored or on an independent basis
<b>Temporary Labor Migration</b>	Migrants are admitted by employers or states to fill specific positions, addressing labor market needs in under-supplied sectors or sites.
<b>Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements</b>	Migrants secure entry and employment rights in host countries through treaties negotiated on a generic basis, then applied to all or specific occupational fields.
<b>The Study-Migration Pathway</b>	International students are first admitted to study, then category switch to remain their host country.

Source: Adapted from Hawthorne (2018)

It is apparently observed that a growing number of OECD governments have developed migration schemes designed to attract and retain skilled workers. Governments have

facilitated transition of residential status of foreign workers from temporary to more longer or permanent status, and have relaxed entry requirements, and have offered incentives to retain skilled workers (Hawthorne 2018, 196). It should be noted that, in many cases, skilled foreign immigrants tend to arrive at a host country as a temporary migrant or an international student, and extend their stay. Indeed, the study-migration pathway or the education pathway is the most common route for many economically advanced countries and individuals in the process of talent migration. Migration initially happens for education, often called the “education pathway”. Many leave their country of origin for education abroad, particularly in developed countries, in pursuit of lifelong advantages provided by excellent academic training, degrees from globally recognized schools, better access to labor markets in advanced economies (Kerr 2019, 30). Host countries accept these migrants who are in pursuit for opportunities, in many cases international students as potentially skilled and highly skilled migrants.

As the previous chapters, particularly chapter 3 has argued about why immigration matters in the international student recruitment policies, rigorously speaking Japanese government and universities’ major interest in recruiting international students is in no way related to importing global talent. If there is a way through which highly skilled migration workers can come to Japan to live and work, the points-based system, HSP or HSFP is literally the only way. In this respect, international students are usually underrated in skilled and highly skilled migration flows, but rather they are only viewed temporary sojourners, passing presences, and translational bridge-builders. Hence, at least, the study-migration pathway does not substantively exist in Japan’s race in the global competition for talent, and even it does not practically pertain to a typical way to attract global talent through highly skilled migration policies that are commonly found in other advanced economies.

### 5.3.2 Fostering the Global *Jinzai* through *Uchinaru Kokuzaika*

The second way is the fostering of Japanese global *jinzai* through tertiary education (Chapple 2013; Yonezawa 2014, 37). When it comes to fostering global *jinzai* in the context of higher education, the goal should have a focus on fostering or creating globally-competent human resources ‘within’ Japan through internationalization of its higher education, more specifically via “Internationalization at Home”, which is commonly translated into *Uchinaru Kokuzaika* in Japanese language, frequently used by Japanese researchers, policy makers and administrators.

As a frequently cited and widely accepted definition of internationalization in the context of internationalization of higher education, this thesis takes the definition by Knight (2004) in which ‘internationalization’ is defined as “the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education (Knight 2004, 11). In this regard the range of internationalization as a process may sufficiently encompass all activities that are conducted by contemporary universities. Under the definition, Knight (2004) distinguishes between “Internationalization Abroad” and “Internationalization at Home”. The former concerns policies and activities that occurs overseas or across borders, rather than in the home university (Knight 2004, 16), and the latter is defined as policies and activities that happen on the home campuses, which includes internationalizing curricular in order to attract inward student mobility (Knight 2004, 16-17).

“Internationalization at Home (hereafter IaH)” was first introduced and appeared as a concept in 1999 in Forum, a member magazine for EAIE (European Association of

International Education), and further endorsed by scholars who belonged to EAIE (Crowther et al. 2001). Originally the concept is a short and narrow definition of ‘internationalization’ in higher education, which refers to any internationally related activity with the exception of outbound student and staff mobility.’ (Crowther et al. 2001, 8). In the Japanese context, the MEXT has continued to put a major priority on IaH in the higher education reform. In particular, as a parallel project of the Global 30 project, in 2013 the government introduced a complementary-follow-up project, named, ‘the Project for the Promotion of Global Human Resource Development’, commonly dubbed as ‘Global 30 Plus’ or “Global *jinzai* program.

According to MEXT, the global *jinzai* project is described as follows:

The Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development is a funding project that aims to overcome the Japanese younger generation's "inward tendency" and to foster human resources who can positively meet the challenges and succeed in the global field, as the basis for improving Japan's global competitiveness and enhancing the ties between nations. Efforts to promote the internalization of university education in Japan will be given strong, priority support.<sup>97</sup>

Under the project, 42 projects by 42 universities were selected, among 152 applications from 129 universities for the grant, to develop various programs that aim at fostering global human resources. These programs included the improvement of language classes, the support to help domestic students study abroad, and the investments in e-learning and EMI (English-Medium Instruction) courses (Brown, 2014, 52).

---

<sup>97</sup> Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development, *MEXT*, Accessed June 10, 2020, <https://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/1373895.htm> .

It is important to mention that IaH is also considered an alternative way for domestic students to, without education-abroad, effectively develop the intercultural competence which is one of the most important components of employability in the era of globalization (Suematsu 2017, 2018). As Suematsu pointed out (2018), education-abroad will probably be considered the most effective way to cultivate students' intercultural competence. However, drawing upon her analysis with specific data, she revealed that only a few percent of students on average in Japanese universities take a chance to study overseas due to some reasons such as financial burden, insufficient language proficiency, fear of delaying graduation schedule and so on. In this situation, IaH is the very alternative to offer domestic students a proper 'internationalized' environment at home to develop their intercultural competence, and international mindsets, and intercultural collaborative skills by which they can effectively work with people from different background in the world that is becoming more globalized and diversified.

It should be noted that for Japanese universities IaH also plays a significant role in recruiting domestic students. As I have already noted in earlier chapters, it is increasingly more observable that Japanese universities are competitively using 'internationalization' as an advertisement to attract domestic students mainly to address their financial difficulties and not as a strategy for actual reform of institutional systems of education, research, and governance that would enhance their international competitiveness. In this situation, it is no doubt that IaH is also considered one of the most significant marketing strategies for Japanese universities to recruit domestic students to their institution, with promises that their institution will provide students an internationalized or globalized campus environment in both personal and academic life, and offer a chance for students to experience foreign exchange programs, so that domestic students may have an opportunity to develop their

intercultural competences and foreign language skills (See Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1 Internationalization at Home and Abroad  
in Internationalization of Japanese Universities.**



Note: Advertisements on commuter trains in Kyoto city to attract domestic students by illustrating how globalized their campus, curricula and exchange programs. On the left image, it is presenting that students can develop their “global competency” through studies in the department of international language and culture in the private university. The right image is presenting an opportunity for “international experience” that the department of international studies at the university can offer by showing a hilarious social media style image of a male student enjoying his exchange student program abroad through the university (Photo by the present author, January 2019 (Left), and Jan 2018 (Right)).

As we have discussed so far, considering how IaH operates and functions, it is certain that IaH is considered a cardinal concept that supports all internationalization strategies for fostering of Japanese global *jinzai*. Hence, concerning the global *jinzai* in the context of tertiary education, the main interest of Japanese government and universities in the global

competition race for talent should be primarily in cultivating Japanese global talent through the development and improvement of ‘Internationalization at Home’ strategies rather than importing and recruiting foreign global talent. With this point in the current situation of fostering global *jinzai* in Japanese universities through IaH, the next section will continue to examine in more detail how IaH as a national policy strategy for domestic students has been developed and implemented.

## 5.4 Internationalization at Home : A National Policy Strategy to Fostering Global *Jinzai* through Internationalizing Campus

### 5.4.1 Cultivating Global Human Resources in IHE

Figure 5.2 Fostering Global Talent in Japanese Universities



Note: A large advertisement in Ikebukuro station, Tokyo, promoting a private university, accompanied by the words “Fostering Global Talent” in Japanese language (Photo by the present author, July 2018).

Under the force of globalization, which denotes the worldwide integration of business systems and technological arrangements, eroding traditional boundaries of geography and

culture (Held et al. 1999, 16), Japanese enterprises face a number of challenges which can be largely categorized as two aspects – hard and soft. In the hard aspect, the main challenge is on how Japanese firms continuously innovate technological development to sustain the market competitiveness of Japanese products, most notably amid the rise of neighboring economies in East Asia, and regarding the soft aspect, the most crucial of which is how to equip its workforce for global business engagement (Breaden 2015, 93). At the same time, experiencing a serious demographic transformation – its rapidly aging population and among the world’s lowest birth rate, Japanese firms feel more and more the necessity of expanding their business further to the regional and global market beyond the domestic market. In this context, the debates over fostering globally competitive human resources, so-called, Global *jinzai*, through the national education and training system have become lively in Japan (Yonezawa 2014, 37).

As I have noted briefly earlier, the global *jinzai*-fostering project has been implemented mainly through internationalization of higher education, more specifically ‘Internationalization at Home (*Uchinaru Kokusaika* )’. Requests from Japanese business industries to cultivate human resources in universities began in the 1990s, and this discourse became an issue of ‘Global Human Resources’ by the 2000s. Since the Japanese Business Federation (*Keidanren*) and Japan Association of Corporate Executives (*Doyukai*) – the two representative economic organizations initially triggered a series of discussion about the cultivation of global human resources, the main scope of the discussions has switched from “the logic of corporation” to “the logic of society” (Aya 2017, 87). Initially Japanese business industries discussed about human resources necessary for their business management, and later the discussions have been developed to that the fostering of the global human resources is universities’ issues (Aya 2017, 97). Later on the fostering of global *jinzai* eventually

became considered an important issue of the country, As *Doyukai* emphasized on the role of universities in cultivating the global *jinzai*, as in the following quote:

Now that we have achieved national goals such as economic recovery and growth and caught up to Western countries, it is time to find solutions through talking the challenges of globalization in the 21st century and the construct a vigorous society (*Doyukai*, 2007 cited in Aya 2017, 88)

In 2007 global human resource development appeared officially as a national project by establishing the Industry-Academia Partnership for Human Resource Development led by METI in cooperation with MEXT.<sup>98</sup> In 2009, the committee published its first comprehensive report on the fostering of global *jinzai* entitled “*Kongo no torikumi no hokosei ni tsuite* (Directions for Future Efforts)”<sup>99</sup> in which it mainly pointed out two problems in the Japan’s global human resource development – first, English proficiency level is low among Japanese, and second, the report tackled the Japanese younger generation’s “inward-looking tendency”, more specifically young Japanese are not going abroad when they are in twenties. To solve these problems, the report suggested that industry and academia should need to cooperate together to develop appropriate human resource development programs, so that global human resources that meet the needs of society may be cultivated.

Based on the proposals by the Industry-Academia cooperation committee, a new committee was established in the same year, 2009, called, Global Human Resource Development Committee. In April 2010, the new committee also published an important

---

<sup>98</sup> 産学人材育成パートナーシップ全体会議 in Japanese language.

<sup>99</sup> 「今後の取組の方向性について」, 産学人材育成パートナーシップ全体会議、August 25 2009, Accessed June 20, 2020, <https://www.ipa.go.jp/files/000023948.pdf> .

report entitled “*Sangaku-kan de gurobaru jinzai no Ikusei wo* (Global Human Resource Development through Industry-Academia-Government)” in which the government attempted to officially define ‘what is global human resource’ for the very first time.<sup>100</sup>

According to the report, ‘global *jinzai*’ is defined as follows:

Global *jinzai* have skills in common (1) having basic skills for working member of society, 2) having communication skills in foreign languages, and 3) having intercultural understanding, ability to utilize it. In a progressively globalizing world, global *jinzai* can think independently, and can comprehensively communicate with colleagues, business partners and customers coming from diversified backgrounds. Furthermore, they can understand other people’s standpoint by comprehending different characteristics and values deriving from cultural and historical backgrounds. Moreover, they can develop new values from understanding these differences. In this context, these three skills are the common skills that global *jinzai* are expected to possess.

「グローバル人材」は共通して、1「社会人基礎力」、2 外国語でのコミュニケーション能力、3「異文化理解・活用力」をもっているため、「グローバル化 が進展している世界の中で、主体的に物事を考え、多様なバックグラウンドをもつ同僚、取引先、顧客等に自分の考えを分かりやすく伝え、文化的・歴史的 なバックグラウンドに由来する価値観や特性の差異を乗り越えて、相手の立場 に立ってお互いを理解し、更にはそうした差異からそれぞれの強みを引き出して活用し、相乗効果を生み出して、新しい価値を生み出すことができる」と考えられる。すなわち、これらの3つの能力

---

<sup>100</sup> 産学官でグローバル人材の育成を～、産学人材育成パートナーシップグローバル人材育成委員会, April 2010, Accessed June 20, 2020, <https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8422823/www.meti.go.jp/press/20100423007/20100423007-3.pdf> .

は、「グローバル人材」に共通して求められる能力である。

(Global Human Resource Development Committee 2010, 33, translated by the present author).

The report continued to emphasize the role of universities to cultivate the global *jinzai* in accordance with the definition presented on the report. In this regard, the significance of internationalizing universities as the place to foster globally-oriented human resources who can contribute to the Japanese society and the nation on the whole in an advancing globalized world.

Soon after the report released, the education ministry, MEXT officially began to be more involved in the global *jinzai* development by establishing the Committee of Promotion of Developing Global Human Resource by the Industry-Academic Cooperation in December 2010.<sup>101</sup> Just as a typical pattern that a committee publishes a comprehensive report after it is established, so the new MEXT led-committee also published a similar report that was made by the former Global Human Resource Development Committee, entitled “*Sangaku-kan ni yoru gurobaru jinzai no ikusei no tame no senryaku* (The Strategy for Developing Global Human Resources by the Industry-Academia-Government Cooperation)” in April 2011.<sup>102</sup> The report particularly emphasized a necessity to improve a system of supporting Japanese students who are increasingly more inward-oriented to study overseas.

---

<sup>101</sup> 産学連携によるグローバル人材育成推進会議 in Japanese language.

<sup>102</sup> 産学官によるグローバル人材の育成のための戦略, 産学連携によるグローバル人材育成推進会議, April 28, 2011, Accessed June 20, 2020, [https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a\\_menu/education/detail/\\_icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/06/01/1301460\\_1.pdf](https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/education/detail/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/06/01/1301460_1.pdf) .

As a result, in 2011, a MEXT-led subsidy program named “Re-Inventing Japan” project was launched, which aimed to foster global human resources capable of being active internationally and strengthen the ability to expand university education worldwide through promoting inter-university exchanges more strategically. In the meantime, after a huge budget cut for Global 30 project under the new Democratic Party administration, the Office of Prime Minister directly attempted an organizational restructuring by setting up a new committee for promoting the global *jinzai* development, named ‘The Council on the Realization of the New Growth Strategy in September 2010,<sup>103</sup> and established ‘The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development ’within it.<sup>104</sup> This is an particularly interesting move led by the government in that the emphasis of the ‘nation’ (or the Japaneseness) began to be included in the substances of becoming global *jinzai* for the growth of the nation.

It should be noted that, as presented earlier, the concept of Global *jinzai* is redefined in a similar way but in slightly different terms by the Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development which was established under the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in 2011. According to ‘The Interim Report of The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development’ published by the Council, the concept of Global *jinzai* is defined as the Japanese human resources who possesses ‘talent’ in three categories - Factor I, Factor II, and Factor III.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> 新成長戦略実現会議 in Japanese language.

<sup>104</sup> グローバル人材育成推進会議 in Japanese language.

<sup>105</sup> The interim report is published both in English and Japanese language. (1) In English: An Interim Report of The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development, June 22, 2011, Accessed June 20, 2020, [https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/global/1206011interim\\_report.pdf](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/global/1206011interim_report.pdf) . ; (2) In Japanese: グローバル人材育成推進会議 中間まとめ, [https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/global/110622chukan\\_matome.pdf](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/global/110622chukan_matome.pdf) .

Factor I Linguistic and communication skills.

Factor II: Self-direction and positiveness, a spirit for challenge, cooperativeness and flexibility, a sense of responsibility and mission.

Factor III: Understanding of other cultures and a sense of identity as a Japanese.

As I will continue to argue in the next section, interestingly the new definition of global *jinzai* is very similar to “The Image of the Desired Japanese (*Kitaisareru Ningenzo*)” that appeared in the late 1960s as an important discourse for the educational reform during the period when Japan became indisputably an economic superpower in the world, recovering from the war-torn modern history, attempting to revamp its damaged image as an imperialist predator. Hence, in the context of reviving The Image of the Desired Japanese, it is crucial to look at the Factor III to redefine what is global *jinzai*. Maintaining a sense of Japanese identity, in other words, the sense of Japaneseness is essential to become the image of desired global human resources. This means that how to foster the global *jinzai* is equivalent to how to foster the Japanese talent with a sense of Japanese identity, particularly through university education in internationalization of higher education.

#### **5.4.2 The Birth of Imagined Global *Jinzai* : Is Global *Jinzai* a Replica of the Image of Desired Japanese (*Kitaisareru Ningenzo*)?**

Japan entered new forms of educational planning in the 1960s which was implemented as crucial part of its national policies designed to promote high economic growth and manpower development, particularly with regard to educational reform on the upper secondary school systems. The ideology of *noryokushugi* (‘ability first’ or ‘academic

competency’) was injected by the government as an important imperative to reorganize Japanese society, at the same time when discussing about the principle of school diversification, and diversification of the curricula of the upper secondary school to meet the demands from the changing society and individuals. Meanwhile “public education was transformed into a system for competition and social selection” (Horio 1998, 152). In this situation, “postwar educational objectives were substantively transformed into a new dimension that makes education serve to the wishes of governmental and industrial powers”. (Horio 1998, 152). Amid this transformation, an official “Image of the Desired Japanese (*Kitaisareru Ningenzo*) was postulated as an ideal image of Japanese for a new era of high economic growth.

Just following the success of 1964 Tokyo Olympics, in 1966 the Japanese government published a policy document titled “*Kitaisareru Ningenzo* (The Image of the Desired Japanese)” by the Central Council of Education (Hereafter CCE), though it has been already prepared a few years before it officially published (Chukyoshin1966). The Image of the Desired Japanese began to critically discuss about the dehumanization and mechanization of individuals produced by the post-war economic prosperity in Japan as a result of the development of science and technology. Considering the situation, only material wealth cannot actualize the ideals of a welfare state, and instead high moral standard is required, which is created by the improvement of human quality (Okada 2012, 99). In this context, it was questioned and recommended by asking ‘what are the qualities of the desired Japanese?’, ‘what abilities do Japanese people need to be the desired Japanese in the face of the startling economic development of the period and constant change in the patterns of society?’ In brief, the very foundational theme and sentiment in the Image of Desired Japanese upholding the image of the desired Japanese were “a return to the prewar era and a

nostalgia piece” (Smith 1998, 93), in other words, a return to “the imperial system and the educational apparatus legitimated by the Imperial Rescript on Education” (Horio 1998, 158) including love and respect the emperor, devote for work, the state, and the household by emphasizing in the document that:

Individual happiness and security greatly depend on the state. The way to contribute humanity is usually opened through the state. To love the state truly is loyalty to the state (cited in Smith 1998, 93)

In this regard, Okada criticized the Image of Desired Japanese as follows:

The conservative wanted a stable pattern of cognitive and motivational orientations to be internalized in the nation’s youth. The recommendation talked of necessary personal qualities and abilities, each individual’s sense of membership within the family, and within society at large, possessions of the proper form of patriotism, respect and love for the Emperor as the symbol of Japan and the promotion of excellent national characteristics. Thus, the significance of the CCE’s recommendation on the “Ideal Japanese” lies in its implication that the conservatives should attempt to strengthen national integration and promote effective economic expansion and competition through traditional institutions and ideology (Okada 2012, 99).

Then, to what extent is the image of desired Japanese is related or linked to the current ideal image of Global *jinzai* ? The Image of Desired Japanese emphasized that the desired Japanese must become more aware of ‘international responsibilities’ as ‘the world persons’ or ‘the world citizens’, at the same time maintaining his or her Japaneseness, as cited in the document as follows:

Japanese must become citizens who are in tune with the world. But this does not mean that you are a world citizen who has forgotten Japaneseness. It is important to become a world citizen who is aware of Japan's obligations (*to the world*). ***Becoming a truly good Japanese, we can be the truly world citizen*** for the first time (translated and emphasis added by the present author).

日本人は世界に通用する日本人となるべきである。しかしそのことは、日本を離れた世界人であることを意味するのではない。日本の使命を自覚した世界人であることがたいせつなのである。真によき日本人であることによって、われわれは、はじめて真の世界人となることができる。<sup>106</sup>

Most strikingly this paragraph is essentially similar to the newly defined global *jinzai* in the report, “The Strategy for Developing Global Human Resources by the Industry-Academia-Government Cooperation” which was published by The Committee of Promotion of Developing Global Human Resources by the Industry-Academia Cooperation in 2011 as follows:

Global *jinzai* are people who, in contemporary society where global competition and cooperation coexist, can - ***while maintaining their sense of Japanese identity*** - possess a broad worldview based on both general and professional knowledge, have communication skills and cooperative abilities to build relationships which go beyond different languages, cultures, and values, and that have the ability to create new values and the desire to contribute to society at the present time and in future generations. We need more education that can foster this kind of talent (translated and emphasis added by

---

<sup>106</sup> 「別記」 期待される人間像、後期中等教育の拡充整備について（第20回答申）, 中央教育審議会, *The Image of the Desired Japanese (Kitaisaseru Ningen zo)*, The Central Council of Education, October 31, 1966, Accessed April 20, 2020, [https://www.mext.go.jp/b\\_menu/shingi/chuuou/toushin/661001.htm](https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chuuou/toushin/661001.htm) .

the present author).

グローバル人材とは、世界的な競争と共生が進む現代社会において、日本人としてのアイデンティティを持ちながら、広い視野に立って培われる教養と専門性、異なる言語、文化、価値を乗り越えて関係を構築するためのコミュニケーション能力と協調性、新しい価値を創造する能力、次世代までも視野に入れた社会貢献の意識などを持った人間であり、このような人材を育てるための教育が一層必要となっている。<sup>107</sup>

As such, the ideal image of Japanese global *jinzai* is essentially identical to the Image of Desired Japanese. Just as the Image of Desired Japanese emphasized the concurrent qualities of the desired Japanese – firstly, by becoming aware of international responsibilities as a world citizen and secondly, by maintaining one’s Japaneseness as a Japanese person. So the ideal image of *global jinzai* emphasizes similarly both qualities that the ideal model of global *jinzai* possesses – firstly, becoming internationally compatible and competitive and secondly, understanding and maintaining the sense of Japanese identity at the same time. Hence, in essence the discourse of Japanese global *jinzai* can be seen as a replica of the Ideal Image of Japanese, which was apparently summoned to create an ideal model of global *jinzai*. As a result, in this context the creation of the ideal model of global *jinzai* which only refers to ‘Japanese’ talent, not ‘foreign’ talent, began to invent the birth of imagined global *jinzai* which refers to ‘foreign talent’, more specifically international students, who only exists cosmetically in the global *jinzai* discourses, not practically existing in actual policies of immigration and internationalization of higher education.

As I have examined and discussed so far throughout the previous chapter 4, Japan’s

---

<sup>107</sup> See 産学官によるグローバル人材の育成のための戦略, p.3, Accessed June 20, 2020, [https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a\\_menu/education/detail/\\_icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/06/01/1301460\\_1.pdf](https://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/education/detail/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/06/01/1301460_1.pdf) .

current internationalization or re-international projects are essentially related to ‘nation-branding’ as its operating principle. In this respect internationalization of Japanese universities may be understood and reviewed in the same context because it is also essentially part of Japanese government’ nation branding strategy in response to its image problems. Given that higher education has always been viewed as soft power and a tool of public diplomacy, the major role of higher education as soft power has been more intensively incorporated into the state’s nation branding strategy under the label ‘*Kokusaika*’.

To remind again, Japanese government, more specifically under the Abe government, adopts ‘internationalization’ as the solution to Japan’s image problem. But in this context, internationalization process is not outward-oriented but rather it is inward-oriented, and hence its internationalization project is operating as “Internationalization from Within Japan” as I name and call. Standing its position very ambiguously in between ‘closing in’ and ‘opening up’ strand of internationalization, and remaining a defensive response against and an adaptation to globalization, the ultimate goal of Japan’s *kokusaika* project substantively aims at re-enhancing national identity by means of a celebrated ethno-cultural essence, at the same time through a universally-circulating tool on the globe which is the popular label of ‘internationalization’. In this situation, the ‘cosmetic internationalization’ may also influence a substance of internationalization of Japanese higher education, and the attempts to symbolically and cosmetically internationalize its universities can be considered the government’s actual policy direction lying behind a slew of environments for internationalization initiatives in Japanese higher education.

Considering the role of cosmetic internationalization in internationalization of Japanese higher education, what the government attempts to cultivate global *jinzai* through

internationalization of higher education is primarily aimed at fostering the Japanese global talent from ‘within Japan’, rather than securing or recruiting the foreign global talent from ‘outside Japan’ in the same way that the government attempts to enhance ‘internationalization from within Japan’, rather than ‘internationalization from outside Japan’. In this context, the presence of Japanese global *jinzai* creates the presence of ‘imagined global *jinzai*’ that refers to international students who only exists cosmetically in the global *jinzai* discourses, not practically existing in Japan’s immigration and internationalization of higher education policies. This is mainly because the global *jinzai* that the Japanese government and companies desire to have is only ‘the globally competitive *Japanese* talent’ who are acting in internationally compatible ways but thinking in Japanese ways as Japanese as I have attempted to reveal by comparing ‘the Ideal Image of Desired Japanese’ and the definition of global *jinzai*. In this category, international student recruitment is functioning only as “importing diversity” (McConnell 2000) in order to create an ideal condition of ‘International at Home’ for fostering the Japanese global *jinzai*. This context should be the reason why there is the absence of immigration in international student recruitment policies, and why there is no need that the Japanese government and companies are proactively engaged in retaining a pool of international students as a pool of skilled laborers on a more longer and permanent basis through immigration.

In the very last part of this chapter, some personal narratives of international students - from Finland, Algeria, China and the U.S. will be illustrated by which we will understand some aspects of how, and to what extent, the lived experiences of international students in Japanese universities are influenced by the cosmetic nature of immigration, and the internationalization of higher education.

## 5.5 Questioning the *Zentei*, Contradictory Internationalization

As we have examined, the Japanese term, '*gurobaru jinzai*' cannot be interpreted equivalently to the English term, 'global talent'. Just as *kokusaika* may refer to cosmetic internationalization, so foreign global *jinzai* may refer to cosmetic global *jinzai*, and as I call, it is the imagined global *jinzai* - which is becoming another name for *ryugakusei*. The *ryugakusei* as the imagined global *jinzai* only exists cosmetically in the discourses of immigration and internationalization of higher education, and their presences are not meaningfully recognized as something beyond the domain of economic terms. In other words, given that international student recruitment is an integral part of internationalization of Japanese universities as a crucial surviving strategy, the strategy to recruit and retain international students is often understood and framed in economic terms (Becker and Kolster 2012; Bolsmann and Miller 2008; Knight and de Wit 1995; Knight 2004); their presences are commonly viewed simply as a source of revenue for Japanese universities' shrunken coffers and as ornaments in order to decorate the big wall of internationalization of higher education.

In this situation, it is necessary to see the lived experiences of international students in Japanese universities, in order for us to understand more vividly how the lived experiences of international students are affected by the cosmetic nature of immigration and of internationalization of higher education. There are mainly two aspects that we need to examine concerning the lived experiences of international students in Japanese universities. Firstly, just like the premise that has already concluded that other types of foreign migrants are termed 'guests'; how the same fixed *zentei* or premise that international students are 'temporary sojourners' and 'passing presences' may determine the nature of the imagined global *jinzai* and even continue creating it. Secondly, how nominal *kokusaika* is generating

the abandonment of international students, as the state, quality, or condition of being abandoned is determined in the superficial internationalization on university campuses.

### **5.5.1 *Itsu Kaeru No?* : A *Zentei* Immortalized in *Ryugakusei*'s Everyday Life**

“*Itsu kaeru no?*” or “When are you going back home.” - The question should be one of the most common questions that international students would often hear from their peer group, friends, colleagues, professors and even neighbors after they arrive in Japan as a *ryugakusei* visa holder (College Student Visa). It is certain that not so many people will really ask *ryugakusei* or international students if they will or have a plan to live in Japan permanently after graduation; and rigorously speaking, no one will really ask them if they wish to, or have a plan to eventually become a Japanese citizen.

This is not simply because it is not easy for ordinary international students to see any ‘tangible’ gateway to becoming either a permanent resident or a Japanese citizen – at least at the point of entry, as well as on the point of graduation. Indeed, there are ostensibly some legitimate gateways for international students to become a permanent resident or a legal Japanese citizen, whereby they can satisfy the requirements for the permanent visa and naturalization application – though it is not easy at all to satisfy the requirements properly, particularly regarding the scope of taxation on income. Therefore, the reason why they would often hear that question, is not significantly attributed to the absence of law or the malfunction of a system while Japan’s immigration policies seem to be continuously restrictive toward non-Japanese populations. Then what is the problem? In my opinion, the problem is located on the fixed premises that Japan is not a country of immigration, and all foreigners are guests, as they will return to their home countries in the future.

During my fieldwork in Sapporo, Hokkaido in Autumn 2019; whereby I was assisted through an arrangement which was offered by a friend of mine, who was a faculty member at a university, I had a chance to conduct a series of interviews with several international students. During an in-depth group interview with three international students (Two PhD students, and one Master's student) from Finland, South Korea and Guatemala, who were enrolled in Japanese taught-postgraduate degree programs; I met Mia from Finland, who was a doctoral student in Tourism studies, who could speak both Japanese and English fluently. In the middle of the interview, she started telling me a very intriguing story about the *zentei*, or premise as I have described above, that international students are systematically viewed only as 'temporary beings'.

*Mia:* "Regarding the relationship between me and other Japanese students, there is no serious problem, well simply because I can speak the language fluently.....there is something....but it's not like a difference...[**between Japanese students and ryugakusei**]...it might be a sort of feelings of distance....not sure what it is, well, it's like international students are systematically existing as temporary beings."

"When I was in the first year of my doctoral program, there was a sort of job seminar for students. During the seminar, at the beginning both Japanese and foreign students were sitting together, but all of sudden, a person (someone in charge of the seminar) said, please leave except international students! Then the person said, from now on, 日本語を勉強しましょう![**let's learn Japanese**], 日本語で話しましょう！ [**let's speak in Japanese**]. It was like becoming ... taking a (Japanese language) lesson, I was kind of shocked by the situation....yeah, international students are treated like that.....that might be a big problem....because here, many students come from outside and leave. No matter what, I have heard a lot and often, "*Itsu kaerundesuka?*", even

when I meet someone for the very first time, I would hear that, “*Itsu kaerundesuka?*”...well (emphasis added by the present author).

Mia added as follows:

*Mia*: “When you look at it, for example...look at the scholarship...when you got a scholarship, there is an explanation about the scholarship, and there is usually like a place [**on a form**] where you have to write, “What do you want to do when you go back?”, and like... ‘How will you use this experience to build a relationship between Japan and your own country?’, and ‘What will do you when you go back?’ ....There is always like.....It’s an attitude, it’s a ‘*zentei*’, It’s like “*Kaeru zentei de kitte kudasai* [**Please come here on the premise that you will return**].” (emphasis added by the present author).

In a similar vein, as one of my interviewees, Said, a doctoral student from Algeria in Kyoto whom I had met during my academic years as a doctoral student, he interestingly mentioned an expression – ‘*building a bridge*’ during an interview in April 2019.<sup>108</sup> Before he came to Japan, when he prepared his documents for admission and scholarship - he also had to present both verbally, and in writing about his future plan including what he would do after returning to his home country. In particular, in an interview for the Japanese government scholarship at the Japanese embassy in Algeria, there was a moment whereby he had to present what he would do when he returned to his home country after study. He illustrated his experiences as below.

---

<sup>108</sup> I used an alias upon his request.

*Said:* “Actually, one of the key points, when I asked many people who got the MEXT scholarship before me...because we have test and interview and so on. So, I asked my friends who got the MEXT [**scholarship**] before. They said, “one thing you should say, I want to take my PhD, then I will go back home, then become a bridge between the two countries [**Japan and my country**]”. They told me, “you have to say like that during the interview”. My friend said, “this is the key point, you have to say.....it will make people feel you are safe”. Honestly, this is from my friend who got the MEXT, and told me. 100 percent for sure.....”. (emphasis added by the present author).

Just as Mia illustrated, similarly he continued to say that he had to write down what he wanted to do after his PhD, on the MEXT scholarship application form by saying:

*Said* “I want to go back home, and become a bridge, well, honestly, it is written like that.”

As such, the take-it-for-granted premise that international students will return to their home country is often found and observed in every aspect of international students and their everyday lives. In my point of view, mainly the reason why the premise commonly exists and is naturally accepted, is particularly attributable to how to view ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrants’, or more specifically, the ‘settlement of non-Japanese populations’ by the government and people in the society. As Mia interestingly said, international students are systematically or institutionally viewed as temporary beings. Hence, they are systematically located in a particular category, being separated from ‘domestic students’ or ‘Japanese students’ based on the premise that ‘international students’ are temporary sojourners and passing presences. International students are often described as the best and brightest foreign

human resources, who are likely to bring benefits to the Japanese society including local communities and Japanese higher education institutions by enhancing the degree of ‘internationalization’ in a variety of ways. However, it should be noted that their roles as ‘*ryugakusei*’ in Japanese universities and society are predetermined, predestined and preoccupied by the premise that they are only viewed ‘passing presences’. In this situation, all sorts of policies toward international students are designed on the premise, and hence it is certain that the premise operates as the most significant factor that may create the presence of the imagined global *jinzai* being separated from the policies and discourses on the fostering of Japanese global *jinzai*.

### **5.5.2 Contradictory *Kokusaika* on Campus**

There was another student, Gordon from Shanghai, China who I met individually during my field work trip to Hokkaido in Autumn 2019. He was a postgraduate student in a Master’s program in International Media and Communication in Sapporo. During my interview with him on a cafeteria located at his university, he said that the most interesting part of his experience was something about contradictory multicultural and international environment on campus under a peculiar scenery of nominal ‘internationalization’. When I asked him about his academic and personal life as an international student on a Japanese university’s campus, he started talking about a striking scenario that was displayed as part of his life on campus.

**Gordon:** “You know, we have a lot of Chinese students in our [**my**] department, it’s like over 90 percent, so we have a lot of chances to use Mandarin. So I am just trying to do my best to avoid using my Chinese, because it’s not doing any good ..... In our course, we have like 30 people, over 20 people are Chinese. I was trying to find more

Japanese students, and trying to speak in Japanese...in seminars and so on..... I usually spoke to my Chinese folks. But I don't want to use my Chinese anymore. I think I have to use Japanese or English, just to improve other language skills.....sometimes when I went to class, all the Chinese students were there, I felt I was in China again.”

Although his degree program is a Japanese-taught Master's program, the vast majority of all registered students are non-Japanese, international students. In this regard, the department might be able to advertise and promote the degree program by illustrating that over 70 percent of students in the Master's program consists of international students, and about 90 percent of registered students in our department consists of international students; so it is a truly international and multicultural academic environment, and a good welcome to the '*internationalized*' society. However, in reality, when it comes to 'diversity' and 'diversification' inside the ethnocultural composition of international students in the department and its degree program, it turns out to be a total myth and a fiction. In my point of view, this sort of contradictory and peculiar situation could occur, mainly because of the superficial nature of internationalization of Japanese universities; which is continuously creating the unpreparedness of internationalization in a variety of ways. In this situation, the presence of international students becomes, and may remain only as a source of revenue for Japanese universities reeling from a serious financial loss due to the loss of domestic students, and remain as ornaments to mask the superficiality of internationalization in Japanese universities.

During the interview with Gordon, he also showed his disappointment about a reality that he did not really expect before he left Shanghai for Japan. One of the biggest reasons was the lack of information about Japanese universities. When I asked him: “Is there anything you

think that should be changed in terms of the internationalization of higher education in Japan?" He started talking about the lack of information in not knowing enough about his degree program, and his university.

*Gordon*: "Personally I think, there could be more communication between Japanese universities and Chinese colleges....When I decided to come to Japan, I didn't get any information [**about Japanese universities**], I just went to a consultant, a private agency, and I asked them to get me information. When I searched online about the [**my**]university, there was just little information I could get.....My department sent teachers to Shanghai to have *setsumeikai* [**informational sessions**] to people who wanted to come to Hokkaido. When I was there, I saw some Chinese students, they came to Shanghai from all over Mainland China.....many people want to come to Japan, but they can't get any information in their own cities. It's pretty hard for them....."  
(emphasis by the present author).

In his description about how he found and applied for a degree course in his current university, initially he could not easily access proper information about admission by himself; but later on he participated in one or two informational sessions that were hosted directly by his current university. Nevertheless, when he came to Japan, and entered the university which he had selected, the environment seemed to be very different from what he had expected - particularly the ethnocultural profile of students in his degree program. He repeatedly said that he was expecting more of an international environment in his degree program, but it turned out to be not at all. When I thought about his experiences, an interesting question was raised in my mind that I did not really relate to at the time. This was something about a discrepancy between what the university attempted to advertise to recruit students overseas, and the benefits Gordon expected to earn from his choice, decision, and opportunity from the

university. To put it more squarely, on the one hand, the university advertises how internationalized they are, and the strong degree of internationalization which they have, may help students enhance their global competitiveness. On the other hand, Gordon expected the degree of internationalization that he could expect would assist him in his future career development. In other words, the university's advertisement which was designed to recruit international students was superficial, but the superficiality was hidden and not tangible until he, Gordon, began to experience life on the university more directly. In this respect, the internationalization of higher education that Gordon has experienced can be called 'Nominal Internationalization' which does not practically exist, but literally exists on the surface level. This is also an aspect of the cosmetic internationalization of higher education in Japan.

In addition to the case of Gordon, I have also heard about many similar stories from other international students whom I have met informally during the period of conducting this research. And during a series of former interviews, international students have often revealed various types of unpreparedness in their degree programs; or more comprehensively speaking 'the unpreparedness of internationalization' in terms of the quality of institutional supports and administrative services, and lack of cultural-religious understanding toward international student from their universities; most notably, in many cases, the quality of education in English-taught degree programs.

Particularly over the past decade the onset and continuation of internationalization in higher education in Japan has had various ramifications on international student recruitment. As more precisely illustrated in previous chapters, a significant growth in English taught degree programs is a typical wave in the process of internationalizing Japanese universities; mainly to attract more non-Japanese speaking foreign students to Japanese higher education.

It is expected that more Japanese universities will join the trend to launch English taught degree programs under the current development of internationalization of higher education that has been tremendously supported by the Japanese government. English taught degree programs are often called by a variety of names by different universities, such as: English-based program (Waseda), English track program (Meiji) and E-Track program (Tokyo International). According to JASSO, as of May 2019, amazingly 943 English-Taught degree programs including undergraduate, Master and Doctoral degrees were offered by more than 65 higher education institutions nationwide in Japan.<sup>109</sup> It seems certain that many more Japanese universities and departments in universities will continue to expand this trend.

Significantly, for this research, I have met both formally and informally many international students who were in English-taught degree programs in Japan, and have observed that they often became an island in their academic and personal life territories. During my fieldwork in Tokyo throughout 2018, I had a chance to meet Christie, an undergraduate student coming from the U.S. through an English track degree program, at a very prestigious private university in Tokyo. I met her for the first time at an academic conference related to Japan's immigration policies, where I made a presentation about the issue of international student migration to Japan. After the presentation, she approached me to introduce herself, and showed her strong interest in my presentation, and her empathy with the cases of *ryugakusei* that I illustrated in my presentation at the conference. After a few weeks, I met her again and undertook a more formal interview with her in Tokyo. During the interview in June 2018, she also talked about the unpreparedness of internationalization based on her personal experiences in her university. Interestingly, part of the story that I heard from

---

<sup>109</sup> University degree courses offered in English, JASSO, May 2019, Accessed June 21, 2020, [https://www.jasso.go.jp/en/study\\_j/search/daigakukensaku.html#no7](https://www.jasso.go.jp/en/study_j/search/daigakukensaku.html#no7) .

her was very similar, and almost even identical to what I heard from Gordon; such as the superficiality of ethnocultural diversity on campus and in classes, and a reality of becoming ‘internationalized’ or ‘globalized’ in Japanese universities.

While I was listening to her stories and the experiences of her campus life, she began to talk about something which was about becoming internationalized for universities. She said:

*Christie*: “They are trying to become more global, on a surface level, when we were applying to my university, but I feel like they are becoming more global, it seems like becoming more international, but once I am really in **J university**, it’s not global at all. I mean I guess it’s pretty global, but it’s not as much as I was told, or that they promised it will be, yeah, because...they have English classes...but I don’t know... I don’t feel I am integrated into....., within English programs, all Koreans are going to them as one group, and the Chinese....., within international programs, different nationalities are going on they own, so I am just kind, one of the Americans?....so internationalization...mmmm.” (emphasis added by the present author).<sup>110</sup>

Indeed, when I continued to listen to her, I felt a particular amount of confusion, unclarity and ambiguity relative to the internationalization of universities, in that she really couldn’t clearly describe what it means to be within the boundary of her experience. Her university offers English classes, and they have a great deal of registered international students on campus. However, despite the fact that these conditions can give her university another tag as being ‘global’ or ‘international’, the facts cannot help her feel practically and clearly, that her life is experiencing the ‘internationalized’ and ‘globalized’ university experience that she was promised. In this regard, it is questionable if the process of

---

<sup>110</sup> During the interview, Christie mentioned her university’s name. However, for privacy purposes, the actual university name has been changed to ‘J University’.

internationalization in higher education in Japan can really provide international students with actual international experiences and environments. In my point of view, as I continue to argue, the internationalization of higher education only exist at very superficial level as a power and function of branding.

Christie continued to add a very interesting point of view about internationalization of universities during the interview.

*Christie:* “Why do universities want to internationalize? Well, I think, the trend is global, so... to be more competitive.... also, and I really think that’s something like nation-branding.....I was thinking like, Japan is, about reputation, you’ve invested a lot, you’ve been.... how useless it is, but as long as it is increasing your reputation, then it’s fine.....like **J university**, I don’t need to do anything as long as I have the **J university** name. The quality of education doesn’t matter.... I learned that in college you build personality, you build a type of person you wanna be through the education. But in **J university**, people barely come to class, the quality of education, I don’t find it really makes you think, people just go to a kind of process of **J university** and just graduate with **J university**, then they can get a job here in Japan”.

As Christie illustrated, what we can observe in the internationalization of higher education in Japanese universities is an effort by Japanese universities not to make out they really are, but to make out how they look, as a strategy not to actualize internationalization, but to decorate them by the brand of ‘internationalization’.

There is always a gap between rhetoric and reality. In this respect, it is not surprising to see that there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality in internationalization in higher

education, and that the gap is creating and generating various levels of contradictory *kokusaika*. Hence, the question is on how to bridge the gap between them. When attempting to bridge the gap, it is necessary to think about how to demystify the superficiality of internationalization in Japanese higher education, and how to actualize the authenticity of internationalization in Japanese higher education.

### **5.5.3 Beyond the Imagined Global *Jinzai***

As we have already examined earlier in the previous chapters, international student migration is often viewed under the purview of highly skilled migration policies, mainly because international students are often considered an important human capital in host countries. In this context, international student mobility is often encouraged by the internationalization of the higher education sector, and therefore increasingly likened to the global competition for highly skilled professionals, which is often described as a ‘global talent war’ or ‘the global competition for talent’. Not surprisingly, Japan is also running the global race for talent. About a decade ago, *gurobaru jinzai* or global *jinzai* - the Japanese term of global talent or global human resources, became a buzzword, and the government increasingly began to officially discuss the issue of global talent. However, the definition of Japanese the term, global *jinzai* is somewhat different from that of the English term, ‘global talent’, which usually refers to highly skilled or knowledge workers who can bring human capital, creativity and innovation to societies.

In the case of the English term, global talent, it is not limited to the categorization of ‘foreign’ or ‘non-foreign’ workers, while the Japanese term, global *jinzai* is exclusively limited to the Japanese global *jinzai* in practice, which means, rigorously speaking, foreign

highly skilled or knowledge workers are not included in the definitions of global *jinzai*.<sup>111</sup> As I have mentioned earlier, the definition of global *jinzai* have emphasized the importance of becoming a Japanese person who must possess and understand the sense of Japanese identity and Japaneseness, and at the same time who possesses certain qualities of global citizen. Hence, as we can see, the definition of global *jinzai* is essentially identical to the Ideal Model of Desired Japanese.

In this regard, in the context of global *jinzai*, the Japanese government is primarily interested in fostering the Japanese global talent from ‘inside or within Japan; but not particularly interested in recruiting or importing the foreign global talent from ‘outside Japan’. In this situation, international student recruitment and the presence of international students in universities are being utilized to help Japanese universities foster the Japanese global *jinzai* -specifically through ‘Internationalization at Home’. In contrast international students are not gaining opportunities to become potentially global talent through the ‘internationalization of Japanese higher education’. Eventually, as a result, international students in Japanese universities become the imagined global *jinzai* - which refers to international students who only exist cosmetically in the global *jinzai* discourses; but do not exist practically in Japan’s immigration and internationalization of higher education policies. Hence, the role of imagined global *jinzai* as consumable, expendable and disposable continues to remain together with the fixed *zentei* that they are ‘temporary beings’ and ‘guests’

---

<sup>111</sup> Poole pointed out an exclusive use of the term ‘Global *Jinzai*’ (Poole 2016). As he argued, it is “a gloss for Globalized Japanese graduates/workers”, and “MEXT and Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) do not often use “Global Human Resources” as a reference to the integration of immigrants and returnees into Japanese society and workplace.” (Poole 2016, 210).

In the final part of this chapter, by listening to selected personal narratives of some international students, I have attempted to illustrate some aspects of how international students become the imagined global *jinzai*' in the absence of immigration, and cosmetic internationalization. International students are always welcome before they come to Japan, but when they come to Japan, the situation is becoming a peculiar reality, which is a reality filled with contradiction, superficiality and ambiguity. And as in the reality, international students soon begin to realize and recognize the *zentei* that non-Japanese, and foreign beings are systematically categorized as '*passing presences*' as paraphrased by Hall (1998a).

As a conclusion of my thesis, the *zentei* is viewed as an important matter now in international student migration to Japan. This is mainly because it is blocking a new possibility of how significantly international students may bring increased benefits to the Japanese society; not only by providing temporary labor, but also by stimulating and refreshing its long stagnancy in the society. Because it is obstructing a new view or perspective towards a new Japanese national identity - which the presence and settlement of international students are highly likely to create (that is more flexibly in its inclusivity of its growing ethnocultural diversity within the society) and because of this, it is negatively functioning to maintain the Japanese society repeatedly in the ambiguous myth of ethnocultural homogeneity and Japaneseness. Hence, the efforts to go beyond the *zentei* should be a tremendously influential step for the Japanese society to start talking more practically about immigration which is recently swamping the society with various pictures of its future.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 International Student Migration as an Alternative to Mass Immigration

Regardless of reasons that different stakeholders maintain, there is always a certain degree of demand, and more recently there is a more growing demand for the recruitment and retention of international students in contemporary Japanese society from the government, universities, and businesses, most seriously and desperately from certain types of industries such as nursing care, the food service industry, construction and agriculture, which all drastically suffer from acute shortages of labor. However, despite the popular demands for international students, very few, if any, of these stakeholders really want international students to be in Japan more permanently. Likewise, none of these actors particularly want them to become Japanese citizens with equal rights. If this is so, how can we understand the case of international students and measure the degree of demand?

As both an observer and the object of the observer, I have thought seriously about my own context simply because I am one of them, an international student who has to take part in the rite of passage which is known as “*shukatsu*” or “*shushoku katsudo*”(job hunting activities) after graduation. I would often ask myself these questions - Does anyone or any place in this society really demand my experience, knowledge and skills? If so, how can I know and measure the degree of demand or the degree of necessity? For my being in this society ? In this situation, as quoted by Tomiyama Ichiro in the very beginning of this dissertation, “ It’s happening around, but it’s already not someone else’s problem (*Katawara de okite iru kotodaga, sudeni hitogotode wanai*)”, I would see the situation surrounding my

everyday life as an international student in contemporary Japanese society with a lot of uncertainties. In this sense, I might be feeling “the feeling of becoming a non-settler against a world of settlers” (Park 2016, 26).

At the onset, this study was located in the middle of the feelings, and with the feeling of becoming a non-settler, this research began in an intellectual and emotional boundary with a question about ‘awkward diversity’: Is Japan now pursuing a society which articulates ‘unity in diversity’ or ‘diversity in unity’? I wanted to know where the proliferation of ‘diversity’ talks and discourses about diversity are located in the society. Therefore, I chose international student migration as the lens to explore, examine, and understand the substances of awkward diversity in contemporary Japanese society.

In the very beginning of writing this thesis, I began to observe the recent development of highly skilled migration policies in Japan, in particular, the newly introduced points-based system, called, “The Points Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (HSFP)”, which may have suggested that Japan’s migration policies were moving toward more liberalized and settlement-oriented directions. It seemed to me that Japanese society would start talking about the possibility of introducing a large-scale immigration program mainly because the introduction of points-system looked like a huge step toward building a country of immigration that we may often see and imagine such as the classic countries of immigration, such as Australia, Canada, the U.S..

It is commonly believed that Japan has been averse to immigration due to strong ideas about homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and culture which is deeply embedded in the society. Despite these discourses, Japan has already turned into a de facto country of immigration,

which can obviously be characterized by the presence of a growing migration-induced ethnocultural diversity. Nevertheless, the issue of mass immigration through a formal immigration policy has not so openly been discussed. It is continuously hard for non-Japanese and foreign nationals to become a Japanese citizen except through intermarriage with a Japanese spouse. However, undergoing a serious decline in its working-age population marked by its rapid population aging and decline, and suffering severe labor shortages in certain industries, it is clear that the Japanese government seems to be moving towards a more liberalized labor migration policy agenda by easing rules for the entry and employment of foreign nationals.

In this situation, I believed that the introduction of points-based system might be a first step for Japan to open its door for more long-term settlement and even permanent settlement of foreign residents. Regarding the settlement issue for foreign nationals, indeed, the point-based system operates relatively well in that the system has continued to ease the requirements for permanent residency. When the points-based system was introduced, some aspects of underperformance of the HSFP were also observed. However, for a very short period of time, the number of the HSFP visa holders has been dramatically increased. In this regard, it is certain that the recent liberalization of the Japanese government's migration policies has been successful to some degree in achieving its quantitative goals.

However, I have since realized that quantitative success does not practically mean that the liberalization of Japan's migration policies towards adding more foreign workers will encourage foreign nationals to settle down on a more permanent basis in Japan. As I have continuously discussed, whether foreign workers are less-qualified (unskilled or less-skilled) or more qualified (highly skilled), they are all continuously regarded as 'temporary beings' or

‘temporary sojourners’ in Japanese society, and they are neither viewed as permanent residents nor potential citizens at the point of their entry. The old and common *zentei* (premise) that foreign workers are guests and that they will return to their home countries, has not been significantly changed over the past two decades. I have found that such *zentei* also applies to the case of international students in a similar or same way as ‘guests’. Therefore, without removing such *zentei* towards foreign residents, in terms of the settlement of foreign nationals, nothing will practically be changed.

In the chapter 2, I suggested a policy recommendation that international student migration may be strategically viewed by the Japanese government to tackle demographic and economic problems mainly because international student migrants will bring not only economic benefits but also socio-cultural benefits. In particular, in the continuously conflicting situation between the government and society’s unwillingness towards immigration, and the growing importance of utilizing foreign human resources in the context of a rapidly aging population and decline, seriously rethinking ‘international student migration’ as a significant immigration and settlement issue may be a good starting point to invigorate public debate about immigration, while at the same time using it as an opportunity for a pretest of Japan’s capability to accept foreign immigrants through a formal immigration program.

Considering the characteristics and intentions of student migrants in Japan, the fact that they are mostly from Asian countries suggests students are more likely to have shared historical and cultural values and a regional identity somewhat connected with Japanese society. Moreover, as the vast majority of international students in Japan, Asian students have higher levels of acculturation as well as cross-cultural and bilingual experiences. In addition,

there are a range of potential benefits when they start to settle and work after graduation - both as skilled and highly skilled migrants. Most importantly, they are young generations. Therefore, there are many reasons why they should be more encouraged by the government and the society to settle as more long-term and permanent residents, and even potential citizens.

As such, in the chapter 2, I also discussed the possibility and feasibility of international student migration as an alternative policy option for a formal mass immigration program in order to address various problems stemming from the graying Japanese society. However, I cannot help thinking that there is one precondition for the alternative approach, which is a new condition that goes beyond the premise that foreign migrants are guests, temporary sojourners and passing presences. In other words, without considering the possibility of permanent settlement of international students, we may not be able to continue to argue about the possibility of international student migration as a pretest of Japan's capability to see if Japan may accommodate foreign immigrants through a more comprehensively mass immigration program in the future.

I have found that this issue is closely related to the government and society's views towards immigration and immigrants; and more specifically to the Japanese immigration policies which may reflect the state's official attitude towards the presence of foreign populations. Therefore, the role of immigration matters greatly in the case of international student migration in Japan. Hence, in the following chapter 3, I have continued to explore more thoroughly international student migration as an immigration and settlement issue and delved into much deeper questions about 'why immigration matters' in international student migration in Japan.

## **6.2 The Role of Immigration in the International Student Migration to Japan**

In chapter 2, examining not only Japan's highly skilled migration policies but also low-skilled migration policies, it is certain that the Japanese government has been committed to addressing serious shortages of labor in various ways, which stems from its rapidly aging population. In addition, the government has attempted to increase the number of international students by recruiting them - particularly through the internationalization of higher education, to utilize as a source of temporary labor, and possibly skilled workers after graduation.

Despite the recent liberalization of Japan's migration policies toward foreign workers and international students, and the government's efforts to attract them to live and work in Japan through various proactive measures, it is somewhat odd to observe 'the absence of immigration' amid the recent changes in the government's move toward more settlement-oriented discourses and migration policies toward non-Japanese populations.

As I have already illustrated, on the one hand, the government proactively emphasizes the importance of foreign human resources to address its demographic problems as I shortly described in the beginning of this thesis, and it even promotes positive images of new Japanese society as an open-international society with non-foreign populations, respecting its ethno-cultural diversity within the society under the phrase such as "it's good to have diversity". On the other hand, however, the government continuously attempts to prevent foreign nationals from settling in Japan permanently. This attempt not only applies to the lower-skilled foreign workers in the new 'specified skilled workers' working visa system, which has been very recently introduced in April 2019, but also to highly skilled workers. Undoubtedly the foreign professionals are considered a desirable and wanted migrant group,

but it is not easy to become a Japanese citizen even for such high-skilled people.

It is important to point out that this situation applies to the case of international students in the same way. Notably, given international students are more ambiguously viewed as both a desirable and unwanted group of migrants, indeed the issue of settlement for international students seems more complicated in that the government proactively promotes the recruitment and retention of international students, while their settlement issue seems to be deliberately ignored and even underrated. In addition to the dramatic changes in its foreign worker policies, ostensibly the Japanese government is proactively using the internationalization of higher education as a way of stimulating skilled migration by attracting foreign students as a source of labor.

However, it is questionable if international student migration can successfully translate into a pool of skilled workers in Japan. The employment rate of international student graduates is gradually increasing but still relatively low. More problematically, their job categories are quite limited and they do not seem to be part of the professionally skilled and highly skilled job categories in practice. In this situation, an observable reality that we can often see is that international students are simply being utilized as temporary migrant workers in limited job categories – most vividly at convenient stores and restaurants, in which the recruitment of highly skilled foreign professionals are not necessarily crucial.

Therefore, Japan's international student recruitment is considerably superficial in that international students are mostly viewed as temporary foreign workers from the point of entry, mainly to meet acute labor shortages in certain industries. This situation is not significantly different from a reality where certain industries urgently needed less-skilled

foreign workers. A recent case of a remarkably increase in the number of foreign students who registered at nursing schools that train state-certified care workers, which is one of the industries with the biggest labor shortages, is a clear example.

Hence, as one of the important research findings, we can see that immigration does not play a role in the process of recruitment, retention, and settlement of international students to and in Japan. This means that there is no formal opportunity for international students who wish to live in Japan more permanently after graduation. Then why this situation matters? Indeed, international student mobility and global talent mobility or highly skilled professional migration, both are often characterized by their flexible mobility and transnational mobility. In this respect, some may argue that international students are not usually settling down in the host country where they migrate to for their study. They will continue to move across borders for a better opportunity. Therefore, it can be said that it is neither a problem nor a strange phenomenon at all.

Nevertheless, a reason why the absence of immigration importantly matters in international student migration in Japan is that the situation is essentially based on the *zentei* or premise that foreigners are ‘temporary being’, and ‘guests’. As I have periodically argued in this research, the *zentei* is a negative factor which is constantly interfering with the possibility for change in how the Japanese society views and treats non-Japanese foreign nationals regardless of who they are, wanted migrants or unwanted migrants, high-skilled or low-skilled, etc.. More specifically, it is continuously playing a role in maintaining the Japanese society’s restrictive manner toward the membership of its national identity.

As discussed, in the situation where the role of immigration is absent in the settlement of international students, there is no doubt that international students are continuously viewed as

temporary sojourners and passing presences through Japan's current immigration and citizenship regime, and their presence in Japanese universities and society will continuously remain as imagined global *jinzai*, which refers to international students who only exist in the global *jinzai* discourses and not practically in the Japan's immigration and internationalization of higher education policies. In other words, they exist as an important human capital in a form of superficiality but not practically exist in the reality of Japanese society.

Throughout chapters 2 and 3, findings of this research show that international students are ostensibly and seemingly considered important human capital, and potentially skilled and highly skilled foreign human resources on global *jinzai* discourse (including government reports and policies related to human resource management), but in reality they are usually viewed temporary being, and simply being utilized temporary laborers. This situation is somewhat contradictory to a strong demand from Japanese universities in the process of 'internationalization of higher education', which is another dimension to be explored as a significant factor that creates and make the imagined global *jinzai* continuously exist.

Before examining the 'internationalization of higher education' in Japan, it is important to understand the substances of Japan's internationalization, and internationalization projects because particularly under the Abe government, internationalization projects are operating part of nation-branding strategy to revamp Japan's lost images, and newly construct a more competitive national images and identity. In this regard, the government-led internationalization of higher education projects are also operating as part of a nation-branding strategy, and why it matters is because the internationalization of higher education as part of national branding strategy is significantly generating, and enhancing cosmetic

characteristics and superficiality in internationalization of Japanese universities, which I term - 'the cosmetic internationalization of higher education'

It is worth noting again that in addition to the immigration and aging society dimension in which there is a growing demand for international student recruitment, as an important factor to increase the demand for international students, the dimension of internationalization should be carefully examined. The government, particularly the Abe government, is proactively attempting to internationalize all aspects of society, universities are also striving to internationalize their institutions, and companies who need international students as their workforces are also desperate for internationalizing their organizations and business boundaries. Therefore, we can see that internationalization is a keyword and rigorously speaking, it is also one of the major reasons why the Japanese government, universities, and companies want to recruit them.

### **6.3 Demystifying Cosmetic Internationalization, Actualizing the Imagined Global *Jinzai* in Immigration and IHE**

In chapter 4, I attempted to demystify the nature and meanings of 'internationalization', and examines the superficiality of Japan's internationalization project, more specifically under the Abe administration. Going through Japan's identity crisis, particularly since the end of bubble economy, losing its national confidence due to economic recession, natural disasters, various challenges from globalization, the Japanese ruling elite attempts to revamp Japan's national identity as more new, beautiful, proud, and confident nation through rebranding the Japanese national identity. In this situation, the Japanese government attempts to exercise nation-branding as a soft power tool, not only capitalize on Japan's popularity but

also ideologically control national images facing challenges from a rapidly globalizing world. Furthermore, ultimately all nation branding exercises are aimed at creating a new competitive identity of Japan as a new country, which has been further enhanced under the Abe government with its ambitious growth strategy through the so-called, “Japan Revitalization Strategy.”

What this research has found is that Japan’s current internationalization projects are essentially related to ‘nation-branding’ as its operating principle. In this regard, it is necessary for us to review and understand the process of internationalization of Japanese higher education in the same context mainly because it is also essentially part of the Japanese government’s nation branding strategy in response to its image problems.

Reviewing how the Japanese government views higher education as soft power and public diplomacy, and how the major role of higher education as soft power has significantly changed to the state’s nation branding strategy, I have explored contextual influences of how higher education is incorporated into the state’s international project. An interesting finding in the reviewing process is Japan’s internationalization project is operating as “*Internationalization from Within*”, which means that the government’s primary interest in internationalizing Japanese universities is mainly focused on an inward-oriented approach, not an outward-oriented one. In other words, what the government attempts to do in the process of internationalization of higher education is primarily to enhance ‘*Internationalization from Within Japan*’, rather than ‘*Internationalization from Outside Japan*’, and to foster the Japanese global talent ‘*within Japan*’, rather than securing the foreign global talent from ‘*outside Japan*’. In this inward attitude toward internationalization, what is most clear is a continuous emphasis of understanding, maintaining and enhancing the

Japaneseness, which is closely linked to the direction, goals, and nature of Japanese government's global *jinzai* policies, and the definition of global *jinzai* which may refer to Japanese who are globally compatible and competitive, but with understanding the sense of Japaneseness.

In the final chapter, I have attempted to locate the buzzword, *gurobaru jinzai* or global *jinzai* issue in the context of international student migration and global talent mobility by which I have argued about the unique characteristics of Japan's global talent cultivation project through internationalization of higher education. What this research has found is strong links between global *jinzai* discourses and the resurgence of cultural nationalism with an emphasis of unique Japaneseness.

Most interestingly, I found that the current definitions of global *jinzai* are similarly found in "the Image of Desired Japanese (*Kitaisareru Ningenzo*)", which appeared in a policy document in the late 1960's and was postulated as an ideal image of Japanese for the new era of high economic growth. Just as the Image of Desired Japanese emphasized the concurrent qualities of the desired Japanese – firstly, by becoming aware of international responsibilities as a world citizen and secondly, by maintaining one's Japaneseness as a Japanese, the ideal image of global *jinzai* emphasizes similarly both qualities that the ideal model of global *jinzai* possesses – first, becoming internationally compatible and competitive and second, understanding and maintaining the sense of Japanese identity at the same time. As such, in the context of Japan's internationalization projects, there is always an emphasis of Japanese identity and Japaneseness. The emphasis has continuously created the cosmetic, superficial, contradictory, and ambiguous nature of internationalization. In contemporary Japanese society, what does it really mean to become internationalized? Or become global? In my

view, the answer should be found by breaking many *zentei* that take things for granted and do not critically unpack these terms. I do not think there is a fixed *zentei* that Japan must be Japan. Instead, I believe there is always another possibility comprised of new ways, models, and modes.

As I mentioned in the last section of chapter 5. This *zentei* blocks such possibilities and is obstructing a new perspective. Hence critically and seriously deconstructing this *zentei* must be the very first and crucial step toward rethinking international student migration in Japan. In doing so, international students in contemporary Japanese society may become essential part of its society and national identity in the future.

#### **6.4 Toward an Opening Possibility, Beyond the *Zentei***

In recent years, contemporary Japanese society has been being swamped once again with the words such as *shoshika* (declining birthrate), *koreika shakai* (aging society), *hitode busoku* (shortage of labor), *gaikokujin kodo jinzai* (highly skilled foreign workers), and *gaikokujin roudousha* (foreign workers), *ryugakusei* (international students) and *imin* (immigration). And these words are more and more becoming intrinsically related to each other or one another in the context of declining population and aging society. The principal rationale of Japan's immigration policies is usually operating in this context. Therefore, the question of how to address various problems stemming from its demographic crisis has been always dominating over the debate of immigration in Japan. However, if the debate of immigration is constrained only to the context, solutions would always remain in the question of numbers such as a question of "how many" – how many foreign workers, highly skilled workers low or lower-skilled workers and international students we need to utilize their

laborer to work our economy properly and better? Therefore, I would suggest that regarding conversations, dialogues, discussions, and debates over the emerging issue of immigration and settlement of foreign nationals, Japanese society and people should start thinking about possibilities rather than counting or calculating the numbers, and the possibilities are undoubtedly linked to a question of what kind of country and society we want to be, and we want to live in?

As this research continues to argue, it is certain that Japan is continuously becoming a more heterogeneous society in terms of ethnicity and culture, mainly generated by an influx of newly arriving foreign migrants, including international students, and the heterogenization process will continue because “acts of migration are self-sustaining social processes which tend to develop their own dynamics” (Castles 2000, 106; Castles and Miller 2009, 29). In this situation, challenges and changes from the growing ethno-cultural diversity induced by migration will also be accelerated and intensified, and all will push society to keep questioning its national identity and citizenship. In this situation, as I assume at a certain point of time, it is highly likely that Japan should consider an introduction of formal immigration policies toward non-Japanese population in one way or another.

In the near future, whether they are in wanted migrant category or unwanted migrant category, the number of foreign migrants including international students in Japan will obviously and continuously increase, and how they experience and overcome the *zentei* - foreigners are temporary being - will be a critical question when we evaluate their successful settlement in Japanese society. No one really can make sure if mass immigration will be a great boon to Japanese society or just will create social and political tensions. Nevertheless, what is clear is that there is always a new possibility, and the new possibility will give us

more new choices to act upon, and we maybe call the new possibility as a hope.

Rebecca Solnit, in her book 'Hope in the Dark', said, "It's important to say what hope is not: it is not the belief that everything was, is, or will be fine. The evidence is all around us of tremendous suffering and tremendous destruction", and she added, as aforementioned as a quote, "The hope.... is about broad perspectives with specific possibilities, and it is "an account of complexities and uncertainties, with openings" (Solnit 2016, pp.xiii-xiv).

Like we as individuals should all do in our own lives, Japanese society and people living in the society – whether they are Japanese or non-Japanese, Japanese nationals or foreign nationals – always have to make a choice with complexities and uncertainties. However, as Solnit mentioned, the choice should be with openings, in other words, without any *zentei*. In doing so, society truly can imagine a new multicultural community that will not remain 'the imagined', but rather a new form of community that will be actualized, and realized, with openings.

## **EPILOGUE**

### **A Reflection on Being a Foreign Graduate in a Time of Crisis**

#### **A Foreign Graduate in a Vortex of Crisis**

At the time of finishing this thesis, Japan and the world are facing an unprecedented challenge caused by the outbreak of novel coronavirus. The challenge is not simply limited to a global pandemic generated by an unknown-fatal infectious disease, but rather a crisis that has plunged the world into what many consider the most serious global crisis since World War II. This crisis is not only having a tremendous toll on the national and global economy, but has also drastically altered the everyday life of hundreds of millions around the globe, including most predominately the way we work, teach and learn in our educational institutes.

While all nations are struggling with the unexpected troubles caused by the pandemic, not surprisingly, my personal life is also exposed significantly to the vortex of this crisis, drastically altering my present and future plans. There is now a plethora of commentaries on the ramifications of this crisis. The higher education sector is one of many that have been significantly impacted by the coronavirus crisis, not only financially, but also institutionally and culturally. In particular, there is growing concern over the internationalization of higher education. Given that higher education relies considerably on the international mobility of students and scholars, universities are negatively affected by the current situation in which cross-border mobility has been completely suspended to prevent the spread of the virus. As a foreign graduate student currently enrolled at a higher education institution, the ramifications of the Covid-19 crisis undoubtedly affected me in numerous ways. At present, I am

experiencing a range of feelings – from confusion about academic activities and my university’s administrative measures, to a feeling of frustration about employment opportunities after graduation.

For example, at least for the first half of the year, all academic conferences at which I was expected to participate in and/or make a presentation at, have been cancelled or postponed. To publish a journal article, it now takes much more time to receive feedback from peer reviewers because of disruptions to their professional and personal life that the pandemic has caused. Like many others around the world, students in my graduate school are forced to become ‘Zoomers’ in the ‘Zoomniverse’. We are all physically distancing ourselves from each other and trying to exist in a new academic space created by the ‘all mighty Internet’. This space is a somewhat peculiar space which has literally never existed within traditional Japanese academia.

Due to the state of emergency declared nationwide by the Japanese government and its continual extension, all areas and facilities on campus have been closed. Student and academic services offered by all administrative offices are only available via non-face-to-face ways such as emailing and phone etc. In this situation, I still do not know how to submit my doctoral thesis by the end of May this year, which is the official deadline set by the university for the submission of doctoral theses within the spring semester. The university has not yet decided what to do and how to receive theses from doctoral students who are ready to submit. Apparently, the matter is not a serious one for the university. Most significantly however, it is employment opportunities that are most negatively affected by the Covid-19 crisis. As I presented throughout my thesis, particularly during the previous year, Japanese media often report positive stories of the employability of foreign student graduates in the Japanese job

market - especially amid high demand for *'ryugakusei'* among Japanese companies. This has suddenly changed; now all foreign students in Japan fear that the pandemic is narrowing job opportunities. Although universities are far from the worst affected sector, it would be very difficult – at least for the time being – for universities to be ambitious and flexible in recruiting new teaching and research staffs to expand their academic capacities. To be honest, the situation makes me feel very worried and anxious about the next step I need to take after graduation, not only in Japan but also elsewhere.

### **Facing the New Normalcy, with Uncertainty and Unpredictability**

Apart from my personal complaints about the disruptive effects of the coronavirus on my everyday life, the crisis is swamping the whole world, and the world has literally turned upside down. Terms such as: 'shielding', 'closing', 'blocking', 'quarantine', 'self-isolation', 'physical and social distancing' have become part of the everyday vernacular for every single one of us. It is thereby not surprising to see that the act of isolating, and the conditions of being isolated, have extended from an individual level to a national and international level. Just as we are isolating ourselves from each other to prevent infection, so too are countries isolating themselves from each other. Many governments have suspended air and sea travel to and from their territories. Borders are closed, and almost all domestic and international flights have been halted suddenly around the globe. No one can deny that distancing ourselves from each other is now considered a commonly shared norm and rule. Hence it becomes 'the new normal' for all of us.

Looking at the emergence of the new normalcy or normalcies, I now feel perplexed and confused once again about the meanings of 'internationalization', 'globalization' and

‘diversity’, which are the major concepts that I have borrowed, cited, used and analyzed for this thesis. The world in lockdown does not look like a globalizing world anymore. Internationalization seems likely to be instantly replaced with de-internationalization. What concerns me most is that as a significant driving force to disseminate, proliferate, and promote ‘diversity’, the cross-border migration of people seems likely to be discouraged. Even if we can expect countries to eventually reopen their borders to let people in for tourism and business when the spread of the virus is under control, it seems highly likely that for years to come, all countries’ ‘permission to disembark of voyagers’ will remain more restrictive and selective and will, to some degree, be based on country and/or region under new rules of quarantine. Moreover, it is more than likely that we will witness an increase in concerning trends such as anti-Asian hate crimes directed at particularly Chinese and East Asian communities as we have seen reported in the global media recently during the pandemic.

The worst part of this is that no one has an idea how or when the terrible crisis will end. No one can really predict what exactly will happen next, and what the post-coronavirus world will look like. As the world struggles through a period of uncertainty and unpredictable times, there is not much room for people to make any definitive decisions regarding the future. If there is any hope for us to return to what we used to be, it is only in finding a vaccine for the virus. However, can we really find a vaccine in the near future, and if so, when will it arrive? If the quest for a vaccine fails, what should we do? How should we live? Are we simply destined to live with the constant threat of the virus forever?

## **Seizing a ‘Transformative Present’, Seeking a New Research Agenda in a Post-Pandemic World**

In the conclusion of this thesis, I offered a quote from Rebecca Solnit’s book ‘Hope in the Dark’ (2016). There, I placed emphasis on the significance of pondering a new possibility as a kind of hope. And with such new possibilities we need to make choices, choices that represent ‘openings’. Undoubtedly throughout this thesis, when I talked about the possibility and choices with openings, primarily I focused on contemporary Japan rather than other societies, and discussed the possibility and choices that contemporary Japanese society needs to ponder and make in order to change, breaking away from all kinds of fixed ideas, notions, and beliefs. This is simply because Japan is a society that I am academically interested in, and the major topics in this thesis that I argue for and against are purposely and deliberately limited to Japanese society for the purpose of completing this study.

Reflecting on this journey, I have come to realize that just as we learn and understand how personal issues are inextricably linked with public issues through a lens of the “sociological imagination” (Mills 1959), so too can we learn and understand how a single country’s issues are also inseparably linked with global issues. At this point, I believe it is becoming important for us, including me in academia, to pursue the development of a ‘global imagination’ in order to more deeply understand the interplay between one country and another, and the interconnectedness of our world. Here, I would like to call the ‘global imagination’ of ‘Global Studies’ not as a new academic field of study but as a new ‘quality of mind’ (Mills 2000, 4) which can help us break free from a fixed location of knowledge and information in which we feel too much ‘familiarity’, and encourage us to journey around more widely and be more globally engaged.

To be honest, when I started my PhD journey as a new doctoral student in the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, I did not really appreciate the value of Global Studies. Moreover, I did not fully grasp the contour of Global Studies either. However, once I started to understand the significance of Global Studies in a real sense, and as an early career researcher, I came to the realization that I can develop new research based on a very valuable approach and perspective.

Even though the present time is a very difficult period for all of us during this pandemic, it is not all doom and gloom. We will continue to have opportunities to think, dream, and imagine something new, and, at the same time pursue new things and enact changes. I believe ‘the present’ at which we live can be called a ‘transformative present’, which is a term that I borrow once again from Rebecca Solnit (2009, 203; 2016, 121). The transformative present may refer to “the present that can be changeable”, and “the present that has possibilities to be changed” (Tomiyama 2014). I am in a vortex of crisis at the present time. With uncertainty and unpredictability, the present is a swirling mixture feelings about my present and future. However, being in a present vortex of crisis is not simply swapping my life with confusion and anxiety, but rather it represents a new possibility, and it can be a new possibility of hope, at which I can make choices and the choices can change many things, because the choices are also ‘opening’.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abella, Manolo. "Global Competition for Skilled Workers and Consequences." In *Competing for Global Talent*, edited by Christiane Kuptsch and Eng Fong Pang, 11-32. Geneva: International Labor Office (ILO), 2006.
- ADBI, OECD, and ILO. "Labor Migration, Skills, and Student Mobility in Asia ". Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014.
- . "Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia." Japan: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2015.
- Aiden, Hardeep Singh. "Creating the “Multicultural Coexistence” Society: Central and Local Government Policies Towards Foreign Residents ". *Social Science Japan Journal* 14, no. 2 (2011): 213-31.
- Akashi, Junichi. "New Aspects of Japan’s Immigration Policies: Is Population Decline Opening the Doors?". *Contemporary Japan* 26, no. 2 (2014): 175-96.
- Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2015.
- Altbach, Philip G. "The New Internationalism: Foreign Students and Scholars." *Studies in Higher Education* 14, no. 2 (1989): 125-36.

———. "Peripheries and Centers: Research Universities in Developing Countries." *Asia Pacific Education Review* 10 (2009): 15-27.

Altbach, Philip G, and Patti McGill Peterson. "Higher Education as a Projection of America's Soft Power." In *Soft Power Superpowers : Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*, edited by Yasushi Watanabe and David L McConnell, 37-53. New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2008.

Anholt, Simon. *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Arai, Andrea Gevurtz. *The Strange Child: Education and the Psychology of Patriotism in Recessionary Japan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Arimoto, Akira. "Japan's Internationalization of Higher Education: A Response to the Pressures of Globalization.". In *Crossing Borders in East Asian Higher Education*, edited by David W Chapman, William K Cummings and Gerard A Postiglione. *Cerc Studies in Comparative Education*,, 195-210. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010.

Aronczyk, Melissa. *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity*. Oxford Oxford University Press, 2013.

Arthur, Lore, Elizabeth McNess, and Michael Crossley. "Positioning Insider-Outsider Research in the Contemporary Context." In *Revisiting Insider-*

*Outsider Research in Comparative and International Education*, edited by Michael Crossley, Lore Arthur and Elizabeth McNess, 11-20. Oxford: Symposium Books, 2016.

Aspinall, Robert W. "Education Reform in Japan in an Era of Internationalization and Risk." In *CRR Discussion Paper Series*, 1-20: Center for Risk Research Faculty of Economics Shiga University, Shiga, Japan, 2010.

AUIDF (Australian Universities International Directors' Forum. "International Employment Outcomes : Where Are They Now?". Australia IEAA (International Education Association of Australia), 2017.

Aya, Yoshida. "'Global Human Resource Development' and Japanese University Education: 'Localism' in Actor Discussions\*." *Educational Studies in Japan: International Yearbook* 11, no. March (2017): 83-99.

Becker, Rosa, and Renze Kolster. "International Student Recruitment: Policies and Developments in Selected Countries." Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education, 2012.

Befu, Harumi. "Conditions of Living Together (Kyōsei)." In *Japan's Diversity Dilemmas : Ethnicity, Citizenship and Education*, edited by Soo Im Lee, Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu and Harumi Befu, 1-10. New York, Lincoln and Shanghai: iUniverse, Inc, 2006.

Bolsmann, Chris, and Henry Miller. "International Student Recruitment to Universities in England: Discourse, Rationales and Globalisation." *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 6, no. 1 (2008): 75-88.

Bommes, Michael, and Ewa T Morawska, eds. *International Migration Research: Constructions, Omissions, and the Promises of Interdisciplinarity*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005.

Bradley, William S. "Multicultural Coexistence in Japan: Follower, Innovator, or Reluctant Late Adopter?". In *Multiculturalism and Conflict Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific*, edited by Kosuke Shimizu and William S Bradley, 21-43. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Breaden, Jeremy. "Global Attributes or Local Literacy? International Students in Japan's Graduate Employment System." *Japan Forum* 26, no. 4 (2014): 417-40.

———. "'Global Human Capital': A Japanese Dilemma." In *Globalizing Japan : Striving to Engage the World*, edited by Ross Mouer. Melbourne Trans Pacific Press 2015.

———. *Articulating Asia in Japanese Higher Education: Policy, Partnership and Mobility*. London and New York Routledge, 2018.

Brettell, Caroline B, and James F Hollifield, eds. *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*. New York and London: Routledge 2000.

Brown, Howard. "Contextual Factors Driving the Growth of Undergraduate English-Medium Instruction Programmes at Universities in Japan." *The Asian Journal of Applied Linguistics* 1, no. 1 (2014): 50-63.

Brown, Phillip. "Skill Formation in the Twenty-First Century." In *High Skills: Globalization, Competitiveness, and Skill Formation: Globalization, Competitiveness, and Skill Formation*, edited by Phillip Brown, Andy Green and Hugh Lauder, 1-55. Oxford Oxford University Press, 2001.

Bryman, Alan. *Social Research Methods*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Burgess, Chris. "National Identity and the Transition from Internationalization to Globalization: "Cool Japan" or "Closed Japan"?. In *Languages and Identities in a Transitional Japan*, edited by Ikuko Nakane, Emi Otsuji and William S Armour, 15-36. New York and London: Routledge, 2015.

Burgess, Chris, Ian Gibson, Jay Klaphake, and Mark Selzer. "The 'Global 30' Project and Japanese Higher Education Reform: An Example of a 'Closing In' or an 'Opening Up'?. *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 8, no. 4 (2010): 461-75.

Business Roundtable. "State of Immigration : How the United States Stacks up in the Global Talent Competition ": Business Roundtable 2015.

Byun, Kiyong., and Sangheon. Um. "The Regionalization of Higher Education in Northeast Asia." In *Emerging Internatioanl Dimensions in East Asian Higher Education* edited by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Arthur Meerman and Kazuo Kuroda, 121-43. Dordrecht Springer 2014.

Cannon, Tara. "Transitions in Japan's National Branding: Recent Developments and Potential Future Directions to Facilitate Small Business Entries Overseas." *YNU Journal of University of Education*, no. 2 (2012): 107-20.

Castles, Stephen. *Ethnicity and Globalization*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage 2000.

———. "Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 10 (2010): 1565-86.

Castles, Stephen, Hein De Haas, and Mark J Miller. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Castles, Stephen, and Mark J Miller. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Fourth ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2009.

Chadderton, Charlotte, and Harry Torrance. "Case Study." In *Theory and Methods in Social Research*, edited by Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, 53-68. London: Sage, 2012.

Chapman, David. "Discourses of Multicultural Coexistence (Tabunka Kyōsei) and the 'Old-Comer' Korean Residents of Japan." *Asian Ethnicity* 7, no. 1 (2006): 89-102.

Chapple, Julian "'Global Jinzai,' Japanese Higher Education and the Path to Multiculturalism: Imperative, Imposter or Immature?" In *Working Paper Series, Studies on Multicultural Societies* 1-14: Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Shiga, Japan 2013.

Cheng, Ying, Qi Wang, and Nian Cai Liu. "How World-Class Universities Affect Global Higher Education." In *How World-Class Universities Affect Global Higher Education*, edited by Ying Cheng, Qi Wang and Nian Cai Liu, 1-10. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014.

Chia, Charles Sheng-Kai "Higher Education Scholarship as a Soft Power Tool: An Analysis of Its Role in the Eu and Singapore." Singapore: EU Centre in Singapore 2015.

Chizuko, Hayakawa "Japan's Recent Developments in Immigration Law and Policy: Reform on the Admission System of Highly Skilled Professionals, Technical Interns, and Domestic Worker." In *17th ILERA World Congress*, 1-16. Cape Town, Republic Of South Africa, 2015.

Choi, Tae-Hee. "Glocalisation of English Language Education: Comparison of Three

Contexts in East Asia." In *Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives on Education in the Asia-Pacific Region*, edited by Chi-Ming Lam and Jae Park, 147-64. Singapore: Springer, 2016.

Chukyoshin. "Kitaisaseru Ningenzo (The Image of the Desired Japanese)." In *Sengo Kyoiku No Nakako Doutoku Shukyo*, edited by Shigeki Kaizuka. Tokyo: Bunka Shobo Hakubunsha, 1966.

Chung, Erin Aeran. "Korea and Japan's Multicultural Models for Immigrant Incorporation." *Korea Observer* 41, no. 4 (2010a): 649-76.

———. *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010b.

Conrad, Harald, and Hendrik Meyer-Ohle. "Overcoming the Ethnocentric Firm?—Foreign Fresh University Graduate Employment in Japan as a New International Human Resource Development Method." *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 30, no. 17 (2019): 2525-43.

Committee of Promotion of Developing Global Human Resource by the Industry-Academic Cooperation. "*Sangaku-Kan Ni Yoru Gurobaru Jinzai No Ikusei No Tame No Senryaku* (The Strategy for Developing Global Human Resources by the Industry-Academia-Government Cooperation)." 2010.

Cornelius, Wayne A, and Takeyuki Tsuda. "Controlling Immigraiton: The Limits of Government Intervention." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global*

*Perspective*, edited by Wayne A Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L Marin and James F Hollifield, 3-48. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative. "Asian Gateway Initiative ": Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative 2007.

Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. "The Report of the Special Board of Inquiry for Examining “Japan’s 21st Century Vision”." Tokyo: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2005.

Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development. "An Interim Report of the Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development." 2011.

Crowther, Paul, Michael Joris, Matthias Otten, Bengt Nilsson, Hanneke Teekens, and Bernd Wächter. *Internationalisation at Home: A Position Paper*. Amsterdam: EAIE (European Association for International Education), 2000.

D'Costa, Anthony P. *International Mobility, Global Capitalism, and Changing Structures of Accumulation: Transforming the Japan-India It Relationship*. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.

Daliot-Bul, Michal. "Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of ‘Cool Japan’ and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age." *Social science Japan journal* 12, no. 2 (2009): 247-66.

David, Matthew, and Carole D Sutton. *Social Research: An Introduction*. Second ed. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi: Sage, 2011.

De Wit, Hans. "The Consequences of Internationalisation Rankings." *University World News*, 03 June 2016 2016. Accessed June 23, 2020, <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160530145212764>

Dinnie, Keith. "Japan's Nation Branding: Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths." 1-14, 2008.  
———. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2016.

Dobson, Hugo. "Is Japan Really Back? The "Abe Doctrine" and Global Governance." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47, no. 2 (2017): 199-224.

Dooley, Howard. "The Commodification of International Education." *Center for the Study of Ethics in Society Papers*, no. Paper 74 (2006).

Douglass, Mike. "The Singularities of Female Migration to Japan: Past, Present and Future." In *Japan and Global Migration : Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*, edited by Mike Douglass and Glenda S Roberts, 91-119. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

———. "Global Householding in Pacific Asia." *International Development Planning Review* 28, no. 4 (2006): 421-45.

———. "Global Householding and Social Reproduction: Migration Research, Dynamics and Public Policy in East and Southeast Asia." ARI (Asia Research Institute), National University of Singapore 2012.

Eades, Jeremy S. "Dimensions of Internationalization : Some Japanese Case Studies." Chap. 5 In *The Impact of Internationalization on Japanese Higher Education : Is Japanese Education Really Changing?*, edited by John Mock, Hiroaki Kawamura and Naeko Naganuma, 71-90. Rotterdam, Boston and Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2016.

Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. "Building Theories from Case Study Research." *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 4 (1989): 532-50.

Etzkowitz, Henry. *The Triple Helix: University–Industry–Government Innovation and Entrepreneurship*. 1st ed. New York Routledge, 2008.

Faier, Lieba. *Intimate Encounters : Filipina Women and the Remaking of Rural Japan*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2009.

Findlay, Allan; King, Russell; Stam, Alexandra "Producing International Student Migration: An Exploration of the Role of Marketization in Shaping International Study Opportunities." Chap. 2 In *Rethinking International Skilled Migration*, edited by Micheline; Wang Van Riemsdijk, Qingfang 19-35. Abingdon: Routledge 2017.

Geddie, Kate. "Policy Mobilities in the Race for Talent: Competitive State Strategies in International Student Mobility." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 40, no. 2 (2015): 235-48.

Global Human Resource Development Committee. "*San-Gaku- Kan De Gurobaru- Jinzai No Ikusei Wo* (Global Human Resource Development through Industry-Academia-Government)." 2010.

Glosserman, Brad. "Japan: From Muddle to Model?". *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2014): 39-53.

Green, David. "Japan's Highly Skilled Foreign Professional Visa: An Early Assessment ". *Meiji Journal of Political Science and Economics* 3 (2014): 11-22.

———. "Low Benefit with a High Cost: An Assessment of Japan's Highly Skilled Foreign Professional Visa." *The Nagoya Journal of Law and Politics (Nagoya Daigaku Hoseiron-syu)* 269 (2017): 405-32.

Hadley, Gregory. "Relating the Curriculum to Regional Concerns: A Japanese Case Study." *GEMA Online Journal of Language Studies* 3, no. 2 (2003).

Hall, Ivan P. *Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop*. New York and London: W.W Norton & Company, 1998a.

———. 知の鎖国—外国人を排除する日本の知識人産業. Translated by Chikara

鈴木主税 Suzuki. Tokyo: 毎日新聞社, 1998b.

Hall, Stuart "The Multicultural Question." In *Un/Settled Multiculturalism: Diasporas, Entanglements* edited by Stuart Hall, 209-41. London: Zed Books, 2000.

Harada, George R. "Promoting International Education and Adapting to the Effects of Globalization: The Issues Involved in Developing Globally-Oriented Human Resources in Japan." *Hiroshima Keizaidai-gaku Kenkyu Ronshu* (広島経済大学研究論集) 41, no. 1 (2018): 1-21.

Harada, Mariko. "Support for the Employment of International Students: Its Current Situation and Challenges Based on My Consulting Experience." [In Japanese ]. *Migration Policy Review* 2 (2010): 40-58.

Hartley, Jean F. "Case Studies in Organizational Research." In *Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research: A Practical Guide*, edited by Cathy Cassell and Gillian Symon, 209-29. London: Sage, 1994.

Hashimoto, Kayoko. "The Japanisation of English Language Education : Promotion of the National Language within Foreign Language Policy." In *Language Policies in Education: Critical Issues*, edited by James W Tollefson, 175-90. New York: Routledge 2012.

Hawthorne, Leslyanne. "The Growing Global Demand for Students as Skilled

Migrants." Paper presented at the Transatlantic Council on Migration's Second Plenary Meeting, New York, 2008.

———. "Attracting and Retaining International Students as Skilled Migrants." In *High-Skilled Migration : Drivers and Policies* edited by Mathias Czaika, 195-221. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Hazelkorn, Ellen. "Globalization, Internationalization, and Rankings." *International Higher Education, Internationalization* (2008): 8-11.

Hennings, Matthias, and Scott Mintz. "Japan's Measures to Attract International Students and the Impact of Student Mobility on the Labor Market." *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies* 7, no. March (2015): 241-51.

Heywood, Andrew. *Political Ideologies : An Introduction*. 4th ed. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Horio, Teruhisa. *Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan : State Authority and Intellectual Freedom*. Translated by Steven Platzer. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988.

Hugo, Graeme. "Demographic Change and International Labour Mobility in Asia-Pacific-Implications for Business and Regional Economic Integration: Synthesis." In *Labour Mobility in the Asia-Pacific Region: Dynamics, Issues and a New Apec Agenda: A Survey and Analyses of Governance Challenges on Labour Migration for Apec Economies*, edited by Graeme Hugo and

- Soogil Young, 1-61. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.
- Iida, Yumiko. *Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics*.  
London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
- IIE. "Open Doors 2014." New York: Institute for International Education, 2015.  
———. "A World on the Move : Trends in Global Student Mobility." 2017.
- Industry-Academia Partnership for Human Resource Development. "*Kongo No Torikumi No Hokosei Ni Tsuite* (Directions for Future Efforts)." 2009.
- Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters "*Nihon Burando Senryaku No Suishin — Miryokuaru Nihon O Sekai Ni Hasshin* (Promoting Japan's Brand Strategy: Delivering the Attractive Japan to the World)." 1-29, 2005.
- IPSS. "Population Projections for Japan (January 2012): 2011 to 2060." National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in Japan (IPSS). 2012  
———. "Population Projections for Japan (2017): 2016 to 2065." National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in Japan (IPSS). 2017.
- Iredale, Robyn. "The Migration of Professionals: Theories and Typologies."  
*International Migration* 39, no. 5 (2001): 7-26.  
———. "High-Skilled Migration." In *Encyclopedia of Migration*, edited by Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown, 1-10. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2016.

ISAJ (Immigration Services Agency of Japan). "Initiatives to Accept New Foreign Nationals and for the Realization of Society of Harmonious Coexistence." 2019a.

———. "国籍・地域別高度外国人材の在留者数の推移 (the Highly Skilled Professional Visa Holders by Nationality and Regions)." Immigration Services Agency of Japan, 2019b.

Ishi, Angelo Akimitsu. "Between Privilege and Prejudice: Japanese-Brazilian Migrants in ‘the Land of Yen and the Ancestors’." In *Transcultural Japan: At the Borderlands of Race, Gender, and Identity*, edited by David Blake Willis and Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, 113-34. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

Ishii, Chihiro. *Globalizing Households and Multi-Ethnic Community Building in Japan, Working Paper No.2010/67*. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), 2010.

Ishikawa, Mayumi. "Redefining Internationalization in Higher Education: Global 30 and the Making of Global Universities in Japan." In *Reimagining Japanese Education: Borders, Transfers, Circulations, and the Comparative*, edited by David Blake Willis and Jeremy Rapple, 193-223. Oxford: Symposium Books, 2011.

Iwabuchi, Koichi. "Multinationalizing the Multicultural: The Commodification of ‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese Tv Talk Show." *Japanese Studies*

25, no. 2 (2005): 103-18.

———. "Cultural Citizenship and Prospects for Japan as a Multicultural Nation." In *Transnational Trajectories in East Asia*, edited by Yasemin Nuhoglu Soyal, 239-53. London and New York Routledge 2015.

Iwasaki, Kaori. "Singapore's Strategies for Attracting Highly-Skilled Foreign Human Resources: How Does Singapore Recruit Foreign Talent?". *RIM Pacific Business and Industries* 15, no. 56 (2015): 2-27.

James-MacEachern, Melissa. "A Comparative Study of International Recruitment—Tensions and Opportunities in Institutional Recruitment Practice." *Journal of Marketing for Higher Education* 28, no. 2 (2018): 247-65.

JASSO. "International Students in Japan 2015." edited by Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2016a.

———. "2016-2017 Student Guide to Japan ": Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2016b.

———. "International Students in Japan 2016." edited by Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2017a.

———. "Job Hunting Guide for International Students 2018." Japan Student Services Organization 2017b.

———. "International Students in Japan 2017." edited by Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2018a.

———. "Job Hunting Guide for International Students 2019." Japan Student Services Organization 2018b.

- . "Job Hunting Guide for International Students 2020.", 2019a.
- . "International Students in Japan 2018." edited by Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2019b.
- Kakuchi, Suvendrini. "Push for Foreign Students to Stay on to Work in Japan." *University World News*, 17 March 2017 2017. Accessed June 23, 2020, <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20170316184126205>.
- Kaneva, Nadia. "Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research." *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011): 117-41.
- Kantei. "*Kontentsu KyoKa Senmon ChoSa-Kai (Dai 9-Kai) Gijiroku* [the Minutes of the Contents Business Research Group 9th Meeting]." 2011.
- . "*Kontentsu KyoKa Senmon ChoSa-Kai (Dai 1-Kai) Gijiroku* [the Minutes of Contents Business Research Group 1st Meeting].", 2012.
- Kashiwazaki, Chikako. "Incorporating Immigrants as Foreigners: Multicultural Politics in Japan." *Citizenship studies* 17, no. 1 (2013): 31-47.
- Keller, Scott, and Mary Meaney. "Attracting and Retaining the Right Talent." (2017). Accessed June 23, 2020, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/attracting-and-retaining-the-right-talent>.
- Kerr, Sari Pekkala, William Kerr, Çağlar Özden, and Christopher Parsons. "Global

Talent Flows." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30, no. 4 (2016): 83-106.

Kerr, William R. *The Gift of Global Talent: How Migration Shapes Business, Economy & Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018.

Kim, Nam-Kook. "Multicultural Challenges in Korea: The Current Stage and a Prospect." *International Migration* 52, no. 3 (2009): 100-21.

Kimio, Ito "The Invention of Wa and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shotoku in Modern Japan." In *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan (Twentieth Century Japan: The Emergence of a World Power)*, edited by Stephen Vlastos, 37-47. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998.

King, Russell, and Parvati Raghuram. "International Student Migration: Mapping the Filed and New Research Agendas." *Population, Space and Place* 19 (2013): 127-37.

Knight, Jane. "Internationalization Remodeled: Definition, Approaches, and Rationales." *Journal of Studies in International Education* 8, no. 1 (2004): 5-31.

———. "The Limits of Soft Power in Higher Education." *University World News*, 31 January 2014. Accessed June 23, 2020, <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20140129134636725>

———. "Global: Moving from Soft Power to Knowledge Diplomacy." In *Understanding Higher Education Internationalization : Insights from Key Global Publications* edited by Georgiana Mihut, Philip G Altbach and Hans De Wit, 381-82. Rotterdam, Boston and Taipei Sense Publishers, 2017.

Knight, Jane, and Hans de Wit. "Strategies for the Internationalisation of Higher Education: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives." In *Strategies for the Internationalisation of Higher Education. A Comparative Study of Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States of America*, edited by Hans de Wit, 5-32. Amsterdam: European Association for International Education(EAIE), 1995.

Kodama, Takashi "Japan's Immigration Problem : Looking at Immigration through the Experience of Other Countries " Daiwa Institute of Research 2015.

Kolmaš, Michal. *National Identity and Japanese Revisionism: Abe Shinzo's Vision of a Beautiful Japan and Its Limits*. London and New York: Routledge, 2019.

Komai, Hiroshi *Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan*. Translated by Jens Wilkinson. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001.

Komine, Ayako. "When Migrants Became Denizens : Understanding Japan as a Reactive Immigration Country ". *Contemporary Japan* 26, no. 2 (2014): 197-222.

Kōu, Anu, Leo van Wissen, Jouke van Dijk, and Ajay Bailey. "A Life Course Approach to High-Skilled Migration: Lived Experiences of Indians in the Netherlands." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 10 (2015): 1644-63.

Koyama, Kaoru, and Masataka Okamoto. "Introduction : Migrants, Migrant Workers, Refugees and Japan's Immigration Policy." In *Ngo Report Regarding the Rights of Non-Japanese Nationals, Minorities of Foreign Origins, and Refugees in Japan*, edited by Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ), 3-6. Tokyo: Solidarity Networks with Migrants Japan (SMJ), 2010.

Kuroda, Kazuo, Miki Sugimura, Yuto Kitamura, and Sarah Asada. "Internationalization of Higher Education and Student Mobility in Japan and Asia, Background Paper Prepared for the 2019 Global Education Monitoring(Gem) Report - Migration, Displacement and Education: Building Bridges, Not Walls." 1-57: UNESCO and JICA, 2018.

Kuwamura, Akira. "The Challenges of Increasing Capacity and Diversity in Japanese Higher Education through Proactive Recruitment Strategies." *Journal of Studies in International Education* 13, no. 2 (2009): 189-202.

Kwon, Daesung. "Rethinking Student Migration in Japan as a Non-Immigration Country in the Context of Aging Society and Immigration." In *Parallel Sessions for Students & Early Career Researchers, Memorial Seminar for the*

- 10th Anniversary of CHEER* Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan, 2017a.
- . "Is Multicultural Korea a Feasible Vision for the Future Korean Society? Questioning the Korean Multicultural Model of Immigrant Incorporation." *Journal of Global Studies* Vol.8 (2017b): 115-39.
- Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Lane, Jason E, and Kevin Kinser. "Rankings, Higher Education Internationalization and National Strategies: Trade-Offs, Policy Levers and (Un)Intended Outcomes." In *Global Rankings and the Geopolitics of Higher Education*, edited by Ellen Hazelkorn, 258-74. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Leach, Robert. *Political Ideology in Britain*. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Lee, Soo Im. "Myths, Beliefs, and Implications of Japan's Naturalization Policy." Chap. 2 In *Japan's Demographic Revival : Rethinking Migration, Identity and Sociocultural Norms*, edited by Stephen Robert Nagy, 41-61. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2016.
- Lévi-Straus, Claude *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1987.
- Li, Jun. "World-Class Higher Education and the Emerging Chinese Model of the University." *Quarterly Review of Comparative Education* 42, no. 3 (2012):

319-39.

Liodakis, Nikolaos, and Vic Satzewich. "From Solution to Problem: Multiculturalism and " Race Relations" as New Social Problems." In *Power and Resistance : Critical Thinking About Canadian Social Issues*, edited by Antony Wayne and Les Samuelson, 145-68. Halifax: Fernwood Press, 2003.

Liu, Yang "To Stay or Leave? Migration Decisions of Foreign Students in Japan." In *RIETI Discussion Paper Series 1-18: RIETI (The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry)*, 2016.

Liu-Farrer, Gracia. "Educationally Channeled International Labor Mobility: Contemporary Student Migration from China to Japan." *International migration review* 43, no. 1 (2009): 178-204.

———. *Labor Migration from China to Japan: International Students, Transnational Migrants*. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.

Lomer, Sylvie. *Recruiting International Students in Higher Education: Representations and Rationales in British Policy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Lowell, Lindsay, and Jeanne Batalova. "International Migration of Highly Skilled Workers: Methodological and Public Policy Issues." Paper presented at the Population Association of America 2005 Annual Meeting Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005.

Mannari, Hiroshi, and Harumi Befu, eds. *The Challenge of Japan's*

*Internationalization : Organization and Culture* Tokyo and New York:

Kwansei Gakuin University and Kodansha International Ltd., 1981.

Marginson, Simon, and Mark Considine. *The Enterprise University: Power,*

*Governance and Reinvention in Australia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2000.

Maruyama, Hideki. "International Student Policy of Japan." National Institute for

Educational Policy Research, 2011.

Matsui, Takeshi. "Nation Branding through Stigmatized Popular Culture: The "Cool

Japan" Craze among Central Ministries in Japan." *Hitotsubashi Journal of*

*Commerce and Management* 48, no. 1 (2014): 81-97.

McConnell, David L. *Importing Diversity : Inside Japan's Jet Program.* Berkeley,

Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2000.

McGray, Douglas. "Japan's Gross National Cool." *Foreign policy* 130, no. 1 (2002):

44-54.

MEXT. "Regarding the Establishment of an Action Plan to Cultivate "Japanese with

English" Abilities." edited by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science

and Technology, 2003.

- . "Monbu Kagaku Sho Ni Okeru Kokusai Senryaku (*Teigen*) (International Strategies at MEXT)." edited by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2005
- . "Working Group Report on Advancing the Establishment of Sufficient Housing for International Students in Japan Towards Realizing the“300,000 International Students Plan”." 2014.
- . "English Education Reform Plan Corresponding to Globalization." edited by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2014.
- . "Plans on the Promotion of Improvement of Students' English Abilities." edited by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2015.
- . "Project for Establishing University Network for Internationalization-Global 30 ", 2017
- . "外国人留学生の就職促進について (外国人留学生の就職に関する課題等)." 2018.
- . "外国人留学生の就職促進について (留学生の採用・定着における現状・課題)." 2019.

Michaels, Ed, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod. *The War for Talent* Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.

Milligan, Lizzi O. "Insider-Outsider-Inbetweener? Researcher Positioning, Participative Methods and Cross-Cultural Educational Research." Chap. 7 In *Revisiting Insider-Outsider Research in Comparative and International Education*, edited by Michael Crossley, Lore Arthur and Elizabeth McNess,

131-43. Oxford: Symposium Books, 2016.

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. "Demographic Survey 2018 (平成29年人口動態調査)." edited by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2018.

Mohrman, Kathryn, Wanhua Ma, and David Baker. "The Research University in Transition: The Emerging Global Model." *Higher education policy* 21, no. 1 (2008): 5-27.

MOJ. "The Results of Re-Examination of the Preferential Treatment for Highly Skilled Professionals in Immigration Procedures under the Points Systems (in Japanese)." 2013.

———. "2015 Basic Plan for Immigration Policy ", edited by Japan Ministry of Justice, 2015a.

———. "The 2015 Immigration Control Report ", 2015b.

———. "The Number of Foreign Resident in Japan by Nationality ", 2016.

Mori, Yoshitaka. "The Pitfall Facing the Cool Japan Project: The Transnational Development of the Anime Industry under the Condition of Post-Fordism." *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 20, no. 1 (2011): 30-42.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. *Hihanteki Sozoryoku No Tame Ni: Gurobaruka Jidai No Nihon (in Search of Critical Imagination: Japan in an Age of Globalization)*. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2002a.

———. "Immigration and Citizenship in Contemporary Japan." In *Japan: Change and Continuity*, edited by Jeffrey Graham and Hideaki Miyajima, 163-78. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002b.

———. *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era, And: Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. Mouer, Ross. "Positioning Japan for the Twenty-First Century." In *Globalizing Japan: Striving to Engage the World*, edited by Ross Mouer, 1-24. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2015.

Mukae, Ryuji. *Japan's Refugee Policy : To Be of the World*. Fucecchio: European Press Academic Publishing, 2001.

Murakami, Yukiko. 人材の国際移動とイノベーション Tokyo: NTT出版, 2015.

Murphy, Michael *Multiculturalism : A Critical Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

McVeigh, Brian J. *Nationalisms of Japan : Managing and Mystifying Identity* Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2006.

NAFSA. "Nafsa (the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers)'S International Student Economic Value Tool." Accessed June 23, 2020,

<http://www.nafsa.org>.

Nagamatsu, Toshifumi. "Globalization and Higher Education in Japan : Developing Global Human Resources ". *International Journal of Business and Management Studies* 2, no. 1 (2013): 345-49.

Nakane, Ikuko, Emi Otsuji, and William S Armour. *Languages and Identities in a Transitional Japan: From Internationalization to Globalization*. New York and London: Routledge, 2015.

Narangoa, Li. "Japanese Orphans from China: History and Identity in a " Returning" Migrant Community." *East Asian History* 25/26 (2003): 141-60.

Nguyen, Phuong-Mai, Julian G Elliott, Cees Terlouw, and Albert Pilot. "Neocolonialism in Education: Cooperative Learning in an Asian Context." *Comparative Education* 45, no. 1 (2009): 109-30.

Nye, Joseph. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

———. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 94-109.

OECD. "International Mobility of the Highly Skilled ". Paris: OECD, 2001.

———. "The Global Competition for Talent : Mobility of the Highly Skilled ": OECD, 2008.

- . "International Migration Outlook 2014." OECD, 2014.
- . *OECD Territorial Reviews : Japan 2016*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016.
- . *Education at a Glance 2018: OECD Indicators*. OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2018.

Ohtsuki, Shigemi. "Coexistent Society in Japan." In *Japanese Perceptions of Foreigners*, edited by Shunsuke Tanabe, 42-55. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2013.

- . "Determinants of Open Attitudes Towards Foreign Nationals in Japan." *Societies Without Borders* 12, no. 2 (2018): 1-24.

Oishi, Nana. *Women in Motion : Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia*. Sandford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

- . "Redefining the “Highly Skilled”": The Points-Based System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals in Japan." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 23, no. 4 (2014): 421-50.

Okada, Akito. *Education Policy and Equal Opportunity in Japan*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books 2012.

Okada, Yutaka "Japan's Foreign Population Hitting a Record High: The Government Announces the Acceptance of More Foreign Workers." MRI(Mizuho Research Institute), 2018.

Onai, Toru "Kyosei Gainen No Saikento to Aratana Shiten: Shisutemu Kyosei to

*Seikatsu Kyosei* (Rethinking the Concept of Conviviality and the New Perspective: Conviviality in the Organized System and Conviviality in the Labor Life World)." *Hokkaido Daigaku Kyoiku Gakubu kiyo (Bulletin of the Faculty of Education, Hokkaido University)* 79 (1999): 123-44.

Ota, Hiroshi. "Japanese Universities' Strategic Approach to Internationalization : Accomplishments and Challenges." In *Emerging International Dimensions in East Asian Higher Education* edited by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Arthur Meerman and Kazuo Kuroda, 227-52. Dordrecht Springer, 2014.

Parekh, Bhikhu. "Three Theories of Immigration." In *Strangers and Citizens: A Positive Approach to Migrants and Refugees*, edited by Sarah Spencer, 91-110. London: Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) / River Oram Press 1994.

———. *Rethinking Multiculturalism : Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Second ed. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Park, Yuha. *Hikiage-Ge Bungaku-Ron Josetsu: Aratana Posutokoroniaru E (an Introduction to Repatriation Literature)*. Kyoto: Jimbunshoin, 2016.

Peterson, Patti McGill. "Diplomacy and Education: A Changing Global Landscape." *International Higher Education* 75, no. Spring (2014): 1-5.

PMC. "The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium." Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the

21st Century 2000.

Poole, Gregory S. "'International' Higher Education in Japan : Expanding Intracultural Knowledge or (Re)Defining Intercultural Boundaries?". In *The Impact of Internationalization on Japanese Higher Education: Is Japanese Education Really Changing?*, edited by John Mock, Hiroaki Kawamura and Naeko Naganuma, 202-20. Rotterdam, Boston and Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2016.

Powdermaker, Hortense *Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966.

Prime Minister's Office of Japan. "Japan Revitalization Strategy 2016." Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2016.

Punch, Keith F. *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Second ed. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage 2005.

Raghuram, Parvati. "Theorising the Spaces of Student Migration." *Population, Space and Place* 19 (2013): 138-54.

Sakanaka, Hidenori. *Imin Kokka Nippon* (移民国家ニッポン). Tokyo: Nihonkajoshuppan 2007.

———. "日本型移民社会は可能か (Nihon Gata Iminshakai Wa Kanoka)." *世界(Sekai)* December no. No.915 (2018): 115-31.

Sato, Yuriko. "Revitalization of Regional Areas through an Increase in International Students." Paper presented at the The 1st Asia Future Conference, Bangkok, Thailand 8-10 March 2013.

Satzewich, Vic, and Nikolaos Liodakis. *Race and Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press 2007.

Science Council of Japan. "Japan Vision 2050: Principles of Strategic Science and Technology Policy toward 2020." Science Council of Japan, 2005.

Serizawa, Kensuke. *Konbini Gaikokujin (Foreigners at Convenient Stores)*. Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2018.

Sharma, Namrata. *Makiguchi and Gandhi :Their Educational Relevance for the 21st Century*. Lanham and Plymouth: University Press of America 2008.

She, Qianru, and Terry Wotherspoon. "International Student Mobility and Highly Skilled Migration: A Comparative Study of Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom." *SpringerPlus* 2, no. 132 (2013): 1-14.

Sheftall, M.G. "Kyosei: Cultural Space, Multiculturalism, and the Prospect of a "Post-Homogenous" Japan." Chap. 1 In *Japan's Demographic Revival : Rethinking Migration, Identity and Sociocultural Norms*, edited by Stephen Robert Nagy, 11-39. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2016.

Shibata, Ria. "Japan's Identity Crisis and Sino-Japanese Relations." In *Disasters and Social Crisis in Contemporary Japan: Political, Religious, and Sociocultural Responses* edited by Mark R Mullins and Koichi Nakano, 81-103. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Shields, Robin. *Globalization and International Education*. London, New Delhi, New York and Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013.

Shimada, Haruo. *Japan's "Guest Workers": Issues and Public Policies*. Translated by Roger Northridge. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994.

Shin, Jung Cheol. "The World-Class University: Concepts and Policy Initiatives." Chap. 2 In *Institutionalization of World-Class University in Global Competition* edited by Jung Cheol Shin and Barbara M Kehm, 17-32. New York and London: Springer, 2013.

Shin, Jung Cheol, and Barbara M Kehm. "The World-Class University in Different Systems and Contexts." Chap. 1 In *Institutionalization of World-Class University in Global Competition* edited by Jung Cheol Shin and Barbara M Kehm, 1-13. New York and London: Springer, 2013.

Shinkawa, Toshimitsu. "Substitutes for Immigrants? Social Policy Responses to Population Decreases in Japan." *American Behavioral Scientist* 56, no. 8 (2012): 1123-38.

Shinzo, Abe. "*Utsukushii Kuni E* (Towards a Beautiful Country)." Tokyo: Bungei Shunju (2006).

———. *Atarashii Kuni E (toward a New Country)*. 2nd ed. Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2013.

Shipper, Apichai W. *Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008.

———. "Contesting Foreigners' Rights in Contemporary Japan." *NCJ Int'l L. & Com. Reg.* 505 36 (2010): 505. Accessed June 23, 2020, <https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol36/iss3/1>

Shore, Cris, and Susan Wrigh. "Conceptualising Policy: Technologies of Governance and the Politics of Visibility ". In *Policy Worlds : Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power*, edited by Cris Shore, Susan Wright and Davide Però, 1-25. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011.

Silverman, David. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. Third ed. Los Angeles, London and New Delhi: SAGE 2010.

Smith, Adam. *The Wealth of Nations. Book I-Iii*. Edited by Andrew Skinner. London: Penguin Books, 1776/1999.

Smith, Patrick. *Japan : A Reinterpretation* New York: Vintage Books, 1998.

- Solnit, Rebecca. *A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.
- . *Hope in the Dark: The Untold History of People Power*. Third ed. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016.
- Stigger, Elizabeth "Introduction: Internationalization in Higher Education." In *Internationalization within Higher Education : Perspectives from Japan*, edited by Elizabeth Stigger, Marian Wang, David Laurence and Anna Bordilovskaya, 1-19. Singapore: Springer 2018.
- Suematsu, Kazuko. "「内なる国際化」でグローバル人材を育てる 一国  
際共修を通じたカリキュラムの国際化— *Uchinaru Kokusai-Ka Te Gurobaru  
Jinzai O Sodateru — Kokusai Kyoshs O Toshita Karikyuramu No Kokusai-  
Ka* (the Fostering of Global Talent Via Internationalization at Home -  
Internationalizing the Curriculum through Intercultural Collaborative Co-  
Learning)." 東北大学 高度教養教育・学生支援機構 紀要第 3 (2017): 41-51.
- . "Internationalization at Home - Enhancing Students' Intercultural  
Competence in “Intercultural Collaborative Co-Learning Class”." In *The  
Asian Conference on Education 2018* 219-28. Tokyo, Japan: The  
International Academic Forum (iaFor), 2018.
- Sum, Ngai-Ling, and Bob Jessop. "Competitiveness, the Knowledge-Based Economy  
and Higher Education." *Journal of the Knowledge Economy* 4, no. 1 (2013):  
24-44.

Szondi, Gyorgy. *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2008.

Tai, Eika. "Japanese Immigration Policy at a Turning Point." *Asian and Pacific migration journal* 18, no. 3 (2009): 315-44.

Takaya, Sachi. "Multiculturalism in Japan : A Victory over Assimilationism or Subjection to Neo-Liberalism?". *Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture* 18, no. 3 (2007): 45-57.

Takenaka, Ayumi. "Paradoxes of Ethnicity-Based Immigration : Peruvian and Japanese-Peruvian Migrants in Japan." In *Global Japan : The Experience of Japan's New Immigrant and Overseas Communities*, edited by Roger Goodman, Ceri Peach, Ayumi Takenaka and Paul White, 222-35. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

———. "Ethnic Hierarchy and Its Impact on Ethnic Identities: A Comparative Analysis of Peruvian and Brazilian Return Migrants in Japan." In *Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 260-80. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Tamaki, Taku. "Repackaging National Identity: Cool Japan and the Resilience of Japanese Identity Narratives." *Asian Journal of Political Science* (2019): 1-19.

- Thorsten, Marie. *Superhuman Japan: Knowledge, Nation and Culture in Us-Japan Relations*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Tight, Malcolm. "The Curious Case of Case Study: A Viewpoint." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 13, no. 4 (2010): 329-39.
- . "Globalization and Internationalization as Frameworks for Higher Education Research." *Research Papers in Education* (2019): 1-23.
- Tiryakian, Edward A. "Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically : E Pluribus Unum, Sic Et Non." In *Governance in Multicultural Societies*, edited by John Rex and Gurharpal Singh, 1-18. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
- Tomiyama, Ichiro "Makikoma Reru to Iu Koto ". Kayokai, June 14, 2014, Accessed June 23, 2020, <http://doshisha-aor.net/place/169/>.
- Tourism Agency. "*Heisei 23-Nen Ban Kanko Hakusho (Heisei 23 Edition of Tourism White Paper)*." Tokyo: Tourism Agency, 2011.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki. "Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration." In *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Takeyuki Tsuda, 3-36. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.

Tsuda, Takeyuki, and Wayne A Cornelius. "Japan: Government Policy, Immigrant Reality." *Controlling immigration: A global perspective* 2 (2004): 439-76.

Tsuda, Takeyuki Gaku. "Crossing Ethnic Boundaries: Japanese Brazilian Return Migrants and the Ethnic Challenge of Japan's Newest Immigrant Minority." In *Multiculturalism in the New Japan: Crossing the Borders Within*, edited by Nelson H.H Graburn, John Ertl and R. Kenji Tierney, 117-38. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008.

Tsuya, Noriko. "The Impacts of Population Decline in Japan : Demographic Prospects and Policy Implications." In *Reexamining Japan in Global Context's Fith Seminar*, 1-8. Embassy of Canada, Tokyo: Suntory Foundation 2014.

UN ESCAP. "Asia-Pacific Migration Report 2015: Migrants' Contributions to Development ". United Nations, 2015.

UNESCO-UIS. "Higher Education in Asia: Expanding out, Expanding up, the Rise of Graduate Education and University Research." Montreal: The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2014.

Valaskivi, Katja. "A Brand New Future? Cool Japan and the Social Imaginary of the Branded Nation." *Japan Forum* 25, no. 4 (2013): 485-504.

Van Mol, Christof. "European Mobile Students, (Trans)National Social Networks, and (Inter)National Career Perspectives." In *Rethinking International Skilled*

- Migration*, edited by Micheline Van Riemsdijk and Qingfang Wang, 54-74.  
Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2017.
- Wang, Li-jung. "Multiculturalism in Taiwan." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 10, no. 3 (2004): 301-18.
- Ward, Steven C. *Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education*. New York and London: Routledge, 2012.
- Watanabe, Satoshi P, Machi Sato, and Masataka Murasawa. "State Initiatives on Globalizing Higher Education in Japan." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education* (2018 ).
- Wax, Rosalie H. *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Werner, Oswald, and G. Mark Schoepfle. *Systematic Fieldwork*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987.
- Wojciuk, Anna. "Higher Education as a Soft Power in International Relations." In *Handbook of Cultural Security*, edited by Yasushi Watanabe, 343-60.  
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing 2018.
- Yamada, Reiko. "The Changing Structure of Japanese Higher Education: Globalization, Mobility, and Massification." In *Mobility and Migration in*

*Asian Pacific Higher Education*, edited by Deane E Neubauer and Kazuo Kuroda, 83-102. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012.

Yamaguchi, Rui, and Yutaka Maeda. "Can Japanese Firms Get Along with Highly Skilled Foreign Workers? : Intentions among Former International Students to Settle and Work in Japan." 1-28: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, 2015.

Yamamoto, Beverley A. "The Internationalization of Japanese Higher Education: Incremental Change in a Dynamic Global Environment." In *Japanese Education in a Global Age : Sociological Reflections and Future Directions* edited by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura and Beverley A Yamamoto, 221-39. Singapore: Springer, 2018.

Yamanaka, Keiko. "Citizenship, Immigration and Ethnic Hegemony in Japan." In *Rethinking Ethnicity : Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities*, edited by Eric P Kaufmann, 159-78. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

———. "Japan as a Country of Immigration: Two Decades after an Influx of Immigrant Workers and Spouses." Paper presented at the Transnational Movement of People in East Asia: Japan in Comparative Focus, Japanese Museum of Ethnology (*Minpaku*), May 31-June 3, Osaka, Japan, 2007.

———. "Japan as a Country of Immigration: Two Decades after an Influx of Immigrant Workers." *Senri Ethnological Reports* 77 (2008): 187-96.

Yang, Hui, Peidong Yang, and Shaohua Zhan. "Immigration, Population, and

Foreign Workforce in Singapore: An Overview of Trends, Policies, and Issues." *HSSE Online* 6, no. 1 (2017): 10-21.

Yanow, Dvora. *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis* Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications 2000.

Yazan, Bedrettin. "Three Approaches to Case Study Methods in Education: Yin, Merriam, and Stake." *The qualitative report* 20, no. 2 (2015): 134-52.

———. "Three Approaches to Case Study Methods in Education: Yin, Merriam, and Stake." *The Qualitative Report* 20, no. 2 (2015): 134-52.

Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research : Design and Methods*. Fourth ed. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage, 2009.

Yonezawa, Akiyoshi. "Japanese Flagship Universities at a Crossroads." *Higher Education* 54 (2007): 483-99.

———. "Facing Crisis: Soft Power and Japanese Education in a Global Context." Chap. 4 In *Soft Power Superpowers : Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*, edited by Yasushi Watanabe and David L McConnell, 54-74. New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2008.

———. "The Internationalization of Japanese Higher Education: Policy Debates and Realities." In *Higher Education in the Asia-Pacific : Strategic Responses to Globalization*, edited by Simon Marginson, Sarjit Kaur and Erlenawati Sawir, 329-42. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2011.

———. "Japan's Challenge of Fostering "Global Human Resources": Policy Debates

and Practices ". *Japan Labor Review* 11, no. 2 (2014): 37-52.

Yoshitaka, Ishikawa. "Role of Matchmaking Agencies for International Marriages in Contemporary Japan." *Geographical Review of Japan Series B* 83, no. 1 (2010): 1-14.

Yu, Wan. "Chinese Student Migrants in Transition: A Pathway from International Students to Skilled Migrants." In *Rethinking International Skilled Migration*, edited by Micheline Van Riemsdijk and Qingfang Wang, 93-110. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017.

Zhang, Jie. "The Less Favored Foreigners: Public Attitudes toward Chinese and South Korean Residents in Japan ". *Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies (Waseda University)* 33 (2018): 205-17.

Ziguras, Christopher, and Siew-Fang Law. "Recruiting International Students as Skilled Migrants: The Global 'Skills Race' as Viewed from Australia and Malaysia." *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 4, no. 1 (2006): 59-76.