

# Kenneth Colegrove and Oyama Ikuo

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## Introduction

On October 23, 1947, Oyama Ikuo, former Waseda University professor, and his wife reached Yokohama on board the American passenger vessel, *Marine Swallow*. Sixteen years had elapsed since their self-imposed exile to the United States in March 1932. Oyama, then a professor of politics at Waseda University, had been the leader of the *Ronoto* (Labor-Farmer Party), which he founded in November 1929 with Marxist economist and former Kyoto University professor Kawakami Hajime and other activists of left-wing persuasions of Communism and Socialism; back in 1919 Oyama, Kawakami, and Hasegawa Nyozeikan, a former colleague of Oyama at *Osaka Asahi Shimbun*, had launched a magazine *Warera* (Us) which became a leading liberal publication for intellectuals during the first half of the 1920s. Oyama collaborated with Kawakami in editing and writing a thirteen-volume book on Marxism (*Marukusushugi zenshu*) published between November 1927 and March 1929. He also tried during that time to publish a translated series on all works by Marx and Engels, an endeavor that fell through.

For Oyama, his chairmanship of the party resulted from several years of personal and political hardship. His involvement in politics had cost him his faculty position at Waseda in 1927. Although Oyama was popular among students and a large-scale campus protest occurred at that University in the aftermath of the University's decision to demand Oyama's resignation after he helped establish the original Farmer-Labor Party in 1926, he left Waseda in order to lead the fledgling party. In the first election held under the newly inaugurated universal manhood suffrage (excluding women) in February 1928, Oyama ran for the Lower House seat from a district in Kagawa Prefecture but political oppressions made his bid for the seat unsuccessful; on April 12, *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* reported that Oyama and two other socialists were

slugged by a right-wing ruffian on the night before.

Shortly after the first election under universal manhood suffrage, the government ordered the dismantlement of the Labor-Farmer Party in April 1928. In March 1929, a member of the now-disbanded party was assassinated. Yamamoto Senji was a leading advocate at the time of birth control preached in the United States by Margaret Sanger; he was the only member of Oyama's party who had won a seat in the Lower House in the February 1928 election and killed on the night of the day that he tried to criticize the bill that amended the Peace Preservation Law to apply the death penalty to those organizations advocating change of the *Kokutai* (Emperor) system, a measure aimed at suppressing the left-wing political organizations.

For Oyama, the resumption of the Labor-Farmer Party was meant to push for addressing social and economic inequalities and combating militarism. Oyama supported women's movement in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the one by Ichikawa Fusae, and opined that women have the right to grow intellectually through education, the right to vote, and gender equality in the household; he lacked concrete ideas for achieving women's liberation but certainly agreed Japanese family morality tended to hinder women's spiritual growth.

In the February 1929 election, Oyama won a seat in the Lower House from a district in Tokyo.

Oyama's chairmanship of the Labor-Farmer Party, however, was a short-lived one. In November 1930, his intellectual colleague Kawakami began advocating the break-up of the Labor-Farmer Party. A feud within the party had been going on regarding the control of this party consisting of Communists and non-Communist socialists. In July 1931, two months prior to the Manchuria Incident, Oyama lost control over his Party as it sought to merge with two other left-wing political parties. The merger resulted in the rightward turn of the newly formed party, Labor-Farmer Social Mass Party (*Zenkoku Rono Taishu to*).

On March 17, 1932, a platform at the Tokyo station was filled with supporters and friends saying good-bye and waving red flags to the Oyamas as their train departed for Yokohama. Hasegawa Nyozeikan was instrumental in recommending Oyama to go overseas for a while because of rumors that Oyama was a target for an assassination plot. Mrs. Oyama was initially not

scheduled to go with him but in a series of negotiations with the Foreign Ministry, which was reluctant in issuing a passport for Oyama, the Ministry finally issued two passports under its condition that Mrs. Oyama travel with him; they left their fifteen-year-old son behind. At Yokohama the Oyamas caught a passenger liner bound for San Francisco. Although many supporters and friends, many of them waving red flags, showed up in Yokohama, both the Communists and the militarists were hostile to Oyama, particularly the latter; the Oyamas were protected by their friends and supporters in boarding the ship bound for the U.S. but in San Francisco, a man approached the Oyamas and confessed that he had been ordered to kill Professor Oyama but failed to do so during the voyage and instead became reluctant to kill this mild-mannered and likeable college professor.<sup>1</sup>

According to a friend of both Oyama and the aforementioned Hasegawa, Ouchi Hyoe, a renowned Marxist economist at the University of Tokyo, recalled years later that in the process leading to Hasegawa's recommendation that Oyama go abroad for a while, Hasegawa had wanted Oyama to stay in Japan to fight for freedom of speech even at the expense of Oyama's involvement in politics but Oyama insisted that he would prefer to exile himself in the United States and wait for an opportunity to resume political activities in Japan. What Oyama initially thought was an exile in the United States for a year at most turned into sixteen years. Kenneth Colegrove provided support for the Oyamas to extend their stay in the U.S. at his Northwestern University. Shortly afterwards, Japan's shift towards militarism and domestic oppression worsened: in 1933 Hasegawa was briefly arrested by Japan's

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1 Maruyama Masao et. al., *Oyama Ikuo (Kaiso Hyoden)* (Tokyo: Shinhyoron, 1980), 24–36, 150–62, 194–200, 215–22, 255–59; well-wishers included Maruyama Masao, son of Oyama's colleague at *Osaka Asahi Shimbun*, Maruyama Kanji; Masao Maruyama later became a leading Japanese intellectual at the University of Tokyo. Kurokawa Midori, *Kyodotai no Fukken: Oyama Ikuo Kenkyu* (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2000), 164–66, 308–309, 318–28; Kitazawa Shinjiro, Suekawa Hiroshi, and Hirano Yoshitaro, eds., *Oyama Ikuo Den* (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1956), 252–380; See the photo at the bottom of the second page in the photo sections of this book published in 1956 for the expressions on Oyama's and other's faces in the aftermath of Yamamoto's assassination. With regard to Yamamoto and his assassination, see *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, March 6, 1929.

secret (thought) police for allegations being a Communist sympathizer and afterwards toned down his political criticisms; the same year, Kawakami Hajime, who had joined the Communist Party the previous year, was arrested on charges of violating the Peace Preservation Law and was sentenced to five years in prison; in 1935 former University of Tokyo constitutional law professor, Minobe Tatsukichi, a victim of attempted assassination by a right-wing fanatic, resigned from the Upper House of the Diet as militarists assailed him for then dominant legal interpretation of the role of the Emperor in the Japanese political system – that the Emperor is an organ of the State and not someone who has unlimited power as advocated by Minobe's rival, Uesugi Shinkichi; and in 1936 an attempted coup resulted in assassinations and serious injuries of high-ranking government officials close to the Emperor. During this increasing turn for the worst, Oyama's supporters informed him that he would be arrested upon setting foot in Japan.<sup>2</sup>

This article is in complementary relations with Kurokawa Midori's biography on Oyama. It also supplements two other books on Oyama. While all three works discuss Oyama's exile in the United States, point to the fact that Kenneth Colegrove, a political scientist and a Japan Studies expert at Northwestern University, was instrumental in keeping Oyama from deportation and point to the support Oyama received in the Northwestern University community when he was ill during the Pacific War, only Kurokawa's work discusses in detail the difference in world view between Oyama and Colegrove. Kurokawa's work, however, tends to see the growing rift between the two as the result of misunderstanding by Colegrove about Oyama's view on Communism and Marxism. Colegrove did not understand or know Oyama's intellectual affinity with Marxism and tended to view Oyama's exile resulted from his confrontations with the Communist faction within the Labor-Farmer Party. I argue that Oyama gave Colegrove the impression that he was an anti-Communist like him but Colegrove was probably unaware of Oyama's aforementioned publications on Marxism. This article ends with the

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2 See the interview article featuring Ouchi in the January 20, 1972 evening edition of the *Mainichi Shimbun*. In addition, see Kurokawa, 318–24; and Kitazawa, Suekawa and Hirano, eds., 252–55.

sad note, a complete destruction of the friendship between Colegrove and Oyama; the former could not forgive Oyama's acceptance of the Stalin Peace Prize offered by the Soviet Union in 1953. As this article will show, this demise in friendship was a product of the Cold War. Although there was a room for an accord between the two over the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* in Japan, Colegrove looked at the Japanese situation from an American Cold War perspective on Japan, a policy that justified using the Emperor to reform Japan and bring Japan under American tutelage; Colegrove viewed MacArthur with great enthusiasm as the charismatic "viceroy" of Japan and looked favorably at Yoshida Shigeru's leadership in Japanese politics; these are issues that I had analyzed in my previous article published two issues ago.<sup>3</sup> Oyama's world view shared the One World view of Franklin Roosevelt, a world in which both the United States and the Soviet Union would work things out with other great powers for the peace and prosperity of the international community, a situation that was to be reinforced through the United Nations. While Colegrove also looked favorably at the United Nations, he was against the popular front implication of the One World view, an idea advocated by Henry Wallace's Progressive Party; Oyama was fond of Wallace and Colegrove was certainly not. Colegrove was supportive of MacArthur's push for *zaibatsu* dissolution in 1947-1948 but felt uncomfortable about its degree; Oyama advocated that the dissolution did not go far enough. Colegrove spearheaded McCarthyism while Oyama fought against Yoshida's red purges. (Oyama also objected to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and advocated a peace treaty with both the Capitalist and Communist blocs.)

Oyama's first statement after setting foot on Yokohama was his call to the people to fight reactionary forces in Japan and around the world.<sup>4</sup> In 1948 he elaborated on this point: the reactionary forces were Prime Minister

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3 "Kenneth Colegrove and Japan, 1927-1946," *Doshisha American Studies* No. 43 (March 2007): 1-31. Corwin Edwards, a Northwestern University professor, wrote a report based on his government-sponsored tour of Japan in early 1946; it advocated a vigorous dissolution of the *zaibatsu* to eradicate feudalism and militarism and promote competition and more economic equality. Edwards may have received intellectual influence from Oyama in the 1930s since Oyama at Northwestern University was writing about the economic history of Japan, a writing requested by Colegrove; see Professor Corwin Edwards to Professor James W. Bell, January 29, 1946, Kenneth Colegrove Papers, Northwestern University.

Yoshida, General MacArthur and the American foreign policy towards the Communist bloc.

### Oyama's Return to Japan and Kenneth Colegrove's Anti-Communist Concerns

Colegrove was instrumental in arranging Oyama's return to Japan. When the U.S. government requested Colegrove to work under General MacArthur in early 1946, Oyama expressed disappointment to Colegrove when the American government denied him permission to accompany Colegrove to Japan.

Colegrove, however, delivered Oyama's letters to Oyama's friends and supporters during Colegrove's stint in Japan from April to July 1946. Colegrove's such actions on behalf of Oyama reconnected the Oyamas with their son with whom they had been out of contact since Pearl Harbor. Moreover, after June 1946 a movement led by Waseda University students called for Oyama's return to Japan. Colegrove also lobbied in the Government Section for Oyama's early return to Japan.

Colegrove had endeavored to realize Oyama's departure for Japan through a powerful figure under whom Colegrove worked in Japan; Courtney Whitney, Brigadier General in charge of the Government Section in GHQ and MacArthur's right-hand man.

On the eve of Oyama's departure for Japan, however, Colegrove became alarmed by Oyama's willingness to pursue a common front between non-Communist left-wing groups and the Communist party, a scenario that Oyama may have begun considering as the result of a letter he had received from Japanese Communist leader Nosaka Sanzo in Yen-an, China in spring 1945 that called for Oyama to work with him in inducing Japan's surrender.<sup>5</sup>

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4 With regard to Oyama's statement at Yokohama see *Oyama Ikuo (Kaiso Hyoden)*, 259 and Kitazawa, Suekawa and Hirano, eds., 275-78. On Oyama's view of Wallace, see Kurokawa, 399. In addition, see in Kurokawa's book the following pages: 397-98, 400, 412-18. With regard to zaibatsu dissolution, see Haruo Iguchi, *Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.-Japan Relations, 1937-1953* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 200-13.

5 Haruo Iguchi, "Kenneth Colegrove and Japan, 1927-1946," 2, 10-11, 17, 19, 31. On Oyama's

In his letter to General Whitney dated June 5, 1947, Colegrove expressed his concern about the possibility that Oyama might call for a common front between the Socialists and Communists in Japan and proposed to have a way to keep an eye on Oyama. Colegrove was trying to reassure Whitney that Oyama was not a Communist but wanted to make sure Oyama would not drift in that direction.

Although Professor Oyama belonged to a small leftist Party, he always disavowed Communist activities, and, at one time, led his party in expelling Communists from it. I have been worried, however, in the last few weeks, because of the fact that in [sic] conversations with me he has indicated approval of a “common front” between the Social Democrat [sic] Party and the Communist Party in Japan.

Because of this concern, Colegrove proposed that an anti-Communist Japanese-American, Mukoyama Teruo, accompany Oyama to Japan for two months; Colegrove claimed he had a “considerable influence” on Oyama.<sup>6</sup> Colegrove had been asking Whitney since May for a permission for Mukoyama, a Japanese-American whom Colegrove considered as pro-MacArthur and strong anti-Communist to visit Japan, a visit that Colegrove considered would strengthen Mukoyama’s position of leadership in the Japanese-American community which Colegrove feared was being infiltrated by Communists. Whitney, however, was willing to consider Mukoyama’s visit until after the end of summer when his section more or less finished dealing with the scheduled visit of four hundred American businessmen.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to periodically informing Whitney his direct observations of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, D.C., Colegrove wrote to Whitney his assessment of the subversive situation in the Japanese-American

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disappointment regarding being unable to accompany Colegrove to Japan, see Kenneth Colegrove, “Statement by Professor Colegrove regarding Professor Oyama,” January 29, March 3, 1952, 46, “Oyama, 1950-1955,” Kenneth Colegrove Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter HHL).

6 For this section including the long quote see Colegrove to Whitney, June 5, 1947, “Oyama, 1932-1949,” Colegrove Papers, HHL.

7 Whitney to Colegrove, May 21, 1947, “C. Whitney, 1947-1949,” Colegrove Papers, HHL.

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### Oyama in Japan, 1947-1948

In the fall of 1947 Oyama returned to Japan with his wife for the first time in sixteen years. Colegrove's friend, Mukoyama accompanied the Oyamas. Before returning to Japan, Oyama had asked Colegrove for a letter of introduction to General MacArthur. Oyama promised Colegrove that he would not call for a common front between the Socialists and the Communists. Colegrove, however, decided to write a letter of introduction to Whitney so that Whitney could decide whether or not it was appropriate to help arrange a meeting for Oyama with MacArthur; Oyama never visited Whitney.<sup>9</sup>

Initially, Oyama did keep his word to Colegrove about not forming an alliance between the Socialists and Communists. Shortly before leaving the United States, Oyama made a public statement to the Japanese public that he was going to maintain distance from all political parties and organizations and planned to examine Japanese politics from the well being and viewpoint of all the average people (*taishu* or Masses). In February Oyama published what turned to be his only postwar book, *Nihon no Shinro* (Japan's Direction). In this book Oyama expressed his gratitude to America (but strangely not to Colegrove and other Americans) for saving his life twice, first when he sought political asylum in the United States and second when he became gravely ill during the Pacific War. Oyama welcomed GHQ's decisions to free political prisoners, legalize and promote labor unions, dissolve the *zaibatsu*, implement land reform and create the postwar Japanese Constitution that stated sovereignty rests in and emanates from the Japanese people and abolished armed forces. In an interview by Tokyo correspondents from *Newsweek* and the *London Times* around the same time of the book's publication, Oyama stated that: (1) he was a social democrat and not

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8 Colegrove to Whitney, May 3, 1947, "C. Whitney, 1947-1949" and Colegrove to Whitney, June 5, 1947, "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

9 "Oyama Arrest 'Wrong;' Faces Trial in Japan," *Daily Northwestern* September 25, 1949; Colegrove to Whitney, October 1, 1949, "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL.



a Communist; (2) no political parties looked appealing to him but he tended to have affinity towards the Socialist Party; (3) he had higher hopes for the “moderate” Nosaka faction within the Communist Party rather than the Tokuda faction that, in his opinion, tended to be out of steps with the Japanese public. Oyama opined that any government run by parties other than the Socialists would place Japanese politics in a worse situation.

Oyama’s interview and publication of his book occurred at the time when the Socialist-led coalition government collapsed and was succeeded by another coalition government led by a centralist Ashida Hitoshi that included the Socialists. It is unclear whether or not Oyama judged the Ashida cabinet to be a worse situation than its predecessor, the Katayama cabinet. In the meantime, Oyama focused his attention on the main idea presented in his aforementioned *Nihon no Shinro*, that is promoting peace movement and peace studies; he supported them so as to promote Japan’s entry to the United Nations, including UNESCO which in particular would help fulfill an idea advocated by many in Japan at the time; Japan’s contribution to the postwar world will come from cultural movements, including exchange of academic and intellectual ideas; UNESCO will serve as a forum for international academic and cultural exchange. Oyama hoped that cultural and academic exchange of ideas and interactions would also contribute in pushing for using atomic energy and technology for peaceful purposes.

As indicated by Oyama’s first statement immediately after his arrival in Yokohama in 1947, Oyama was cautious about the “reactionary forces” within and outside Japan. In his *Nihon no Shinro* he elaborated who they were; politicians and bureaucrats who survived GHQ’s purges who had oppressed the people and freedom in Japan and promoted or contributed to Japanese militarism. Oyama looked at these politicians and bureaucrats with great suspicion. Between spring 1947 and spring 1948 the United States and GHQ considered an early peace treaty with Japan but disagreements among the Allied Powers, not to mention the Chinese civil war tilting against the Nationalists, led the negotiations to nowhere. While these negotiations among the Allied Powers were taking place, Oyama, in the aforementioned February 1948 interview, stated the reactionary forces might reemerge to suppress and ban freedom of speech and abolish the postwar Constitution.<sup>10</sup>

## Oyama's Call for a United Front between Communists and Socialists

Oyama confirmed such fears in the aftermath of Yoshida Shigeru's reemergence. Although Whitney and Charles Kades, his second-in-command in the Government Section, tried to form a cabinet other than Yoshida, the latter outmaneuvered the two by directly talking with MacArthur who gave his approval to form the new cabinet after the Ashida cabinet disintegrated in a major political scandal that sent seismic waves across the Japanese power structure, the Showa Denko incident. In the January 1949 election, the first election held under the postwar Constitution, Yoshida's Democratic-Liberal Party won a landslide, crushing the other conservative and left-wing parties, except for the Japan Communist Party that impressively increased small but significant number of seats in the Diet.

Oyama was angered by the Yoshida cabinet's decisions to prohibit civil servants from forming labor unions in late 1948 and firing hundreds of civil servants during the first half of 1949. He was also appalled by the Yoshida cabinet's decision to change the labor laws to, in his opinion, suppress workers. He also criticized the Yoshida cabinet's consideration of increasing the police force and toy with the idea of forming a committee to monitor "subversive" activities. In Oyama's mind, Yoshida reminded him of the late 1920s when he was battling against conservative reactionary forces who were the stooges of Monopolies; after all, Oyama opined, Yoshida had been the vice-minister in the Foreign Ministry when he was battling the authorities in the late 1920s. Although Oyama's observations were being made in the midst of the severe monetary and fiscal contraction policy implemented under the guidance of Joseph Dodge, Oyama seemed to believe Monopolies were back in control and the *zaibatsu* dissolution had not gone far enough.

In an essay written shortly before the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb on August 29, 1949 and in the midst of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, Oyama argued that he had been believing since Japan's sur-

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10 Oyama Ikuo, *Nihon no Shinro* (Tokyo: Rodo Bunkasha, 1948), 5, 10-11, 158-62. With regard to Oyama's interview by two foreign journalists, see "Sengen," *Nihon Shuho*, February 1, 1948, 27-31. In addition, see Kurokawa, 382-83, 388-89, 398-99.

render that Japan should live in the international community as a neutral nation. Whether or not such a neutrality is achieved through international agreements, Oyama advocated the need for the Japanese people to act in a way to avoid the collision between the Capitalist bloc and the Communist bloc. He believed Japan's future lay in playing its role to promote international peace, including disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Japan had a unique role to play as the only country that was destroyed by nuclear weapons. He castigated Yoshida for not being forthcoming about enabling Japan to be a neutral country like Switzerland, an idea, he pointed out, that had been mentioned by MacArthur to a British journalist in spring 1949. Oyama charged that Yoshida only gave lip service to the idea of Japan becoming a neutral country and wanted to side with the Anglo-American camp.

Oyama was right about Yoshida but Yoshida was trying to prioritize Japan's economic recovery by siding with the United States. He entertained the idea of neutrality but in a way that dovetailed with MacArthur's opinion about Japan becoming a neutral country; MacArthur told a renowned British journal in March and a British admiral in July 1949 that the United States should not consider Japan as an ally after a peace treaty with Japan but the latter should be protected from foreign aggressions by nearby American bases in Okinawa and Guam.<sup>11</sup>

Amid American hysteria over the successful detonation of the atomic

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11 See Oyama's essay written on August 23, 1948, days before the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb on August 29; "Sekai Heiwa Kensetsu ni taisuru Nihon no Rekishiteki Shimei (Japan's Historical Mission to Establish World Peace)," *Chikyu wa Futto suru: Beiei ka Soren Chukyo ka Warera no Seikatsu to Jiyu wa doko e Kaiho Tokushu Daiichigo* (World is Boiling: Anglo-American Camp or the Soviet-PRC Camp – Where is our Life and Freedom Heading Special Issue Number 1 of the *Kaiho Magazine*) (Tokyo: Kaihosha, 1949), 160–61, 163–64, 168, 170, 173–74, 176, 178, 180, 182–84. With regard to MacArthur's idea about Japan becoming the Switzerland in the Asia-Pacific region, see Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies Towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-53* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1997), 19–20. On Yoshida's relations with Whitney, see Haruo Iguchi, "Nihon no Fukko to Kokkyo Naisen, Chosen senso (Japan's Reconstruction, the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War)" in Kawashima Makoto and Hattori Ryuji, eds., *Higashi Ajia Kokusai Seijishi* (The International Political History of East Asia) (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press), Chapter 9, Sections 1–3, 225–29.

bomb by the Soviet Union in August, Colegrove wrote to Whitney inquiring about Oyama's detention for a day by the military police of the GHQ on September 27.<sup>12</sup>

Whitney responded immediately upon reading Colegrove's letter and had the following to say about Oyama:

[Oyama] never presented the letter of introduction, a copy of which you attach, but I watched his activities shortly after his arrival, knowing your interest in him. His immediate reaction upon arrival appeared to be one of considerable confusion, attributable seemingly to the fact that he soon found that the liberal policies under which General MacArthur has administered the Occupation went far further than those he himself had advocated prior to his departure from Japan in 1932 and quite evidently much further than he at that time even envisaged. I believe that it was for this reason that shortly after his arrival Oyama went into relative obscurity, I think on the teaching staff at Waseda University.

Only recently has he emerged from this semi-retirement and taken a position close support of the Soviet, the Communist cause in China and the Japanese Communist Party, although I do not know whether he has gone so far as to become a Communist Party member or not. I rather judge that he has not.

Whitney then went on to say "The incident to which you refer occurred just following a speech Oyama made on September 17th, under the sponsorship of the Chinese Research Institute (Chugoku Kenkyusho) and the Alliance for Protecting Democracy (Minshu Shugi Yogo Domei) on the subject "Chinese Revolution and World Peace." This speech, recorded by a competent observer present, was as follows:

Laborers and farmers in Japan today are suffering from all kinds of suppression by Prime Minister Yoshida. This suppression is similar to that of ten years ago, the time of the Manchurian Incident. It can be said

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12 Colegrove to Whitney, October 1, 1949, "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

that Prime Minister Yoshida of today is the *Gumbatsu* (military clique) of that time.

Japan has caused the Manchurian Incident and the Pacific War in the past; therefore, we must go through much suffering in order to recover. Thoughtful Japanese cannot help but stubbornly oppose the military clique like conservative reactionary (Yoshida Government). Prime Minister Yoshida is no different from the former military clique.

Prime Minister Yoshida has stated at a discussion meeting that he is absolutely against war. What Prime Minister Yoshida is against is the struggle by laborers and farmers, but he is not the type to oppose war at all. Since it might be assumed that I am making up stories if I talk like this, I would like to criticize with you the statement made by Prime Minister Yoshida at the discussion meeting referring to the article that appeared in the newspapers.

To the question: "In the event of World War III, would Japan participate in it?", Prime Minister Yoshida answered: "She will probably not take part in it."

What got Oyama into trouble was the following section of his speech that argued that the GHQ was using Yoshida to violate the Potsdam Declaration.

Prime Minister Yoshida answered in such a simple manner using the term 'probably.' However, this term 'probably' cannot be trusted at all.

"We, the Japanese people, have been suffering from the disastrous defeat beyond description. The 'Potsdam Declaration' was given to the Japanese people as guide to their course. A real democratic country can be established only if the Japanese people should advance accordingly following the Potsdam Declaration. Prime Minister Yoshida has completely violated the Potsdam Declaration by scheming with a capitalistic country, that is an army of occupation. It can be said that an occupying capitalistic country is using Yoshida to violate the Potsdam Declaration. The recent order to dissolve the Korean League was issued in connivance with a capitalistic country.

If Prime Minister Yoshida does not join hands with a real democratic country, and if he continues to violate the Potsdam Declaration by

joining hands with a capitalistic country, I want to impress upon you that the establishment of a government desired by the Japanese people can never be expected in Japan. At the same time we must by all means overthrow the reactionary Yoshida Government.

Whitney informed Colegrove that Oyama “was not placed under arrest as a result of the foregoing but he was called in by authorities of the Occupation for questioning. Thereafter he was released and as far as I know no further action is in contemplation.” Whitney concluded his letter by stating that Oyama “has contributed nothing since his return from the United States to the furtherance of the objectives of the Occupation and . . . nothing objectively toward the furtherance of representative government or the democratic concept in Japan.”<sup>13</sup>

At the time Colegrove received this letter from Whitney, he had learned through a United Press report on October 2 that Oyama did not stop criticizing the Yoshida government after his release from an overnight detention in a Tokyo metropolitan police prison cell. Oyama attended a Communist rally led by the Communist Party leader Tokuda Kyuichi and not only resumed his criticism of the Yoshida government but also celebrated the founding of the People’s Republic of China at the rally. Furthermore and most notably, Oyama agreed with Tokuda’s speech that the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb will contribute to world peace by making the following statement:

Prof. Ikuo Oyama . . . described the Soviet Union’s possession of the atomic bomb as a “happy thing for world peace.”

“The threat of war has prevented the world from being one,” said [Oyama]. “That threat was the possession of the atomic bomb by one country.”

Oyama said he believed outlawing of the atomic bomb in war and [sic] international control of atomic energy is [sic] now hopeless but he thought possession of the bomb by the “two sides” of the world would

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13 With regard to all the quotes and content after footnote 12 and up to this footnote number, see Whitney to Colegrove, October 10, 1949, “Oyama, 1932-1949,” Colegrove Papers, HHL.

lead to world peace. . . .

“Russia has the atomic bomb,” Tokuda said at the outset of his speech as most of the three thousand people present cheered. . . .

[Oyama] said the Japanese people must reassert their opposition to war, pointing out that leaders of this movement back in 1918 had to make sacrifices. He stressed that the Japanese now had a weapon in the Potsdam Declaration and the new Constitution.

The above statement by Oyama reflected a seemingly strange mix of idealism – call for One World, Japan’s neutrality and Japan’s anti-war stance based on the Potsdam Declaration and the postwar Japanese Constitution -- and realism -- analyzing international politics by foreseeing the dawn of peace through mutually assured destruction. The fact that Japanese attending the rally cheered about the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb reflected not only an ideological divide in Japanese politics but also the lack of awareness among the Japanese public about radiation, a situation that resulted from GHQ censorship regarding radioactive consequences of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an awareness that finally took root in the aftermath of the *Lucky Dragon* incident in 1954.<sup>14</sup>

### Colegrove and Yoshida Shigeru

Distressed by, in Colegrove’s mind, Oyama’s breach of promise to him, Colegrove wrote Prime Minister Yoshida that he had recently “learned” of Oyama’s detention by the military police because of his “unwarranted charges against” Yoshida’s government and the Allied Occupation. Although already fully aware that Oyama was now an advocate of an united front between the Communist and Socialist parties, Colegrove informed Yoshida that Oyama had assured him that he “was hostile to the Communist Party and would never try to promote a United Front between” the two parties. Yoshida’s reply to Colegrove was that he did not know Oyama but followed “his activities with interest.” Yoshida wrote Colegrove that upon his release

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14 “Oyama, 1932-1949,” Colegrove Papers, HHL In addition, see Kurokawa, 387-88, 399.

from detention, Oyama was following a quiet life as a Waseda University professor, a point Colegrove probably read with skepticism since he was aware of Oyama's participation in a Communist rally shortly after his release. Colegrove must have been delighted to learn that Count Makino Nobuaki, who had died early in 1949, had "spoken so often of you" and that Yoshida appreciated Colegrove's "interest . . . in the welfare of our country."

The last point alluded to Colegrove's praise of Yoshida in implementing a change in the Japanese parliamentary election law that decreased the number of proportional representation from 3 to 4 seats to 2 to 3 seats per electoral district. Colegrove reminded Yoshida that he had pointed to the danger of proportional representation to GHQ during his 1946 Japan visit and indicated to Yoshida by pointing to New York City's decision in November 1947 to discard proportional representation and hence remove the possibility of Communists gaining seats to the City Council, a reality achieved under proportional representation. Colegrove informed Yoshida that Americans "have no faith in proportional representation." Colegrove's anti-Communism was getting to a point he was suggesting a leader of another country to do away with a system that permitted Communists access to legislative seats.<sup>15</sup>

Oyama further radicalized with Yoshida's crackdown on Communists after the outbreak of the Korean War. Colegrove, however, fully concurred to Yoshida's decision. As a matter of fact, Colegrove had been promoting the idea of outlawing the Communist Party in Japan shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War. In his June 15, 1950 letter to Yoshida, Colegrove sent a majority and minority reports for Mundt-Ferguson-Nixon Bill, which would have required registration of all Communist political organizations and their members. Then, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 which had the effect of virtually outlawing Communist action groups through a complicated registration procedure and permitted detention of suspected subversives during national emergency. This law had been passed over President Truman's veto and Colegrove sent Yoshida a copy of this law and a reference material re-

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15 Colegrove to Yoshida, November 7, 1949, Yoshida to Colegrove, December 10, 1949, "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL.



lated to it. In receiving these documents, Yoshida informed Colegrove in his August 29 and November 1 letters that he intended to “go slow” on trying to pass anti-Communist laws.<sup>16</sup>

Yoshida, however, had the following to say to Colegrove:

The members of the Central Executive Committee and the staff of the party organ the “Akahata” (Red Flag) who were purged two months ago, seem now to have gone definitely underground. Where they are and what they are doing, we don’t know. Meanwhile, we have had no special trouble; the left-leaders are fast losing their hold on labor’s file.

The government has announced more than once its policy to dismiss communists from its services, and to extend the purge to local governments and educational institution. The announcement is intended to serve as a warning and to allow time for the less hardened Reds to drop out of the party and reform. The policy will, of course, be executed in the end.

As regards the outlawing of the Communist Party, the Diet is expected to act in due course and eject the Reds from both Houses.

You will note that so far no legislative measure has been taken. The purge of top-communists [sic] and suppression of party publications, and also [sic] creation of the National Police Reserve have been carried out by Cabinet Order in pursuance of SCAP directives.

Colegrove soon heard about the details regarding Yoshida’s above statement from his confidant, Inukai Takeru, when the latter visited the United States in November.<sup>17</sup>

By the time of Yoshida’s visit to the United States to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Colegrove was an advocate of revising the Japanese Constitution so as to permit Japanese rearmament, something which he be-

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16 Justus D. Doenecke, *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Cranbury, New Jersey: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 213; Colegrove to Yoshida, June 15, 1950; Colegrove to Yoshida, October 11, 1950; Yoshida to Colegrove, August 29, November 1, 1950, “Yoshida,” Colegrove Papers, HHL.

17 Yoshida to Colegrove, August 29, November 1, 1950, “Yoshida,” Colegrove Papers, HHL.

lieved the Americans would not object to after the outbreak of the Korean War. Furthermore, Colegrove supported no reparations and no restrictions on Japanese industry and shipping.<sup>18</sup>

A firm believer in the existence of subversive elements in the American government, Colegrove supported Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist crusade that began shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War. Colegrove testified against his colleague in the Institute of Pacific Relations, Owen Lattimore, an eminent Asian Studies scholar who was accused by McCarthy and his supporters as being a Communist during the Senate investigations of Lattimore from spring 1950 to 1952. Colegrove's testimony contributed to the perception among anti-Communists who believed that Lattimore was a subversive element who was either a Communist or a fellow traveler because of his advocacy for supporting the Chinese Communists over the Chinese Nationalists towards the end of World War II. Even John F. Kennedy, a young Congressman from Massachusetts, had accused Lattimore and his friend, Harvard University Chinese history professor, John K. Fairbanks, of providing dangerous advice to the American government regarding Chinese Communism.<sup>19</sup>

Yet, Colegrove was initially reluctant in attacking Oyama because of his remaining feeling of friendship that had begun to deteriorate in 1949. Nevertheless, by June 1952, Colegrove's support for McCarthy went to the extent that he wrote Senator Robert A. Taft, the leading Republican Senator, to place the junior Senator from Wisconsin into more influential committee in the Senate.<sup>20</sup> To this inquiry by Colegrove, Taft replied that the seniority system in the Senate made it impossible for such a favorable consideration.<sup>21</sup>

Although Colegrove had been an interventionist favoring war prepared-

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18 Colegrove to Yoshida, August 8, 1950, and Colegrove to Yoshida, August 24, 1951, "Yoshida," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

19 Stanley L. Kutler, *The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 183-214. For Colegrove's testimony against Lattimore, see Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Colegrove also portrayed the Institute of Pacific Relations as a Communist front organization during the McCarthy hearings; see Joseph Keeley, *The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberg* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), 171.

20 Colegrove to Taft, June 26, 1951, "Taft," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

21 Taft to Colegrove, July 10, 1951, "Taft," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

ness through implementing the draft and American support of Great Britain short of war in 1940-1941,<sup>22</sup> Colegrove's shift towards conservatism had propelled him to support the MacArthur-for-President movement in 1951-1952. Although Colegrove preferred the Republican ticket under which MacArthur was the Republican presidential candidate and Taft was the Republican vice presidential candidate, he judged that Taft had a better chance of securing the party's presidential nomination than MacArthur.<sup>23</sup>

### End of the Friendship: Colegrove Rejects Oyama

After this incident, there was a brief recovery period in Colegrove's relations with Oyama during 1950-1951 when Oyama was hospitalized for a serious liver-related illness, a symptom caused by diabetes, shortly after he was elected a member of the House of Councilors in the National Diet from Kyoto under a joint support by the Socialists and Communists. Colegrove heard about Oyama's illness from Mrs. Oyama in 1950 for the first time since the Oyamas left Chicago to end their fifteen-year exile in the U.S. Mrs. Oyama's letter was primarily of a practical nature, asking the Colegroves to assist her in having the remaining amount of about one thousand dollars sent to her; this amount was held under the care of the Colegroves based on the request by the Oyamas at the time of their departure for Japan in 1947. In reply to this letter, Colegrove expressed his sympathy to Professor Oyama's illness and told Mrs. Oyama not to worry about searching for a Buddhist goddess statue that Mrs. Colegrove had requested in 1947. Instead, the Colegroves worried about not being able to help the Oyamas. In return, Oyama sent Colegrove books on Japan, including the diaries of former Prime Minister Hara Takashi.

However, in 1952 Professor Oyama's political activities, which happened in the midst of McCarthyism, led Colegrove to release a statement on

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22 For example, see Colegrove to Robert Taft, September 12, 1940, Taft to Colegrove, September 16, 1940, Colegrove to Taft, September 24, 1940, "Taft," Colegrove Papers, HHL

23 Colegrove to John D. Hamilton, March 21, 1952, Colegrove to Courtney Whitney, March 21, 1952, Whitney to Colegrove, March 25, 1952, "Taft," Colegrove to Yoshida, August 24, 1951, "Yoshida," Colegrove Papers, HHL.

January 12, 1952 for the campus newspaper, the *Daily Northwestern*, a statement that began to mark an end to the long friendship between the two: Said Colegrove, "I deeply regret to learn from the press that Professor Ikuo Oyama has accepted the Stalin Peace Prize of twenty-five thousand gold dollars." "It is difficult for me to believe that this truly distinguished scholar is either a Communist or a 'fellow-traveler'. I am still inclined to think that he is a naive and idealistic Japanese professor who has unhappily allowed himself to be used by the Communist Party. ." Colegrove then recalled his first encounter with Oyama in 1932:

Arriving in San Francisco, Professor Oyama traveled all the way to Chicago to apologize me for failure to send me literature regarding the Ronoto which I had requested of all Japanese parties in 1928.

I found Professor Oyama completely without funds and in dire need of employment. Inasmuch as I had long opposed militarism in Japan, I naturally felt sympathy for a scholar-statesman who had been forced into exile as a result of his opposition to militarism. Because of his scholarship and skill in Oriental languages it was obvious that Professor Oyama would be useful in research. With the approval of the Dean of the Graduate School, I employed Professor Oyama as my research assistant, paying him month by month my grant-in-aid of research from the University. This sum amounted from six hundred to one thousand dollars per year for several years. On this meager sum, Professor Oyama and his wife lived in a one-room apartment on Grant Street [in Evanston].

No one can deny the fact that without Colegrove's protection, the Oyamases would have had to return to Japan at the end of their tour in the United States in 1932.

Colegrove explained the chores Oyama did for him at Northwestern, something that a proud and famous Waseda professor turned politician probably felt increasingly frustrating over the years that he stayed in the United States: Oyama had studied at the University of Chicago and he certainly had not expected to work like a graduate student for fifteen years.

One of Professor Oyama's duties was to order and catalogue Japanese books and documents for the Harris Japanese Collection in Deering Library. . . .

In the summer session of 1935, Professor Oyama taught one course on the Evanston campus on the subject of Japanese history. In 1937, he was given the title of Research Associate in the Political Science Department, but he was not paid a salary and was still dependent in the grant-in-aid of research.

Here, Colegrove did not mention that students taking Oyama's course complained that they could not understand Oyama's English and Colegrove had to assist him. Oyama did not elaborate the kindness extended to him and his wife by the Northwestern University community upon returning to Japan.

Colegrove wrote a summary about American kindness to the Oyamas:

Friends of Northwestern University extended many courtesies to Professor and Mrs. Oyama. Mr. and Mrs. George H. Tomlinson sheltered them in their home until we could find the one-room apartment for them. Professor Theodore W. Koch, the librarian, allowed him to use a carrel in Deering Library. Many members of the faculty extended gracious hospitality to the Oyamas. During two desperate periods of illness, Dr. Frederick Christopher gave Professor Oyama free surgery while Dr. Kyser gave him medical service without charge. After his first operation in 1944, when Professor Oyama greatly needed blood transfusion, I appealed to Northwestern students for aid. Twenty students and faculty members responded.

Here, Colegrove omitted the fact that he had to seek assistances from his colleagues to work on extending Oyama's visa once a year on the grounds that Professor Oyama was a political refugee.

With regard to Colegrove's protection of Oyama during World War II, he stated the following:

During the Second World War, while I served as a consultant to the Office of Strategic Services, I refrained from using any of the current

materials on Japanese government supplied to me by Professor Oyama. I desired to shield him from the humiliation of participating in any project aimed at the defeat of his country on the battlefield.

Here, Colegrove alluded to Oyama's unwillingness after Pearl Harbor to cooperate with the Office of War Information. Interestingly, Colegrove argued that he was not influenced by Oyama's "current materials on Japanese government" at the time. While this might be true, it may be that Colegrove made such a statement to distance himself from McCarthy-era controversy about American contacts with the Chinese Communists in Yen-an, an episode that resulted in John Emmerson's visit to see Oyama.

Colegrove went on to describe his relations with Oyama after the war:

After the Second World War, it was a great disappointment to Professor Oyama when he was not permitted to accompany me to Japan. Nevertheless, while I was serving as a political adviser to General MacArthur, I was able to arrange permission for Professor Oyama's early return to Japan.

Upon my return from Japan, and prior to his leaving the United States, Professor Oyama promised me that he would join the Social Democrat Party and should never work for a "common front" between the Social Democrat [sic] Party and the Communist Party of Japan.

Not only was Colegrove instrumental in the Oyamas' political asylum in the U.S., he was also the key factor in helping the Oyamas' return to Japan.

Therefore, Colegrove's disappointment with Oyama was understandable in that he had been led to believe that Oyama had denounced Communism:

During my fifteen years of association with Professor Oyama, we frequently discussed Communism, particularly Communism in Japan. His conversation always indicated his opposition to Communism. The public record also showed that in 1930, he had expelled the Communists who had infiltrated into the Ronoto.

To my great chagrin, in 1948, friends in Japan told me that Professor Oyama had publicly called for a "common front". Again, in the

general election of 1950, Professor Oyama received Communist support in his candidacy for membership in the House of the Councilors.

The asylum which Northwestern University extended to Professor Oyama in 1932 became widely known throughout Japan. While traveling even in backwoods provinces in Japan, teachers have come to me to thank me for the succor which Northwestern University extended to the exiled Japanese liberal. . . .

Needless to say, the action of Professor Oyama have [sic] proved painful to those who befriended him during his exile in the United States. Japanese people seems to have an unusual devotion to loyalty. Professor Oyama's recent course, however, seems to be contrary to Japanese traditions.

When one reads through the Oyama file in the Colegrove papers deposited at the Hoover Library in West Branch, Iowa, one is impressed by the troubles Colegrove took to make sure the Oyamas' temporary stay got extended annually to avoid their deportation to Japan and galvanize support in the Northwestern University community to secure a job for Oyama as well as to have Professor Oyama get the best medical treatment when he suffered from illness during the Pacific War.<sup>24</sup>

In this public statement addressed to the Northwestern University community, Colegrove omitted some details regarding the kindness he had extended to Professor Oyama. For example, in his letter to Northwestern University Dean Payson S. Wild, Colegrove recalled Oyama's performance teaching a summer course at Northwestern University, the fact that he had failed to complete the requested translation of Minobe's famous scholarly work on the Japanese Constitution and Oyama's failure to keep his promise not to seek support of the Japanese Communists. These explanations were

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24 With regard to quotes and content after footnote 23 and up to this footnote number, see Kenneth Colegrove, "Statement by Professor Colegrove regarding Professor Oyama," January 15, 1952, 46, "Oyama, 1950-1955," Colegrove Papers, HHL. For Colegrove's friendship with the Oyamas from 1932 to their return to Japan, see "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL. The Emerson-Oyama episode is discussed in Haruo Iguchi, "Kenneth Colegrove and Japan, 1927-1946," 10-11.

made to Dean Wild in addition to reiterating what he had stated in his public statement about his relations with Professor Oyama. Dean Wild had been anxious to know Colegrove's connection to Oyama because individuals and the press had made inquiries to Northwestern University about how and why an alleged Communist who received the Stalin Peace Prize became affiliated with Northwestern University until 1947. Wild had to deal with potential criticisms by individuals and the press in a period when American campuses were not spared from the Red Scare.

When Oyama and his wife left Japan for a six-month long tour of the Communist bloc as part of his tour to attend his award ceremony for the Stalin Peace Prize in 1953, a tour which included China and North Korea, Colegrove could no longer forgive Oyama and decided to criticize and ostracize him through the media. Colegrove's statements to his university newspaper and dean were well reflected in two articles written by a *Chicago Tribune* Tokyo correspondent Walter Simmons, one which appeared in the December 4 edition of the *Chicago Tribune* entitled "Oyama Lived 16 Years on American Charity," and another which appeared in the December 14 edition of the *Chicago Tribune* entitled with a harsher tone "Jap Repays N[orthwestern] U[niversity] Kindness by Turning on U.S.: Winner of Stalin Prize Back from Tour." Simmons informed Colegrove in his December 5 letter that the enclosed December 4 article was published in the *Tokyo Evening News*, an English language publication with a circulation of 12,000. Simmons was confident that this piece will receive wider attention as Japanese-language papers introduced it in their publications. Although Simmons did not quote Colegrove, the wording was almost verbatim from Colegrove's letter to Simmons that arrived on the eve of Oyama's return from his tour.<sup>25</sup>

Simmons's December 4 article relied almost entirely on Colegrove's aforementioned statements about Oyama to his university paper and to his dean, although some of the details about Oyama were based in part on newly added information by Colegrove in his letter to Simmons and in part on an investigation by Simmons.

The two articles did not necessarily reflect the correct facts regarding

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25 Simmons to Colegrove, December 5, 1953, 46, "Oyama, 1950-1955," Colegrove Papers, HHL.



Colegrove's friendship with Oyama. For example, Colegrove did receive a letter from Professor Oyama in 1948; in a letter dated June 3 and addressed to Professor and Mrs. Colegrove, Professor Oyama expressed his and his wife's "undying gratitude" to the Colegroves and promised Colegrove that he will resume the project to translate the work of Minobe, who, Oyama informed Colegrove, had died very recently. Oyama expressed his hope to do so next fall. Until then Oyama was busy trying to start an "institute," a project that led to the creation of an institute that focused on international affairs and had as its participants leading academics and opinion leaders at the time.<sup>26</sup>

### Conclusion

The friendship between Kenneth Colegrove (1886-1975) and Oyama Ikuo (1880-1955) initially started as a heartwarming story of American humanitarianism to secure a political asylum for a progressive Japanese intellectual escaping Japanese militarism. The story, however, ended with Colegrove's rejection of Oyama, a reflection of how ideologically apart from one another the two had become as the result of the Cold War. Although Colegrove was a supporter of the New Deal in the 1930s, his anti-Communist views had shifted his political orientation towards right-wing Republicans. Oyama, on the other hand, may have been, as he claimed, a Communist but an intellectual with a Marxist orientation. Had Yoshida government's move to suppress radical labor unions after late 1948 not taken place, perhaps Oyama would not have entered politics and there may not have been a complete split between Colegrove and Oyama. But the two differed in philosophy since, unlike Oyama, Colegrove rejected both Communism and Marxism. Had Oyama not decided to receive the Stalin award perhaps the friendship between the two could have been retained. Oyama, however, probably sensed he was racing against time in his life expectancy as the result of his hospitalization. He, who had retired from Waseda in 1951, wanted to leave a footprint reflecting what

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26 Oyama to Colegrove, June 3, 1948, "Oyama, 1932-1949," Colegrove Papers, HHL. On Oyama's research institute project see .Kurokawa, 384.

he had been advocating after his return to Japan and make up for the lost sixteen years in the United States where he had been dependent on the kindness of Colegrove and other Americans and worked like a graduate student, something humiliating for a leading intellectual and opinion leader. On November 30, 1955, two years after his return from his overseas travel to receive the Stalin Peace Prize, Oyama Ikuo died of cerebral hemorrhage. Colegrove took an even more rightward turn in the 1950s; he became a supporter of the ultra right-wing John Birch Society. (He renounced the organization in 1960 because it became ultraconservative even for him.) Colegrove's retirement from Northwestern in 1952 coincided with his troubles with Oyama. Colegrove, then afterwards professor emeritus of Northwestern University, became professor of political science for a year at Queens College in Flushing, New York. Colegrove served as editor-in-chief for the Institute of Fiscal and Political Education in New York City from 1954 to 1958. In 1959 Colegrove resumed teaching as professor of history at C.W. Post College of Long Island University. In 1970 he assumed the duties of senior research associate at the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Colegrove died in 1975.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> On Oyama, see Maruyama, ed., 267-68. With regard to Colegrove, see the biographical information in the finding aid for the Colegrove Papers, HHL.