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The Winter of Discontent and the Decline of Trade Unions in Britain

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During the winter of 1978 to 1979 Britain experienced large scale industrial disputes. In the 1979 election following this conflict between the Callaghan Government and the trade unions, Labour was defeated by the Conservatives led by Mrs Thatcher. It is not too much to say that Labour lost over the single issue of industrial relations. In retrospect one may hold that the Government, obsessed by inflation, tried to enforce its incomes policy on the reluctant trade unions, who responded, later, by "suicidal" strikes. Both of them felt betrayed while an pay policy ceased functioning in any form. The oil tanker drivers dispute was followed by road haulage disputes with bitter secondary picketing. And finally the strikes of the public sector shook the nation.

What was behind this unrest? What sort of rationalization can be made to the trade union movement? Was it merely a part of, as disastrous it was, the long history of British industrial disputes? Or could it be interpreted as a sign for a historic change ? These are the questions to which I wish to give partial answers in this paper.

1. The Uniqueness of British Industrial Relations

In many advanced industrial societies, industrial relations appear to be one of the most boring subjects for students of political science as well as for the

average citizens. The thesis is often associated with some left-wing discourses at night school or the old historical documents preserved in a dusty corner of a library. An industrial dispute is considered to be a form of class struggle from the past, and in many cases the trade unions have been incorporated into management, especially at major established companies. Although this is just a personal comment, I was particularly surprised at the strikes of the public sector in Britain because industrial actions in the public sector are severely limited in Japan.

The case, however, does not apply to Britain, where industrial disputes have been part and parcel of its history. Even after Mrs Thatcher took office in 1979 with her alternative policy towards industrial relations, there were a series of serious industrial disputes, one of which was the miner's strike from 1984-85.

While it is doubtful, and indeed misleading to a great extent, to believe that the coinage 'British Disease' can clarify the situation Britain had gone through, particularly in the 1970s, still the expression did provide those from outside the British Isles with a certain way of looking at the difficulty Britain had. It is a shared understanding that the disease was mainly created by the trade unions. In regard to this point, the simplest and the clearest explanation is given in the Tory's *Campaign Guide 1987*:

By 1979, it had become clear that Britain's economy was being gravely damaged by union militancy. Throughout Europe, it had become a commonplace to talk of industrial action as the 'British Disease'. Monopolistic trade union power had led to overmanning and low productivity, and—in pursuit of reckless wage claims leapfrogging ahead of inflation—strikes had become a weapon of first, rather than last, resort.¹

The statement above may invite criticism, for it is too rough to decide that the narrow-minded trade unionists with their anachronistic militancy were wholly responsible for the economic damage done to Britain. The situation had been more complicated. There were external causes as well as internal causes that affected the British economy. For example, neither the British government nor any other single government was capable of controlling the abrupt, high increase of oil prices, or the international capital movements often on a larger scale than trade flows, to name two. As far as the domestic elements were concerned, however, it is an undeniable fact that low productivity and high inflation had a great deal to do with the trade unions' refusal to accept a modernized management and the repetition of their wage demands. In addition, this structure anticipated the later high unemployment, as Denis Healey, the Labour Chancellor from 1974-79, argued rightly that "high labour costs without correspondingly high output would lead to greater unemployment."² Needless to say, to secure jobs for their members is one of the most important roles the trade unions must play.

Workers get wages from their employers, who run companies, factories, shops, etc. using this work force. The biggest employer is, as we know, a government that has a large public sector. In order to achieve its economic policies, the government, like private companies, needs cooperation from the trade unions who organize this work force. In the 1970s the British government in particular needed the trade unions' cooperation in order to achieve its incomes policy so that it could combat inflation. Thus the government, employers and workers came to be dependent on each other. Without the proper and harmonious cooperation among these three actors that constitute organized interests, it was difficult to achieve constant economic growth and

stability. But more often than not, this organized interest collapsed because of what Anthony King referred to as ‘non-compliance.’³ The most notorious case is found on the part of the trade unions. This appears to be a very strange phenomenon for the rest of the advanced countries today, but in Britain it had to be accepted as a way of life. There are many examples of this ‘interdependence and non-compliance’, but let me give just one example here.

In 1974 the trade unions had received enough already through what is called threshold agreements and they had agreed to limit their wage demands to what was needed to compensate for price increases in the previous year. But to the great dismay of the Chancellor of Exchequer, they did not keep their promise. In his voluminous autobiography Healey complained that “the trade unions’ unwillingness to limit their wage increases to what the nation could afford not only damaged the prospect of combining growth with low inflation, but also took the distribution of the nation’s wealth” out of his hand.⁴

This episode reflects the trade unions’ basic attitude towards the government and its pay policy, which later became more evident in the period of the Winter of Discontent. I have shown this rather minor evidence of “non-compliance” on the part of the trade unions partly because the trade unions’ stance is more clearly illustrated here than in a boisterous industrial dispute in which the situation tends to be too complicated to single out the tacit intention of the trade unions. The bottom line is that they were too confident or even arrogant in thinking they could control the Labour Government as they had succeeded in pulling down the Heath Government with their strikes. The other reason is that here we can clearly see the failure of the Labour administration in getting the message from the trade unions. More detailed discussion about this will be made later.

The trouble was that the fatal gap between the trade unions and the Labour

Government had not been recognized by both sides. Optimism was soon to be replaced by embittered recollection. The Labour Party was 'dizzy with success' and 'blind' to the warning from the trade unions.⁵ They thought they could control the trade unions, but they could not. For example, when they asked Alan Fisher, the General Secretary of NUPE, "to use his influence to get the grave-diggers to go back to work," Fisher simply refused.⁶ If Callaghan believed that they could persuade the trade unions and thus constrain inflation by 5 per cent as the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did, one must say he had been too naive. In West Germany both the employers' organization and the trade union movement had been centralized and there were no strong local shop-stewards.

In his "Organized Interests after Thatcher", Ian Holliday introduces the thesis developed by Hennessy in 1992. According to this hypothesis, the economic miracle West Germany enjoyed in the post-war period is attributed to the removal of various interest groups by the totalitarian regime and above all by its defeat. On the other hand, in Britain a system of interest group representation was "painstakingly" restored by the Attlee Government.⁷ In the 1950s and 1960s economic growth enabled the governments to expand welfare programmes without increasing the tax rate because tax revenue was guaranteed by a fiscal dividend.⁸ Thus as the society matured, interest groups tended to seek their own sectional interest rather than pay attention to the general good, simply because they were unable to.

It is true that after the Attlee Administration, so-called consensus policy making had been sought more or less not only by the Labour Governments but also by the Conservative Governments. But by the late 1970s it became more and more difficult to continue this policy. Like all other industrialized countries, Britain was affected by a considerable shift from traditional heavy

industries to high-technology and service-oriented industries. Accordingly, the roles government, capital, and labour had played so far came under revision. This is why the controversial industrial dispute during the dismal winter of 1978/79 must be treated as a major political issue.

2. The Winter of Discontent

It is alleged that the Shakespearean phrase ‘Winter of Discontent’ was used first by Peter Jenkins in the *Guardian*.⁹ The phrase represents the situation very well: the public was irritated, the government was at a loss, and above all the trade unions themselves were discontented. The number of days lost to industrial action was nearly 9.5 million. This was higher than the total for the historical General Strike in 1926.

Besides this monstrous figure, the inconveniences caused by the strikes in the public sector were imprinted so deeply on the the minds of millions of citizens that this particularly cold winter was to be remembered as a most disgusting period. There are some arguments how discontented it really was. Douglas Smith, for example, disapproved of Bernard Donoughue’s account. According to Donoughue, “the country was virtually paralyzed” and “there was serious shortage of food and medical supplies.”¹⁰ For Smith, Donoughue’s description is an exaggeration, because the only shortage of food he could recollect in the whole of the affair was “that Kellogg’s Cornflakes were difficult to obtain in some supermarkets.”¹¹ Arthur Marwick also states that “the situation was not nearly as bad as that of 1974, but in the inventive stories of the right-wing press it sounded bad, on television it looked bad, and for millions of discomfited citizens it felt bad.”¹²

We live in a TV age. Television gives us strong messages in the form of visual experiences which are apt to be subjective rather than objective. It is

not a coincidence, therefore, that all the sources I depend upon in this chapter refer more or less to the impact of television. One of the major differences between the previous industrial disputes and the Winter of Discontent was that the sensational aspects of the affair tended to be emphasized because of the TV coverage. Thus in the winter of 1978/79, the harsh picketing of lorry drivers and “the brutal face of trade unionism”, to borrow the phrase used by Donoghue, were nightly reported on the television screens.¹³ We must be aware that some remarks and some scenes might have been picked up and edited to give the maximum effect on the appalled viewers. It is possible that Donoghue, in his position at the time of strife, must have been more nervous and vulnerable and, in consequence, more inclined to be a prey of this manipulation. In his book he took up one of the extreme cases in which an union official of NUPE, preventing the sick into hospital, stood before the television cameras and stated that “if people died, so be it.”¹⁴ In reality, this official's merciless and irresponsible remark did less damage to the economy than the private sector strikes, but its effect on the public image was decisive. This is even truer of the grave diggers in the north who refused to bury the dead. It was a question of morality rather than any socio-political issues. On another occasion the television newscasts showed that Moss Evans' instructions were ignored by militant pickets. Televisions did convey the impression that Britain was almost in a state of civil war.¹⁵ Besides arousing ill feelings among the citizens, the media also added to the growing tension between the government and the trade unions, between the trade union leaders and the shop floor stewards.¹⁶ What was worse, petrol and food shortages were reported daily so that once lists of items alleged to be in short supply were announced on the television, people rushed to the supermarkets on the following day.¹⁷

But this mass hysteria was not merely the product of illusion. It must be

noted that for the majority of the public who saw a series of unstable political situations in the 70s, this winter was the last straw. The widening gap between the public who had traditionally supported the idea of free collective bargaining and the trade union members who pursued their pay claims by resorting to unsavoury tactics was remarkable. The trade union movement was regarded as political. In addition, even though the trade unions were still big interest groups, by this time they ceased to represent individual workers both in quality and quantity.

There are three major factors that made this period worse than the previous disputes: secondary picketing involving violence, the strikes of the public sector which affected civil life so badly, and the impotent government and the trade union leaders that completely lost control over the union members. And all of this was clearly shown to people through the media, especially the TV.

As many have already argued, the story of the Winter of Discontent began when the Callaghan Government enforced its 5 per cent wage restraint on the reluctant trade unions in July 1978.¹⁸ In spite of the fact that a group of members of the TUC General Council supported the principle of an incomes policy, the majority were opposed to it. More than that, their trust in the leaders who supported the Labour Government's pay policy was deteriorating dramatically during this period. For example, Jack Jones, then retiring as General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, was to be defeated in his attempt to persuade his members to support the pay policy.

It is natural, therefore, that TGWU led by Moss Evans, the successor to Jack Jones, became most militant in the first stage of the attack on the government: from the Ford car strike of September 1978 to the road haulage dispute of January 1979. In a symposium later published in *Contemporary Record*, Paul Roots, who was then the director of industrial relations at Ford,

revealed a very interesting story. According to him the trade unions were seeking free collective bargaining from the very beginning. They disregarded a clause in the Ford contract which prohibits walkouts during the negotiating period. Ron Todd, the TGWU leader, was said to have declared, "Well, you have violated the contract yourself because our agreement is between the Ford Motor Car Company and the signatory unions. It does not involve a third party. You've introduced a third party and by doing that you have really made all the clauses of the agreement null and void."

There had been a great misunderstanding between the government and the trade unions. On the one hand, the cabinet, particularly Callaghan and Healey, wanted to control inflation by restricting wages and they thought they could. On the other hand, the trade unions believed that the 5 per cent pay policy was just a campaign strategy and that the pay situation would be different after an autumn election.¹⁹ This is why the trade unions felt so bad after they learned there would be no election in the autumn of 1978.²⁰ They felt they had been used and betrayed by Callaghan. The postponement of the election meant that the 5 per cent wage restraint would be real, which would bring serious political damage to the TUC leaders who had worked hard "to cover up various disputes within the union movement in order to give the Prime Minister a united front."²¹

Callaghan believed in an incomes policy and was even convinced of its political popularity, but for the trade union leaders a pay policy meant nothing but straight wage restraint. If the unions had accepted the government's incomes policy, it would have led to their self-denial, because "the unions' main *raison d'être* is wage negotiations."²² By 1978 it became difficult for the union leaders to support the incomes policy.

But the question remains. Why did Callaghan adhere so obstinately to the

5 percent norm? Martin Holmes comments.

As well as the Chancellor, Mr Callaghan made clear his preference for continued incomes policy restraint by obliquely noting that he had 'ceased to worship' free collective bargaining ten years ago.²³

Also, both Callaghan and Healey got on well with Helmut Schmidt, and particularly Callaghan seemed to have been influenced by him. In Germany the wage increase was settled at 5 per cent and inflation was only 4 per cent.²⁴ It is debatable how seriously Callaghan was influenced by Schmidt, but it is certain that the 5 per cent figure did not reflect the economic situation precisely, given the annual rate of earnings was rising at 14.4 per cent that fiscal year.²⁵ It is ironic that this economic illiteracy would be proved by the trade unions' mockery of the incomes policy.

Now the unions started to fight the government. One may say it was a kind of civil "economic" war. Ford car strikes started in September. After a nine-week strike Ford settled on a total pay package of 17 per cent. In December the Government was defeated in the Commons over the use of economic sanctions against Ford.²⁶ BBC technicians and others secured 15 per cent after threatening a TV blackout over Christmas. The oil tanker drivers dispute started which would end with pay deals of 13 to 15 per cent in January of 1979. The new year was celebrated with the road haulage dispute that first began in Scotland and soon spread all over the country with bitter secondary picketing.²⁷

It is interesting to see how much the trade unions claimed during this period rather than where the disputes settled. There are some typical examples. Oil tanker drivers claimed a 30 percent wage increase, road haulage drivers 20-30

per cent, local authority manual workers 40 per cent, British Leyland production workers 37 per cent. It seemed to the government that industrial relations were infected by "feverish madness."²⁸ Certainly the trade unions were challenging the government's wage restraint.

In the course of the disputes, however, even the trade union leaders were to lose control over their members.²⁹ In January of 1979 the oil tanker drivers did not go on strike, but there were unofficial actions in some regions. Many homes suffered from the shortage of water because the water industry was damaged by unofficial actions. And there were other unofficial actions among local authority and Health Service workers.³⁰ The union leaders were determined to smash the incomes policy, but at the same time were frightened by the excessive militancy. As Barnett described it, they were "finding it hard to recapture control of the tiger" they had unleashed.³¹

But the biggest responsibility seems to lie with the Prime Minister who not only miscalculated the weight of the unions' objections but also failed to judge accurately the limits of his own capacity for influence.³² In the first place, Labour ministers had not seriously taken into consideration the warning from the trade unions. In May of 1978, David Basnett, the TUC chairman, preferred a return to free collective bargaining. ASTMS voted against wage restraint, and Alan Yates, the president of NUPE, openly denied a further stage of incomes policy. The miners and the TGWU were opposed to further pay restraint. Only the NUR, GMWU, and NALGO favoured a pay policy.³³ Callaghan was "a prisoner of his own trade union past" as Rodgers described.³⁴ "His whole career had been built alongside the trade union movement and he seemed to find it quite impossible to fight against it."³⁵ Callaghan failed to distance his Government from the trade unions and even he hesitated to speak out in public condemning their abuse of power. According to Donoghue,

“several tough speeches were drafted” but the Prime Minister did not deliver them.³⁶

The Winter of Discontent ended up with the ‘concordat’ agreed between the Labour Government and the trade unions. Barnett recalled: “We in the Labour Party could never part from the institution that gave birth to us. We were stuck with each other, and had to make the best of it.”³⁷ Probably this sentiment was shared by many others. The Labour Party remained the political wing of the trade unions. But if this was the case and the tragicomedy they had performed was just like a fight between brethren, how would they make up for the damage they had caused to the nation?

The relationship, or partnership, which the Labour Party and the trade unions had developed had been dramatically undermined. In principle, Britain had to put an end to the power sharing by means of which a single interest group first sponsors and then exerts a direct influence upon a political party. The Winter of Discontent was the price they had to pay. During the crisis a number of ministers repressed what they thought they should do and remained indeterminate. They were members of the unions involved in the strikes and these unions gave them their parliamentary sponsorship. In the discussions concerning declaring a State of Emergency in the case of the road haulage workers, Donoghue said, the ministers in greatest opposition tended to be those supported by the Transport and General Workers’ Union.³⁸

The historic role they had played was over. In the 1979 general election “a considerable number of trade unionists voted Conservative, perhaps for the first time in their lives.”³⁹ As for the trade unions, a MORI poll showed “85 per cent of those questioned favoured a legal ban on secondary picketing and 68 per cent supported the use of troops to maintain essential services in the vital industries.”⁴⁰ As Rodgers pointed out, in the spring of 1979 there was no

serious barrier in public opinion to major reforms of the law to terminate trade union immunities.⁴¹

3. The Impact of the 1980s' Reforms

The miners' strikes of 1984-5 can offer a model by means of which one predicts the direction of British industrial relations. The strife itself is an issue too complex to be dealt here and the discussion requires another paper. But having seen the Winter of Discontent and the Tory's victory in the 1979 general election followed by legislative reforms, the general understanding is that what happened provided a touchstone for British industrial relations to come.

The Thatcher Government's victory over Arthur Scargill's NUM have been attributed to various factors. First of all, as Peter Riddell points out, the Government's careful contingency planning defeated the NUM's ill-organized strikes.⁴² Secondly, Britain depended on more diversified resources of energy in the 1980s than in 1973-74, when the NUM's strikes destroyed the Heath Government.⁴³ It appeared that the 1980 and 1982 Acts did not play major roles in the dispute, but certainly the legislation stopped the secondary picketing which, as we have seen, had troubled the Callaghan Government. More importantly, from the institutional point of view, the legislation had offered an alternative course by means of which British tripartite power sharing could take place provided they chose it.

The 1980 Act excluded secondary action and the 1982 act restricted lawful disputes to those between workers and their own employers over pay, conditions of work, and jobs. In the view of Sked and Cook, the effect of those Acts was mainly psychological.⁴⁴ This is because there were other factors which contributed to the decline of the trade unions. The most influential one was the continuing rise of unemployment. For example, the steel workers'

strike of 1980 settled on a higher level than the original offer, but the unions' apparent victory was to be followed immediately by cutbacks and redundancies. It should be noted, however, that a large percentage of unions' members supported the Government's legislative changes.⁴⁵

The Conservative Government carried on its reforms step by step. The 1984 Act and the 1988 Act introduced inner democracy into the unions with the purpose of depoliticising the trade union movement. The reaction to the changes were not wholly enthusiastic. For the trade union leaders and the left-wing intellectuals the reforms seemed to function only in favour of the employers, which they did. But the lesson Britain learned in the 1970s was that the balance of power had been weighted excessively on the trade unions' side. In this sense, the reforms can be interpreted as State intervention through legislation, which British institutions of interest groups had sought to avoid ever since the Industrial Revolution.⁴⁶

In the society of late capitalism, it is reasonable to get rid of bad management in the form of free competition among the employers rather than by any class-based confrontational approach. As early as in 1970, Will Paynter wrote:

The unions grew out of a particular stage of industrial development. Their organization was forged in bitter battles with employers. Trade union consciousness and political consciousness was conditioned by this early experience.⁴⁷

With the end of the Winter of Discontent, the incomes policy had gone. The Tory's *Campaign Guide 1992* lacked a chapter on industrial relations. The whole course had been set for the reform of industrial relations.

It is true that the Conservative legislation has not been widely used because

few employers resort to the law when conducting their industrial relations.⁴⁸ The situation has not changed dramatically since the classical argument of O. Kahn-Freund. And it is also true that there still exist the bitter class distinctions in Britain. Merlyn Rees, who is the son, grandson, and great-grand son of miners, concluded his review of Seumas Milne's *The Enemy Within* with the following paragraph:

I stick to mine, which is based on a belief that miners have never been helped by "radical toffs" and that the ballot box is the only way for socialists. It was, after all, the miners who set up the Labour Party.⁴⁹

It may be that the distinction between 'them' and 'us' is still strongly felt. It is indeed beyond my reasoning to guess in which direction Britain's next step will be taken: to a centralisation of economic control or to traditional collective *laissez faire*. The former will bring economic success more easily but it will inevitably be accompanied by a kind of bitter socio-cultural consequences that have been seen in post-war France.⁵⁰ It is true that changes in markets and production systems have brought about stronger management initiatives. Nevertheless, any transplantation or transfer of new management methods or techniques into a country without them will be doomed to fail if there is no consideration of its cultural background.

Notes

1. Alistair B. Cooke (ed.), *The Campaign Guide 1987* (Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1987), p.135.
2. Martin Holmes, *The Labour Government, 1974-79: Political Aims and Economic Reality* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1985), p.127.
3. Anthony King, 'Overload: Problems of Governing', *Political Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2

- and 3, 284-296.
4. Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life* (London: Penguin, 1990), p.392.
 5. Healey, p. 398.
 6. James Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London: Collins, 1987), p.537.
 7. Ian Holliday, 'Organized Interests after Thatcher', in *Developments in British Politics 4*, ed. by Patrick Dunleavy et al. (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993), pp.307-320.
 8. Richard Rose, 'Ungovernability: Is There Fire behind the Smoke?', *Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1979), 351-370 (p.357).
 9. Arthur Marwick, *British Society since 1945* (London: Penguin, 1990), p.270.
 10. Bernard Donoughue, *Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p.174.
 11. Robert Taylor et al., 'Symposium: The Winter of Discontent', *Contemporary Record*, Autumn 1987, 34-43 (p.42).
 12. Marwick, p.271.
 13. Donoughue, p.175.
 14. Donoughue, p.180.
 15. Joel Barnett, *Inside the Treasury* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), p.169.
 16. Barnett, p.166.
 17. Barnett, p.169.
 18. William Rodgers, 'Government under Stress: Britain's Winter of Discontent 1979', *Political Quarterly*, 55(1984), 171-179 (p.172). Also see, David Marsh, *The New Politics of British Trade Unionism: Union Power and the Thatcher Legacy* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), p.59.
 19. According to Barnett, "despite their disagreements with the government's pay policy, the TUC leaders, led by their 1978 President, David Basnett, General Secretary of the Municipal and General Workers Union, gave the Prime Minister a rousing welcome at their annual conference in September. They, like the rest of us, believed there was to be an election in a few weeks, and did not want to rock the boat." Barnett, p.163.
 20. Donoughue, p.156.
 21. Donoughue, p.162.
 22. Marsh, p.61.
 23. Holmes, p.125.
 24. Holmes, pp.125-26.
 25. Holmes, p.128.

26. Nick Gardener states that the success of the Labour Government's incomes policy was partly due to the threat of financial sanctions against employers. Therefore, the defeat in the Commons had effaced its psychological as well as symbolical effect. Nick Gardener, *Decade of Discontent: The Changing British Economy since 1973* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 108.
27. The account is based on the chronology included in Taylor et al., pp.38-39.
28. Donoughue, p.171.
29. Donoughue, p.176, p.179.
30. Barnett, p.169.
31. Barnett, p.172.
32. Rodgers, p.173. Also see, Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, *Governments and Trade Unions: The British Experience, 1964-79* (London: Heinemann, 1980), p.219.
33. Holmes, p.127.
34. Rodgers, p.178.
35. Donoughue, p.177.
36. Donoughue, p.177.
37. Barnett, p.173.
38. Donoughue, p.177.
39. Taylor et al., p.35.
40. Holmes, p.152.
41. Rodgers, p.179.
42. Peter Riddell, *The Thatcher Decade: How Britain Has Changed during the 1980s* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.48.
43. Alan Sked and Chris Cook, *Post-War Britain* (London: Penguin, 1993), pp.444-53.
44. Sked and Cook, p.345.
45. Marsh, p.114.
46. O. Kahn-Freund, 'Labour Law', in Morris Ginsberg (ed.), *Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), pp.215-63.
47. Will Paynter, 'Trade Unions and Government', *Political Quarterly*, 41(1970), 444-54 (p.447).
48. Marsh, pp.82-104.
49. Merlyn Rees, 'Big Talk That Cost Lives', *Guardian*, 29 November 1994, p.13.
50. Jack Hayward, 'Institutional Inertia and Political Impetus in France and Britain', *European Journal of Political Research*, 4(1976), 341-359.

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