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Religious Reforms in Occupied Japan:
GHQ’s Struggle with the Principle of Religious Freedom

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Abstract
During the American occupation of Japan, GHQ executed many reforms in Japanese religious life aiming at democratizing the country. In order to achieve the democratization of Japan, GHQ attempted to realize religious freedom by removing ultra-nationalism and militarism from Shinto. While some early documents of the State Department pointed out that Shinto itself was closely related to nationalism and therefore dangerous, GHQ did not eradicate Shinto but preserved it as a religion. In the meantime, some individuals within GHQ supported Christianity hoping to plant the spirit of democracy in the mind of Japanese, although it was not the official policy of the occupation. While its reforms are often criticized as too much or too little, what GHQ valued most was to achieve the principle of religious freedom in Japan, not to destroy Shinto or to Christianize Japan. During the occupation, GHQ was struggling to realize freedom of religion when most of the Japanese are largely ignorant of their own religion. Even the shortcomings of GHQ’s religious reforms stem from its commitment to the principle of religious freedom. In view of the new understanding of Shinto in the recent studies, GHQ’s religious reforms should be evaluated more positively.

Keywords
Occupation, Freedom of Religion, Separation of Church and State, Shinto, Christianity

Introduction
The American occupation of Japan brought radical change to every aspect of Japanese lives. During the occupation, from September 1945 to April 1952, Japan changed in a way that Americans thought was democratic. In the area of religion, the
different treatment of Shinto and Christianity was symbolic of this change. Simply put, Christianity received preferential treatment, whereas Shinto did not.

The attitude of the occupation toward Christianity and that of Shinto were two sides of the same coin. People who criticized religious reforms of the occupation often discussed the issues together. Shigeru Fukuda, the head of the Religious Division of the Japanese government, testified that General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) treated both Christianity and Shinto unfairly. According to Fukuda, GHQ tried to promote Christianity in Japan as it was recorded in several of MacArthur’s speeches, whereas it discriminated against Shinto. MacArthur and some of his staff likewise unjustly intervened in Japanese religious matters.1

Helen Mears, one of the members of a labor advisory committee during the occupation, also argued that the occupation was prejudiced against Shinto and in favor of Christianity. She pointed out that GHQ believed that American Christianity was inherently peaceful whereas Japanese Shinto was war-making in spite of the fact that “[d]uring an extremely important period of Western expansion, the Sword and the Cross went hand in hand.”2 Various religions, including both Shinto and Christianity, can be militaristic, but the occupation accused only Shinto as a limb of Japanese militarism. In fact, the occupation rarely blamed Japanese Christians and Buddhists for supporting the nationalistic war effort during the war years.

Furthermore, Toshio Nishi points out that GHQ’s unfair treatment of Shinto resulted in the destruction of Japanese traditional values. He condemns the American occupation reforms as a “crime” committed by American occupation forces against the Japanese.3 He calls American religious reforms in occupied Japan “[t]he American ‘moral disarmament’ of the Japanese people,” and asserts that it “left them [the Japanese] devoid of spiritual support.” Assuming that Christianity is an American religion, Nishi contends that the American occupation took advantage as the winner and pressed “their” religion upon the Japanese without noticing their superiority complex based on their perception of race.4

These criticisms may sound legitimate; however, GHQ did not haphazardly intervene in Japanese religious lives. GHQ did not rather have a choice in leaving Shinto as it was in order to achieve its ultimate purpose; the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. As a general rule, the American military involvement in local religious matter is prohibited by army regulations, but the American occupation of Japan was recognized as an exceptional case. According to the United States Army and Navy manuals of Military Government and Civil Affairs, army involvement in religious practices of local people was strictly prohibited. It states that local “religious convictions and practices [should] be
respected,” and “places of religious worship should not be closed unless necessary as a security or sanitary measure.” The occupation intervened in Japanese religious life because it was seen as “necessary as a security.” It did not violate the army regulations.

William P. Woodard, the head of the Religious Research Unit of the occupation elaborates this explanation. He says that GHQ/SCAP recognized the great significance in dealing with Japanese religious problems in order to eradicate militarism and nationalism, which was one of the two ultimate purposes of the occupation. It aimed at establishing religious freedom in Japan because it was recognized as necessary for democratizing Japan, the other purpose, as it was assumed that the Japanese were not able to achieve this by themselves alone. The occupation did not and could not leave the matter to the Japanese because Americans believed that the Japanese understanding of religious freedom, as well as democracy, was bleak. There would have otherwise been no need to democratize the Japanese from the beginning. In spite of the army regulations, the occupation intervened in Japanese religious matters as an exceptional case in order to assure the security of the United States and the Pacific by establishing a non-militaristic and democratic Japan.

For GHQ, establishing religious freedom was inevitable in demilitarization and democratization of Japan as it was clearly stated in some early official documents. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 clearly stated: “Freedom of ...religion... as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.” The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan of September 22, 1945, also stated: “[t]he Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion.” It further stated that “[f]reedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.” These documents showed that the Occupation wanted to eliminate Japan’s militarism and ultra-nationalism, not to eliminate Shinto as a religion. By eradicating militaristic and nationalistic aspects of Shinto, the occupation expected to realize freedom of religion in Japan.

The so-called Civil Liberties Directive of October 4, 1945 was issued for this purpose. It ordered the Japanese government to repeal “all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which establish or maintain restrictions on freedom...of religion.” It meant “to remove restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties.” The directive specifically demanded to abolish the Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Ho, Law
No. 54 of 1941, promulgated on 10 March 1941), the Protection and Surveillance Law for Thought Offence (Shiso Han Hogo Kansatsu Ho, Law No. 29 of 1936, promulgated on 29 May 1936), the Religious Body Law (Shukyo Dantai Ho, Law No. 77 of 1939, promulgated on 8 April 1939) and others, and to release all persons who had been jailed for their creed, political opinions or religious faith.12

Interestingly, while GHQ stopped all the Japanese government’s favoritism toward Shinto, the separation of church and state was not clearly mentioned in the early official occupation documents such as the Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. Unlike the principle of religious freedom, the separation of church (religion) and state (politics) was not officially mentioned in the beginning of the occupation because of the principle of the separation was considered to be included in religious freedom by most Americans.13 The principle of the separation of church and state had never been an end, but it was set in a new Japan in a strict way as a means of strengthening demilitarization and democratization of Japan14 because the occupation definitely recognized the need to do something to make Shinto “harmless” without abolishing Japanese traditional religion, Shinto. As Woodard testified, the occupation wanted to eliminate the Kokutai Cult (national polity), his term for “Japan’s emperor-state-centered cult of ultra-nationalism and militarism,” which he understood as different from Shinto as a religion. Woodard says, “[t]he Kokutai Cult was not a form of Shinto. It was a distinct, separate, and independent phenomenon. It included elements of Shinto mythology and ideology and it utilized Shinto institutions and practices, but this did not make it a form of Shinto. If it had been otherwise, SCAP would have been forced to abolish all expressions of Shinto.”15 GHQ was very careful in its intervention of Japanese religious matters even though it could not leave the matter to the Japanese.

GHQ faced the dilemma of keeping a balance between eradicating militarism and ultra-nationalism and establishing democracy in Japanese religious tradition. More specifically, it was the attempt to eliminate militaristic and ultra-nationalistic aspects of Shinto and to preserving Shinto as a Japanese religion simultaneously. The problem, however, was that no one, not even the Japanese, understood what exactly Shinto was.

Another interesting fact is that there were no official documents referred to as “Christianization” of Japan. As early as on December 29 in 1945, GHQ sent a message to Washington saying that “…it is policy to permit the return of missionaries to Japan to the maximum extent practicable,” and encouraged the entry of Christian missionaries.16 It is well known that some occupation officials, especially General MacArthur, favored Christianity and tried to spread it in Japan. It was also the Japanese that welcomed
Christian missionaries as Dr. Tamon Maeda, the new Education Minister, expressed his welcome in his interview in September, 1945. However, the occupation authority gave no directive to the Japanese government, and the Japanese government made no law concerning “Christianizing” Japan. Contrary to popular belief, “Christianization” was never an official occupation policy.

This study intends briefly to trace religious reforms of the American occupation of Japan. Using the U.S. State Department documents and the SCAP documents, the paper examines various American efforts in Japanese religious matters during the occupation. By analyzing the work of the occupation, I will first point out that Americans perceived Shinto quite accurately in the pre-war period, although it somehow changed its view as the end of the war approached. Second, I will make a point that Christianization of Japan was not, at least publicly, meant to be achieved by the occupation, nor was a unanimous idea among American occupationnaires. I will argue that realizing religious freedom is much more complicated than we can imagine, so that GHQ’s religious reforms should be reevaluated more positively.

In his recent study, Masafumi Okazaki argues that GHQ failed to propagate Christianity in Japan due to its Shinto Directive. While many Christians understand that the directive liberated Christianity, and Shintoists, on the other hand, believe that it oppressed them, it was GHQ’s directive that ironically hindered American Christian missionary work in Japan and blew up its attempt to change the old Japanese regime. Yet it seems that GHQ knew all the implications of the directive, including the negative ones. Because it valued the principle of religious freedom more than anything else, GHQ’s religious reform appeared to be unaccomplished.

**Shinto**

The so-called Shinto Directive of December 15, 1945 was especially issued for achieving religious freedom in Japan and democratizing the country. It says that “[t]he purpose of this directive is to separate religion from the state, to prevent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds upon exactly the same legal basis, entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protection.” It also “forbids affiliation with the government and the propagation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology not only to Shinto but to the followers of all religions, faiths, sects, creeds, or philosophies.” The directive aimed to reduce State Shinto to a mere religion by depriving all the privileges they had enjoyed during the war.

Referring to the directive, Woodard says, “[s]cholars and writers have usually
equated the extremist interpretations of the *kokutai* concept with some form of Shinto and have taught that Shinto constituted the essential core of Japan’s militarism. This was the interpretation of CIE and its Japanese advisors and as a consequence the document abolishing the cult became known as the Shinto Directive.”21 He continues, “This was most unfortunate. It perpetuated a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Shinto on the one hand and the relation of Shinto to Japan’s militarism on the other. The Kokutai Cult was not a form of Shinto…. If it had been otherwise, SCAP would have been forced to abolish all expressions of Shinto.”22

Yet the fact was that he did not have to admit to the misunderstanding. According to a new finding, it was correctly stated that Shinto was a source of Japan’s ultra-nationalism and militarism. Many people assume that Shinto is a traditional Japanese religion, the only indigenous religion which derived from a primitive faith of animism, but the background for this is not solid. Just as they equate the United States and Christianity without questioning, so do they with Japan and Shinto. While this view seems to make some people comfortable, it is not borne out of any concrete evidence.

According to Mark Teeuwen, a Dutch medieval Shinto scholar, the word “Shinto” was originally Chinese and pronounced as “Jindo” referring to non-Buddhist local deities.23 Then, the term “was transformed from ‘word’ to a ‘concept’ in the course of the Kamakura period,” and “this transformation was of great importance to Shinto’s subsequent development into the self-defined religion that it is today.”24 By tracing the formative process of the word “Shinto,” Teeuwen supports the argument that Shinto did not exist as a traditional Japanese religion which was ceaselessly handed down from generation to generation.25

Hiroshi Inoue, a Japanese medieval historian, also denies today’s untested but widely accepted understanding of Shinto. The understanding of Shinto as a naturally-grown Japanese indigenous religion was advocated by many famous scholars, but, according to Inoue, this popular concept of Shinto was disseminated after World War II when Kunio Yanagida severely criticized “State Shinto” distinguishing it from genuine “Shinto.” Yanagida argues that the source of Japanese Shinto exists in its folk religion rather than State Shinto, and that State Shinto which was set up by the Meiji government was remote from what people had believed. Inoue, however, disagrees with Yanagida and points out that the concept of Shinto itself was established as a “national ideology” aiming at ruling over Japanese people.26

Much before the Occupation, however, Americans quite accurately perceived Shinto as nationalistic and militaristic. Several State Department documents demonstrated this.
Edwin L. Neville, the Charge in Japan, to the Secretary of State on August 10, 1935, reported that the Japanese government took a step forward to “create a new national religion” by positioning the Emperor at the top of the Japanese political system. It also stated, “[t]he new needs of Japan which flooded in upon its being opened to occidental contact called for some principle to unify the efforts of the nation and the country’s leaders deliberately chose for this purpose a religion to be built around the Emperor. It was called Shinto; Basil Hall Chamberlain aptly called it Japan worship.”27 In December of the same year, Joseph Grew, the Ambassador to Japan, also reported to the Secretary of State saying that Japan now decided “the compulsory teaching of Shinto doctrines in all schools” recognizing that Shinto “has for many years been the cult of supreme patriotism in Japan.”28

These early documents clearly point out the danger of Shinto as an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic religion. Yet in later years, such as in 1944, the American government concluded that it was necessary to distinguish “the harmless, primitive animism, which was the original Shinto” from “a nationalistic Emperor-worship cult” in order to apply religious freedom, and therefore “[s]hrines of the ancient Shinto religion should be permitted to remain open except where it is found that such shrines are being utilized for subversive activities.”29

Then, why and how did GHQ changed its understanding of Shinto in a milder way before the occupation? While the answer to the question is not clear yet, this sympathetic way of dealing with Shinto came partly from its practical decision of using the Emperor in order to facilitate the occupation. GHQ’s understanding of Shinto was identical to that of Yanagida, Inoue argues. Yanagida’s understanding of Shinto made it possible to maintain the Emperor in a new political system in Japan. The U.S. government and GHQ exempted the Emperor from war responsibility because of the political speculation.30 Susumu Shimazono points out that GHQ did not refer to imperial rites because it assumed that imperial rites and Shinto were separated and that imperial rites were out of the realm of the religious freedom issue; therefore, it left imperial rites untouched whilst respecting the Emperor’s right to exercise his freedom of religion.31

Another explanation of this merciful treatment of Shinto is that GHQ was sticking to the principles of religious freedom. Even though many Americans saw Shinto negatively, it never officially treated it unfairly. What GHQ was trying to achieve was to remove militarism and ultra-nationalism and to democratize Japan, not to disestablish Shinto as a religion. That is why GHQ let the Emperor conduct religious rituals during the occupation. GHQ did not want to violate Emperor’s freedom of religion as an individual. It tried to
balance and be fair to all religions by depriving privileges from Shinto and removing the burdens from Christianity and other oppressed religions. GHQ’s unfinished religious reforms revealed its faithfulness toward the principle of religious freedom.

**Christianity**

The occupation personnel, noticeably General MacArthur and chaplains supported Christianity in Japan, but the official policies of the occupation was to maintain an attitude of respect for all religions, religious organizations, and religious property. The individual members of CIE (Civil Information and Education Section) might have been in favor of Christianity, but “the official attitude was one of respect and the staff members conducted themselves accordingly.” Woodard writes, “What business does the United States Army have to set up a Religions Division in Japan?” was “a legitimate question,” because it seemed to violate the American principle of the separation of church and state to some, and because it was assumed to help Christianity to others. Even though the main reason that the Religions Division of CIE was established was just to have a parallel occupation office to a Religions Section of the Japanese Ministry of Education, and “[n]othing in the policy and planning of the Allied Powers called for the occupation to give special attention to the Christian movement,” Woodard confesses, “Christianity did receive a great deal of moral and material support from the Supreme Commander, the General Headquarters, CIE, and the occupying forces…. SCAP was obliged to deal with problems related to the Christian Movement because soon after the occupation began Christian leaders requested assistance on the one hand and the troops, in defiance of official regulations, began to assist Christian individuals and organizations on the other.”

Nevertheless, it is worth paying attention to the fact that a force loyal to the official policies existed in the occupation. Some occupation officials were aware how inappropriate it was to intervene in Japanese religious life. They tried to adhere to the principle of equality among all religions as an official document of the occupation asserts that, “Occupation authorities concerned themselves with positive encouragement of religious activity free of curbs or favoritism,” and that, “All religions, including Shinto once it was divorced from the State and purged of militaristic and ultranationalistic elements, were to be on exactly the same basis and entitled to exactly the same opportunities and protections.”

William K. Bunce, the chief of the Division, was the most conspicuous figure in making such an effort. His statements demonstrate his professional concern with the principles of religious freedom and the separation of church and state. When he found that
the Christian chaplains were heavily involved in assisting Christian institutions in the spring of 1946, Bunce tried to stop it by saying that occupation personnel should “avoid the active promotion or propagation of any particular brand of religion among the Japanese people,” including “participation in sponsorship, planning, or conduct of religious ceremonies, observances, and practices, services on committees associated with the propagation of a particular religion among the Japanese people.” Although it was never issued for some reason, the following memorandum, dated March 26, 1946, was drafted by the Religions Division, and was probably prepared by Bunce, in order to clarify the policy of CIE. It stated:

The Propagation of Christianity is not one of the objectives of the Occupation. Surveillance should, therefore, be exercised to see that: (a) Occupation personnel and facilities are not used to further the cause of Christianity over other Japanese religions. (b) Christianity is treated in the same fashion as any other religion in Japan. (c) Missionaries and Christian workers are shown no greater courtesies than are accorded to others of their nationalities. (d) Active proselytizing of Christianity by personnel attached to the Allied Forces is discouraged.

Another time, Bunce wrote to a missionary and said:

I believe that Christianity now faces its greatest opportunity in the history of Japan. The people are receptive and the government friendly. But I also believe that the greatest service the Occupation can perform for Christianity and all other minority religions is to establish respect for the principle of religious freedom so firmly that years after the Occupation is ended no Japanese official will desire to return to the old policy of favoritism and discrimination. Only on such a basis can Christianity look forward to a hopeful future in Japan.

He was acutely aware that the Occupation’s partial treatment of Christianity weakened the principle right of freedom of religion. More importantly, the Shinto Directive, which was drafted by Bunce aiming at guaranteeing the principle of the separation of state and religion, restricted not only Shinto but also Christianity to be favorably treated and put all religions under legal control, even if MacArthur publicly supported Christianity. Some people accused the occupation of trying to destroy Japanese Shinto, but Bunce distinguished “State Shinto,” or “National Shinto,” from Shrine Shinto, and only condemned State Shinto for fostering militancy and for justifying Japanese ultranationalism, while he recognized Shrine Shinto as a religion and gave it the same protection as other religions under the principle right of freedom of religion. In fact, the
occupation let the Emperor conduct fall equinoctial rites in memory of the Imperial ancestor in September\(^\text{42}\) and visit the Grand Shrines at Ise to worship in November, both in 1945.\(^\text{43}\) It even let the Yasukuni Shrine hold services for war dead in November 1945.\(^\text{44}\)

Despite Bunce’s endeavors to treat all religions equally for religious freedom, however, supporting Christianity by occupation personnel had never stopped. That was because even Bunce, as the chief of the Religions Division, could not stop individual venture of supporting Christianity based on their beliefs. No one had a right to stop individual action based on his or her religious belief. Bunce in his address to chaplains, said that “there was no objection to Occupation personnel accepting invitations to speak before religious groups, providing it was made clear that they spoke as individuals and not as representatives of the Armed Forces,”\(^\text{45}\) but he was worried to find that the excessive support of Christianity by the occupation personnel, even if it was an individual activity, violated the principle right of freedom of religion. The official policy of the occupation was to guarantee freedom of religion, including the separation of religion and state, for the democratization of Japan. The occupation by no means aimed at abolishing Japanese Shinto whilst establishing Christianity instead, and yet it was evidently prejudiced in favor of Christianity because it blindly assumed that democracy and Christianity went hand in hand for Americans.

Nevertheless, the occupation authority did not purge Japanese Christians and Japanese Buddhists. As William Bunce discloses, “all leadership by government officials ceased, but so far as the religions themselves were concerned, wartime leadership remained largely unchanged.”\(^\text{46}\) While both the Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy made it clear that the purge of Japanese militarists and ultra-nationalists was mandatory, the Japanese leaders in religious circles were not purged. When the purge of Toyohiko Kagawa was overlooked after a serious consideration, people thought that that was because he was a Christian, but it was not only Christians. Bunce explained that “the arguments against a purge in religion outweighed those in its favor.” He knew that American public opinion had no problem with purging Shinto, but “was not sure what would happen if this were extended to other faiths,”\(^\text{47}\) such as Buddhism and Christianity. Bunce was aware that the American public valued religious freedom, and he did not want to violate it. Nonetheless, it should be noted that an important discussion about religious freedom, more specifically, about how the American occupation should treat Christianity in Japan, had been conducted during the occupation.

The effort on the part of the occupation to be as impartial as possible to all religions was demonstrated in the following episode. When a Buddhist priest in San Francisco
asked permission to enter Japan in 1949, the Religions Division was delighted because it was aware of “a completely one-sided arrangement,” which meant accepting only Christian missionaries; therefore, the Division even changed its existing policy in order to permit the entry of the Buddhist missionary. Assisting Christianity was at least not a unanimous idea among American occupationnaires.

Conclusion

The occupation’s religious reforms were completed when the new Constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946. The Constitution promised Japanese citizens with more religious liberty and the separation of church and state than ever before in Japan, but if we evaluate the occupation’s religious reforms in the light of how it could achieve its ultimate purpose such as demilitarization and democratization of Japan, its treatment of Shinto may have been lukewarm. As Americans before the war pointed out, ultra-nationalism and militarism centered around the worship of the Emperor was deeply rooted in Shinto itself, and it could have been completely destroyed.

In the pre-war period, the U.S. government had come to conclude that Japanese Shinto was a cunning device to drive people to totalitarianism. The U.S. Department of State documents before the occupation showed this American understanding of Shinto in the pre-war and during the wartime. Americans accurately perceived the essence of Shinto, which even Japanese had not fully recognized. Even before the occupation, Americans had recognized that Japanese Shinto was closely related to nationalism and possibly militarism. Yet, when the occupation started, GHQ did not completely abolish Shinto. What GHQ did instead was to endorse a popular idea that Shinto itself was not to be blamed.

GHQ recognized the inseparable link between religion and nationalism. Americans did not overlook the link between religion and militarism, but as they saw some positive aspects of patriotism, they tried to understand Shinto as a religion. American religious reforms should be more positively reevaluated because we might be able to learn further hints of achieving religious tolerance from this case.

There was, or still is, a widespread assumption that the U.S. was a good democratic Christian nation, and Japan, on the other hand, was an evil totalitarian Shinto state. While this dichotomy was a highly simplified view of both Christianity and Shinto, it was not totally incorrect for Americans to see Shinto as militaristic. As recent studies show, Shinto is not a traditional Japanese religion which derived from a primitive faith of animism. As Inoue and other historians have found out, Shinto has been reestablished
several times in Japanese history as a device of unifying the nation, which was easily led to ultra-nationalism and militarism. If this is true, Americans had pointed out the essence of Shinto before the occupation started. Americans valued the principle of religion, and that is why they did not officially endorse Christianity. Religious reforms of the occupation should be reevaluated accordingly.

Notes


7 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Woodard, op. cit., 49.

14 Yoshiya Abe, “Senryogun niyoru Kokkashinto no Kaitai to Tenno no Ningenka — Senryogun niyoru Wagakokutai no Henkaku” [The Dissolution of State Shinto and the Emperor as a Human Being — Change of the Japanese National Polity by GHQ], Ikado, op. cit., 109-110. 阿部美哉「占領軍による国家神道の解体と天皇の人間化 — GHQ による我が国体の変革」井門『占領と日本宗教』。

15 Woodard, op. cit., 11.

16 Ibid., 219.
Ibid., 218.
19 Government Section, SCAP, “Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto),” op. cit., 468.
Ibid.
20 Woodard, op. cit., 11
Ibid.
21 Woodard, op. cit., 11
Ibid.
Ibid., 234-235.
30 Woodard, op. cit., 181.
Ibid., xi.
32 Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 210.
36 Woodard, op. cit., 210-211.
38 Ibid., 211.
39 Undated draft of letter to Miss Elizabeth Whewell (missionary), cited in Woodward, op. cit., 212.
41 William K. Bunce, Religion in Japan: Buddhism, Shinto, Christianity (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978, reprinted), originally printed in 1955 by Charles E. Tuttle, 166-167. This is “from the report prepared by the Religions and Cultural Resources Division, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, March 1948, under the editorial direction of William K. Bunce.”
42 “His Majesty Conducts Fall Equinoctial Rites at Palace Sanctuaries,” Nippon Times (Tokyo), September 24, 1945.
44 “Yasukuni Shrine to Hold Services for War Dead for 3 Days from Monday,” op. cit., November 18, 1945.
45 Woodard, op. cit., 212.
46 Bunce, op. cit., 43.
48 Conference Report 24, January 1949 WN (Koob G-1), cited in Woodard, op. cit., 188.
占領期日本における宗教改革
— 占領軍による宗教の自由との苦闘 —

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要旨：占領期において、アメリカ占領軍は日本を民主化するという目的のもと、宗教の分野においても多くの改革を行った。占領軍は、日本を民主化するために、神道から超国家主義や軍国主義を取り除かねばならないと考えた。国務省は、占領期以前には神道は国家主義と密接に結びついており危険であるとの認識を持っていたが、占領が始まって後は神道自体を取り除くことはせず、神道から危険な思想のみを取り除き、一宗教として存続させることを選択した。一方で、日本人に民主主義の精神を吹き込むとキリスト教を様々な形で援助する個人もあらわれたが、占領軍が公的にキリスト教を援助したわけではなかった。日本における占領軍の宗教改革は、行き過ぎた介入であったもしくは十分ではなかったとしばしば両方の面から批判されるが、占領軍が最も大切にしたことは、宗教の自由の実現であり、神道を破壊したりキリスト教を布教したりすることではなかった。ほとんどの日本人でさえ神道とは何かを理解していなかった戦後の日本において、占領軍は、宗教の自由という原則の実現に苦悩していた。その改革の弱点は、占領軍の原則への献身の表れであるとみることができる。神道理解を見直す最近の研究から観みても、神道の占領軍の宗教改革は、より肯定的に見直すべきである。

キーワード：占領、宗教の自由、政教分離、神道、キリスト教